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Neoliberal globalisation is spread through a complex web of polycentric and 
interdependent powers. These powers advance Western norms and practices, 
even into non-Western societies with very different cultural traditions. We know 
little about the processes and application of global norms at the nation-state 
level, especially norms described as “international best practices”. There is an 
emerging interest among accounting scholars who have begun to consider the 
struggles surrounding attempts, at the national level, to standardise their audit 
oversight systems with those of the US. Prior research has primarily focused 
on Western states. This thesis aims to complement the emerging debate by 
considering how and why Kuwait implemented “internationally best” audit 
regulatory practices. Kuwait provides a new institutional setting for accounting 
research. The thesis contains interviews with key actors involved in the 
process of regulatory change in Kuwait, including senior executives in audit 
firms, the Kuwaiti accountancy body, and different state financial regulators. 
The theoretical framework is drawn from Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
(including his theory of the state) and Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers’ 
theory of recursivity. The thesis finds that the Kuwaiti attempt to modernise 
audit regulations created a conflict between the newly created regulator and 
the audit profession, similar to findings in prior accounting research. Uniquely, 
the thesis finds that the changes produced inter-governmental struggles since 
Kuwait follows a legalist system of governance as opposed to a corporatist 
one. Each field employed different strategies to maintain or transform the 
extant (status quo) order of regulatory arrangements, audit field dynamics, and 
the hierarchical structures of society. The thesis further examined attempts to 
institutionalise “international best practice” audit independence technologies: 
audit rotation and the prohibition of non-audit services. In light of this, the thesis 
found that local influential auditors drove regulatory manipulation and 
misconceptions. This thesis concludes that, in the audit regulatory domain, the 
embedded Western logic of global norms creates a sea of conflicts and 





Nation-states are under various forms of (direct and indirect) pressure to adopt 
the financial regulations of the regulatory systems of powerful countries. These 
powerful countries describe their own systems as “international best practice” 
as part of their strategy to encourage changes to the practices and traditions 
of less powerful countries. Although we hear about “international best 
practices” in many aspects of social life, this thesis focuses on the auditing 
regulatory domain. In particular, it is concerned with Kuwait. Kuwait is a 
country that has a different social system and a different way of regulating 
auditors’ practices than powerful Western countries.  
Following the recent global financial crisis, Kuwait reformed its capital market 
according to Western-driven “international best practices”; it created a new 
government agency for this task. This thesis aims to explain why and how 
Kuwait modernised its audit regulatory practices. To do so, the researcher 
carried out interviews with key local people involved in the changes to the 
Kuwaiti audit regulations to bring them into line with Western “best-practice”.  
The thesis draws on the theoretical perspectives of French philosopher Pierre 
Bourdieu and American sociologists Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers. 
The thesis found that there were significant conflicts between different local 
social groups. Conflict over the changes to audit (regulatory) practices was not 
limited to disputes between the new regulatory agency and established 
auditors, as was found in prior studies. In Kuwait, conflict spread throughout 
various government agencies and powerful social groups outside the field of 
audit regulation.  
The Kuwaiti public believed that the adoption of “international best practices” 
would help to overcome some problems inside the government and the 
broader nation-state. Indeed, some of the changes required by the adoption of 
“international best practices” challenged the way some influential local groups 
maintain their power and their social status. Accordingly, some powerful 
Kuwaiti groups opposed changes to the regulatory framework as well as some 
of the new rules on auditing.  
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This thesis analyses and explains the different strategies of collaboration and 
confrontation employed to maintain or transform the “pecking order” of audit 
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Global financial systems have experienced intensified Anglo-Americanising 
since the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s (Wade, 2007). International 
organisations (IO’s) were empowered by advanced capitalist states to 
restructure and redefine the rules of global economic arrangements (Arnold, 
2012; Halliday and Carruthers, 2009). International financial architecture 
works in three ways. The first way is bottom-up, where the practices of 
important economies influence the mindsets of international players. Second, 
top-down “direct” interference in the arrangement of nation-states, either 
coercively or non-coercively. The last form of power for engendering  
international convergence of financial systems is the most complex of the 
three, the enforcement of global norms.  
By global norms, I do not mean the internationalisation of material neoliberal 
policies, but a type of soft pressure to achieve particular ends. Global norms 
interplay bottom-up and top-down models in a non-direct fashion. Several 
instruments are contained within the logic of global norms: benchmarking, 
rating, ranking, transparency, and “international best practices”. These norms 
also take the form of measures to pressure countries into institutional and 
organisational changes. That is, indigenous practices outside the trajectory of 
global patterns are considered a non-(or less-) legitimate form of modern 
arrangements (Brown, 2015). Global norms aim to reproduce and then govern 
the international financial system through the standardisation of indigenous 
arrangements and the individual mind to support the political embedded logic 
of economic globalisation, neoliberal rationality (Brown, 2015). Nonetheless, 
the wide spread of global norms by (Western dominated) IOs could be 
perceived as a “soft” instrument to institutionalise Western cultural practices. 
Within this context, it is worth noting that global norms in general, and 
international best practices in particular, are widely neglected themes not only 
in non-positivist accounting studies but also in the broader social science 
literature. This thesis aims to unpack the structural complexities involved in the 
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adoption of so-called “international best practices” in terms of audit regulation 
and the implications of this for the dynamic of power within the Kuwaiti nation-
state (more details in Section 1.1). 
Some historical events that contributed to the reconstitution of the global 
(financial) space are worth noting here. Friedrich Hayek proposed ideas for 
economic liberation in the mid-1940s. He believed that the Keynesian logic of 
the planned economy leads to dictatorship even in democratic societies 
(Hayek, 1944)1. His book, The Road to Serfdom, aimed to provide a road map 
to destroy totalitarianism by empowering capital over the state. This political 
project was intensively practised, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when 
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ronald Reagan in the 
United States of America (US) were elected. Since then, critical studies 
(scholars) on accounting, particularly in the UK, began to question the role of 
accountancy in such political activities.  
Research started to identify the correlation between accountancy (ideas and 
practices) and the neoliberalising of the Western social sphere. Several 
studies raised concerns about the rising power of the accountancy profession 
in the national neoliberal(ised) economic space (Sikka et al., 1998; Willmott, 
1986). The interplay between the state and the accountancy profession 
continues to be a significant issue of concern in contemporary (neoliberalised) 
societies2. Studies scrutinise the corporatist arrangement as a mode for 
governing accountancy in light of local and regional economic (neoliberal) 
changes that affected the balance of power between the state and the 
accountancy profession (as part of the broader market) in favour of the latter 
 
1 Keynesianism was adopted in many advanced capitalist states (particularly the US and the 
UK). This macroeconomic theory aimed to mitigate the social implications of the Great 
Depression in the late 1920s and 1930s. 
2 In advanced capitalist societies, the anxiety of critical studies on the professionalisation of 
accountancy is driven by interest in social welfare. States depend on corporations for 
employment and taxes. However, in a corporatist system, external auditors often are the first 
and last line of defence against corporate misconduct. Fraudulent activities (with weak 
oversight) are often costly for capitalist states that adopt such arrangements.  
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(Cooper et al., 1996; Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Puxty et al., 1987; Robson et 
al., 1994; Sikka et al., 1998; Willmott, 1986; Willmott et al., 1992)3.  
After the dissolution of the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), the ideological and economic conditions of the global space became 
free for advanced capitalist states to hegemonise, particularly the US (Harvey, 
2005, pp. 10, 87). However, in the four years from 1997 to 2001, two major 
financial crises contributed to the reconstruction of the (international) financial 
relationship between the West and the non-West: the Asian financial crisis and 
the multiple financial scandals in large American corporations. However, 
before moving ahead with the discussion of these two global events, important 
terminologies must be defined.  
I started writing my thesis using the terms “North” and “South” to distinguish 
between two broad clusters of global powers. For me, “the North” can be used 
to represent states with international influence, and I considered countries 
outside this classification as “the South”. However, I realised many powerful 
states in the global space share different sets of cultures that drive their 
international practices. So I decided to reclassify countries as Western vs. non-
Western to distinguish between the two collections of widely dissimilar 
cultures.  
In the global space, I understand that Western countries do not share equal 
(global) leverage; they compete with each other to accumulate power. Still, 
they often take joint action to confront threats to Western civilisation, culture, 
and hegemony. I found separating Western power (which is underpinned by 
shared culture) is very difficult. On the other hand, non-Western societies have 
much more diverse cultures, and consequently, dispersed interests in the 
 
3 In all modes of state regulatory practice, the state empowers (and depend on) various social 
groups (e.g., the audit profession) to perform specific social function(s) (e.g., legitimacy). The 
main difference between corporatist and legalist modes of arrangements, is that with 
corporatist arrangements, the audit profession has more autonomy in governing their micro-
practices with minimal state intervention. In contrast, in the legalist mode of regulation, the 
state extends its involvement to the audit profession micro-arrangements. Differences in the 
inherited level of state involvement in regulating the micro-practices of audit provide different 
dynamics to the audit profession as well as the relationship between the state and the audit 
profession. 
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global space. Collective action by non-Western countries is rare to 
nonexistent.  
The Western vs. non-Western classification raised another dilemma. As the 
purpose of this classification is to categorise global hegemonic powers, where 
are, for example, China, Russia, or even Japan located in this cultural 
scheme? I decided to embrace the following diagram that explains my more 
nuanced understanding of global hegemonic groups. 
 
Figure 1: Country categorisation re. global hegemonic power 
The terms “North West” and “North non-West” will be used in this thesis to 
discriminate broadly between two globally influential groups with dissimilar 
cultures. Also, southern countries with low global power have been 
categorised based on culture as either Western countries with low hegemonic 
power (south West) or non-Western countries with less influential power (south 
non-West).  
Back again to the two incidents that changed the relationship between Western 
and non-Western cultures. Without going into too much detail about these 
incidents, what is important here is that following the Asian financial crisis, the 
US influenced the G7 decision to empower IOs (e.g., the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank) to reconstruct the architecture of 




































































Harvey (2003, p. 4) explained this new global economic system as a new form 
of imperialism to ground a Pax Americana.  
The IMF and the World Bank collaborated and created the Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), a joint force to guide countries 
in avoiding systematic financial crises partly through advancing neoliberal and 
capital stimulation policies. Nonetheless, the duties of the IMF and the World 
Bank were not limited to producing reports and recommendations; for 
countries in need of monies, facilitating capital was conditioned on structural 
changes to advance national economic liberation policies (neoliberalism). 
Accordingly, changes to the balance of power in the global economic space 
resulted in the growth (and interference) of various IOs and transnational 
agencies (e.g., OECD, IASB, IFAC, IOSCO)4. This new international financial 
architecture aims to assist/back the IMF and the World Bank in their new 
hegemonic mission to fulfil the vision of the “North” for a new world order.  
The second event that contributed to reconfiguring the conception of 
international (financial) space happened in the early 21st century. The US 
witnessed significant financial scandals in large American corporations which 
resulted in the dissolution of their external auditor, the world’s largest 
international audit firm, Arthur Andersen. In 2002, the US enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) intending to change regulatory traditions and 
arrangements within the US capital market field.  
In the audit domain, SOX aimed to change the inherited corporatist self-
regulation system through the creation and empowerment of an “independent” 
body (PCAOB) to oversee the practices of corporate external auditors. Also, 
additional courses of action were implemented aiming to govern the 
relationship between auditors and their clients and to enhance the independent 
opinion of external auditors (rotation and prohibition on specific advisory 
 
4 Collaboration and confrontation are diffused among transnational activities aiming to lead a 
specific global (material) norms (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009). On the one hand, Arnold 
(2005) also helped us to understand how transnational players (e.g., international professional 
services firms) exploit the hegemonic activities of IOs. On the other hand, Davis et al. (2012) 
argue that some norms are labelled as belonging to a specific transnational agency (e.g., the 
OECD) while in reality, they were designed by a Western consultancy company.  
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services for audit-clients). However, such changes by an international 
hegemonic power became globally recognised and influenced the perceptions 
and operations of international players as well as some other (Western) 
countries that follow a similar corporatist system and/or have “interests” in 
imitating/mimicing the US rearrangements.  
SOX regulatory logic became a (bottom-up) benchmark for the activities of IOs. 
In return, international players exercise (top-down) pressure to change 
countries’ capital market arrangements on SOX terms, either coercively, 
through structural reform conditions for funding, or non-coercively, by 
framing/guiding the perception of nation-states through the production of 
reports and recommendations. Global norms are used as a secondary layer to 
pressure for change. International players and global norms reinforce each 
other to pressure countries to change their traditions. The ranking of a 
country’s capital market, for example, is not only limited to the amount of 
trading liquidity, but also to the application of “modern” financial regulatory 
arrangements similar to the US SOX, which later became “international best 
practices”.  
Membership in prestigious international clubs (e.g., IOSCO) demands 
regulatory change similar to the US SOX (IOSCO, 2002a, 2002b). The 
establishment of a specialised “independent” body (similar to the US PCOAB) 
became an international best practice in the oversight of the audit profession. 
Likewise, modern technologies to promote auditors’ “independent” opinions on 
the trustworthiness of their clients’ financial positions became (partially) 
measured by the application of rotation and prohibiting advisory services as 
well as increasing the role of company audit committees (IOSCO, 2002a, 
2002b). The IFAC Code of Ethics emerged to standardise audit “quality” by 
advancing Anglo-American logic across the globe (IFAC, 2015)5 6.  
 
5 For IFAC’s Code of Ethics, audit independence is clearly driven by SOX logic. Rotation of 
external auditors is limited to partners (IFAC, 2015, pp. 75-7) and prohibition of advisory 
services followed SOX classification of prohibited services (IFAC, 2015, pp. 77-96).  
6 Similarly, the 2014 European Union (EU) audit legislation (effective 2016) follows the same 
logic of SOX and its subordinate, IFAC. The EU required enhancing state-audit oversight and 
various measures to enhance auditor independence. However, while on paper, the EU 
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Modernising the function of the external audit became associated with 
empowering an “independent” body to oversee the practices of auditors as well 
as implementing micro-technologies such as rotation and prohibition of (some) 
advisory services for the audit client. Following these international best 
practices was purported to lead to (fictitious) social prosperity and an attractive 
environment for foreign monies.  
With the hegemonic forces of globalism, some critically-inspired audit research 
considered examining the creation and operation of an “independent” 
oversight body (similar to the regulatory logic of the US PCOAB) to change the 
inherited self-regulation of corporatist arrangements. Five countries were 
studied--Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, and Russia--to understand the 
dynamics behind attempts to “standardise” national regulatory systems (Alon 
et al., 2019; Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, 2016; Caramanis et al., 2015; 
Hazgui and Gendron, 2015; Malsch and Gendron, 2011).  
These studies have similarities and differences. Regarding their similarities, all 
five societies followed a neoliberalised economic system as well as corporatist 
logic before the regulatory change. Henceforth, the underlying dynamic of 
change resulted in conflict mainly between two social groups: the audit 
profession and those advancing the operation of the newly created oversight 
body. Likewise, methodologically, all prior studies looked at the problem of 
regulatory change from an international standardisation perspective. The 
differences relate mainly to each country’s particularities of history and social 
system that affected the dynamics of conflict as well as the outcomes of 
structural change. However, except for Malsch and Gendron (2011), this 
literature often escapes answering “why” transformation happens and covers 
this shortage in knowledge with claims for global standardisation/US imitation. 
 
requirements look more rigorous in comparison to those of the US, as they mainly depend on 
national enforcement power, the EU followed SOX logic with regard to the classification of 
advisory services. 
 8 
1.1. Motivation and objectives 
My aim is to complement prior studies on regulatory audit change by 
examining why and how Kuwait implemented/“localised” SOX-driven “global-
norm” “modern” audit regulations. Global norms in general and “international 
best practices” in particular are disseminated internationally to influence and 
change many aspects of social, economic, and political life. However, 
accounting and auditing research has not considered in detail how nation-
state(s) reproduce themselves in line with these exogenous forces which are 
used to influence changes to the dynamic of power within nation-states in 
general and audit regulatory practices and settings in particular. With this in 
mind, and for several other reasons, Kuwait makes a compelling case for 
research. As a major oil producer, albeit one that participates in the global 
order for oil, it has been independent of the direct constraints of the financing 
conditions frequently imposed by IOs. Its economic system depends mainly on 
oil (which is owned and produced by the state), has no local corporate tax, and 
its political regime has been defined (without change) since the revocation of 
the protectorate agreement with Britain in the early 1960s. These social 
factors, including its distinctive history, make Kuwait a unique context for study. 
Importantly, for this research, unlike most prior studies that examine the state-
accountancy profession relationship underpinned by a corporatist 
arrangement, Kuwait follows a “legalist” mode of regulations. It has a 
distinctive legal structure regarding audit practice since legally there is no such 
thing as an “audit firm”. So while all members of the Big 4 have a presence as 
full members in their global networks (with noticeable variation in market 
share), corporate audits are signed off by individuals and not firms (which 
legally do not exist).  
As SOX-driven “international best practices” had been developed mainly within 
corporatist systems, the value of examining a unique context (Kuwait) with its 
different mode of regulating auditors practices (legalist) is that it offers different 
perspectives (and new insights) into the internationally-driven changes to 
indigenous settings and traditions; it further develops a deeper understanding 
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of the relationship between internationalisation forces, nation-state(s), and 
national audit arrangements and practices. 
Four objectives will help achieve my fairly complex aim. While prior studies 
focused on regulatory changes to the audit profession self-regulatory model in 
states with corporatist arrangements, as I argued earlier, Kuwait follows a 
legalist system. This means that the state of Kuwait had regulated auditor 
practice before the implementation of global-driven regulatory change. The 
reform included a new “state” regulator to participate in (re)regulating audit 
practice within capital market companies. Accordingly, my first objective is to 
identify how the newly created bureaucratic agency was able to transcend the 
bureaucratic field and control audit regulations, despite the existence of other 
long-standing state financial regulator(s) that used to collaborate in regulating 
audit practices.  
My second objective is to assess why and how the audit field responded to the 
new regulator’s demands to modernise audit practice. In Western systems, 
regulatory reform often includes an element of the democratic process; for 
example, a public consultation process, the inclusion of professional 
representation in regulatory reviewing groups, and/or audit profession 
involvement in the oversight bodies/regime. The influential accountancy 
profession (with inherited regulatory power) uses these (democratic) 
processes to protect the interests (power) of its prominent members by 
subverting/obstructing regulatory change. Whether democracy in this context 
is good or bad is outside the scope of this research. However, Kuwait does not 
follow similar (democratic) regulatory processes and does not have a powerful 
accountancy body. The new regulator planned and decided to modernise audit 
practices all by itself, without the inclusion of the audit profession. Therefore, 
the dynamic of conflict within Kuwait is different from the Western logic which 
dominates the literature extant. 
My third objective is to evaluate the implications of the conflicts between the 
new regulator and the audit field. This objective is very challenging but worth 
pursuing. The micro-technologies of regulatory standardisation, such as 
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regulations for rotation and prohibition of advisory services, are widely 
neglected by non-positivist accounting research (see Section 2.5). The 
majority of earlier studies assume (or take for granted) that the application of 
these measures “could” be potential solutions to the embedded contradictions 
of the contemporary external audit function. That is, the conflict between the 
commercialisation of social life and the social purpose of the external audit 
where auditors and audit firms are part of the same commercialised (social) 
space (Carter and Spence, 2014; Sikka, 2015)7. However, my findings suggest 
the opposite. The implementation of international best practice micro audit 
technologies must be subject to critical examination.  
As Kuwait is not dependent on funding from IOs--with their frequent 
requirements to reform institutional arrangements and regulatory practices--
my fourth objective is to understand why Kuwait modernised/changed its local 
regulatory arrangement and aimed to implement micro audit technologies 
based on the Western-driven global norm.  
Having located my research problem in prior knowledge, and defined my aim 
and research objectives, the following section summarises the methodological 
process I use to investigate how and why Kuwait modernised its capital market 
audit regulations. 
1.2. Methodology and methods 
Consistency in the research(er)’s philosophical positioning is vital (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Cunliffe, 2011; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). The 
methodological location of this thesis, based on the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
explanation of research philosophy and their paradigmatic separation, is 
somewhat controversial. My methodological position backs the arguments of 
Hopper and Powell (1985) and Ryan et al. (2002) on the hazard of splitting 
“critical” paradigms. The philosophical assumptions of my thesis combine both 
structuralist and humanist paradigms. This methodological choice recognises 
 
7 Here, I am not criticising prior studies that neglected to examine the contradiction between 
audit (as a social verification) and capitalism (that promotes private accumulation), but on their 
not questioning modern technologies that are propagated to move audit practices forward.  
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the socially constructed nature of accountancy practices without neglecting the 
underlying social arrangements and it’s taken for granted systems.  
A case study approach was adopted to explore (in-depth) the phenomenon of 
the application of modern audit regulations in Kuwait. Semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with key actors who produce (regulators) and 
implement (accountancy profession) accountancy regulations8. Interviews are 
the primary source of data and were carried out in different fields: audit firms, 
the accountancy body, and the three state financial regulators9. A 
predetermined interview agenda was designed to cover four specific themes: 
the dynamic of the audit field, the relationship between audit firms and state 
regulators, the application of Anglo-American accountancy regulations to 
Kuwait, and the rationality behind “localising” Western financial systems.  
Following the guidelines of Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis was 
carried out to analyse the collected data. As well, two (related) theoretical 
lenses were adopted to help analyse and explain the collected data, and 
understand the problem under study: Bourdieu’s practice theory (including his 
theory of the state), and Halliday and Carruthers’ theory of recursivity. 
Additionally, the thesis draws from Brown's (2015) theorisation of international 
best practices to consider the modernisation of the Kuwaiti audit regulations.  
1.3. Findings overview 
In Kuwait, attempts to “modernise” and to reform audit practices ignited an 
enormous battle between influential social groups. Conflicts surrounding 
changes to institutionalised traditions and arrangements mirrored a struggle in 
the field of power. However, unlike prior studies that examined corporatist 
systems, the legalist mode of regulation in Kuwait resulted in a battle not only 
between the audit field, influential social groups (e.g., merchant groups), and 
the new regulator, but were mainly inter-governmental. Nonetheless, as 
political interference (including by some ruling groups) in government agencies 
 
8 On the consumption axis, private companies were deliberately excluded from my research 
design. For more detail, see Section 5.4.3.2. 
9 Another source of data is a detailed review of local financial laws and regulations. 
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varies, the accountancy profession was located in the middle of a broader 
bureaucratic battle over who would lead the changes to audit regulations.  
As the Ministry of Commerce (the audit law enforcer) was perceived to be weak 
in its audit oversight function, the new regulator planned to change the course 
of auditor practices by implementing new global-driven norms with embedded 
logics that confronted local (inherited) traditions and raised challenges to the 
balance of power within Kuwait’s social structure. Consequently, former 
financial regulator(s), influential auditors, and some (other) influential social 
groups collaborated to obstruct the (audit) modernisation agenda of the new 
regulator. However, in addition to explaining the dynamic of the bureaucratic 
conflict, I was able to identify specific strategies employed by the new regulator 
to accumulate (bureaucratic) power and confront its opposition. As part of this 
battle, influential auditors used the “powerless” accountancy body to form a 
collective resistance. They challenged not only the regulations changing 
auditor practices, but also the legitimacy of the new regulator.  
Firm rotation was perceived by many social groups as a significant threat, a 
disturbance to the (long-term) mutual social investments between former 
regulators, influential auditors (some of the Big 4), and local banks (which are 
mainly controlled by “some” ruling groups)10. Consequently, influential auditors 
encountered firm rotation and challenged the ambiguity of this global 
technology in a legal setting that does not recognise “firms”. However, to 
mitigate the struggle, some influential auditors engineered rotation 
requirements based on an existing (rather old) audit law. This resulted in the 
application of a strange type of “partner” rotation but with no significant 
changes to the structure of the audit field and the “social investment portfolio” 
of influential auditors. In other words, the outcome of (social) conflict resulted 
in the signal that Kuwait had implemented the international best practice of 
audit rotation, but, in reality, it was manipulated to maintain the status quo for 
social actors with symbolic social status.  
 
10 More detail on ruling groups is offered in Chapter 3. 
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Arguably, such gaming activities by the locals to confront exogenous 
influences could travel to the broader social space. If social actors become 
involved in similar behaviours to protect their interests and status, such 
practices could have potential (moral) hazards for society. My point here is that 
economic globalisation offers opportunities for societies to engage in 
malpractice.   
My story does not stop here. I was surprised that the collective resistance of 
the audit field did not reject the new regulatory demands for a “full” prohibition 
on non-audit services. My findings suggest that the regulatory understanding 
of advisory services was long framed by influential auditors. The same 
understanding was carried forward by the new regulator. Ironically, the 
prohibition on advisory services does exist but has long been designed to allow 
audit firms to provide whatever services they desire!  
Lastly, I reflect on two inquiries related to the question “why”. First, why did 
modernisation happen? Second, why late modernisation? Concerning my 
latter inquiry, Kuwait is argued to be late to modernise its capital market and 
audit regulations in comparison to its neighbour countries, despite the doxic 
belief in international solutions to Kuwait’s social problems. My findings 
suggest that the social implications of the global financial crisis of 2008 was a 
golden opportunity for some ruling powers to overcome locally rooted forceful 
groups that oppose changes that challenge the way they maintain their 
symbolic status.  
On the question of why global norm driven changes were made to the capital 
market arrangements, I found no single answer to this complicated question. 
The Kuwaiti locale, as my findings suggest, take for granted the supremacy of 
Western financial arrangements over local tradition(s). I argued that such 
social submission has been grounded for many reasons: the teaching of an 
Anglo-American curriculum in Kuwait universities, the openness of Kuwait to 
expatriates from a variety of cultures, the interference of the West in Kuwait 
during and after the Gulf War, and the influence of Western cultural ideas 
through the involvement of the IMF and the World Bank in Kuwait locales.  
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My findings also suggest that the local rationalisation that Western-driven-
global-norms changes to local regulatory arrangements could be potential 
solutions to the ineffectiveness of the Kuwaiti government in promoting social 
progress. Similarly, for the modernising of local systems to compete with 
regional markets in attracting foreign money. Additionally, there is also a 
salient understanding between senior officials that attracting foreign monies 
(through the modernising of financial systems to legitimise local arrangements 
in the international space) contributes to elements of national security.  
1.4. Contribution  
This thesis is one of the first studies that investigates the application and 
implications of “international best practices” in terms of audit regulations. I do 
so by examining Kuwait, a unique non-Western country with a “legalist” mode 
of audit regulation. The first contribution this thesis makes is to the literature 
that explores the dynamics of applying SOX-driven changes to countries’ 
regulatory framework in corporatist systems (Alon et al., 2019; Canning and 
O’Dwyer, 2013, 2016; Caramanis et al., 2015; Hazgui and Gendron, 2015; 
Malsch and Gendron, 2011). Kuwait’s audit regulatory arrangement (before 
and after change) is different than the contextual traditions of prior studies. The 
Kuwaiti state regulates auditor practices with the existence of a powerless 
accountancy body which happens to be regulated by the state as well.  
My second contribution is to the international best practices literature. This 
particular global norm is neglected in critical studies. In fact, to my knowledge, 
prior research considered the broader standardisation practices, but none 
specifically explains international best practices in the accountancy domain. 
This thesis aims to open a new space for critical accounting research. That 
said, international best practices are employed to regulate many 
aspects/practices of/in social life and are linked to a complex web of global 
governance dynamics and power. In this thesis, I only focus on some aspects 
of SOX-driven international best practice audit micro-technologies such as 
audit rotation and prohibition of non-audit services. My findings suggest that 
following best practices must not be taken at face value. Countries aim to 
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achieve specific interests (e.g., legitimacy in the global space) by signalling 
proper application of modernised indigenous practices but also (sometimes)11 
engage in gaming (manipulating) the global (power) trajectory to maintain 
national social order. 
My third contribution is to the literature that explores the state-accountancy 
relationship in non-Western systems. This literature, according to Chua et al. 
(2019), still lacks in-depth investigation. The majority of these particular studies 
recognised state power in regulating auditor practices, but often focused on 
the historical formation of the profession or were driven by the post-colonial 
lens, without considering detailed (contemporary) regulatory arrangements. In 
the Arab world, critically-inspired accounting studies are minimal (Gallhofer et 
al., 2011), and in Kuwait, critical perspective on accounting research is almost 
absent. This thesis contributes to the non-Western literature by unpacking the 
regulatory arrangements of Kuwait, a country in a region that is merely 
regarded as consisting of rich oil-producing societies.  
1.5. Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as 10 chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
the literature review chapter consists of five parts. The first and second parts 
focus on prior studies that examined the relationship between the state and 
the accountancy profession in Western and non-Western contexts. It is worth 
noting that mainly Western research dominates these particular studies. As 
this thesis is interdisciplinary and guided by sociological theoretical framing, 
the third part identifies prior studies on the sociology of the accountancy 
profession. However, as the theoretical framing of this thesis is heavily built 
around Bourdieu’s ideas, the cited literature on the sociology of the 
accountancy profession focuses only on studies that adopted Bourdieusian 
theories. The fourth section in Chapter 2 navigates prior studies on the 
globalisation of US audit arrangements. The last part examines prior research 
on international best practices.  
 
11 Especially for technologies that disturb local order.  
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Chapter 3 explains the context of the empirical case, Kuwait. It starts by 
providing some general geographic and demographic information on Kuwait. I 
then move to explain the genesis of Kuwait as well as significant phases in 
Kuwait history, the uniqueness of Kuwait’s economic, political, bureaucratic, 
and social systems.  
Chapter 4 illustrates the theoretical framework that guided the trajectory of this 
study. I intend to cover two theoretical lenses. First, Bourdieu’s practice theory 
(including the state). Second, Halliday and Carruthers’ work on recursivity 
which is appreciated to help in the understanding of transnationalism. I argue 
that, methodologically, recursivity works well with Bourdieu’s social 
theorisation.  
Chapter 5 discusses my research methodology and methods. In this chapter, 
I will provide some explanation on my research philosophy and the 
methodological positioning of my thesis. I then move to explain my research 
design, the case study. In this chapter, I provide details on the organisation of 
my collected data as well as my data analysis. I categorise my findings in three 
chapters (Chapters 6 to 8). 
Chapter 6 provides the regulatory audit framework in Kuwait. This chapter has 
three sections. Section 1 explains the Kuwaiti regulatory framework before the 
change. Section 2 discusses the interference of IOs in pressuring Kuwait to 
change its regulatory arrangement. In section 2, I also offer my findings on why 
the Ministry of Commerce (the antecedent sole regulator) was perceived to be 
weak in its oversight function. Section 3 of this chapter explains changes to 
the regulatory framework as well as the required changes to the capital market 
audit regulations. I intend to demonstrate the further interference of IOs after 
the regulatory change and my findings on why Kuwait followed the 
internationalisation trajectory. 
Chapter 7 is the second part of my findings. In this chapter, I focus on the 
conflict surrounding attempts to modernise Kuwait capital market audit 
practices. Chapter 7 covers two struggles. The first part demonstrates the 
bureaucratic conflict between the newly established regulator with long-
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established regulators that used to collaborate in regulating audit. Also, it 
covers the new regulator’s strategies to confront the other agencies. The 
second part explains the rationalisation of the audit field actors for resisting the 
new regulator’s modernisation programme and their strategies for facing the 
new regulator’s modernisation agenda. 
Chapter 8 focuses on the outcome (implication) of conflict between the new 
regulator and the audit field to modernise capital market audit practices. In this 
chapter I aim to concentrate on two international best practice driven micro 
audit technologies that I found the most challenging to the dynamic of the audit 
field: changing firm rotation to “partner” rotation, and the silence of auditors on 
the new regulator’s proposal to implement “full” prohibition of non-audit 
services.  
Chapter 9 discusses my findings and theorises why and how Kuwait 
modernised its capital market audit regulations. In this chapter, I elaborate the 
“how” question in three parts. First, a reflection on the inter-governmental 
battle within the broader field of power. Second, the exploitation of influential 
auditors of the collective lobby to advance their “private” interests. Third, the 
customisation of micro audit technologies to maintain the structure of the audit 
field by deceiving both the global and the local. The last part of this chapter 
discusses the doxic submission to international rules and the lateness of 
Kuwait in modernising its capital market regulations in comparison to its 
regional neighbours.  
The final chapter concludes this thesis. It will illustrate my contribution to 
knowledge, the practical implications to Kuwaiti policymakers, its potential 





2. GLOBAL NORMS AND THE STATE-AUDIT 
PROFESSION LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction  
In Western societies, with the intensification of the political processes to 
neoliberalise their social life, many accounting scholars recognised the role 
and implications of accountancy in these processes. Several calls had been 
raised to locate accountancy practices where they belong: the political sphere 
(e.g., Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Willmott, 1986). In the non-Western world, 
Anglo-Americanisation logics and practices have been enabled to spread and 
govern the global space through accounting technologies (Arnold, 2012).  
In this chapter, I aim to provide an overview of prior literature that investigated 
the relationship between the nation-state and the audit profession without 
neglecting the (direct and indirect) forces of the system of economic 
globalisation and its influence on (institutionalised) local arrangements. It is 
worth noting that prior studies that examined audit regulations within the global 
context, in both Western and non-Western settings, are relatively few. In the 
Arab world, such a critically-inspired investigatory model is scarce (Gallhofer 
et al., 2011).  
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first section illustrates studies on the 
relationship between the state and audit profession in the Western context. I 
will start by illustrating seminal works that theorised modes of regulations and 
the dynamic relationship between the state and the accountancy profession. 
Arguably, although these studies are relatively old and north-Western 
dominated, they continue to influence the trajectory of current research on 
state-profession dynamics in both West and non-West research. The first 
section will also reflect on studies that considered the regional and global 
influences on such (north-Western) relationships.  
The second part will look at studies on the relationship between non-Western 
states and the audit profession. However, as the majority of this particular 
literature adopts (post)colonial and/or historical formation perspectives, I 
 20 
intend to focus on state-profession studies outside these focuses. The second 
section of part two will demonstrate how prior studies recognised the influence 
of economic globalisation on the relationship between the non-north Western 
state and the audit profession. 
Part three is intended to examine the sociology of the audit profession 
literature. However, as I am heavily dependent on Bourdieusian theorisation, 
this section will only examine Bourdieusian driven studies on the sociology of 
the audit profession. Part four of this chapter emphasises the globalisation of 
US audit arrangements, particularly the SOX. This part will offer scholarly 
critiques on US audit solutions as well as studies that examined the application 
of SOX globally inspired changes to non-US regulatory settings. The last part 
of this chapter examines one of the salient global norms: international best 
practices. As this particular norm is outside the radar of critically-inspired 
accounting research, I will explain relevant (non-mainstream) studies outside 
accounting, particularly in the public administration and sociology literatures.  
2.2. North-Western theorisation of the state-profession 
relationship   
Accounting and auditing practices do not act independently of the social space 
in which they operate (Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Miller, 1990; Willmott, 1986). 
In the 1980s, with the rise of the neoliberalising of Western social life, 
accounting scholars (especially from the UK) started to identify the role of 
accountancy in such a political process. The seminal work of Puxty et al. 
(1987) was one of the early attempts to theorise the reciprocal relationship 
between accountancy and the social space in which it operates. Puxty et al., 
following the Streek and Schmitter model, stresses  examining accountancy 
from the perspective of maintaining social order. Western order used to 
balance relations between the state (coordinated via hierarchal control and 
bureaucracy), market (coordinated via competition), and community 
(coordinated via solidarity). This accounting regulation approach stresses the 
system of power accumulation (Cooper and Robson, 2006, pp. 429-30).  
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Puxty et al. (1987) compared strategies of accounting regulations in four 
Western societies: Germany, the UK, Sweden, and the US. They found 
variation in the modes of regulations as each country has a different history 
and social system (culture) which influences accountancy regulation. 
Additionally, they theorise that accounting regulations depend on four 
(possibly shifting and combinatorial) strategies to societal order: legalism, 
corporatism, associationism, and liberalism. This particular study is one of the 
core bricks in the wall of “critical” accounting regulations literature.  
To understand the similarities and differences in the way social order is 
maintained in these four advanced capitalist societies, Willmott et al. (1992) 
investigated their development of disclosure regulations and corporate 
accounting treatments. They argue that differences between these countries 
are mainly based on particularities of state institutional arrangements, while 
similarities are mediated through the parties involved in the political process in 
directing accounting regulations (Germany is found to be dissimilar because 
of its different historical and national context).   
Richardson (1989) tried to extend the Puxty et al. theorisation through 
analysing  corporatist accounting control and the maintenance of social order 
in Ontario, Canada. However, half of Richardson’s paper was dedicated to 
providing an alternative account to Puxty et al.’s corporatist theorisation. 
Richardson criticised the Streek and Schmitter model for omitting the 
importance of values and the relationship between values in the social context. 
In this paper, the Gramsci theory of hegemony (consent and coercion) was 
used as an alternative theoretical framework for understanding order in the 
social world. Richardson explained the hegemonic strategies of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Ontario in the intra-professional conflicts on 
controlling the accountancy profession.  
Studies started to examine (at the national level) the politics of accountancy 
regulations in the corporatist approach to maintaining order. Sikka and Willmott 
(1995) for example, examined the state-accountancy profession relationship 
by studying the UK Department of Trade corporate arrangement in two errant 
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companies, Ramor Investments and Euroflame Holdings. Sikka and Willmott 
found that the UK government involved audit partners (from audit firms that 
failed to audit these companies properly) in the inspection of these errant 
companies. Additionally, accountancy bodies were allowed to have early 
access to inspection reports which allowed the profession to be prepared for 
any type of criticism. This indulgent relationship, as coined by Sikka and 
Willmott, is theorised to protect the legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness of 
the accountancy profession in its role of promoting investor and public 
confidence in the objectivity of financial information.  
In another study, Sikka (2002) argue that during the 1980s and the 1990s, due 
to corporate failure, fraud, and audit failure, the UK, in 1991, established the 
Auditing Practices Board (APB) to interfere in the accountancy profession’s 
self-regulation/corporatist arrangement approach. Sikka, based on personal 
engagement, explained the political struggle surrounding changes to the 
accountancy practices in the UK.  
Sikka found that the state establishment of APB was designed to not contradict 
with capital’s accumulation and the audit profession’s legitimisation functions. 
This was evidenced through the facilitating of the audit profession’s control 
over audit standards setting, excluding the public from attending APB meetings 
and denying it access to the meeting minutes, and collaboration between the 
state and the accountancy profession to implement controls over public 
consultation exercises. Sikka also found that the selection process of APB 
chairman and members is done by organisations that give priority to capital: 
the Bank of England and London Stock Exchange. Non-audit representation 
became limited to capital representatives (company directors). Sikka argues 
that combining auditors with their clients (corporations) in setting auditing 
standards is a regulatory process that undermines the social function of the 
corporate audit system.  
In a historical study, MacDonald and Richardson (2004) examined the process 
of implementing a law on the right to practice auditing in Ontario, Canada in 
1950. MacDonald and Richardson found that the system for granting audit 
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licensing is one of the strategies used by the state regulator to reconstruct and 
secure a position in the regulatory space with accountancy profession 
associations. Interestingly, they argued another approach was the 
institutionalisation of contradictions to existing arrangements by the state 
regulator, reshaping the regulatory space and aiding the legitimacy of the 
accountancy regulator.  
Robson et al. (1994) analysed the dynamics of the UK state-profession 
relationship in the responses of accountants to three regulatory episodes by 
focusing on the interplay between the ideology of self-regulation and the 
accounting profession’s quest for markets. First, concerning the European 
Eighth Directive, they found collaboration between the state and the profession 
to override independence requirements in order to support the expansion of 
UK audit firms to European markets.  
The second episode was an attempt to incorporate self-regulated bodies that 
offer investment advice, including the accounting profession, in the Financial 
Services Act to be under the regulation of the government for investor 
protection purposes. The accounting bodies lobbied to be recognised as a 
profession. They succeeded through pressure to implement a special category 
(recognised professional bodies) that protected their image of professionalism 
as well as their ability to continue providing advisory services without 
government interference. Finally, the last regulatory episode was a proposal 
to enhance the governance of ICAEW (the UK’s leading accountancy body) by 
segmenting/dividing its members based on their functions. ICAEW rejected 
this proposal and supported the existing structure but agreed on additional 
governance to balance both the self-interest of its members as well as the 
public interest. 
It is clear that, even in a corporatist system which dominates the logic of this 
literature, the accountancy profession cannot operate in a society without the 
authorisation of the state. The state empowers actors to operate a profession 
and provides them with markets to monopolise (e.g., statutory audit). This 
literature suggests that the dynamic relationship between the state and the 
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profession is not only derived by inherited modes of regulations, but also by 
similarities and differences of “interests” between the state and audit 
profession. On the one hand, the accountancy profession seeks to maintain 
its image of professionalism and the inherited self-regulation system and find 
new markets to expand. The state, on the other hand, wants to increase its 
accumulation of monies and ensure that the broader social order is not 
disturbed. The next section will provide studies that examined the external 
influences on the state’s modes of audit regulation and order. 
2.2.1. Regional influences on national state-profession 
corporatist arrangements 
In the 1980s, the European Union (EU) started to standardise (minimum) 
regulatory arrangements within its member states. Accounting studies began 
to consider how these regional involvements influence the relationship 
between states and the local accountancy profession. Cooper et al. (1996), for 
example, expanded the work of Robson et al. (1994), mentioned earlier, on 
the Eighth Company Law Directive of 1984. Cooper et al. argue that the EU 
attempt to harmonise education, training, and qualifications of the statutory 
audit in member states was found to challenge the UK state-profession 
arrangement for the national neoliberal shift.  
Both the state and the accountancy profession collaborated to maintain their 
relationship by rejecting most of the EU requirements that challenged the Big 
4’s competitive advantage (especially those related to audit independence) 
over other European audit firms and the potential expansion of the Big 4 to EU 
markets. Consequently, the UK government only implemented requirements 
that did not challenge the relationship and corporatist interests between the 
UK state and the accountancy profession, which resulted in maintaining the 
status quo. Cooper et al. put it this way: 
It is too simplistic to assert that such international regulations are 
implemented merely so as to maintain current relationships (the ‘‘status 
quo’’): as we see with the Directive, international regulations become 
the site for negotiations and struggles between professions and nation 
states concerning issues that are sometimes as indirectly associated 
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with their subject, as they are specific to national contexts … The 
‘‘politics’’ of accounting regulation have the character of a contest 
played out not only at an international level in terms of notions of 
competing national-professional ‘‘interests’’ but continuing through into 
the implementation of directives into national law in ways structured by 
the features of the institutional relationships between the State and the 
profession. (p. 609) 
In Denmark, with its different social system, Jeppesen and Loft (2011) 
investigated the implementation of the same EU directive. They found that this 
requirement, as it recognises a single group of auditors, created conflicts 
between “two types of local audit groups” (top tier since 1909 and second tier 
with only experience requirement since 1970) that have substantial differences 
in education, training, and expertise. This requirement, according to Jeppesen 
and Loft raised conflicts between the two local audit groups, including 
universities and the accounting body from 1984 on, which only ended in 2006. 
However, similar to the Sikka (2002) argument, Jeppesen and Loft found that 
accountancy bodies secured their influence by occupying seats on the state 
examination committee and hence controlling the examination process.  
Caramanis (1999) examined the harmonisation of Greece’s audit system with 
the EU, which resulted in liberating/revoking the monopoly of indigenous 
auditors and the inclusion of international accounting firms. In this study, 
Caramanis examined the conflict between the government, political parties, 
international accounting firms, and indigenous auditors in restructuring the 
audit profession there. The Greek government and international accounting 
firms lobbied and collaborated mainly because they had shared interests. 
International firms want to revoke indigenous enclosure, and the government 
wants to restructure (neoliberalise) the Greek economy. Accordingly, the 
government was able to manoeuvre parliamentary oppositions that sided with 
indigenous auditors. To lessen conflict, the government proposed legislation 
to create a body to suggest reforming the audit profession which later, after its 
creation, constrained the involvement of indigenous auditors. A reform decree 
was signed by the president, not the parliament. 
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There are few studies on the “regional” harmonisation of accounting 
regulations outside the EU standardisation programmes. The EU 
standardisation programme is found to have different implications on its 
member states because every state has unique political and economic settings 
and local arrangements, and consequently maintains order differently.  
The next section explores how globalisation affects the balance of power 
between the state and the audit profession, which often favours those 
supportive of capital. 
2.2.2. Globalisation and audit in North-Western states 
Globalisation works differently not only between Western and non-Western 
countries, but also within the West and the non-West. In all cases, globalisation 
empowers capital and those who provide services and markets to capital, such 
as international accounting firms, over nation-states. However, the alliance 
between a powerful Western state and international audit firms represents an 
influential group in governing the trajectory of economic globalisation (Arnold 
and Sikka, 2001, p. 476).  
The following section explains the few studies that examined the relationship 
between globalisation and north-Western countries. In a later section, I will 
explore similar studies that researched the relationship outside the north-
Western context (Section 2.3.1). However, as we will see next, with the 
increase of external (global) forces in the way societies maintain order and 
regulate accountancy, studies started to be scattered (Arnold, 2009, p. 808). 
This was apparent for Western as well as non-Western research. It is unclear 
to me if such diversion is because power (within the economic globalisation 
context) became more sophisticated (Cooper and Robson, 2006, p. 426; Yee, 
2012, p. 429), or the research focus moved to the global regulatory site 
(Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey, 2014, p. 904). I am not generalising this 
claim, but it is something I have noticed through reviewing the literature. 
In the UK for example, Arnold and Sikka (2001) investigated the scandals of 
the non-Western world’s fastest growing bank, BCCI (Middle-Eastern owned),  
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headquartered in London and licensed by the Bank of England. Arnold and 
Sikka argue that the Bank of England was able to close BCCI due to its 
suspicious operations since it moved its headquarters to the UK in the 1970s. 
Still, it only did so when BCCI became a threat to the legitimacy of the UK 
financial system and the reputation of London as a capital city in the early 
1990s (Arnold and Sikka, 2001, p. 492).  
Arnold and Sikka found that the UK corporatist reliance on the opinion of 
external auditors induces collaboration between the state and the accountancy 
profession mainly to balance/protect agendas for encouraging international 
capital inflow and protecting auditor functions in forming investor/public 
confidence in audit firm opinions, despite weaknesses in audit technologies 
and the improper practices of BCCI external auditors. 
In the same capital centric state policymaking, Sikka (2008) investigated 
threats of UK based audit firms (Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse) on the 
UK government to enact limited liability partnership legislation (auditors liability 
concessions). Or move their offices to the Island of Jersey (south of Britain but 
independent from British and EU laws). Eventually, the UK government, to 
protect its agenda/interests for attracting capital, submitted to international 
audit firm demands for liability concessions.  
As these two studies suggested, the ability to move capital out of capitalist 
economies has various social implications (e.g., market reputation, 
employment, tax) which sometimes empowered international accounting firms 
over nation-state regulatory activities. Henceforth, as the accumulation of 
capital is one of the logics of the state to maintain its power/order (Bourdieu, 
1994; Catchpowle et al., 2004), globalisation offers strategies to capital, and 
those who provide services to capital, to pressure states to submit to their 
demands.   
Before I move to characterise the state-audit profession relationship outside 
the north-Western context, the following section cover how international 
accounting firms use globalism (e.g., transnational agencies) to pressure and 
influence the balance of power within nation-states in their favour. The reason 
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for covering these studies is that I found some of these (transnational) 
strategies had been adopted by some representative(s) of international audit 
firms operating in Kuwait (see Section 6.3.2).  
2.2.3. Strategies of international audit firms at the level of 
transnational agencies 
With the intensification of economic globalisation, Suddaby et al. (2007) 
theorised that the emergence of transnational fields resulted in significant 
changes to the authorities of the accountancy profession. Suddaby et al. study 
focused on four structural changes: boundaries (the move of regulatory power 
from states to transnational agencies), logic (from social trustee to a mediator 
of economic commercial exchange), identity (elite vs. traditional firms), and 
power (from hard/coercive state power to soft/normative power to shape the 
profession and its role in nation-state). Suddaby et al. (2007) argue that 
although transnational organisations replaced the nation-state function in 
regulating the accountancy profession, the state continues to be an essential 
player as transnational agencies rely on the state’s coercive power to empower 
and discipline the accountancy profession operating within state boundaries.   
Arnold (2005), found that the transnational accounting industry (international 
accounting firms and transnational accounting agencies; e.g., IFAC) and 
Anglo-American industry lobbies “exploited” the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to create an 
international market for their commercial interests. Arnold argues that the 
transnational accounting industry influenced GATS requirements for domestic 
laws on audit licensing and qualification standards to win markets from 
indigenous auditors and to create a freely mobilised accounting labour market.  
As transnationalism is argued to empower the international accountancy 
profession over nation-states (Suddaby et al., 2007), accounting research also 
identified strategies of these firms to influence the operations of transnational 
agencies to advance their interests. Loft et al. (2006), for example, investigated 
the IFAC reform of 2003, a transnational organisation that attempted to issue 
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standards that aim to govern auditors practices. Part of the IFAC reform, 
according to Loft et al., was to establish a body responsible for the oversight 
and public interest activities of IFAC (Public Interest Oversight Board, PIOB); 
this committee was within the IFAC organisational structure. However, they 
found that the Forum of Firms as a body was created for international 
accounting firms to have representation in the IFAC structure, but outside 
PIOB oversight responsibility.  
Concerning IFAC operations, Loft at al. found that IFAC focused on governing 
its operations through expertise, not through its member representations. The 
Big 4 exist in IFAC operations in their own right, not through member 
representations. They raised the point that the IFAC system generates conflict. 
International audit firms participate in and influence IFAC operations, and at 
the same time, they are the major financial supporters for an organisation that 
tends to govern international audit firms practices. They also criticised the 
process of IFAC on the grounds that a small number of elites (mainly from the 
Big 4) participate in standards-setting on behalf of millions of auditors. Also, 
countries vary considerably in their ability to influence IFAC standards-setting.      
With a similar thematic investigation, Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey 
(2015) explained how international accounting firms were “partially” successful 
in influencing the EU for further liability concession. International firms were 
(partially) able to achieve this, they argued, because of their involvement in the 
EU governance structure. Accordingly, infiltration of regulatory committees is 
a salient strategy that international audit firms often use to advance their 
interests, not only at the transnational level as per Samsonova-Taddei and 
Humphrey (2015), but also at the local north-Western level as demonstrated 
by Sikka (2002) in the UK APB. I found a similar situation in non-Western 
Kuwait (see Section 6.3.2).  
With the global financial crisis of 2007/8, Sikka (2009) criticised the silence of 
auditors in facing their audit-clients on suspicious (risky) activities that partially 
resulted in this crisis, and instead of reforming and blaming the current audit 
system, the accountancy profession used the crisis as an excuse to demand 
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more concessions. Humphrey et al. (2009), in return, argue that the 
accountancy profession is active in (re)shaping/framing the regulatory 
response of international regulators on the global financial crisis.  
One of the important messages that this literature is trying to deliver is that 
extending corporatist ideas to the transnational level and allowing the audit 
profession to be involved in regulating their practices (at the transnational 
level) often results in regulations that empower the accountancy profession to 
protect and advance their own interests.  
Now I move to the second part of this chapter, audit regulations and the state-
profession relationship in the non-north-Western context. 
2.3. The relationship between “non-advanced Western” 
states and the audit profession 
Unlike the arrangements of the majority of Western states in relying on the 
accountancy profession to regulate audit professionalisation, in the non-
Western world, Chua et al. (2019) correctly argued, the state (explained as 
government) is often “the dominant” player. However, in non-Western settings, 
the literature on audit regulations and the state-profession relationship lacks 
in-depth examination (Chua et al., 2019, p. 2268). Critically-driven research on 
accountancy in the Arab world (including Kuwait) is minimal (Gallhofer et al., 
2011, p. 378).  
In non-Western societies, the relationship between the national state and the 
audit profession has mainly been investigated from (post)colonial and 
formation contexts. However, in this section, I only intend to identify studies 
that examined accountancy regulations and the state-profession relationship 
in non-Western jurisdictions and outside the colonisation focus. This type of 
research interest is relatively small.  
In explaining the state-profession relationship, Dyball and Valcarcel (1999), for 
example, investigated audit regulations in the Philippines. They argue that 
although the Philippine regulatory framework looks like a corporatist system, it 
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is significantly affected by familial ties. Such an arrangement made both the 
law and the family into competing authorities there. 
Dyball and Valcarcel examined two audit failures (Engineering Equipment Inc. 
and Victorias Milling Company, totaling US$150 million) of the largest audit 
firm in the Philippines, ABC & Co. However, as ABC & Co. alumni (family) 
head many large corporations, government agencies (including ministries), as 
well as the accounting association which it dominates, the ABC network in 
return (regulators and the accounting body) protects the firm from any financial 
threats for their misconduct. Dyball and Valcarcel theorised that, in the 
Philippines, ABC & Co. (audit firm) familial authority exceeds state legal 
authority.   
In Nigeria, Uche (2002) investigated the development of the accounting 
profession and found that Nigerian members of the UK ACCA formed a local 
branch of that organisiation aiming to combine all Nigerian accountants with 
different UK qualifications under one association. However, with the formation 
of a local accountancy association and later setting qualification requirements, 
local members who did not meet Western requirements formed a counter 
association and started legal disputes. 
When a new government took power in Nigeria, the counter body, due to a 
social relationship with the new government, relaunched a campaign to revoke 
the monopoly of the UK ACCA educated accountancy association. Each body 
employed different strategies to achieve their interests. However, the counter 
body reformatted itself to a broader association (ANAN). After a long series of 
conflicts between the two professional bodies, the Nigerian president signed a 
decree that recognised ANAN as a rival association which revoked the 
monopoly of the ACCA-qualified accounting association.  
In Brunei, Yapa (1999) argues that although the Brunei accountancy system 
gives the impression that the profession is well-developed, the situation is 
anything but. The state (royal family) is the dominant user and regulator of 
accountancy profession services. The majority of the large accounting firm 
businesses are related to the royal family’s private businesses.  
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The accountancy body does exist but has minimal power in regulating the 
profession for a number of reasons. First, practitioners are not required by law 
to be members of the Brunei accounting body. Second, the Big 5 (at that time, 
now Big 4) are not members of the accountancy body. Third, the majority of 
members in the accountancy body are non-Bruneians which makes it difficult 
for them to build relations with the royal family and state authorities. 
Nonetheless, a number of reasons are also behind the difficulties in developing 
the accountancy body: lack of resources, lack of licensing accountants, and 
lack of any type of self-regulation.  
In another study, Yapa (2006) examined the state-profession dynamics in Sri 
Lanka. He argues that the Sri Lankan chartered accountants association 
implemented strict measures for membership which implicated its national 
objective for promoting the audit profession. This, despite changes in 
government, continued to empower only a small number of its members to 
monopolise the audit market. The high examination failure rate and a refusal 
to exempt university graduates diverted Sri Lankan actors with British 
qualifications (ACCA and CIMA) to participate in other sectors: commerce and 
government agencies. This contributed to the monopoly of Sri Lankan 
chartered accountants over the audit market. The power of the audit 
association in building barriers to membership is explained by Yapa as a result 
of strong political connections, friendship with an elite groups, lobbying, and 
lack of government concern.  
In China, Yee (2012) analysed the role of the Chinese state in the 
professionalisation of public accounting. In 1988, as part of an economic 
reform, the Chinese accounting association (CICPA) was established and 
supervised by the government. The first honorary chairman was the Minister 
of Finance. As public accountants are perceived by the state to have an 
important function in monitoring state-owned enterprises, the association 
steered public accountants to the state economic agenda. Yee argues that the 
state-profession partnership to control public accountants was built in line with 
Chinese political and ideological perceptions. 
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Yee (2012) found that due to an increased need of the accountancy function, 
the Chinese state established a second accountancy body (CACPA). 
However, significant differences in membership entry standards and the 
overlapping functions of the associations resulted in intense competition and 
confusion. To solve the intra-professional conflicts and preserve the Chinese 
character of the profession, Yee argues, the state interfered by merging the 
two associations. 
Within the Chinese context, Spence et al. (2019) employed Bourdieu state 
theorisation to investigate the relationship between the Chinese state and the 
audit profession. To justify the importance of their research, Spence et al., 
correctly argued for two points. First, prior studies on the state-profession 
relationship are dominated by Western contexts where neoliberal systems 
guide such arrangements. Second, the majority of studies on state-profession 
dynamics focus on the material power of the state (neo-Weberian). Whereas 
Bourdieu perceived the power of the state as an interplay between the physical 
(material) and the misrecognised non-physical (symbolic) powers (for 
Bourdieu’s ideas on the state, see Section 4.3). 
Spence et al. (2019) argue that in China, the state, not the market, shapes the 
audit profession/field. The Chinese state supported the field of Chinese audit 
firms (through awards, subsidies, and facilitating/encouraging mergers) to 
increase in size and to compete with international audit firms. The state 
implemented a number of strategies to facilitate/promote/encourage the 
competitive position of local firms. For example, designing a ranking system 
and incorporating large local firms in the audit of state-owned entities to protect 
national security (economy and information). It even encouraged local firms to 
expand advisory services. The government also uses its influence in the 
accountancy association to influence the decisions taken.   
With the enlargement of the Chinese firms, the ability of international Big 4 
firms to accumulate social capital with the government became more difficult. 
Spence et al. (2019) argued that the state-implemented strategies (re)shaped 
the audit profession field which at the same time enforced the state’s material 
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power as well as constructing the cognitive structure of local auditors on the 
symbolic power of the Chinese state.  
In the Arab world, Mihret et al. (2017) analysed the corporatist system of the 
Saudi accounting body (Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants, 
SOCPA) from 1979 to 1992. They argued for three findings. First, SOCPA was 
able to gain the authority to regulate accountancy because it was able to align 
its agenda with the national public policy of indigenising the profession and 
safeguarding religious values. Second, SOCPA developed accounting 
standards by combining US accounting standards with religious laws. Third, 
SOCPA included incumbent auditors under its umbrella and trained them as a 
long-term strategy which later resulted in restricted involvement of expatriate 
labour in the Saudi audit profession.   
In a recent study, Mihret et al. (2019) employed neo-Gramscian analysis to 
examine changes to the Iranian state-accountancy profession relationship in 
parallel with changes to Iranian state ideology. In the pre-revolution era, Iran 
was driven by pro-Western ideologies. Mihret et al. argue that this did not 
mean that Iran followed Western regulatory practices (often of the corporatist 
system). In that period, the accountancy profession was mobilised under a 
state monitoring system.  
With the Iranian ideological shift which happened in the 1970s, the new anti-
Western regime prohibited the operations of international firms and included 
accountancy within the state apparatus of an Islamist nationalist-driven audit 
function. However, according to Mihret et al., post Iraq-Iran war, the Iranians 
adopted some transnational norms to manage its economy. This ideological 
change contributed in the reconstitution of the accountancy regulatory setting 
which gave the accountancy profession some authority of operations to 
accommodate transnational norms, but under state control.  
In Kuwait, the case that I aim to investigate, I could not find any (non-positivist) 
contemporary studies on the state-audit profession relationship. However, I 
found a historical study on the formation of the Kuwaiti accountancy body. 
Altaher et al. (2014) examined the role of the state in the creation of an 
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accountancy body in Kuwait in 1973, arguing that with the involvement of 
Anglo-American corporations in Kuwait oil activities, the audit function became 
a necessity. Historically, Altaher et al. (2014, p. 263) argued: “The lack of 
indigenous accountants in Kuwait led to a high reliance on foreign 
accountants.”  
With the rising number of indigenous accounting graduates, the Kuwaiti state 
facilitated and funded the creation of the accountancy body which was initiated 
by Kuwaiti accountants to counter the domination of non-Kuwaitis on the 
accountancy market. The accountancy association in Kuwait was formed 
based on the concept of an important sociocultural institution, Dewaniya12.  
As I illustrate in this section, the majority of non-Western studies on the state-
profession relationship focused on the (historical) formation of the 
accountancy profession in various countries with different focuses. The 
findings mirror countries’ social systems and culture--all emphasise the role of 
the state in steering accountancy professionalism, but without giving much 
focus on the states’ modes of regulating auditor practices. The next section 
will explore prior research on the influence of external (Western-driven-global) 
forces on the state-profession relationship in the non-north-Western states.  
2.3.1. Globalisation and audit in the non-north-Western context 
In Greece, Caramanis (2002) stressed the power of the state in influencing 
and (re)shaping social order and argued that activities to liberate the Greek 
economy had underpinning survival logics. Economic liberation was pursued 
to help Greece become fully integrated with the EU and to protect itself from 
Turkish threats. Caramanis argues that part of such a liberation agenda 
created inter-professional disputes between international accounting firms and 
indigenous audit firms that monopolised statutory audit. International 
 
12 “Dewaniya traditionally takes place in a room in a house with external access; it is restricted 
to males, and bears the name of the house owner … in many cases it acted as a forum for 
groups with special interests, and as the starting point of social change.” (Altaher et al., 2014, 
p. 269). “The general atmosphere of the Dewaniya is similar to that of social clubs, cultural 
and literary forums and political salons” (Kuwait Government Online, 2013; cited in Altaher et 
al., 2014, p. 269). 
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accounting firms lobbied the US to interfere and support their strategic 
interests to overcome the monopoly of local firms.  
In post-Soviet Russia, Samsonova (2009) found that development of audit 
regulations evolved through three phases and was strongly influenced by the 
regulatory practices of European counties, especially those that directly 
interfered in regulating Russian audit practices. With the opening up of 
Russia’s economy, economic players (including the EU as donors to Russia) 
influenced Russia to implement market-driven restructuring and accept their 
approaches to audit policymaking.  
Within the same Russian context, Mennicken (2008) examined the 
implementation of international standards on auditing (ISA). Mennicken 
argued that the implementation of ISA for Russia was an important factor for 
its international recognition and legitimacy. She also found that as Western 
firms are more linked to multinational corporations, the implementation of ISA 
benefited international firms which created a hierarchal difference between 
international and indigenous firms. Consequently, indigenous audit firms 
perceived modernity as joining an international audit brand name (network). 
In another study, Mennicken (2010) examined the relationship between the 
expanded audit market and the mode of governance in the context of 
neoliberalism in post-Soviet Russia. She found that the perception of good 
audit is often linked to firm size and corporate influence. Also, with low 
government requirements to be an auditor, international firms distinguish 
themselves from indigenous firms on the basis of organisation structure, audit 
manuals, archiving system, quality control, and audit firm ranking. Mennicken 
theorised that in post-Soviet Russia, audit expansion was not an outcome of 
neoliberalisation, but because international audit firms guided some 
corporations to succeed, their marketing strategies, and the expansion of audit 
ideas to social life.  
In an investigation similar to that of the Mennicken (2008) study explained 
above, Ezzamel and Xiao (2015) argue that, for China to be part of the 
globalised world, accounting standards were customised to satisfy 
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international pressure and at the same time preserve local cultural identity. 
Ezzamel and Xiao analysed the dynamics of the process of producing 
accounting regulations for the foreign-invested firm. They explained the state 
politics that produced accounting regulations similar to IFRS/ISA but with 
Chinese characteristics maintained as a boundary to limit full international 
involvement and at the same time absorb public resistance to following 
Western systems.   
In attempts to neoliberalise the Sri Lankan economy, Yapa et al. (2017) 
investigated the inter-professional conflicts surrounding the conditions of IOs 
to adopting international standards of auditing. Yapa et al. found that such 
reform facilitated Big 4 domination of the audit market because of their 
knowledge of these standards and global reputation. Nonetheless, the Sri 
Lankan state, according to Yapa et al., did not give much consideration to local 
firms and supported international accounting firms to achieve its economic 
reform agenda.  
Studies on globalisation and non-north-Western states suggest that state 
submission to Western driven reform varies depending on a state’s power on 
the global scale. One of the salient reasons for reform is to obtain international 
recognition (legitimacy). However, as the culture and history of non-north-West 
countries are different, variation in the application of global rules also exists 
between these states. In all cases, economic globalisation empowered 
international audit firms over indigenous local audit firms. 
Within the global context, China for example, is found to be on a slower path 
to transforming its economy. That is because its global economic power 
mingled with its non-democratic regime allow it to “relatively” resist pressure 
for rapid transformation. In Sri Lanka, the state interests in neoliberalising the 
economy, in association with carelessness in the audit function of local firms, 
empowered the Big 4 to dominate the audit market. Research also provided 
evidence, in Russia for example, of how north-Western states interfere in 
societies' economic transformation to advance their interests, either indirectly 
(through supporting/guiding local governments) or directly (through the EU or 
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IOs). That is, to extend the advancement of capital practice, multinational 
corporations, and international audit firms of the north-West to the territories 
of the non-north West.  
Before I move to identify studies that examined the globalisation of American 
audit regulatory arrangements, the following third section of this chapter 
investigates sociology studies of the accountancy profession.   
2.4. Sociology literature on the audit profession  
This section aims to explain the scholarly debate concerning how the audit 
field operates in different nation-states. The purpose of exploring this literature 
is that it focuses on how audit firms accumulate and maintain their power at 
the national level. Examination of a professionalisation project might help to 
understand the underlying logic (arrangements and structure) of audit firms 
that guides their relationship with the state. This type of study reminds us that 
“individuals” and power relations that underpin human practices matter.  
Additionally, as I am adopting a Bourdieusian perspective in this thesis, 
understanding the logic of Bourdieusian studies in audit, the state, and their 
interconnection is valuable. However, it is worth noting that in the accounting 
domain, the sociology of the audit profession literature that employs Pierre 
Bourdieu’s practice theory often focuses on one field without much 
consideration of the intersection of audit with other fields. That said, except for 
the work of Spence et al. (2019) that I covered in an Section 2.3, this particular 
literature widely neglects the state and its power to influence the dynamics of 
the audit field. In fact, the state is an underutilised theme in the accounting 
literature, especially in north-Western corporatist focused research.  
The Bourdieusian literature in the audit field is relatively small, interview 
sourced, with many comparative studies, mostly Western-based. It does not 
explicitly recognise global norms as influential forces that affect audit field 
dynamics. That said, within this small literature, research on non-Western 
context is even smaller as noted by Spence et al. (2016): “it should also be 
noted that relatively little research has been done on PSFs [Professional 
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Services Firms] and professions in emerging markets” (p. 4). Similarly, as Belal 
et al. (2017) discuss, “There has therefore been only very limited work looking 
at the market for professional services in emerging economies” (p. 148). Now 
I move to navigate this literature. 
2.4.1. Locating power in the site of audit firms 
In the UK audit field, Stringfellow et al. (2015) investigated the modes of 
domination of the Big 4. They performed interviews with various accounting 
firms and regulators and found that as the Big 4 audit banks, banks in return 
give more preference to clients who are audited by the Big 4. Also, an audit 
client, when expanding and requiring finance, often moves to one of the Big 4 
to satisfy bank preferences; this logic constituted a barrier to non-Big 4 growth. 
This type of oligopoly and domination is maintained by the Big 4 through their 
involvement and influence on the accountancy bodies. These bodies pressure 
regulators for further liability concessions on the logic of avoiding the 
demolition of one of the Big 4 which would result in further concentration in the 
audit field.  
The findings of Stringfellow et al. (2015) are similar to those of Samsonova-
Taddei and Humphrey (2015) concerning the Big 4’s pressure for concessions 
at the EU level, though they do not refer to each other. Interestingly, however, 
Stringfellow et al. mistakenly applied Bourdieu’s notions on symbolic violence 
in the audit field, and argue that:  
We found that the exercise of symbolic violence in the field led to 
smaller firms internalising a sense of victimisation, evaluating 
themselves against the practices of the Big Four, and emulating their 
practices in processes of mimetic isomorphism. (p. 95)  
Arguably, Bourdieu’s symbolic violence is a more “socially” profound concept 
than implications of competition for economic accumulation (see Section 
4.2.3.5). Perhaps, the marginalisation and reaction of small firms is an act of 
violence (but not what Bourdieu theorised as symbolic violence) by the Big 4 
and their large clients to maintain their dominant position.   
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In comparative studies, Spence and Carter (2014) investigated how partners 
and senior auditors perceive professionalism in the Big 4 in Canada, the UK, 
Ireland, and Austria, but the majority of their 31 interviews are in Canada and 
the UK. They argue that three common thematic logics were found. First, social 
skills to generate trust are crucial and contribute to the firm income. Second, 
no discourse was found to enhance technical abilities, protect public interests, 
and promote ethics or independence, but instead to focus on mitigating firm 
risk while bringing in new work.  
Finally, concerning the management of risk, they found that risk logics vary at 
different hierarchal levels. Because risk management is perceived within firms 
as a technical function, assessing risk became a responsibility of directors, a 
level below partnership. These technical directors give authorisation to 
partners to sign. As an implication, partners give more weight to commercial 
activities while directors focus on the technical and risk logics. Spence and 
Carter argued that, as commercial logic lies in the highest level within the Big 
4 hierarchy, this led serving the public interest (through progress on ethics and 
independence) to be of secondary importance to international audit firms.   
In another study, Carter and Spence (2014), examined how to become a 
partner in the Big 4, possibly with the same data set from their Spence and 
Carter (2014) study. They argue that relationship to social elites (e.g., ministers 
and businesspeople) is vital. Also, partners disavow technicality and focus on 
the satisfaction of their client. Partners are expected to have high linguistic 
capabilities and charitable activities to build up a social network to grow the 
firm income, unlike the old abandoned organisational structure, where 
dedicated partners were responsible for commercial activities. They criticised 
the contemporary unified partner model which focuses on generating revenues 
for their firm and disseminating commercial logic of the Big 4 top levels, 
whereas risk and technicality are delegated to the lower level. 
Spence et al. (2015) undertook a comparative study between the UK, Canada, 
France, and Spain to investigate the commonalities between countries for 
promotion to partnership in the Big 4. The findings suggest the following: first, 
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a huge emphasis on the commercial aspects for partnership promotion 
consideration. Second, as a global firm aims to standardise partner profiles, 
local firms have a big influence on the global appraisal system for partner 
promotion. However, for partners, the process for growing their profile and firm, 
and to provide their expert services, is often through a social network with the 
business community. France is different in the sense that a social network is 
inherited with many partners’ prestige university education and graduate 
network.   
In a comparative study between the UK, Canada, France, Spain, and 
Bangladesh, Spence et al. (2016) investigated the habits of the Big 4 partners. 
They found that capital/money dominated the logic of Western partners but not 
in the non-Western nation, Bangladesh, where the focus was more on 
technical expertise. While social networks were found to be vital, the 
accumulation of this resource varies between countries. In the UK, Canada, 
and Spain, the accumulation of networks is done through performance. 
Whereas in France, social network is more inherited and collected mainly 
through alumni of prestigious French universities. In Bangladesh, social 
relations are collected through social origins, dynasties, and nepotism.  
Furthermore, in Bangladesh, British professional certification is perceived as a 
more prestigious qualification compared to the local one, as well as a 
designation for distinction. They concluded that though there is some variation 
within Western countries, Bangladesh is radically different in how they 
perceived professionalism. Interestingly, in this study, four interviews with 
international audit firms were conducted within the United Arab Emirates, one 
of Kuwait’s neighbouring countries that shares many cultural aspects, but 
these interviews were not considered in the analysis and discussion. 
Belal et al. (2017) tried to explore the internationalisation of the Big 4 field in 
Bangladesh. They found social networks rely on familial and political links. The 
Big 4 operate through local representation(s) that sign audit reports in their 
name(s). However, Belal et al. interviewed the majority of partners of the Big 
4 in Bangladesh. Only KPMG is a member firm (integrated with the global firm 
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network and sharing profits and losses, following the network methodology, 
access to resources, and subject to inspection by the global office) and the 
remaining Big 4 are (long-established) correspondence firms (not integrated; 
arrangement varies between firms).  
The accountancy body in Bangladesh restricted non-audit services on firms 
that were not full members. And because of that, many of these services are 
provided by regional firms (e.g., from India or Pakistan). And, in some cases, 
if the non-audit contract was large, foreign firms set up an office in Bangladesh 
(Belal et al., 2017, pp. 155-6). Belal et al. also found three issues that affect 
the mechanism in the audit field that pressure against changing the regulatory 
audit model in Bangladesh. First, insufficient levels of technical 
professionalism. Second, low audit fees are a barrier for firms to change their 
arrangement from correspondence firms to full member. This is mainly 
because audit is seen as a mere legal requirement. Third, nepotism in the 
appointment, promotion, and retirement of partners, as many of the audit firms 
are run by families. In conclusion, Belal et al. found a strong sense of 
professionalism within audit firms.  
To understand the power of the Big 4 in different national contexts, Spence et 
al. (2017) interviewed many of the Big 4 in Japan and China and suggest the 
following. In Japan, part of firms’ operational logic is outside Bourdieu’s 
practice structure as it is attached to moral issues (repayment of kindness and 
duty/obligation), not only economic goals. In China, it is more commercial 
based. In Japan, social relationships target colleagues and are part of the 
broader patronage (parent-part/child-part, master/apprentice) systems, while 
in China, social networks privilege clients and government. Nonetheless, 
technical expertise weighed more in the Japanese context compared to China.  
Spence et al. (2017) argue that professional services firms in Japan were able 
to maintain their Japanese identities because the Big 4 existed through a 
merger of established Japanse audit firms. Also, the small market for non-audit 
services. In China, by contrast, the Big 4 were established and developed 
through Western partners located in Hong Kong, especially US partners. This 
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led the Chinese Big 4 field to construct a logic that embraces Western norms 
and practices.  
This particular literature examined how the accountancy profession (audit 
firms), especially the Big 4, practice (accumulate power) at the national level 
with variation in communal norms. It often focuses on one field without giving 
much consideration to the interaction between fields, the role/power of nation-
states, or global forces in (re)shaping national professionalisation projects (if 
any) (Spence et al. (2019) and Belal et al. (2017) are exceptions). 
In the Western audit market as well as in China, commercialisation saturates 
the logic of senior levels of the Big 4 (Carter and Spence, 2014; Spence et al., 
2017; Spence and Carter, 2014). In Bangladesh, less emphasis on 
commercialisation is found (Belal et al., 2017; Spence et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, in all examined markets, this literature suggests that social 
capital is crucial, but the way social capital is accumulated varies between 
countries. The logic of social capital accumulation in Japan was found to be 
outside Bourdieusian theorisation as it is located in moral values rather than 
economic conversion.  
Now I move to the fourth section of this chapter, the US-driven audit regulatory 
norms in the accounting literature.  
2.5. The globalisation of US audit arrangements   
With the US’s indirect interference in reforming East Asia economies through 
supranational organisations (Arnold, 2012; Halliday and Carruthers, 2009), the 
US witnessed major financial scandals by large American corporations with 
their external auditors, Arthur Andersen. This crisis resulted in the enactment 
of the US SOX in 2002 to reform the corporatist regulatory practices of the US 
capital market. However, SOX became the benchmark for the activities of both 
supranational organisations and transnational agencies.  
Concerning audit, as I illustrated in Chapter 1, SOX aimed to change the mode 
of the corporatist self-regulatory system by increasing state oversight of auditor 
practices in the capital market through the establishment of an “independent” 
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oversight body, the PCAOB. SOX also aimed, as part of its mandatory 
corporate governance system, to promote an independent relationship 
between auditors and their clients through two striking mandatory 
technologies, rotation and prohibition of non-audit (advisory) services. 
However, regulatory demands to implement rotation as a perceived solution to 
the audit independence dilemma began as early as the 1930s (Hoyle, 1978)13, 
and constraining audit firms abilities to provide advisory services since the 
1970’s (Zeff, 2003)14; but these technologies became globally recognised only 
after SOX implementation.  
The US reform became one of the global benchmarks and best practices for 
reforming Northern and Southern capital market regulatory practices despite 
the non-corporatist setting of many nation-state(s). For example, a few months 
after the enactment of SOX, IOSCO issued its first Principles of Auditor 
Independence and the Role of Corporate Governance in Monitoring an 
Auditor’s Independence (IOSCO, 2002b) and Principles for Auditor Oversight 
(IOSCO, 2002a) for its members, which directly followed the logic of SOX.  
The IMF and the World Bank ROSC collaboration followed SOX for capital 
market/audit reform either directly or through promoting the work of IOs that 
embrace SOX (e.g., OECD) (The World Bank, n.d.). Similarly, both the IFAC 
code of ethics as well as the recent EU audit legislation (effective 2016) 
followed SOX ideas. For example, the IFAC and EU followed the 
categorisation of SOX concerning prohibited advisory services! With the 
support of various transnational players, SOX ideas became “best practices” 
for capital market audit/corporate governance regulations.  
Regardless of the global spread of SOX audit regulatory logic (I will return to 
this theme later in this chapter), the following section provides scholarly 
 
13 Rotation of firms was raised by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in the 
McKesson and Robbins fraud case in the US in 1939.  
14 The expansion of audit firms’ advisory services in the 1970s was concurrent with the 
economic (neoliberal) transformation of many north-Western states.  
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critiques on some aspects within SOX as well as their application in other 
geographic territories. 
2.5.1. Critiques of SOX-driven audit technologies  
Audit independence technologies are intensively investigated by positive 
(market-based) studies with conflicting findings on their usefulness. However, 
the majority of non-positivist studies do not examine the content of audit 
regulations to understand their effect (Samsonova-Taddei and Siddiqui, 2016, 
p. 184). That said, many of the prior critiques on the micro audit technologies 
of SOX solutions (rotation and prohibition of advisory services) are “diffused” 
and theorised as a “concept”, but I did not come across any study that 
examined the process/dynamic of their implementation at the national, 
regional, or international levels.  
McMillan (2004), for example, argues that imposing technologies from outside 
the profession enclosure (e.g., rotation and prohibition on some consultancy); 
“merely dance around the key issue of the auditor–management relationship” 
(p. 949). McMillan emphasised enhancing auditor moralities within the 
profession because if audit firms were able to override moral principles to their 
independent opinions, they would bend roles even if they were pushed to 
provide only audit services. Similarly, Windsor and Warming-Rasmussen 
(2009) and Sikka (2015) are of the view that enhancing regulatory audit 
practices in a neoliberal system is not enough to promote audit 
independence/quality, but structural changes to commercialisation are 
required.  
Others argue that because of conflicts of interest between auditors and their 
clients, the accountancy profession only supports cosmetic changes to auditor 
independence/quality (Moore et al., 2006). Moore et al. criticised the US model 
of only promoting partner rotation and omitting the ability to provide tax 
services--one of the significant consultancy services provided by auditors--as 
well as the ability of PCAOB to exempt audit firms from the prohibition against 
non-audit services on a case-by-case basis (Moore et al., 2006). Arnold (2009, 
p. 807) argued for the same tax permission views. For Moore et al., not 
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changing structural settings (management hire and fire auditors, insufficiency 
of rotation in mitigating auditor interests, and regulatory ease with non-audit 
services) makes these technologies ineffective.  
Fiolleau et al. (2013) investigated SOX-driven audit independence 
technologies (rotation of external auditors and board audit committee) by 
examining the process of audit request-for-proposal in Canada. They found 
that company management--not the board audit committee--still has a big role 
in appointing external auditors, despite the SOX-led Canadian corporate 
governance system requirements. Also, they argue that because competition 
in the audit market is high, it enhances management power over newly 
appointed auditors, negatively affecting auditor independence. 
As the EU enacted similar logics to the US-SOX audit independence in 2014, 
Samsonova-Taddei and Siddiqui (2016) studied the content of the EU audit 
policy that targets the promotion of auditor ethics. They argue that these 
policies are of deontological (non-consequentialist) approaches to ethics 
which largely failed to promote audit moral constitutions, dispositions, values, 
and virtues.  
Despite criticisms to SOX and SOX-driven global norms, we know little about 
why transnational agencies comply with SOX and pressure countries to do the 
same. Malsch and Gendron (2011, p. 471) for example, found that fear that 
US authorities would not recognise audit quality of the European block is one 
of the reasons to follow US regulatory practices. Halliday and Carruthers 
(2009) argue the reason is because international organisation are occupied by 
senior staff with an American background, and the financial support provided 
by the US to these organisations. Harvey (2003, 2005) theorise that 
international organisations are instruments for global US hegemony.   
Concerning the global spread of SOX, a number of prior studies investigated 
the national dynamic of establishing a body responsible for taking over 
regulatory power from the audit profession, similar to the US PCAOB logic 
aiming to change the institutionalised corporatist system. This literature is 
emerging, relatively small, and follows a global standardisation perspective.  
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2.5.2. The internationalisation of SOX-inspired changes to 
nation-state corporatist arrangements 
A number of studies started to examine tensions within local regulatory 
systems following the US-SOX idea by establishing an independent body 
(similar to the US PCAOB) to promote state oversight in an inherited 
“corporatist” system. This particular literature investigated the dynamics in 
Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, and Russia. With differences in outcomes, 
the “effectiveness” of SOX-inspired regulatory change was mainly conditioned 
on countries’ historical and socio-political arrangements (Caramanis et al., 
2015, p. 13). However, I believe this literature is methodologically inspired by 
the early seminal works on accounting regulations (e.g., Robson et al. (1994), 
Radcliffe et al. (1994), Cooper et al. (1996)), but the majority of this literature 
does not refer to these studies!  
In Canada, the structural reform aimed to shift audit standards-setting from a 
self-regulated Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (dominated by the 
audit profession) to a newly created state body, the Canadian Public 
Accountability Board (CPAB). Malsch and Gendron (2011) argue that the 
structural reform aimed to preserve the reputation of the Canadian capital 
market and align Canadian regulatory practice with its neighbour, the US. 
By employing a modified version of Luke power dimensions, Malsch and 
Gendron (2011) found resistance and allegiance between CPAB and large 
Canadian audit firms. As Canada witnessed no major issues to push for the 
establishment of CPAB, it wanted to signal its initiative but at the same time 
did not want to disrupt its regulatory system. Partners from the Big 4 occupied 
executive positions in the new regulator with no representation from 
government agencies which resulted in maintaining the status quo concerning 
the modernising of corporate audit (Malsch and Gendron, 2011). 
To understand the Western trajectory of audit regulatory change, Malsch and 
Gendron (2011) went beyond the Canadian context and also performed some 
investigations in Europe but purposely did not disclose details of these 
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interviews or the names of the European countries (Malsch and Gendron, 
2011, p. 459 [2]). They found in Europe, similar to Canada, local regulators 
promote changes to regulatory practices to be in conformity with the global 
norms as well to obtain the acceptance of their regulatory practices by other 
powerful Western countries (p. 468). Also: 
[O]ur analysis also indicates that the creation of regulatory 
organizations in the EU is more the outcome of fear than of a genuine 
willingness to institute a mechanism aimed at protecting the public 
interest. Threats that US authorities would not recognize the quality of 
audits carried out in Europe reportedly played a key role in the decision 
to institute independent regulatory offices in EU countries (Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011, p. 471).  
They found commonalities in discourse and resistance to state arm’s length 
regulations between Canada and the EU. With regard to similarities in 
discourse, for example, the same justification for a low level of transparency 
with regard to inspection reports was used. Concerning commonalities of 
resistance, to escape sanctioning decisions, audit firm strategies include 
criticising inspector competence and threats of loss/collapse of one of the large 
audit firms. The public interest, according to Malsch and Gendron, is 
marginalised in these power dynamics. 
In Ireland, Canning and O’Dwyer (2013) argue that the incitement for the 
regulatory shift of oversight was malpractice in the accountancy profession. 
Unlike most studies within this particular literature, Canning and O’Dwyer 
found that most of the Irish audit field strategies to influence/subvert the design 
of the new regulator failed. By analysing archival data and using the concept 
of regulatory space as a theoretical framing, they investigated the 
renegotiation and reshaping (from 1999 to 2007) of the new Irish accounting 
and auditing oversight body.  
Canning and O’Dwyer (2013) found that the Irish accountancy profession was 
involved in defiance and manipulation (exploiting legislative drafts) and 
adopted strategies (dominating the positions in the new body, controlling 
information about their members, claiming lack of competence of the new 
regulator, and engaging lawyers to amend the legislation draft) aiming to 
 49 
constrain the design of the new body, as well as challenging the interpretation 
of its mandate. Due to legislative and legal support, the new regulator’s 
mandate was not changed. Furthermore, they found that regulators and audit 
profession resistance strategies change over time. 
In France, Hazgui and Gendron (2015) investigated the localisation of the 
global trajectory for creating an “independent” audit oversight regulatory body 
in 2003. They examined documents from 2003 to 2012 and performed semi-
structured interviews with regulators and auditors, drawing on the regulatory 
space concept. With their longitudinal analysis, they found a hybrid regulatory 
arrangement was the result of disputes.  
Concerning the French shift of regulatory power from the profession to the 
state, various forms of resistance existed and changed over time. In the first 
phase (2003-2007), the profession prevented and complicated the work of the 
new regulator to protect the self-regulatory system. This was done by 
exploiting technical knowledge of the new regulator, continued self-regulatory 
oversight practices (ignoring the change, issuing self-regulatory inspection 
reports, and claims that the new regulator will follow the same model), 
developing models to delay application of the new system, withholding 
information from the new regulator, and large firms submitting two legal cases 
against the new regulator. Then the profession started to support the creation 
of the new regulator but resisted changing the self-regulatory mechanism on 
the ground that France had not witnessed significant fraud cases.  
In phase two (2008-2010), to mitigate media coverage concerning the legal 
cases and some international firms threatening to stop auditing, the new 
regulator proposed to establish joint working groups with the profession. 
Nonetheless, due to pressure from the US PCAOB inspecting US companies 
in France as well as pressure from European commissions to advance audit 
systems, France’s new regulator was pushed to establish its mandated roles 
with the help of the profession. The second phase witnessed collaboration 
between the new regulator and the profession. Later, the professional 
association started to question the competence of the new regulator and 
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demanded the association of the accountancy body be represented on the 
board.  
Finally, in phase three (from 2011 on), the accountancy body became a 
member of the new regulator’s standard development and inspection 
committees. Also, again, the close proximity between the new regulator and 
the profession started to be questioned.  
Caramanis et al. (2015) investigated the creation of a new regulatory system 
(oversight board) in Greece. They argue that Greece is different than other 
European countries on two grounds: it has a clientelistic political system and 
the global financial crises of 2008 had major implications, unlike anywhere else 
in Europe. Nonetheless, as Greece is subject to European policies, and with 
the rise of financial scandals that involved highly placed politicians, an 
independent oversight body was perceived to be one of the solutions. 
Caramanis et al. analysed archival documents, performed semi-structured 
interviews, and followed O’Donnell’s conceptualisation of delegative 
democracies.  
Caramanis et al. (2015) argue that due to the Greek socio-political system, the 
created (Anglo-American model) oversight body was prevented from 
improving the quality of financial reporting from its inception. The new 
regulatory body faced many issues in performing an audit quality inspection 
program (lack of legal authority to perform such function, limited human 
resources with junior-level expertise). Additionally, although the new oversight 
board became independent from the profession, the new body continued to be 
dependent on the “clientelistic” government, arguing that the control of the 
Ministry of Economy on this body has resulted in the government (through the 
Minister of Economy) appointing their political allies and friends, including the 
appointment of audit quality inspectors. Caramanis et al. argued for an 
integration mismatch between global institutional design and the national 
system.  
Interestingly, there is a significant contradiction between how Malsch and 
Gendron (2011) and Caramanis et al. (2015) viewed regulatory 
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“independence”. On the one hand, Malsch and Gendron criticised the 
government’s lack of involvement in the operation of the new oversight body 
because the newly created body is dominated by representatives from the 
profession. On the other hand, Caramanis et al. argue that the Greek oversight 
body lacks independence because it is dominated by the (clientelist) 
government. 
Canning and O’Dwyer (2016) contradict Caramanis et al. (2015). This 
difference in findings may be mainly due to each country’s socio-political 
particularities. Canning and O’Dwyer (2016) investigate the struggle for power 
and legitimacy by directors and senior executives operating the newly 
established oversight institution in Ireland. They argue that in Ireland, a review 
group (of elite actors in industry, audit, firms, politics, academia … etc.) was 
established to assess the system of the accountancy profession. This group 
recommended that there should be some external oversight by the state.  
A radical proposal, according to Canning and O’Dwyer (2016), was issued to 
eliminate self-regulatory logic which created disputes between the newly 
established regulator and part of the assessment group. Nonetheless, 
Canning and O’Dwyer found that the chairman of the audit review group played 
an important role in pushing the trajectory for audit regulatory reform. The 
chairman stressed (as hard advocacy) the board members (especially 
representatives of the audit profession) to reject any type of self-
interest/resistance to advancing audit regulations (p. 9). Also, forming 
alliances with the media and politicians through public announcements (as soft 
advocacy) helped accountancy thrive in Ireland. They add that the 
appointment of a chief executive with previous public interest functions to 
manage the new accountancy regulator has also helped to overcome the 
profession’s self-interest/resistance.  
In a special issue on state power in Organization Studies journal, Alon et al. 
(2019) argued that “the broader issues of governmental transformation and the 
(re)building of governmental capacity and authority have largely remained 
unexplored” (p. 1221). Accordingly, they examined the regulatory shift of audit 
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oversight in Russia. Interestingly, within this particular literature, this study is 
the only one that explored local audit laws. However, they argued that the 
international regulatory change that pressed to enhance audit quality by 
changing self-regulation via the peer-review mechanism to state inspection, 
enabled the Russian government, unlike in the Western context, to include 
audit oversight under government institutions (the Ministry of Finance) to 
regulate and oversee audit firms.   
In this study, Alon et al. mobilised “legislative layering” as a theoretical 
concept; that is, different layers of regulations. For example, maintaining a 
register with minimum conditions, peer-review continued, and inspection for 
control review was conducted by the Ministry of Finance. Besides its main 
argument--that regulatory reform in Russia, unlike in many Western regulatory 
systems, empowered the government over the accountancy profession--does 
this paper offer us nothing about the micro-dynamic of change in Russia? 
Prior studies investigated the dynamic of establishing a state body responsible 
for assuming regulatory power from the audit profession, similar to the US 
PCAOB logics. However, we do not know what happens in non-Western or 
non-corporatist systems, or in a combination of these two settings. Prior 
studies on SOX-driven institutional change adopted a standardisation 
perspective without elaborating on “why” nation-states change their local 
arrangements to follow the global standardisation trajectory (Malsch and 
Gendron (2011) is an exception), or what the international instruments are that 
lead (a) nation-state(s) to pressure countries to pursue the standardisation 
path (e.g., international best practice). Additionally, in the regulatory audit 
domain, creating an independent body is one of the global norms. 
Nonetheless, other norms probably follow a similar logic, such as regulations 
to rotate auditors and constrain advisory services offered by audit firms. These 
global micro-norms, although they are extensively examined by positivist 
studies, are widely neglected in the “critical” accounting literature. Now I move 
to discuss the last part of this chapter, “international best practices”. 
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2.6. International best practices: The unobserved global 
norm  
Wendy Brown in her book, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth 
Revolution, explained so-called “international best practices” as one of the 
contemporary methods to govern societal political rationality and secure 
political meanings for intensive economic activities. She puts it this way: 
[B]est practices stand for value-free technical knowledge validated by 
experience and consensus, where the alternative is not only tradition or 
mandate, but partisanship and contestation over purposes, values, and 
ends (Brown, 2015, p. 139). 
While best practices may be “set forth by an authority, such as 
governing body or management”, they embody precisely the 
consensus-developed directives with which neoliberal governance 
more generally aims to replace law, policing, punishment, and top-down 
directives. At the same time, best practices may incite or instigate 
certain legal reforms that would permit closer comportment between the 
law and business interests, and they also may entail or generate certain 
legal and ethical workarounds. Thus, while best practices often 
operates as replacements for law and regulation (not to mention for 
religion, tradition, or other forms of deliberation), while they are 
neoliberalism’s alternative to the state that it officially abjures, proof that 
we can be both ethical and efficient without external interference, they 
can also be a Trojan horse through which law and the political order it 
secures may be transformed for and by neoliberal reason (Ibid., p. 141). 
For Brown, international best practices could be understood on two related 
fronts. First, an ideological pressure to reconstruct rationalities to endorse 
neoliberal ideas. Second, a form of measuring local practices; that is, state 
practices that do not follow “international best” are considered not best, or 
outdated. I call these two theorisation fronts related because ideology and 
practice are in a reciprocal relationship: ideology impacts practice and practice 
impacts ideology. Following Brown’s theorisation, if international best practices 
do exist in the audit domains, and they obviously do, they should influence 
accounting regulations as well as the relationship between states and the 
accountancy profession and the way social order is maintained.  
Despite the global (intensive) diffusion of the concept and the process of 
international best practices, they have no (or limited) appearance in non-
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positivist accounting studies. In fact, besides the work of Mehrpouya and 
Salles-Djelic (2019) on transforming transparency to self-discipline and 
Mehrpouya and Samiolo (2016) on ranking of pharmaceutical companies, we 
do not know much about the global (neoliberal) norms, and how they confront 
the way order is maintained between the state and the accountancy 
profession.  
Prior studies often link standardisation to financialisation and international best 
practices to neoliberalisation. I understand that financialisation, 
neoliberalisation, standardisation, and international best practices are different 
concepts. However, I consider, the “process” of standardisation and 
international best practices, although both aim to achieves similar ends (social 
change on the terms of those steering these norms to provide an environment 
for capital), they share similarities but also differences. With regard to 
similarities, on the one hand, international best practices are one of the 
methods to influence changing national practice/regulations to achieve 
international standardised practices. On the other hand, standardising 
practices propagated to change national practices by following international 
best practices.  
Perhaps the typology of standardisation is used for Western states, while 
international best practices is applied to non-Western states. Or the opposite, 
standardisation is used as a justification for coercive involvement in the internal 
affairs of national-states and international best practices is a form of soft 
influence. Again, we do not know much about these problems. 
The differences between standardisation and international best practices are 
mainly related to the perspective they offer for (a) research(er). Looking at 
regulatory change from a standardisation lens is not similar to examining a 
problem from an international best practices perspective. Probably, from a 
critical methodology, the former has less effect on power in comparison to the 
latter. On the contrary, an international best practice perspective offers a 
deeper investigation into power/hegemonic activities as it offers an additional 
view in comparison to standardisation, which is practice measurement.  
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As I identified in the earlier section, in changing local corporatist arrangements 
to the reformed American/SOX system, some studies did consider the process 
of some of these norms on the state-profession relationship, not from a 
neoliberal/practice measurement perspective, but from a standardisation view. 
That being said, as I mentioned earlier, to the best of my knowledge, there are 
no studies in the accountancy literature that critically investigate international 
best practices or use international best practices as a perspective to navigate 
social problem(s). I did find international best practices explored in the public 
administration literature, as well as indirect discussion on “global norms” in the 
sociology literature. 
2.6.1. International best practice in the public administration 
literature 
Fougner (2008) described the process of “best practice” as a “bottom-up 
approach” or “top-down approach”. The former occurs when “powerful” 
countries develop their own benchmarks and then find common patterns for 
international generalisation. With the latter, non-powerful countries have no 
say in the formulation of these practices, so top-down means imposing these 
practices by external forces that aim to govern nations via neoliberal practices.  
Within the global norms production, Davis et al. (2012) argue that despite the 
promotion of some practices by some IOs, the making of these regulations is 
not always done by the same IOs: 
In many cases promulgators attach their names to indicators whose 
production involves contributions from a number of other actors. For 
example, reports and rankings for the Programme of International 
Student Assessment (PISA) are promulgated by the OECD, but are 
actually prepared and produced by an Australian consultancy under a 
contract with the OECD (p. 13). 
To understand modern practices, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) stress the 
importance of navigating the roots of whose localism is globalised. That is, to 
understand the socio-political roots embedded in the construction of 
internationally diffused practices.  
 56 
Some studies in the public policy and administration domain examined the way 
some African countries are governed through “international best practices”. 
These studies concur that pressuring African countries to imitate/mimic 
Western practices leads to failure with no proper progress for southern non-
Western societies (Andrews, 2010; Pritchett et al., 2013). This creates more 
problems for countries than solutions (Andrews, 2008; Pritchett and Woolcock, 
2004), and the isomorphic mimicry is a significant threat to democracy as 
countries have no voice with regard to the implementation of international best 
practices (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004).  
Pritchett et al. (2013) argue that in Africa, countries often fail to implement 
functional “international best practice” policies because each country has its 
own politics, social, and economic structures. They also added that countries 
merely imitate “best practices” to maintain legitimacy in the global order 
(Pritchett et al., 2013). Similarly, Andrews (2012) argues that to assess “fit or 
relevance” of “best practice” to developing countries, one should “Look at the 
degree of difference between the proposed adoption context and the context 
in which such practice emerged as ‘best’” (p. 137). He found differences 
between African countries on the relevance of applying these practices. 
Andrews argues that the implementation of “best practices” is more functional 
in African countries where their local practice is closer to the north-Western 
context, where “best practices” emerged. 
Andrews (2010) argues that good government looks different in different 
countries. He criticised the “one-size-fits-all” type of global pressure and 
claimed that in many cases, implementing “international best practices” does 
not lead to more effective government. Andrews not only criticises the 
ineffectiveness of the global governance norm of international best practices, 
but also discusses pressuring southern countries with transparency practices! 
He contests the idea that north-Western countries are more transparent in their 
system than southern states. Andrews (2010) argues that in certain sectors, 
such as defence, northern countries are less transparent than the south. 
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The majority of this small literature uses quantitative analysis from data 
published by IOs (World Bank and OECD) for developing countries. These 
studies do not question the concept of “international best practice”, or as 
theorised by Brown (2015), consider this global norm as a hierarchal (power) 
relation between the north and the south to pressure changing indigenous 
practices with its embedded (neoliberal) rationality. They take “international 
best practice” as-is.  
This literature is constrained with quantitative methodology, which limits 
explaining “how” implementation of “international best practice” takes place. 
Or “what” type of internal disputes are created by shifting local/traditional 
practices in Africa. Also, this literature criticises the global “best practice” 
governance model but does not discuss “why” the top-down system of 
international best practices is still in place despite many “empirically-proven” 
stories of failure. Now I move to explain the “spirit” of “international best 
practice” in sociological studies.  
2.6.2. The spirit of global norms in sociological studies 
It is worth noting that the following two sociological studies could be argued to 
be outside international best practices domain. Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 
2009) are more inclined to standardisation logic, and Espeland and Sauder 
(2007) studied ranking. However, although I did not find any sociological study 
that directly examined “international best practices”, I find Halliday and 
Carruthers work echoes the material aspects of the Brown (2015) explanation 
of “best practice” as a measurement. With regard to Espeland and Sauder, I 
believe their work on ranking offers potential answers to “why” questions 
concerning the diffusion of global norms despite the public administration 
studies that proved international best practices fail to help societies progress. 
During the Asian financial crisis, Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) 
examined the implementation of global standardisation of bankruptcy 
regulatory reform in Indonesia, South Korea, and China. They developed a 
theoretical framework to explain how countries, based on their distance from 
the culture of global norms producers, reacted to pressure to reform local 
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institutions and practices. I am using Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) 
theorisation as part of this thesis’ theoretical framework.  
Halliday and Carruthers found that the level of pressure from IOs on nations 
varies between countries, as do the local dynamics for dealing with these 
pressures. In Indonesia, imposing standardised bankruptcy laws internalised 
the ethnic and political struggle between the Chinese who dominate in the 
economy and ethnic Indonesians who dominate in politics. Internal disputes 
between these two social groups, as explained by Halliday and Carruthers, 
were mainly due to an ideological contradiction (market forces vs. national 
identity), a mismatch between who makes the law and who implements it, and 
the exclusion of locals from the diagnosis of and prescription for local 
problems.   
In South Korea, Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) argued that pressure to 
change local institutions took a different trajectory. As South Korea’s banking 
systems are more developed and more aligned to north-Western systems, 
local political tension was mainly between the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (economists) and the Ministry of Justice (lawyers). Disputes were 
mostly due to their epistemological differences with regard to bankruptcy laws. 
The Chinese case was relatively different; it was able to resist 
recommendations for bulk reform due to the limited effects of the Asian 
financial crisis on China, and government ownership in many companies. 
Instead, China implemented partial changes aimed at limiting risk to its local 
system and culture. 
Prior studies in both public administration and sociology helped us to 
understand that in many cases, the global trajectory of standardisation or 
through international best practices “failed” to help societies advance. We also 
know that the “direct” process of implementing these practices is often, 
depending on the financial situation of a country, driven by IOs, whether 
coercively or through proposals. Additionally, global-driven changes often 
create local disputes between social groups. In fact, one could perceive that 
as these pressures intensify conflicts, local groups work harder to protect their 
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interests; it may diffuse corruption to polities as protecting individual interests 
from the global reform pressure might be an indigenous norm.  
If the “best practice” norm fails to advance societies, “why” is this system (a 
form of governance) still in place despite its adverse outcome? Although this 
inquiry could be interpreted with Brown’s (2015) theorisation of neoliberal 
rationality and global (neoliberal/norm) governance, I found Espeland and 
Sauder's (2007) work on US law school ranking also useful to understand “best 
practices”.  
Espeland and Sauder (2007) examined the impact of ranking on US law 
schools. They created a theoretical framework to understand social measures; 
Espeland and Sauder coined this framework as “reactivity”. Reactivity as a 
form of reflexivity is when “individuals alter their behavior in reaction to being 
evaluated, observed, or measured” (p. 6). They see ranking as a mechanism 
to control public institutions and provide access for consumers, not insiders. 
Ranking even penalises schools with different religious or social missions for 
not following the ranking’s “competitive” criteria.  
Based on 136 interviews with law school representatives, they found self-
fulfilling prophecy (defining a situation or belief, alter institutional expectation-
-embedded in measures) and commensuration (transforming cognition, 
alter/shape attention) cause people to react. Such ranking guided reaction 
stimulates changes in resources distribution, redefinition of work, and 
increased gaming strategies to increase institution ranking.  
Gaming is found to be one implication of reactivity. For Espeland and Sauder, 
“Gaming is about managing appearances and involves efforts to improve 
ranking factors without improving the characteristics the factors are designed 
to measure” (p. 29). The consequences of gaming are threating the legitimacy 
of the ranking, build a distrustful relationship between other institutions, and 
threaten profession moralities. For example, gaming practices in law schools 
aim for misrepresentation. This includes: employing graduates in any job, even 
illegal jobs; reclassifying admitted students from full-time to part-time to 
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improve class sizes; pressuring faculties to take spring holidays to improve 
certain ratios, and; recruiting graduates to improve employment numbers.  
Gaming, according to many administrators, encourages them to be 
more distrustful of their peers, especially in their reporting of statistics 
like graduate placement that are difficult to verify ... organizational 
actors alter their behavior to try to influence their rank (p. 32).  
If one sees “international best practice” from a measurement perspective, it 
follows similar logics of ranking, rating, transparency, and benchmarking. All 
these global norms aim to measure/alter how people rationalise and practice 
things. We also do not know what are the international “indirect” methods are 
that burden countries to follow the “international best practice” path. 
Additionally, as every country has different social arrangements and settings, 
why/how does implementing “best practices” audit regulations disturb the way 
social order is maintained? These are important questions but widely 
unexplored in non-mainstream studies. I will reflect on these important 
questions in my thesis. 
2.7. Chapter conclusion  
The core aim of this chapter was to identify how prior studies theorised the 
relationship between the state and the audit profession without neglecting 
international forces that affect such relationships. I illustrated studies in the 
Western and non-Western as well as the northern and southern contexts. I 
also demonstrated how economic globalisation and global norms are 
perceived in the accounting literature and how that literature supposedly 
understands external influences on the relationship between the state and the 
audit profession in different societies. 
This chapter was divided into five sections. The first section covered the state-
audit profession relationship in north-Western countries, which happen to 
dominate the accounting literature. Part two focused on the state-profession 
relationship in the non-north Western context from a non-colonial perspective. 
Section three illustrated Bourdieusian studies on the sociology of the 
accountancy profession that focuses on the practice of elite audit firms. Part 
four examined the global spread of US norms to international audit practices. 
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The last section navigated one of the important “neglected” global norms, 
international best practices.  
What can be noted from this broad state-profession literature is that on the one 
hand, the state is not given much consideration in studies that examined 
Western settings. Perhaps, in corporatist systems, the state is perceived to be 
neutral. On the other hand, in non-Western contexts, although the state is seen 
to be a crucial player in determining/shaping the accountancy profession’s 
abilities (Uche, 2002, p. 472; Chua et al., 2009), studies on state power lack 
in-depth investigation (Chua et al., 2019). Prior studies on the state-audit 
profession relationship in non-north Western settings often do not provide the 
regulatory explanation in which auditor practices take place.  
Nonetheless, within the contexts of accountancy regulations, in non-north 
Western studies, state-audit profession relationship studies mainly considered 
the state from a neo-Weberian (material) approach and frequently focus on the 
formation of local accountancy bodies (Spence et al. (2019) is an exception). 
Additionally, they often do not give much consideration to contemporary global 
forces influencing such relationships as well as how these norms affect the 
way social order is maintained.  
With the intensification of transnational activities, research on state-profession 
relationship, as we saw, started to deviate from examining how social order is 
maintained to focusing on the professionalisation of accountancy. I believe 
both perspectives have different methodological concerns. The way the 
accounting literature examines professionalisation pushes researchers away 
from understanding the situation in its totality. I find looking at audit regulations 
from the lens of the maintenance of social order provides a deeper 
understanding of a social problem. I agree with a recent literature review paper 
by Chua et al. (2019) that stressed understanding contemporary accounting 
regulations by following a modification to Puxty et al.’s social order perspective 
(state, market, community). Chua et al. proposed including transnational 
agencies and the accountancy profession to Puxty et al.’s social order model, 
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with which I partially disagree. I believe the accountancy profession was and 
still is part of the market. 
In audit regulations research, prior studies that examined the application of 
global norms, although few in number, focused on the struggle surrounded the 
creation of a state body (similar to the US PCAOB) in corporatist systems, but 
omit investigating other norms. These studies concentrate on the material 
structure of northern states with similar social systems underpinned by 
inherited corporatist arrangements, local neoliberal order, tax logic, and 
relatively similar “democratic” arrangements. Arguably, these studies, from a 
macro analysis, share many similarities from their methodological 
perspectives to their findings.  
Within the broader state-accountancy profession literature, there are lots of 
problems about which the prior accounting studies do not inform us: 
- We do not know much about the interaction of global accountancy norms 
with non-corporatist social arrangements. Associated with this shortage in 
our knowledge is the confrontation between indigenous practices and the 
embedded culture of international norms. 
- The process of international best practices is a widely neglected theme in 
critical accounting literature. Relatedly, we know nothing about the 
process/politics of implementing other global “best practice” norms in the 
audit domain such as audit independence technologies: auditor rotation 
and the prohibition of advisory services. In fact, critical accounting lacks 
consideration of audit regulations within contemporary corporate 
governance systems.  
- We do not know much about the state-accountancy profession dynamics in 
the Arab world. 
- As I covered studies in the sociology of the audit profession that used 
Bourdieusian ideas (Section 2.4), very limited research incorporated 
Bourdieu’s theory of the state. In a similar vein, Halliday and Carruthers’ 
work in transnationalism is highly cited, but their recursivity model (which is 
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an integral part of their transnational ideas) is not found to be applied in the 
accounting literature.  






3. THE CONTEXT OF KUWAIT  
3.1. Introduction 
Ezzamel and Xiao (2011) argue that for accounting and auditing change, 
global pressure leaves no space for societies to develop practices based on 
their particular needs; this is indeed so. In the previous chapter, I examined 
how non-positivist studies viewed and analysed the relationship between the 
state and the audit profession in different cultures. I also illustrated how prior 
studies realised economic globalisations, their methods, and their encounters 
with nation-states’ audit regulatory arrangements.  
In this chapter, as audit (practices) do not exist apart from the social system in 
which they operate (Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Puxty et al., 1987), I intend to 
provide a general explanation of the Kuwaiti social system in which modern 
audit regulations evolved. However, although I would very much like to provide 
a detailed description of the Kuwaiti context, enumerating all social aspects 
here is impractical. It is mainly because excessive description “inhibits the 
analysis of data” (Bryman, 2016, p. 395)15. 
This chapter is organised as follows: I start by illustrating some general 
geographic and demographic information. Then I explain the social structure 
of the Kuwaiti people. In Section 3.4, I intend to demonstrate Kuwait’s 
distinctive social system. It is followed by a general explanation of the historical 
aspects of the genesis of modern Kuwait as well as historical causes that 
underpin Kuwait’s unique social system. I then describe the political, 
bureaucratic, and economic structures of Kuwait. At the end of this chapter, I 
write about the capital market of Kuwait, followed by the chapter conclusion.  
It is worth noting that, as this chapter aims to provide a general understanding 
of Kuwait, I decided to move the explanation of changes to the audit regulatory 
framework to a dedicated chapter, Chapter 6. This was because my 
 
15 In a previous version, I tried to write this chapter using a chronology to explain events that 
(re)shaped Kuwait social systems. I found it chaotic, complicated, and out of control. 
Accordingly, although I believe all social aspects are intertwined, to make this chapter easier 
to digest, I decided to explain Kuwait based on separate categorisations of the social space.  
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explanation of the Kuwaiti regulatory framework was mainly a result of an 
analysis of laws and regulations as well as my interview findings. 
3.2. Geographic and demographic background of 
contemporary Kuwait 
Kuwait is located in the northeast of the Arabian Peninsula and north-west of 
the Arabian Gulf. It shares borders with Iraq in the north and Saudi Arabia in 
the south. Across the Gulf, Kuwait faces Iran (see Figure 2). All Arabian Gulf 
countries (except Iran) share a similar language and culture, underpinned by 
Islam. Ecologically, although there is seawater on the east side, Kuwait has a 
desert and arid climate. Especially in summer, Kuwait is considered one of the 
hottest areas on Earth.  
 
  
Figure 2: Kuwait’s geographic location 
Kuwait is an independent city-state (slightly smaller than the State of New 
Jersey in the US and Slovenia in Europe) with an area of 17,818 sq. km. It has 
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one central city (city of Kuwait). Following is some recent demographic 
information:   
Total number of inhabitants 4.5 million 
Kuwaitis citizens (51% male, 49% female) 30% 
Expatriates (69% male, 31% female) 70% 
 Indians 1 million 
 Egyptians 0.675 million 
 Bangladeshis 0.275 million 
Workers in government institutions  
 Kuwaitis 74% 
 Non-Kuwaitis 26% 
Workers in the private sector  
 Kuwaitis 4% 
 Non-Kuwaitis 96% 
Table 1: Some demographic information on Kuwait (1) 
Source: (The Public Authority for Civil Information, 2019) 











Table 2: Some demographic information on Kuwait (2) 
Source: (The US Central Intelligence Agency, 2018) 
As the above two tables describe, Kuwait is an educated, multi-cultural society. 
However, it is very difficult for non-Kuwaitis, who represent the vast proportion 
of residents, to become citizens or even permanent residents (even for 
expatriates born in Kuwait), as no clear programme to gain citizenship exists. 
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For expatriates (including their families), living in Kuwait is mainly conditioned 
on securing a job and having a local sponsor. Accordingly, because work in 
government institutions is widely dominated by Kuwaitis, especially for mid-
level and senior bureaucratic positions, private organisations attract and 
“favour” expats. This includes the audit field. Now I move to explain the social 
structure of the indigenous people living in Kuwait.  
3.3. Social classification of Kuwait society 
Kuwait is a Muslim country controlled by its indigenous people. However, 
social classification of individuals depends on many factors and is mainly 
based on blood-lines (family, tribal names/roots), ideological aspects (religious 
and political), as well as loyalty to the social system, norms, and order.  
The symbolic status of an individual depends firstly on either belonging to the 
royal family or a wealthy merchant family. As the majority of these families are 
historically rooted to Najd (a town in Saudi Arabia), the public differentiate 
themselves based on their historical roots (or not) to Najd, the origin of the 
local symbolic group; these are the ruling families. That is, a Najdi rooted family 
often has a higher social symbolic status than a non-Najdi.  
Another important method of social classification is between Badu or Hadar.16 
That being said, there are some differences in the underpinning cultural 
traditions between the two. However, although ruling families are mainly 
Hadar-Sunni, Badu only started to develop their political and economic 
interests since the 1970s. This made many Bedouins a late runner in 
accumulating economic, political, and symbolic capital in comparison to Hadar. 
However, they cover these short-comings by mainly accumulating social 
capital, especially with their tribes, to represent an influential social bloc(s).    
 
16 According to Longva (2006, p. 172): “the term hadhar designates Kuwaitis whose fore 
fathers lived in Kuwait before the launch of oil era (1946) and worked as traders, sailors, 
fishermen, and pearl divers. In contrast, the term badu designates a specific group of 
newcomers: these are immigrants, mostly from Saudi Arabia, who used to live on animal 
pastoralism; they moved to Kuwait between 1960 and 1980, after Kuwait had become an 
independent, oil-exporting nation, and have been granted Kuwaiti nationality over the years 
since then.” Although this is a broad definition, there are some exceptions. For example, some 
badu tribes used to live inside Kuwait territory, but outside Kuwait residential town/city.  
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Ideologically, the Kuwaiti people could be set in one of three overlapping 
categories: Islamist, conservative, and liberal. Although Kuwait is a Muslim 
country, there are different branches of Islam. In fact, there are different 
schools, even within the Sunni and Shia Islamic branches.  
Within the Sunni, the Salafi group, for example, is more strict on religious 
issues. They have interest in maintaining social order, loyalties to rulers and 
their school of thought is often inclined to the Saudi Arabian religious school. 
The Muslim Brotherhood is another Sunni Islamist group that is more 
pragmatic on religious issues, interested in accumulating economic and 
political powers, and used to favour Egypt (as leaders of Muslim Brotherhood 
movement) before the current ruling regime. Now they lean toward Qatar and 
Turkey, countries that offer support to their political interests. The Shia also 
have different schools of thought and are mainly attracted to Iran, which holds 
the highest Shia population.  
The second ideological group is Islamist conservative. This group represents, 
I think, the majority of the Kuwaiti people. This group has been raised with 
Islamic philosophy and believes that religion is an important source to organise 
social relationship but not in a strict way. They have no interest in joining 
religious groups (agendas) such as Salafi or Muslim Brotherhood, but share 
many of their different religious and political beliefs which gives Islamist groups 
local influence.  
Liberal ideology in Kuwait does not necessarily follow the Western definition 
of liberalism. Liberal groups in Kuwait vary from the left to the right, but mainly 
position their political interests in removing the role of Islam, and especially the 
involvement of Islamists, in regulating and influencing social life.  
Ideological affiliations are unknown in Kuwait because there is no census on 
these socially “sensitive” issues. However, the approximate classification of 
the society could be anticipated based on the outcome of the parliamentary 
election, especially as related to Sunni and Shia. However, despite the design 
of constituencies, non-voters, and winning based on high voting numbers, are 
all factors influencing the outcome of the election which still, arguably, reflect 
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an approximate image of the structure of Kuwaiti society. Now I will provide 
general background on the uniqueness of Kuwait’s social system. 
3.4. The distinctiveness of the Kuwaiti social system 
What distinguishes Kuwait and most of Arabian Gulf countries is their 
economic system. Most Arabian Gulf countries, including Kuwait, depend on 
oil as the primary source of economic revenue, not on taxes. What I mean is 
that the state owns the oil and controls its means of production, not private 
corporations. In recent years, however, after the 2014 decline of oil prices and 
the intensive involvement of international organisations (especially the IMF) in 
recommending neoliberal proposals, such a dependence on oil started to vary 
between the Arabian Gulf countries. Each country began to search for 
alternative economic resources (e.g., privatisation) and some introduced, 
excluding Kuwait, some types of taxes (e.g., value-added tax). Still, oil 
continues to be the main source of revenue for the Arabian Gulf countries. In 
Kuwait today, oil revenues continue to represent around 90% of the 
government’s annual economic resources (The Ministry of Finance, 2019). 
Although the Gulf countries share a similar culture and language, Kuwait is 
different due to two main factors. First, the historical existence of politically 
powerful merchant families outside the royal family did not happen elsewhere 
in the Gulf (Crystal, 1990). In Kuwait, both merchants and royal families form 
what used to be known as the ruling families of Kuwait. Recently however, with 
the death of many notable representatives of merchant families, ruling power 
now lies with a few individuals within ruling families. In the economic domain, 
these wealthy few (often) form (loyal) groups to advance their diverse (and 
sometimes) contradictory interests (within different state apparatus) and 
compete with each other to accumulate different forms of power, most 
noticeably economic and symbolic, to legitimise their domination. Therefore, 
arguably, the correct contemporary definition of ruling power in Kuwait is not 
ruling families, but ruling groups/classes as each of these groups is often 
controlled by a powerful individual. They compete with each other, but 
collaborate to protect their symbolic legitimacy.  
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Second, Kuwait has a semi-democratic monarchy which has not had a single 
change to its constitution since it was implemented in 1962. The constitution 
was implemented in a time of rising socialist and communist ideas in the Arab 
region, including Kuwait. The no-change setting with the internationalisation of 
neoliberal philosophy (both material and ideological), made the Kuwaiti 
political system a hybrid one. 
As I will demonstrate later (see Section 3.6.1), the parliamentary institution 
empowers the public to freely elect parliament members to legislate and 
supervise the non-elected government. Publicly elected representatives have 
the power to vote for no-confidence against non-elected Minister(s), including 
the Amir-appointed Prime Minister. Also, the elected parliament, with a 
majority of its members, endorses the chosen Crown Prince of Kuwait (the 
future Amir, head of state). However, this parliamentary system became a 
ground for political and economic disputes between and within the ruling 
groups as well as other social groups.  
Concerning the financial audit system (details in Chapter 6), audit firms have 
existed in Kuwait since 1952 (Altaher et al., 2014). That being said, audit 
practices were regulated from 1962 on, but only in 1981 was a comprehensive 
Audit Law enacted that empowered the Ministry of Commerce to regulate all 
aspects of corporate external audit(ors) with limited power to the local 
accounting body. Interestingly, since 1981, the audit law not been changed. 
This law regulates auditors as individuals without legally recognising the 
“firm(s)” in which they practice audit. However, despite the no-firm legal 
environment, international audit firms (including the Big 4) operate fully in 
Kuwait as members of their global networks. Remarkably, the Big 4 market 
share and symbolic status are noticeably unequal (details in Section 7.3).  
Now I will provide more detail on the history of Kuwait and the historical events 
that underpin Kuwait’s distinctive social system. 
 72 
3.5. The history of Kuwait 
The word Kuwait is a diminutive of the word koot which means a fort. Casey 
(2007) argues that the area of Kuwait used to be referred to, in old European 
maps, as Grane, which in Arabic means a high hill. The fort on a hill is argued 
to be owned by one of the rulers of the Bani Khaled tribe (Abu-Hakima, 
1984)17. This was a tribe that used to control the eastern side area of the 
Arabian peninsula (from Kuwait to Qatar) before the current Kuwait emerged.  
To escape drought, some of the Bani Utub tribe including the Alsabah family, 
Kuwait’s current royal family, left Najd (a town in the middle of the Arabian 
Peninsula, where many of the Arabian Gulf rulers are rooted) and eventually 
with the approval from the Bani Khaled ruler, they resided in Kuwait. Alqenaei 
(1946) argues that when many tribes and people emigrated to Kuwait in the 
mid-eighteenth century, with the approval of the Ottoman envoy in Basra, 
people decided to empower someone to manage the daily affairs of the polity 
and Sabah Bin Jaber from the Alsabah family (a family within the Bani Utub 
tribe) was chosen. To this day, individuals from the Alsabah family rule Kuwait.  
Historically, one of the main reasons for Kuwait’s flourishing was its location 
near Basra-Iraq (see Figure 2). In the eighteenth century, the Persians 
implemented a siege on the wealthy Ottoman-controlled city of Basra, Iraq. As 
Kuwait is located near Basra, many merchants moved from Basra to Kuwait, 
including the British commercial agency (Abu-Hakima, 1984). Accordingly, 
Kuwait became one of the main cities linked to British interests in India, which 
helped Kuwait to flourish economically.  
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, ruling power was maintained 
through taxes and customs paid by merchant families to the ruler, which gave 
merchant families significant political power (Crystal, 1990). The primary 
sources of merchant wealth were pearl hunting and sea shipping to India18.   
 
17 Bani means people and Khaled is a man name. Bani Khaled means people of Khaled. 
18 Finance and hierarchy is the business model of merchants’ sea activities to control the 
“working class” (Crystal, 1990). 
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One of the major political shifts in Kuwait happened in 1896 when Mubarak 
Alsabah assassinated two of his brothers, Mohammad and Jarrah, who had 
helped each other in ruling Kuwait. Mohammad used to rule Kuwait and 
allowed his brother Jarrah to participate in the ruling, but not Mubarak. With 
their murder, Mubarak appointed himself as the seventh ruler of Kuwait (Abu-
Hakima, 1984; Alqenaei, 1946; Alrushaid, 1978). This incident created tension 
not only locally with influential merchants, but also made the Ottomans accuse 
Britain of being behind this killing.  
Mubarak approached Britain for protection from the Ottomans and the outrage 
of some local merchants (Abu-Hakima, 1984; Alrushaid, 1978). Britain rejected 
these requests to avoid tension in their relations with the Ottomans. However, 
only when the Ottomans empowered Germany and Russia to have a presence 
in the region through exclusive rights to build railroads, did Britain agree to 
protect Mubarak/Kuwait (Abu-Hakima, 1984).  
This protectorate agreement of 1899 was another major shift for Kuwait, as it 
was limited to representing Kuwait in its foreign affairs. Post WW1, after Britain 
inherited the Ottomans influence in the Arabian Peninsula, and with the 
expansion of the Ibn Saud (current rulers of Saudi Arabia) regional power, 
Britain implemented border systems in the region. And because, arguably, this 
is considered an international matter, Britain represented Kuwait in the Al Uqair 
protocol of 1922 and allowed Ibn Saud to include two-thirds of Kuwait in their 
territories (Abu-Hakima, 1984).  
Interestingly, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) argues that at the time of the setting of borders between Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, Britain expected oil to exist in the south of Kuwait and purposely 
defined this area as a neutral zone so that any oil in the neutral zone would be 
jointly shared between the Kuwaitis and the Saudis (IBRD,1961, p. 3)19. 
During Mubarak’s rule, modern Kuwait started to develop. According to Abu-
Hakima (1984), in that period, in comparison to other regional cities, Kuwait 
 
19 IBRD is part of the World Bank group. 
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implemented an advanced mailing system, electronic telegraph, a hospital (by 
American Christian missionaries), as well as allowing a few locals to establish 
the first school in Kuwait, Almubarakeya school.  
In the late 1920s, after the Mubarak rule, another major economic and political 
crisis happened due to the creation of Japanese cultured pearls. As pearls 
used to be one of the main sources of merchants wealth, this discovery had 
significant implications for the rulers and the public. During the same era, 
Kuwait was also affected by the Great Depression through Britain’s reduced 
commercial activities in India which affected the revenues of Kuwaiti shipping 
activities, another major hit to the other main source of merchant revenues and 
eventually to the amount of taxes they paid to the ruler (Abu-Hakima, 1984; 
Crystal, 1990). 
After a challenging decade, in 1938, during the protection agreement, oil was 
discovered in Kuwait by a concession agreement given to an Anglo-American 
corporate consortium (Gulf Oil Corp., currently Chevron Corp., and the Anglo-
Persia Oil Co., currently British Petroleum), and Britain’s interests in the region 
changed from a passage way to their interests in India to an area with crucial 
sources of income. In the same year, merchant families pressured the ruler 
and demanded creation of a constitution and parliament to participate in ruling 
Kuwait with its new economic resources. This political experience lasted for a 
year, and included deaths and imprisonments. However, immediately post 
WW2, in 1946, Kuwait exported its first crude oil commercial shipment. Kuwait 
received an agreed nine US cents per barrel, which was amended in 1951 to 
split profits 50/50 after Iran nationalised their oil (Crystal, 1990). Kuwait 
peacefully bought the shares of the Anglo-American consortium and fully 
nationalised its oil sector in 1975.  
With the discovery of oil, a new era began in Kuwait. The ruler(s) started to 
become independent from monies paid by the merchants. And with the 
expansion of bureaucratic institutions, the ruler started to empower his family 
to assist in ruling Kuwait (Crystal, 1990). To win the legitimacy/loyalty of the 
public, and to attract people to work for government institutions, the 
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government offered more secure and relaxed employment. It implemented a 
program for government employees to settle debts owed to the merchants 
(Crystal, 1990).  
As I will discuss later (see Sections 3.6.2 and 3.7.1), before the implementation 
of the Kuwaiti constitution, all state bureaucratic institutions used to be headed 
by the Alsabah family (IBRD, 1961). According to Crystal (1990), the 
merchants started to establish political lobbies (e.g., a Chamber of Commerce) 
for their political disputes with the royal family over reducing the latter’s 
involvement in decision making. However, to maintain an alliance with a 
powerful social group--merchant families--a share of oil was given to them 
(indirectly through contracts) in return for their reduced participation in decision 
making (Crystal, 1990).  
3.5.1. The birth of capital practices in Kuwait  
In line with the creation of the oil industry in the 1940s, Kuwaitis started to learn 
capitalist practices from Britain through their management of commercial oil 
operations. In 1942, to manage oil revenues, Britain opened its first 
commercial bank branch in Kuwait and the first in the Arabian Gulf region, 
primarily operated from Iran with many offices in the Middle East, called the 
Imperial Bank of Persia (later the British Bank of the Middle East and now part 
of HSBC). In 1950, the Kuwait branch, because of oil activities, according to 
Brenchley (1989, p. 49), was the most profitable office for the Imperial Bank. 
And, in the same year, the bank moved its headquarter from Iran to Kuwait20.  
In 1951, Kuwait applied its first corporate income tax law which was then 
amended in 1955. However, according to Mulla (1997), this law was written in 
English and then translated into Arabic. This law was designed for (or probably 
by) foreign oil companies to escape high taxes paid in their own countries. 
Mulla (1997, p. 30) explained that paying taxes on income from exclusive rights 
is not a deductible type of tax in the home countries of foreign oil companies, 
 
20 This was during the period of the Iranian struggle to nationalise their oil industry. 
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and henceforth, the taxes paid to Kuwait had been re-classified (through the 
law) to a deductible type of taxes, the foreign tax credit. 
The income tax law  in its original English version had terms which, when 
translated into Arabic, created confusion. For example, income tax applies to 
the “body corporate”, but what did the term mean? Later, “body corporate” was 
clarified by the tax director as a separate legal entity from its owners. However, 
because Kuwait did not have a Companies Law to regulate entities, taxes 
became applicable only to companies registered abroad (International 
Business Publications, 2012, p. 34; Mulla, 1997, p. 31). This interpretation was 
the starting point for a tax-free environment for Kuwaiti companies.  
In 1952, after local taxes were waived from Kuwaitis, local merchant families 
established the first local shareholding company in Kuwait, the National Bank 
of Kuwait. In 1953, merchants founded Kuwait National Airways (now Kuwait 
Airways), and a few years later, it became wholly owned by the government. 
In 1954, the Kuwait National Cinema Company was also established and in 
1957, the Kuwait oil tanker company, followed by many more. 
With the increase in the size and number of companies, merchant families in 
1959 established the Kuwaiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry as an 
official political lobby for the merchant community to protect their commercial 
interests (before Kuwait’s constitution). It is worth noting that as the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry was established before the Kuwaiti constitution, it 
is the only “legal” organisation in Kuwait that continued its operations without 
a parliament legislated law (Almoqatei, 2010). The Chamber of Commerce 
resisted and confronted some parliamentary recommendations to reform its 
laws and to include it under the oversight of the government and parliament.  
One year after the establishment of the Chamber of Commerce, the first 
Companies Law no. 15 of 1960 was implemented and empowered the Ministry 
of Commerce to regulate and oversee the activities of the growing local 
companies. This law was only reformed (in 2016) to complement the activities 
of the new capital market regulator (see Section 7.2.1.3).   
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Furthermore, as the trading currency in Kuwait used to be the Indian Rupee, 
in 1960 Kuwait also implemented its first official currency, the Kuwaiti Dinar. In 
1969, Kuwait established its first central bank (the Central Bank of Kuwait: 
CBK), responsible for Kuwait economic-monetary policies and to oversee 
money trading and financing activities. CBK works as the government’s bank 
and financial advisor.  
Concerning audit practices, according to Altaher et al. (2014), in the early 
1940s, the British firm Peat Marwick (KPMG since 1987) was appointed to 
provide audit services for the Anglo-American oil consortium, travelling from 
Britain to Kuwait and back, as required. In 1952, Whinney Murray (Ernst and 
Young as of 1989) opened its first audit firm in Kuwait, taking over the audit for 
oil activities; later on, many Kuwaiti companies started to use their audit 
services (Altaher et al., 2014). 
3.5.2. Kuwait: independence and constitution 
In 1961, after a decade of geopolitical disputes between the Arab block and 
Western block concerning Palestine and Israel, the independence of India and 
Pakistan, Iran’s nationalisation of its oil industry, the Egyptian revolution and 
nationalisation of Suez Canal, the Iraqi revolution, the rise of Pan-Arabism and 
Arab communist ideas, global pressure against British colonial strategies as 
well as local pressure in rejecting British involvement in representing Kuwaiti 
external affairs, the protection agreement was cancelled and Kuwait became 
freely independent on the international stage.  
According to Hijazi (1964), before independence was granted, Britain 
demanded that Kuwait modernise its legal system. This was probably to 
protect its interests in Kuwait, i.e., oil and influence. However, Kuwait 
approached a famous Egyptian judge (Abd El-Razzak El-Sanhuri, the author 
of the Egyptian civil code) to design the legal system of Kuwait. Henceforth, 
following the Egyptian system based on French law, Kuwait adopted a civil law 
legal system. Casey (2007) explains that Britain also helped Kuwait to be able 
to defend itself by increasing its defence forces.  
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Hijazi (1964) argues that upon independence, Abdulkarem Qasim, the 
president of Iraq (in office from 1958 to Feb. 1963), claimed Kuwait to be Iraqi 
territory as it was under the influence of the Ottoman envoy in Basra. For 
Kuwait to legitimise itself as a sovereign state in the global arena, two 
international memberships were targeted, the Arab League and the United 
Nations. Despite Iraq’s rejection of Kuwait’s request for membership in the 
Arab League, the request was accepted one month after  independence. But 
Kuwait’s demand to the United Nations was rejected because the USSR 
(which backed Iraq’s leader, an Iraqi communist party supporter), used its veto 
power. However, when another political party took over after Qasim’s rule 
ended, the USSR withdrew its veto, and Kuwait was admitted to the United 
Nations in May 1963.  
There are various arguments addressing why Kuwait, unlike its surrounding 
Arab region, democratised its political life. Hijazi (1964), for example, argues 
that the Iraqi autocratic claims against Kuwait was one of the motives that 
influenced the Kuwaiti ruler at that time (Mr Abdullah Alsalem Alsabah) to 
democratise Kuwait’s political system. Similarly, Herb (2016) argues that the 
implementation of Kuwait’s constitution was a method of refuting Iraqi threats 
by demonstrating the monarch’s support of the Kuwaiti people. Others, for 
example, Alnfese (2017, 00:45:50), argues that for Britain to protect its 
interests in Kuwait (oil and influence) and to counter its international colonial 
image, democratising Kuwait was British designed and conditioned to grant 
Kuwait its independence in representing its external affairs.  
The following sections explain Kuwait’s political (parliamentary and 
government) system.   
3.6. Kuwait’s political system 
The constitution of Kuwait was not a result of war or social revolution. Kuwait 
had a couple of attempts to institutionalise a parliamentary system in 1921 
(due to regional and inter-ruling families tensions) and 1938 (due to oil 
discovery). These attempts were ended shortly after they were implemented. 
However, from 1962 on, for reasons mentioned in the earlier section, Kuwait’s 
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ruler Mr Abdullah Alsalem Alsabah implemented a constitution that classifies 
the governance of Kuwait into three authorities: judiciary, legislative, and 
executive. All these institutions operate under the authority of the Amir.  
With the constitution, power became inherited within the bloodline of Mubarak 
Alsabah and all natural resources (oil) are owned by the state. People are 
entitled to free medical services and education, and it became the 
government’s responsibility to secure jobs for Kuwaitis. Nonetheless, although 
the constitution places emphasis on social justice, freedom, and equality as 
the pillars of the society (based on local laws and regulations), private 
ownership is also encouraged and protected. The constitution also forbids 
Kuwait to directly enter wars to attack other countries, but only to defend itself. 
In Kuwait, official political parties cannot legally participate directly in the 
election process, but only individuals with their different ideological/political 
affiliations. The public (Kuwaitis only) freely elect individual members for the 
parliament to legislate and supervise all non-elected executive (government) 
operations. The elected parliament has the power to vote no confidence 
against any government minister(s) (including the Amir-appointed Prime 
Minister). It is also empowered to, with a majority of its members, endorse the 
Amir-named Crown Prince of Kuwait (the future Amir). Parliamentary members 
have full legal immunity for their activities inside the parliament. 
As the judiciary system is relatively independent of tension between social 
groups,  I will now provide a general understanding of Kuwait’s parliamentary 
and bureaucratic government structure as part of its broader political system.   
3.6.1. Kuwait’s parliamentary arrangements 
The parliament is represented by a maximum of 66 members in a unicameral 
system. This includes 50 elected members based on specific constituencies 
and a maximum of one-third (16) non-elected ministers (including the Prime 
Minister). The 50 elected members legislate and oversee the practices of the 
non-elected government represented by individual ministers. All 66 members 
have voting powers.  
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The number of constituencies was changed from 10 in 1962 (with five winning 
members in each constituency) to 25 in 1980 (with two winning members in 
each constituency), and to five in 2008 (with ten winning members in each 
constituency). However, as each constituency is not equally divided based on 
the number of voters but on residential areas, changing constituencies is a 
method of influencing the outcome of the election (characteristics of parliament 
members).  
It is worth noting that the 66 parliament members (50 elected members plus a 
maximum of 16 ministers) elect a speaker from among the elected members. 
Often a speaker is from a famous Kuwaiti family. However, since 1999, 
parliament has been chaired by members of the wealthy merchant families. 
Ironically however, as the design of the constitution involved many individuals 
from merchant families, it does not forbid parliament members from combining 
political with commercial activities.  
Parliament became an official battle ground for different social groups with 
their different beliefs, ideologies, loyalties, and symbolic status. It also became 
a site of conflict within the royal and within merchant families as well as 
between ruling groups. With time, the regionally unique democratic experience 
got subverted by some influential locals. Infiltration in the parliamentary system 
is often achieved through accumulating loyalties among the parliament 
members to support ruling decisions. Also, the government become involved 
in such (loyalty construction) practices with some parliament members through 
many facilities/clientelism for loyal members (also see Section 9.2).  
As all constitutional authorities (judiciary, administration, and parliament) work 
under the Amir’s power, the Amir has the constitutional ability to revoke the 
parliament. When political conflicts (due to local or regional issues) between 
the parliament members and ministers reach a dead-end, the Amir may 
interfere through revoking parliament and calling for a new election. That is 
done to reduce political tension, change the government ministers, and 
probably, to affect the election outcome.  
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Kuwait’s parliamentary life has witnessed ten dissolutions, seven times during 
the ruling of the current Amir (Aljazeera, 2016). Including these ten 
dissolutions, the parliament was suspended twice; in 1976 for four years and 
in 1986 for six years. During the second suspension, Kuwait was invaded by 
Iraq (more detail in Section 3.7.2.2). 
The parliamentary experience used to be limited to males. Since the 1990s, 
women began appearing in senior positions in the government as deputy 
minister and an ambassador. However, only in 2005 were females empowered 
by the parliament and the government to fully practice their parliamentary 
rights. In the same year, the first female minister was appointed and in 2009 
women began to win parliamentary seats. However, women still have weak 
representation in the political system. 
Despite the social changes in Kuwait from the early 1960s onward, the Kuwaiti 
constitution has never been amended. One of the reasons for the no-change 
political environment is that majority of social groups worry that change may 
result in more constraints/suppressions to the political space (e.g., increasing 
the power of the government, reducing parliament’s authority), Bahrain 
(Kuwait’s neighbour) is one good example.21 Now I will go on to explain the 
structure of the bureaucratic field (government) in Kuwait.  
3.6.2. The government structure  
The government, as per the Kuwaiti constitution, is managed by a maximum 
of 16 ministers, including the Prime Minister. The Amir appoints the Prime 
Minister. The appointment of ministers is based on the recommendation of the 
Prime Minister and the approval of the Amir. Three ministries are always 
administrated by members of the royal family (Alsabah): the Ministries of 
Defence, Internal, and External Affairs. Other ministries are often 
administrated by ministers outside the Alsabah family. However, because the 
constitution was implemented for a different time, and the resistance of many 
 
21 In early 1970s, Bahrain implemented a constitution similar to Kuwait’s during the period of 
their independence from Britain. In 2002, the Bahraini constitution was amended, which 
resulted in reduced political authority for parliament members. 
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social groups to amending the constitution, one of the methods of overcoming 
such obstacles is to establish government agencies attached to ministers. The 
following table represents the number of government bodies attached to each 
minister; 






of the minister 
Total 
Minister of 
defence Defence - 2 3 
Minister of 
foreign affairs Foreign affairs - 1 2 
Minister of 
interior Interior - 3 4 
Minister of 




and industry - 10 11 
Minister of 































and labour - 2 3 
Minister of 
Health Health - 1 2 
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Minister of 





Islamic affairs - 4 5 
Minister of  
energy Oil 
Electricity and 











Table 3: Responsibilities of each minister within the government 
Source: (Alqabas Newspaper, 2019) 
Bourdieu (2004, p. 31) argues that lengthening the chain of bureaucratic 
authorities reduces central power. I do not know if the 56 bureaucratic 
agencies were created because of a real need, or if they represent a method 
of the government to provide senior positions for their political allies, a 
bureaucratic technique to overcome parliamentary-ministerial direct 
involvement, or if the creation of these agencies is one of the methods used 
by influential groups to infiltrate the government (indirectly). However, the 
majority if not all senior positions within these agencies are either appointed 
by the cabinet or recommended by the responsible minister and appointed by 
an Amiri decree.  
Recruitment of non-senior positions differs between ministries and attached 
government bodies. For most ministries and some attached government 
agencies, recruitment, especially for non-senior Kuwaiti officials, goes through 
a central recruitment agency (The Civil Service Commission) such as the 
Ministry of Commerce. Some non-ministerial bodies can decide autonomously 
whom to recruit (see Section 7.2.1.2).  
The Civil Service Commission often classifies potential recruits based on 
education as well as specialisation. Despite the quality of an individual’s 
cultural capital (education), it treats graduates with similar specialisations and 
degree levels the same (as long as their qualification is from an accredited 
university).  
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This recruitment system dissuades graduates with high cultural capabilities 
from working at government agencies that follow the centralised recruitment 
system. Also, arguably, such a system does not encourage youth to invest in 
their cultural competence. Nonetheless, the government recruitment policy 
and political clientelism in the appointment of senior government officials has 
resulted in many government agencies that are over-staffed, less efficient, and 
often exposed to political interference and tension.  
3.7. Economic system of Kuwait 
Economically, Kuwait depends on producing and selling oil as the primary 
source of state revenue. Currently, Kuwait produces approximately 2.8 million 
barrels per day (IMF, 2019). In spite of Kuwait’s small size, it owns 6% of the 
world’s total oil reserves (The US Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). 
According to the Ministry of Finance (2019), Kuwait’s revenues from selling oil 
is 90% of total revenues whereas tax revenue is only 3%.  
There are no income taxes for any inhabitants (Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis), 
and only Kuwaiti shareholding companies pay three forms of nominal annual 
taxes, totalling 4.5% of their annual profit. Taxes of 15% exist for foreign 
companies.22 However, this oil-dependence/tax-free system was not the case 
before oil discovery. Taxes used to be a vital part of the ruling system (see 
Section 3.5).  
Another important economic issue is the Kuwaiti sovereign fund, managed by 
the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA). Kuwait owns the fourth largest and 
internationally oldest sovereign wealth fund established in 1953, with a current 
estimated worth of US$500 billion (SWF Institute, 2018). Kuwait’s sovereign 
wealth fund is managed through offices in Kuwait, London (since 1986), and 
Shanghai (since 2018).  
 
22 In 1955, taxes on foreign companies were set at 55%. The logic of the tax law was designed 
for Western oil companies (pre-nationalisation in the 1970s) and continued with the same rate 
even after Kuwait fully nationalised its oil industry. In 2008, income taxes on foreign companies 
operating in Kuwait was changed to 15%. 
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The KIA invests budgetary surpluses (general reserve fund) in addition to 10% 
of total revenues allocated to a specific fund managed by KIA. Despite the 
state annual financial net position, annual monies (10% of total revenues) are 
allocated to KIA to be invested overseas. However, details on the fund’s 
investment strategies or profitability are unknown to the public, but the majority 
of these monies are invested in the US (Alarabiya, 2017). 
Although Kuwait’s economic system may sound solid and relaxed, in reality, it 

















2014/2015 81.725 Actual deficit 2.721 8.921 
2015/2016 44.701 Actual deficit 5.975 19.590 
2016/2017 42.951 Actual deficit 5.918 19.403 
2017/2018 52.459 Actual deficit 4.848 15.895 
2018/2019 67.406 Actual deficit 3.346 10.970 
Table 4: Kuwait fiscal closing accounts in the last five financial years 
Source: (The Ministry of Finance, 2019) 
Fiscal deficits are covered (in addition to emergency capital needs) by 
withdrawing from the state general reserves fund. Some parliament members, 
in return, resists government demands to approve their IMF-driven 
economisation reform proposals (e.g., privatisation) and approves a credit line 
for government borrowing. The justification for such parliamentary resistance 
is the government’s “significant” weakness and mismanagement of the state 
financial resources. However, with the current government strategy of covering 
its fiscal deficit, it is expected that Kuwait’s general reserves fund may be 
depleted in the next four years (Reuters, 2019). 
In the last couple of decades, Kuwait started to think of facilitating and 
attracting foreign monies to operate there. In 1963 Kuwait became one of the 
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first countries in the region to be admitted as a member of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). And automatically, in 1995, it became 
one of the founding members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO, n.d.). 
For a foreign company to operate directly in Kuwait, it has to be registered 
there and pay an annual tax of 55%, which only changed to 15% in 2008.  
Maintaining the high taxes was probably a strategy by merchant groups to 
dissuade the interference of foreign monies in the merchant monopoly over 
local commercial activities. To escape from the local tax system, international 
companies often exist in Kuwait through commercial agencies that used to be 
limited to Kuwaitis. The Commercial Agencies Law (law number 36 of 1964) 
allows a foreign company to operate there but only through a Kuwaiti agent. 
This law was amended in 2016 (law number 13 of 2016). The amendment 
allowed international companies to operate in Kuwait through more than one 
Kuwaiti agent. It also allowed a Kuwaiti individual or group to own at least 51% 
(a majority) of a local company (instead of 100%, as the old law required) to 
be able to become an agent for a foreign company. 
Kuwait only enacted a law to regulate foreign direct investments in 2001 (law 
number 8 of 2001). Nonetheless, this law is not a full liberalisation of the Kuwait 
market. The law empowers the ministries’ cabinet to decide on the commercial 
activities and projects that foreign capital can participate in. The law also gave 
authority for the Minister of Commerce, based on the recommendation of the 
foreign investment committee, to bypass the Companies Law and allow 
foreigners to establish a company with a majority of ownership. In the same 
year, 2001, the income tax on foreign property was 55% (amended to 15% in 
2008) but a waiver on income tax could be granted for a maximum of ten years.  
In 2013, a new institution was established (the Kuwait Direct Investment 
Promotion Authority), chaired by the Minister of Commerce, to encourage and 
facilitate direct investments for both local and foreign investors. 
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3.7.1. Merchants and the economy 
With the increase of state wealth, to maintain order within ruling families, 
Crystal (1990, p. 8) argues that a pact existed between the royal and merchant 
families, where the royal family only rules and the merchants are responsible 
for private businesses. According to Crystal, to compensate merchants on their 
reduced involvement in ruling decisions, a redistribution of wealth took place: 
the government bought merchant lands at high prices and sold them back at 
low prices. The government also limited local trade and commercial activities 
to Kuwaiti merchants. This type of arrangement between ruling groups is 
probably a method to incentivise merchant groups to support the government 
in controlling the public, especially in the parliament. 
Today, some individuals from the royal family operate businesses and some 
individuals from the merchant families chair parliament and (indirectly) occupy 
senior positions in the government through their group loyalties (see Section 
3.4). However, one of the critical institutions as a medium for wealth 
distribution in Kuwait is the public tenders system. Public Tendering Law 
number 37 of 1964 requires that any government institution wishing to spend 
(to buy or construct) more than 5,000 Kuwaiti dinars (equivalent to US$16,000) 
must use a public tender. The public tendering committee is a subcommittee 
of the ministers' cabinet and is formed by six members appointed by the 
cabinet. To become involved in all kinds of tenders, a participant must be a 
Kuwaiti merchant and registered with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(merchant lobby). 
Nonetheless, foreign companies are allowed to bid on tenders but must have 
a Kuwaiti merchant representative. Also, builders are classified into four 
categories based on the size of the tender and the capabilities of the merchant. 
Merchants can jointly participate in a single bid. The only exception to this 
system is the military goods and weapons requirement. This system has been 
in place for the last 50 years, and the average yearly government contract, for 
example, in the previous five years was US$16 billion (National Bank of 
Kuwait, 2018).  
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According to the Alshahed Newspaper (2014), six merchant families won over 
95% of Kuwait’s tenders. The majority of merchants’ large companies 
(especially construction companies) are family-owned and non-listed. The 
public tendering law was changed in 2016 (law 49 of 2016) and allowed non-
Kuwaiti companies--with many conditions--to participate in these public 
tenders without a direct Kuwaiti representative. Still, the new law prioritises 
local companies and manufacturers over non-Kuwaiti companies.  
The following section explains Kuwait’s capital market system.  
3.7.2. Kuwait’s capital market 
For many decades, the Companies Law of 1960 was the basis for governing 
private corporations. It regulated certain aspects of shareholding companies, 
including shares, internal control systems, as well as their financial audit (see 
Chapter 6). The Ministry of Commerce used to have significant direct 
involvement in regulating share trading, even before opening the first 
(temporary) stock exchange site in 1972. A new capital market regulator was 
created in 2010. However, Figure 3 shows how strongly Kuwait’s capital 
market is correlated with oil prices, the primary source of revenue. 
 
Figure 3: International oil prices and Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) market index  
Source: (IMF, 2010, p. 42) 
Aside from significant fluctuations in the international oil price since the 1960s, 
Kuwait has witnessed three substantial crises with significant economic, 
political, and social implications: the Souk Almanakh stock market crash of 
 89 
1982, the Kuwait invasion in 1990, and the global financial crises of 2008. 
Despite these Crises, Kuwait only recently increased its capital market 
integration with the international capital system following the oil price collapse 
of 2014. Historically however, the capital market of Kuwait witnessed two 
significant reforms. The first reform was a reaction to Souk Almanakh of 1982 
and the second reform was caused by the global financial crises of 2008. 
However, the nature of these two reforms is different.  
It is worth noting that except for Souk Almanakh collapse, the history of 
economic and financial systems and crises in Kuwait is poorly documented. In 
the following sections, I will explain the incidents of Souk Almanakh, the Kuwait 
invasion, and the subsequent global financial crisis.  
3.7.2.1. Souk Almanakh and the first stock market reform 
During the 1970s, with the oil embargo and the Iranian revolution, oil prices 
rose. These geopolitical incidents benefited politically “stable” oil countries. 
With Kuwait’s increased liquidity, interest in the accumulation of wealth shifted 
to the stock market. Merchants increased the establishment of shareholding 
companies. Kuwait witnessed the first market crash in 1976 (Kuwait News 
Agency, 2004). The government interfered by stopping the establishment of 
shareholding companies in Kuwait for two years, 1977 to 1979. The 
government also bought shares to support and stabilise the market and to 
protect the banking system. By the end of this crisis, in 1979, the government 
ended up owning 35% of listed companies (Al-Sultan, 1898, p. 30).  
During that period, indirect government support (through the buying of shares), 
probably signalled to many merchants that the rich government will act as a 
“safety net” if anything went wrong. Consequently, with increased ownership 
by the government and controlled trading on capital markets, some merchants 
searched for other ways to overcome government constraints for wealth 
accumulation.  
Some merchants created a secondary “unregulated” over-the-counter market, 
called Souk Almanakh (1979-1982). To overcome government constraints on 
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establishing shareholding companies, the majority of shares traded in this 
unregulated market were Kuwaiti owned companies established and 
registered in other Arabian Gulf countries (Al-Sultan, 1989). However, 
because this market was created outside the legal capacity of regulators, its 
trading activities were left without oversight. 
As the Companies Law forbade the trading of shares before a company 
achieved three years of consecutive profitability, to overcome this regulatory 
condition, owners of some companies started to trade not using the company’s 
shares, but letters of sale for these shares. Post-dated cheques dominated the 
scene in trading the stocks of these shell companies23.  
The chaos started when investors began to cash post-dated cheques and 
found that there were insufficient balances to meet these cheques; everything 
started to fall apart. The implications of this collapse affected 6,000 people, 
including many within the ruling groups. This crisis resulted in 29,000 bad 
cheques worth US$94 billion (Al-Sultan, 1989). Interestingly, one year before 
the Souk Almanakh crash, the first audit law was implemented, which remains 
in force, unchanged (see Section 6.2.1.2).  
Following the Souk Almanakh crash, the Kuwaiti government implemented 
various solutions to limit the recurrence of a similar crisis. These include the 
establishment of a share trading clearing system, and applying a programme 
to restructure people’s debts. Casey (2007, p. 120) argues that the debt 
restructuring programme cost around US$20 billion. And, according to Al-
Sultan (1989, p. 30), as a result of the support programme, by 1983, the 
government owned 48% of all listed companies on the main market.  
One of the major institutional reforms post-Souk Almanakh, in 1983, was the 
establishment of a specialised regulator for stock market activities (Amiri 
decree of 14 August 1983). Instead of direct management by a unit within the 
Ministry of Commerce, regulation of the stock exchange was redesigned to be 
managed by a committee called the Market Committee (see Section 6.2.4). 
 
23 By Kuwaiti law, there is no such thing as post-dated cheques. Cheques can be cashed 
immediately even if they have a deferred date. 
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The KSE Market Committee became responsible for all issues related to share 
trading and in 1984, Souk Almanakh was closed permanently. However, the 
implications of this crash on some individuals continue to this day.   
3.7.2.2. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait  
Without going into detail about the historical roots of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait 
(for details see Casey, 2007), the implications of this war were catastrophic at 
the social, environmental, and financial levels. The seven month invasion (from 
2 August 1990 to 28 February 1991) and the battle to expel Iraq cost the lives 
of 1,000 Kuwaitis and the disappearance of an additional 600 people.  
Financially, the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait (from 17 January 1991 to 28 
February 1991) had an estimated cost of US$61 billion of which Kuwait bore 
the majority (Callanan and Weiler, 2008). Casey (2007) argues that some 
estimated the maximum cost of total reconstruction at US$100 billion. Kuwait 
prioritised the rebuilding of its oil industry and borrowed tens of billions of US 
dollars from international markets to cover its financial needs (Casey, 2007, 
pp. 118, 121).  
The stock market re-opened in September 1992 and the government, due to 
cash shortages, sold much of its ownership in companies that were bought in 
the 1970s and 1980s as part of the rescue plan in the pre and post-Souk 
Almanakh crisis. These shares were mainly bought by wealthy Kuwaitis after 
Kuwait was invaded. Additionally, in 1992, the government publicly guaranteed 
banks deposits, avoiding any bank failures (IMF, 2004a, p. 19). 
3.7.2.3. The Iraq invasion of 2003 and the global financial 
crisis of 2008 
The tension between Kuwait and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq continued, and 
Kuwait started to recover from the economic costs of the invasion. In 2003, the 
US invaded Iraq, claiming it would remove Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. 
However, this war financially benefited Kuwait (IMF, 2004a, p. 7). Between 
2003 and 2008, oil prices rose from US$30 to US$140. Also, according to 
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Fifield (2013), although the major winner of contracts throughout the Iraq war 
was the US company KBR (a subsidiary of Halliburton)24, many Kuwaiti 
companies provided services to the US military. Agility Logistics, for example, 
a Kuwaiti listed shareholding company, won contracts of US$7 billion alone 
(Fifield, 2013).  
As Iraq is an oil-producing country, with its invasion, the international supply 
of oil was reduced and oil prices rose subsequently. Kuwait benefited from the 
international rise in oil prices. As Figure 3 illustrates, oil prices influence the 
stock market. High oil prices along with the demolition of the Iraqi regional 
threat was reflected in higher confidence in the Kuwaiti governance system. 
This mirrored the position of the capital market. However, investors in the 
capital market used to be mainly locals. 
During the five years from 2003 to 2008, many shareholding companies were 
established in Kuwait, and stock market listings increased. The number of 
investment companies doubled to 100 (IMF, 2010) and the number of 
companies traded on the Kuwaiti stock market jumped from 112 in 2003 to 200 
in 2008. In that period, the KSE index accelerated from 3,000 points to 15,000 
points, and the market capitalisation rose by 210% to US$190 billion (Trading 
Economics, 2012).  
Speculations, rumours, insider trading, and lack of regulatory oversight used 
to be the motor of the skyrocketing capital market, fuelled by billions of US 
dollars in business opportunities provided by the US for Iraq through many 
Kuwaiti companies, as well as rising oil prices. According to the IMF (2010), 
the skyhigh rise in oil prices gave Kuwait the highest stock market performance 
among the Arabian Gulf markets. However, it went out of control and ended 
with the global financial crises of 2007/8.  
Many companies, especially those in the investment sector, used to borrow 
short term loans to finance long term investments and projects. It is possible 
that short term borrowing was acquired to fund difficult to liquidate or toxic 
 
24 Dick Cheney, the vice president to President George Bush (from 2001 to 2009) was the 
chairman and CEO of Halliburton Company from 1995 to 2000. 
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assets. And probably, in some cases, money was borrowed to pay dividends, 
bonuses, and remunerations. The practice was, as loans matured, they would 
be renewed or repaid by acquiring another loan from the same or another 
financial institution. Money was obtained from local and overseas financial 
institutions. When the crisis started in the US, most financial organisations 
stopped renewing their loans and, at maturity, began to call back their monies 
which created liquidity chaos in Kuwait.  
The effect of the global financial crisis on Kuwait was not due to massive local 
investments in US derivative markets with its poisoned products. It was mainly 
due, as some of my interviewees argued, to weak regulatory oversight, liquidity 
mismatch, and mismanagement. On this matter some interviewees put it in 
this way: 
In the global crisis [referring to the 2007/8 crisis] some people accused 
us of losing their money. I am not an executive, we give you facts, what 
you do with it is up to you. I cannot tell a company to buy or sell. I come 
to you as a shareholder and tell you that they have a high concentration 
of risk, they have a liquidity problem, you can see it from the numbers, 
it is your decision. My responsibility is clear; the numbers are correct. Is 
it good or bad, this is another thing. I give you facts, and you have to 
decide, I do not decide for you. (BIG-A) 
[T]he companies that failed [referring to Kuwaiti companies during the 
global financial crisis] [it] was not due to toxic products, such as Lehman 
Brothers involvements in derivatives, it is all governance issues. It is 
clear mismanagement. There is no appropriate governance framework 
that boards and executive committee followed. There is no 
accountability. Accordingly, companies failed, each followed the other. 
(TIER3) 
The implication of the global-Kuwait financial crisis created major disorder for 
those involved with the private sector (owners, management, staff, and shares 
traders). Many companies were forcibly delisted from the stock market, some 
investment company licences were cancelled by CBK and there were many 
disputes between company owners and management in general assembly 
meetings. Many ordinary people lost their money from this loosely regulated 
bubble which created significant conflict between the parliament and the 
government and, alongside the significant decline in oil prices, resulted in the 
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revoking of parliament and calls for a re-election, a political solution to 
reduce/divert political congestion.  
Due to the liquidity shortage, many companies were not able even to pay their 
staff salaries, and many employees were laid off. The government 
implemented a programme to support laid off Kuwaiti private company 
employees. It injected some money into the stock market to mitigate the crash, 
without success. As the government guaranteed bank deposits, it immediately 
interfered in a potential failure in one of the local banks (the Gulf Bank) as a 
result of international derivative transactions by a few of the Gulf Bank’s 
clients.   
The implications were not similar to those of the Souk Almanakh unregulated 
market, but it was a significant crisis under the regulations and oversight of the 
KSE Market Committee (the antecedent capital market regulator). However, 
this economic crisis was not limited to the capital market alone, but also 
extended to oil prices. As Figure 3 illustrates, from June 2008 to March 2009, 
the stock market lost 51% of its market capitalisation (IMF, 2010, p. 28) and 
international oil prices dropped from US$140 to US$45.  
In 2010, due to international, political, and public pressures, a law was enacted 
to change the regulatory framework of the capital market by creating a 
specialised regulatory body (see Section 6.4). This body was empowered to 
re-regulate all capital market activities, including corporate audit, and align its 
regulatory practices with international best practices. Unlike the 1983 reform 
that reinforced the involvement of the Ministry of Commerce in regulating the 
capital market, the new capital market regulator, although under the Minister 
of Commerce’s parliamentary responsibility, fought to expel the influence of 
the Ministry of Commerce, as we will see in a following chapter (see Section 
7.2).   
3.8. Chapter conclusion  
In this chapter, I provided a summary of Kuwait’s broader social system. I 
started by illustrating general demographic information and the social structure 
 95 
of Kuwait. Then, I demonstrated the Kuwaiti system of social classifications, 
underpinned by blood-lines and ideological reasons. I explained the 
particularities that make Kuwait a unique social system in comparison to its 
surrounding Arab neighbours: historically powerful merchant families 
coexisted alongside the royal family and a parliamentary system with the 
power to confront the non-elected government. I also tried to explain salient 
historical events that created such distinctiveness.  
I enumerated notable historical events that drove the making of contemporary 
Kuwait, starting from the interference of Britain in Kuwaiti affairs through the 
signed protection agreement to protect Mubarak/Kuwait from the Ottoman 
threats. Nonetheless, Britain interests in the region and Kuwait changed after 
the discovery of oil. The relationship between the royal family and merchant 
families also changed. Merchant groups started to learn from the Anglo-
American oil consortium how to manage capital activities in a local tax-free 
environment.   
Oil changed the Kuwaiti governance system, and the ruling system started to 
exclude historically powerful merchants from decision-making. Merchants, in 
turn, demanded that the governance system be democratised. However, as 
the government tried to compensate merchants for their exclusion with monies, 
only in the 1960s were the merchants’ plans achieved. I provided varying views 
on why Britain granted Kuwait its independence in foreign affairs. The Kuwaiti 
constitution, unchanged from 1962 to today, became the platform for 
organising the country’s social structure.  
Parliament became a battlefield between different social groups. Each social 
group, as well as the government, tried to advance their own interests. The 
government role became an instrument to balance these interests without 
threatening order and the hierarchy of power. The government maintained its 
symbolic power and accumulated political power not through efficient 
administration but often by “constructing” the loyalties of (some) parliament 
members as well as locals with high social capital to confront and handle 
societal disturbance. Merchants and other social groups often influenced 
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government choices by infiltrating bureaucratic agencies and occupying senior 
official positions.  
I also explained the Kuwaiti economic system. Even today, around 90% of 
Kuwait’s revenues are from selling state-owned and controlled oil. Another 
source of revenue, with details unknown to the public, is the Kuwaiti sovereign 
investment fund. Kuwait’s economy faced significant budgetary deficits over 
the last five years and the general reserve fund that the government relies on 
to fund its capital shortages is expected to be depleted in the coming few years.  
Merchants groups depend on the government to accumulate economic wealth 
and maintain their symbolic social status. The public tendering system is the 
main central arrangement for state wealth distribution. On the one hand, 
merchant groups employ various political strategies to pressure the 
government to distribute economic wealth by offering them large government 
contracts. These strategies include, for example, from direct pressure to the 
building of public opinion on the need for new construction. One the other 
hand, the government engages in political and economic trade-offs and uses 
the political support of various groups (including the merchants) to impose its 
vision of reality (ruling vision, hierarchal positions, and power) on society.  
In the last part of this chapter, I focused on the Kuwaiti capital market. Stock 
trading and oversight used to be under the sole authority of the Ministry of 
Commerce. However in 1983, with the Souk Almanakh crisis, the stock market 
witnessed its first reform. A market committee was created to regulate and 
oversee stock trading. However, although this reform included various actors 
(other financial regulators and representatives of the merchants) who 
participated in the changed regulatory system, the Ministry of Commerce 
continued to chair this committee (see Section 6.2.4).  
The second and most recent reform constrained the direct interference of the 
Ministry of Commerce. In Kuwait, the 2008 crisis was not a result of Kuwait’s 
exposure to the US market. The market performance bubble was mainly due 
to the Iraq invasion (business opportunities offered by the US army to Kuwaiti 
companies), high oil prices which often stimulate the capital market position, 
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weak regulatory oversight, and corporate mismanagement. The 2010 reform 
empowered a specialised body to re-regulate the capital market based on 
international best practices.  





4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
4.1. Introduction 
The intention of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework to guide my 
data analysis to help understand the modernisation project of audit regulations 
in Kuwait. As I am interested in understanding the dynamic of power in 
implementing international-driven audit regulations, I found two theories very 
useful to provide me a perspective--first, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
(including his theory of the state). Second, Terence Halliday and Bruce 
Carruthers’ theory of recursivity.  
The purpose behind the adoption of two theoretical lenses is that I found 
Bourdieu’s practice ideas beneficial in understanding struggle in the 
production and consumption of audit regulations. Nonetheless, Bourdieu’s 
practice theory, if adopted in a similar fashion to that of the accounting 
literature, does not tell much about the interaction between government fields 
as well as the power of the state. For that reason, I found Bourdieu’s works on 
the state, which underpin practice philosophy, are very useful for providing a 
better and more comprehensive understanding of the dynamic of power within 
a society.  
In the contemporary globalised era, to explore the struggle between national-
state and transnational forces, I found Halliday and Carruthers’ work on the 
transnational processes between the global and the local is extremely 
beneficial. I believe Halliday and Carruthers’ work complements gaps in 
Bourdieu’s framework (due to his death) to include the influence (and process) 
of transnationalism on the dynamic of power in the social space. Both 
theoretical lenses provide me with a powerful framework to unpack the 
complexity of modernising traditional practices in Kuwait.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. From the micro to the macro, the 
first part explores Bourdieu’s sociological notions on individual practices in the 
social space. Accordingly, a holistic explanation of Bourdieu’s practice ideas 
will be provided. The second section of this chapter explains Bourdieu’s theory 
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of the state. Bourdieu’s understanding of the state may be divided into three 
parts. First, a historical examination of the transformation from feudalism to 
bureaucracy. Second, ideas on how the state maintains its power through 
physical and “symbolic” violence. Third, the dynamic of the bureaucratic field.  
It is worth noting that although Bourdieu’s state theory underpins his theory of 
practice, I found difficulties in combining the two relatively large and complex 
ideas. For that reason, I decided to explain them in separate sections without 
neglecting their interrelation.  
The last section of this chapter explores Halliday and Carruthers’ recursivity 
framework. I intend to explain the recursivity theory in full. Additionally, as I am 
immersed in Bourdieusian perspectives, I aim to reflect on recursivity ideas 
using Bourdieu’s practice philosophy, which includes the state. However, in 
every section, I will start by introducing the theorist and conclude with scholarly 
critiques on the theories. The last part of this chapter provides concluding 
remarks. 
4.2. Bourdieu’s theory of practice  
4.2.1. Introduction 
Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) was a French philosopher, anthropologist, 
sociologist, and public intellectual. The origin of Bourdieu’s scholarly work is 
interesting. He studied philosophy and worked in academia in France for one 
year before he was conscripted by the French army. In 1955, Bourdieu served 
in Algeria (army support function) during the Algerian-French War (1954-
1962). After his three years of compulsory service, before returning to France, 
Bourdieu took an academic position at the University of Algeria from 1958 to 
1961 (Silverstein and Goodman, 2009, p. 12).  
During his time in Algeria, Bourdieu carried out an ethnographic study on 
Kabyle tribe culture. In 1958, Bourdieu produced his first work Sociologie 
d’Algerie (sociology of Algeria) on the objective structure of Algerian society 
from an anti-colonial position (Silverstein and Goodman, 2009, pp. 12, 18). 
Later, during his job in Algeria, Bourdieu produced a couple of studies on 
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Algeria with his first sociologist assistant and co-author, Abdelmalek Sayad 
(Silverstein and Goodman, 2009, pp. 30-2).  
Bourdieu’s book Outline of a Theory of Practice (1972) (first English translation 
in 1977) was the first formulation of his practice master concepts that 
developed and reached maturity in his book The logic of practice (1980) (first 
English translation in 1990). Bourdieu’s theoretical foundation, according to 
Silverstein and Goodman (2009, pp. 3-6, 18), was influenced by his time in 
Algeria, his anti-colonial ideas, the ethnographic approach of his first works 
(Algerian studies), as well as collected ethnographic data from the Kabyle 
people. However, probably because Bourdieu’s theoretical ideas were 
influenced by different cultures (Arab-Algeria, Berber-Kabyle, and Western-
France), in addition to his underlying combination of objective-structure and 
subjective-disposition, his theory of practice has been considered, for 
example, by Robbins (2002), as universal and flexible as to space and time.  
In the accounting literature, Bourdieu’s ideas have been followed since the 
1990’s (Malsch et al., 2011) and probably the number of studies that have 
adopted Bourdieusian perspectives are on the rise. It could be argued that 
nowadays, Bourdieu is a well-known figure for non-mainstream accounting 
scholars. Malsch et al. (2011) for example, analysed accounting studies that 
used Bourdieu’s notions from 1999 to 2008, arguing that using Bourdieu’s work 
has made a significant contribution to accounting knowledge. Similarly, Everett 
(2018) examined accounting studies that applied Bourdieu’s holistic concepts 
and argued that these studies made a substantial contribution to the critical 
accounting literature (also see Section 2.4). 
4.2.2. The praxeology of Pierre Bourdieu 
Before explaining Bourdieu’s practice theorisation, it is appropriate now to 
explain Bourdieu’s methodological position. Bourdieu is relatively vague with 
regard to his philosophical assumptions. He refers to his work as “constructivist 
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structuralism or of structuralist constructivism” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14)25. This 
fuzziness in combining and linking objective structure with subjective 
disposition, according to Bourdieu is “irreconcilable” and “fruitful” to find the 
“truth of social world” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 22) and the “truth of human practice” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 10). On the one hand, for Bourdieu (1989), 
structuralism is conscious and unconscious “objective structures” that guide 
and constrain practice. On the other hand, constructivism is twofold of habitus 
and social structure (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14).  
If I want to position Bourdieu’s philosophical assumptions on the Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) quadrant paradigms of research philosophy, and disregard the 
vertical line that separates the two radical positions as criticised by, for 
example, Hopper and Powell (1985), I would station Bourdieu in the top-middle 
that combines both “radical humanist” and “radical structuralist” paradigms 
(see Figure 4 and Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.4). Even though Bourdieu in many 
investigations relies heavily on codification, numbers, and statistics, I believe 
it is the purpose of research that defines philosophy, not merely evaluation 
based on methods. In other words, Bourdieu’s reliance on big data is to 
develop a “general” theory.  
 
Figure 4: Bourdieu’s position based on Burrell and Morgan (1979) philosophical paradigms 
 































One of the reasons behind positioning Bourdieu in this philosophical spot is 
his ontological realisation through employing objective structure to unpack 
structural conflicts, modes of domination, and unconscious practices. In short, 
the Bourdieu logic of practice is a logic of social domination (Friedland, 2009). 
For Bourdieu, the symbolic system between social and mental structures is an 
instrument of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 13). All these 
assumptions about the nature of society (social process) underpin Bourdieu’s 
position as a radical based on the philosophical categorisation of Burrell and 
Morgan (1979).  
4.2.3. Bourdieu’s theorisation of praxis 
Bourdieu is interested in “power” that mediates the symbolic structure of 
society at both the individual and societal levels (Everett, 2002). Similarly, 
Friedland (2009) argues that “power” is the central interest of practice and 
social dynamics in Bourdieu’s theory. To understand human disposition and 
practice, Bourdieu created an objective structure of the social world. The 
objective structure is represented in semi-autonomous fields; actors in any 
field struggle to compete for domination and power.  
Bourdieu’s understanding of the state is as yet underutilised in the academic 
accounting literature. For Bourdieu (1989), the state is the source of societal 
common sense, the bank of symbolic power, and the holder of legitimate 
physical coercion and symbolic violence. In a later section, I will outline how 
Bourdieu theorised the state and how the state encounters social practice.  
Bourdieu has seven “main” interrelated master concepts that formulise his 
objective-subjective structure (practice theory): field, capital, habitus, the field 
of power, and taken for granted concepts (illusio, doxa, and symbolic violence). 
These interrelated theories guide actor practices. Each of these concepts is 
explained separately but I will also explain the links between them.  
4.2.3.1. Field 
To define the relationships, forces, and practices between individuals and 
groups in any social space, Bourdieu uses the objective concept of field(s) to 
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structure social space. Bourdieu describes a field as “space of objective 
relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of 
competing powers or species of capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 
114). A field is the platform of struggle that Bourdieu’s practice notions settle 
on. A site for interactional struggle between positions and the type of struggle 
depends on the occupied position (based on capitals) as well as actors’ 
conflicts to preserve or change the structure of a particular field (shape and 
division)26.  
Every field has a position (in terms of its social importance) in the broader 
social sphere as well as the field of power that sits at the top of social space 
(details on the field of power are provided in Section 4.2.3.3). The more 
important field(s) affects another field(s) and constrains or shapes the way 
each operates. In other words, fields are not autonomous; they are influenced 
by the logic of other fields.  
For Bourdieu, all hierarchal struggle is to reach the top of a field. However, 
actor domination strategies and disposition (habitus) depend on the actor’s 
position within a field and the level of recognised weapons (capitals) s/he holds 
as well as the accumulation of significant, specific capital(s); these vary 
depending on the field. That said, being at the top of an important field means 
the ability (if one has the interest) to enter the field of power. For Bourdieu, 
field, capitals, and habitus are relational because they all operate 
simultaneously.  
4.2.3.2. Capitals 
Depending on the logic (structure) of a field and the actor’s position within a 
field, for an actor to compete (play the game), s/he needs weapons. Within a 
field, accumulation of weapons is the source of engagement and competition 
for the field profit (to dominate). For Bourdieu, these arms are capital. Capitals 
define an actor’s position and are the means to exercise power over a field.  
 
26 For Bourdieu, changing the structure of a field is accomplished through changing the 
distribution and weight of capitals, and for important fields, this is done by the field of power 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
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Bourdieu (1986) argues that capital is accumulated labour, and the collection 
occurs in two forms, materialised or embodied. Bourdieu (Ibid, pp. 15-6), draws 
his perception on the mechanism of capital (power) in any field from the 
economic theory (capitalism), arguing for two levels of convertibility to 
monetary profit. Capital with immediate conversion (economic capital), and 
capital with restricted convertibility (cultural and social capital). Restriction 
relates to the condition(s) operating during the conversion into economic 
capital. As in every field, some capitals outweigh others, the structure of 
distribution of capital(s) representing the structure and function of a field. 
Bourdieu established many types of capital. The fundamental powers are four: 
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital.  
Economic capital 
Economic capital is the form of material wealth (money and money 
institutionalised in other forms). Bourdieu (1986) perceives economic capital 
as the purpose of agent practice for domination and power. He argues that all 
capital can be derived from economic capital, and all capital can be 
transformed into economic capital. Transformation of capital(s) into economic 
capital could be in the short or long term and depends on the establishment 
and maintenance of other capitals, the cost of investment, and the time lag of 
conversion.  
For Bourdieu, the time spent on the accumulation of social and cultural capital, 
although it could be perceived as pure waste, is an investment that will yield in 
the long term (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 25). Capital transformation is the strategy of 
capital reproduction. For Bourdieu, in any field distinguished capital is the one 
that converts to economic capital in the easiest, fastest, and least risky ways. 
Hence, for Bourdieu, accumulation of economic capital is the dominant form 
of power (Friedland, 2009, p. 902).  
Cultural capital 
Cultural capital is a form of power of competence. For Bourdieu, cultural capital 
is “a media for power, not its content” (Friedland, 2009, p. 903). Bourdieu 
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(1986) argues that cultural capital should be understood beyond the 
functionalist perception of human capital theory27. Cultural capital donates to 
economic capital which also (indirectly) helps to reproduce the social world 
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). And, dominants reproduce cultural capital to 
distinguish themselves (Friedland, 2009). For Bourdieu, cultural capital is of 
three kinds: embodied, objectified, and institutionalised. 
Embodied cultural capital is the knowledge and skill that influence the way an 
actor thinks and acts (Everett, 2002). This include actors’ physical appearance 
(dressing, eating, walking) that is animated by knowledge. In other words, 
Bourdieu (1986) defines it as external wealth that is converted into actor 
habitus, but this transformation is not immediate, it is unconscious and 
depends on social conditions and field structure. It has the same 
characteristics as symbolic capital; it is “unrecognized as capital and 
recognized as legitimate competence” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 18). 
Objectified cultural capital is a material object of cultural goods such as writing, 
instruments, and machines. For Bourdieu (1986), this classification of cultural 
capital relates to embodied cultural capital and economic capital. For example, 
to possess a material good, an actor or group of actors needs economic 
capital. To use the object with its specific purpose, embodied cultural capital is 
required either by the possessor(s) or another actor(s). Bourdieu argues if the 
actor(s) does not own the material object but profits from their cultural capital 
or any particular type of capital by selling services that make the means of 
production of the material object possible, they will be classified as a dominant 
group which extends their embodied cultural capital. Such material and 
symbolic activity are used as weapons to battle in the field of cultural 
production and class division (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 20).  
 
27 Bourdieu (1986) criticised human capital theory as narrow rationality based on the direct 
calculation and relationship between monetary investments and profits without taking into 
consideration important factors such as different chances of profit related to the social class 
of an actor (class-division). This includes the reproduction of the education system to the social 
structure, previous investments of cultural capital by the family, and the importance of social 
capital in cultural yield. 
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Institutionalised cultural capital relates to institutional recognition of cultural 
capital. This could take the form of an academic institution that certifies the 
educational competence of its holder, or the cultural power of an actor working 
in a recognised institution. Bourdieu (1986) argued that institutionalising 
differences between agent(s) competence and cultural capital imposes 
institutional recognition. Such recognition creates different conversion levels 
between cultural to economic capitals. Besides, the material and symbolic 
value of the institutionalised cultural capital depends on demand and the 
structure of the field. 
Social capital 
Social capital is an individual social network. Bourdieu argues that the 
structure, mechanism, and the shape of social capital is different in each 
society. For example, in some societies, social capital is shaped by political 
capital which is a source of utility similar to economic capital in other societies 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 119).  
Elaborating more on social capital, Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as 
the collection of a durable network of relationships. Social capital is exchanged 
and maintained through material and/or symbolic profits of institutionalised 
relationship. This also includes the name (family, tribe, social class etc.), 
neighbours, and relatives. For Bourdieu (1986, p. 28 [17]), social capital goes 
without saying and has a governance logic similar to symbolic capital (symbolic 
capital is explained in the next section). 
Bourdieu (1986) explains that social capital is never completely independent 
of economic, cultural, and symbolic power. Likewise, social capital is the 
product of investment strategies: individual or collective, conscious or 
unconscious, to benefit from in the short or long run. For Bourdieu, the 
reproduction of social capital is often done through investment in competence.  
Symbolic capital 
Prestige and reputation are examples of symbolic capital. For Bourdieu, 
symbolic capital is “world-making” and the “power of constitution” (Bourdieu, 
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1989, p. 22). Bourdieu (1989) put it in this way: “Symbolic capital is a credit; it 
is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition in a 
position to impose recognition” (p. 23). Symbolic capital is the most 
recognisable form of power between actors with a dominant position in a field 
(Everett, 2018)28.  
To further explain symbolic power, capitals (economic, social, capital) convert 
into symbolic capital when they are considered, recognised, and legitimised by 
actors as a valuable capital (Bourdieu, 1989, 1994). People adapt to such 
domination logic and “misrecognise” symbolic power as a source of capital 
(Everett, 2018). Symbolic capital influences the way a field operates through 
intervening individual habitus (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 27 [3]). 
These explanations demonstrate that all capitals are interrelated, 
interconnected, and convertible to one another. Simultaneously, the 
conversion level and the type of possession and accumulation depend on the 
field structure in which the actors engage (Everett, 2002). The next section 
discusses Bourdieu’s theorisation of the field of power.  
4.2.3.3. The field of power 
Bourdieu theorises that to dominate a field, an actor accumulates the 
maximum amount of power that is most appreciated by a field (accumulation 
is direct or indirect through conversion from and to other capitals). Therefore, 
actors at the top of an important field occupy (if they have the interest) a 
position in the field of power.  
The field of power is a sort of meta-field. Bourdieu argues that the power field 
is determined by power relationships among the holders of the dominant 
positions of important social fields with different positions vis-à-vis the field of 
power (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 264-5, 271-2), including the bureaucratic and 
economic fields. This also means that the structure of various social fields is 
linked vis-à-vis the field of power (Everett, 2018).  
 
28 Emirbayer and Johnson (2008, p. 13) argue that symbolic capital (authority) is often attached 
to the establisher of a field.  
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Unlike social fields, in the meta-field of power, each actor employs different 
strategies to maintain or enhance the legitimacy of her/his dominant position 
in a specific field as well as the actor’s position in the broader social space. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 99-100) conceptualise the field of power as 
one of sacrifices and struggle; indeed it is. Bourdieu put the conflict within the 
field of power in this way:  
This struggle over the power to dictate the dominant principle of 
domination, which leads to a constant state of equilibrium in the partition 
of power, in other words, to a division in the labor of domination (as 
times intended and conceived as such, and explicitly negotiated), it also 
a struggle over the legitimate principle of legitimation and, inseparably, 
the legitimate mode of reproduction of the foundations of domination 
(Bourdieu, 1996, p. 265). 
The fight within the field of power is often between two positions (one group 
with high economic capital and low cultural capital and the other with high 
cultural capital and less economic capital) aiming to legitimise their domination 
over social fields. The struggle is partially or wholly related to strategies of 
(re)defining dominant capitals as well as the conversion/exchange rate of 
different capitals (cultural and economic capitals in particular) in various fields. 
The sacrifices relate to actor gains, concessions, and compromises of power 
to maintain or enhance their symbolic position and domination in social space 
(Bourdieu, 1996, p. 265).  
Swartz (2008) explained Bourdieu’s field of power as a representation of the 
power of the ruling class within a society. However, as I will explain in more 
detail the relationship between the field of power and the state in Section 4.3.4, 
Bourdieu (1994) argues that actors in the field of power struggle over the 
state’s power to dominate society and the social order. In other words, many 
of the fights in the field of power aim to control the power of the state; that is, 
over the statist capital “that enable the state to wield a power over all games 
and over the rules that regulate them” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 
100)29. Hence there is a kind of constant struggle between the field of power 
and the state. The field of power battles to control or reduce the state’s 
 
29 Statist capital is explained in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. 
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domination power (Swartz, 2008) and the state struggles to dominate the field 
of power (Swartz, 2013). Now I move to explain Bourdieu’s theorisation of 
habitus. 
4.2.3.4. Habitus 
For Bourdieu, habitus is: 
[S]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). 
[T]he strategy generating principle enabling agents to cope with 
unforeseen and ever-changing situations . . . a system of lasting and 
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, 
functions at every moments as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations 
and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified 
tasks (Bourdieu (1977), cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 18). 
Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) provided a more simplified definition to 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus;  
[T]he habitus is a mechanism linking individual action and the macro-
structural settings within which future action is taken. The habitus also 
links past fields to present fields through the individual actors who move 
from one to the next (p. 4).  
Habitus is a powerful tool to link macro and micro approaches (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991b cited in; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). It is the incorporation 
of actor disposition to the social structure (Friedland, 2009).  
An actor’s habitus is not limited to a specific field, but revolves as agents 
interact with external (other) fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). This 
means that participating in different fields also affects how an agent thinks and 
acts in a specific field, interactively. Hence, habitus represents continuous and 
changing mental and physical actions and reactions in any given field.  
To simplify these complex definitions on a single field, habitus is the way an 
actor thinks and acts based on her/his historical, continuous, and changing 
physical and embedded capitals, taken-for-granted beliefs, social processes, 
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field structure and mechanism. It also includes an actor’s position and 
interaction in various fields. Habitus is a disposition to cope and (re)act in 
different situations.  
The next sections will cover the last part of Bourdieu master concepts: the 
system of taken-for-granted. This includes illusio, doxa, and symbolic violence.  
4.2.3.5. Concepts of taken-for-granted 
Field, habitus, and capitals are all relational and not independent of each other. 
On the one hand, habitus is the operator of the objectified field(s) along with 
its structure and dynamics. Similarly, capitals also participate in structuring the 
habitus (and vice versa), which depends on an actor’s position in and the 
dynamic of a field. On the other hand, taken-for-granted beliefs (the unspoken 
rules) affect actor habitus, capitals, field structure, actor position, and 
respectively, the rules of the game in any field. Friedland (2009) argues that 
practice and the way the social world is organised is through taken-for-granted 
concepts, thoughts of the “naturalized world of everyday life” (p. 888). Bourdieu 
differentiated between three salient types of taken-for-granted concepts as 
follows. 
Illusio 
Illusio is a specific interest in the rewards of a field. Illusio (interest) goes 
automatically with a field. This means that an actor “only” enters a field if s/he 
has interest in the rewards a field may offer. In other words, entering and being 
in a field makes a difference that matters for an agent to pursue it (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992). The type of benefits (profits) differ between fields and 
depend on the agent habitus, capitals, and position in the field, and the 
rewards that are pursued.  
Doxa and symbolic violence  
Doxa is common sense. According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), it is 
accepting the world as it is. Doxa is not about the soundness of common 
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sense, but radical belief in the social rules and structure. Nonetheless, such a 
belief produces symbolic violence.  
Symbolic violence is not physical violence. For Bourdieu symbolic violence “is 
the violence which is exercised by a social agent with his or her complicity” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). Such violence is misrecognised and 
is not perceived as constraining an agent’s freewill. The word symbolic is 
included in this concept because such violence is a result of symbolic 
domination. Symbolic domination does not mean the influence of the dominant 
class or agent(s) but accepting, reasoning, or belief in the dominant structure 
of the social world and social order because agent perception is constructed 
according to these structures (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). That is why, for 
Bourdieu, doxa and symbolic violence are relational.  
For Bourdieu (1989), as I will demonstrate in a following section, “the state is 
the repository of common sense” (p. 22) and “the holder of the monopoly of 
the legitimate symbolic violence” (p. 22). It is worth noting that state power in 
(re)shaping practice is underutilised by many Bourdieusian scholars. The next 
part concludes Bourdieu’s practice theory and I then move on to explain 
Bourdieu’s theory of the state.  
4.2.4. Concluding Bourdieusian practice   
In this section, I explained my understanding of the Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice by going through many of his original (in English translation) works. I 
explained Bourdieu’s master concepts. However, as Bourdieu is a popular 
figure in the accounting literature, there are some variations in understanding 
and interpreting his ideas. One of the most sophisticated concepts is symbolic 
violence. Some, for example, Stringfellow et al. (2015, pp. 92), mistakenly 
argue that banks’ preference for the Big 4 and not small firms is a form of 
symbolic violence over non-dominant actors. For Bourdieu, symbolic violence, 
as I mentioned earlier, is a deeper structural condition than mere competition 
for capital within the economic field. It constrains the self because of an 
incorporated social system and structure that restrains individual freewill, but 
with her/his “complicity”.  
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Bourdieu theorisation of practice is not without limitation. One of the main 
criticisms of Bourdieu theoretical framing is the exclusion of “sentiment” from 
his social scheme (Friedland, 2009, pp. 896-7). Arguably, dismissing 
“emotions” (as they are challenging to codify/objectify for power purposes) is 
an attempt to “generalise” a road map to understanding social world and 
practices. I see another drawback that is related to linking “all” actor disposition 
to economic capital: actors’ continuous struggle to transcend in a field. I think, 
even in Western societies, not all behaviours are conditioned to be converted 
to economic power, similar to the findings of Spence et al. (2017) in Japan 
(see Section 2.4.1). Likewise, actors do not compete for domination in all 
fields. The risk with such rationalisation is (re)inforcing these capital 
(competitive) ideas in societies.  
According to Friedland (2009), in any field, explicit rules only get involved when 
a disposition cannot meet the practices that are required by the social 
structure. Bourdieu (1994) argues that the state is a powerful field that imposes 
rules explicitly  (through regulations) and implicitly through their monopoly of 
social space. Also, it has a permanent position in the field of power, as well as 
significant power to (re)produce the dynamics and structures of all social fields 
to control specific order (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 100).  
The next section discusses Bourdieu’s thoughts on the state. 
4.3. Bourdieu and the state 
4.3.1. Introduction 
Bourdieu considered the power of the state in forming social practice from his 
early writings (Swartz, 2013, p. 124-5). However, only after he completed his 
practice philosophies did he start to theorise about the “state”. Bourdieu began 
to consider the state in his book The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field 
of Power (1996 [1989], pp. 371-89), but arguably, in his housing policy study, 
The social structures of the economy (2005 [2000]), the state was at the centre 
of his investigation. Bourdieu started to produce scholarly works dedicated to 
explaining the state. His major works on the subject include On the State: 
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Lectures at the collège de France 1989-1992 (2014 [2012]), Rethinking the 
State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field (1994), From the King's 
House to the Reason of State: A Model of the Genesis of the Bureaucratic 
Field (2004), and The social structures of the economy (2005 [2000]).  
It is worth noting that Bourdieu’s understanding of the state is as yet 
underutilised in the academic accounting literature. To my knowledge, very 
few accounting studies considered Bourdieu’s theory of the state (e.g., Cooper 
et al., 2019; Spence et al., 2019). Probably, except for Loïc Wacquant (a 
Bourdieu co-author) and David Swartz (an American sociologist specialised in 
Bourdieu’s work), none attempted to provide a holistic explanation of 
Bourdieu’s theorisation of the state, which I intend to offer in this section.  
Bourdieu challenged the taken-for-granted notions that the state is merely 
“symbolic” and focused on the symbolic dimension of the state in relation to 
his theorisation of the field of power as well as his taken-for-granted master 
concepts, especially doxa and symbolic violence. This position has helped 
Bourdieu to provide a different perspective on the state than those of Michel 
Foucault, Norbert Elias, and Max Weber (Swartz, 2013, pp. 126-7, 129). What 
Bourdieu tried to achieve is to explain why and how the “state” legitimised its 
monopoly not only on physical violence over specific territory and people as 
Max Weber theorised, but also symbolic violence. 
Bourdieu’s work on the state could be categorised into three parts. First, the 
genesis of the bureaucratic state and the reproduction of the field of power, 
which I will briefly cover. Second, the process of concentration of different 
(interdependent) species of capital. Finally, the internal struggle within the 
bureaucratic field to impose its vision of reality to win symbolic profits. I will 
follow the same classification in this section.  
4.3.2. The genesis of the bureaucratic-state  
In his work, From the King's House to the Reason of State: A Model of the 
Genesis of the Bureaucratic Field, Bourdieu started analysing the historical 
process of transforming the logic of capital accumulation from the King’s royal 
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power to what  became the power of the state (from dynastic royal power to 
the bureaucratic public state) (Wacquant, 1993, pp. 40-2). Bourdieu (2004) 
provides a historical exploration focused on the dynastic system and the 
political shift to bureaucracy in Western Europe (especially France and 
England) until the mid-seventeenth century, when the bureaucratic state 
started to become a social reality.  
I wish to be concise in explaining the detailed reasons behind the diminishing 
of dynasticism. In summary, Bourdieu (2004) argued that in France and 
England, many (interrelated) reasons were behind the political transformation 
that empowered “bureaucracy” which resulted in a simultaneous reproduction 
of the field of power. First, the division of labour of domination and the 
reconfiguration of the education system. Second, lengthening the chain of 
authority within the dynastic system. Third, the implementation of Roman Laws 
that influenced judicial interest in the public interest by which the public, in 
return, empowered the judicial system with the capacity to change things. 
Finally, the construction of political authorities. For Bourdieu, there is no one 
reason for the political shift from dynasticism to bureaucracy. The logic behind 
the genesis of the modern bureaucratic state is to separate the public interest 
from the private interests of the King30.  
4.3.3. The process of concentrating different 
(interdependent) species of capital in the state 
In his study Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic 
Field, Bourdieu (1994) tried to unpack the logic of the process of state 
concentration of different species of powers. For Bourdieu (1994), the 
bureaucratic state is:  
[A]n X (to be determined) which successfully claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite 
territory and over the totality of the corresponding population (Bourdieu, 
1994, p. 3).  
 
30 Contemporary differences between England and France include that the former follows 
Common Law, while France adopted the Civil Law system. This significant difference probably 
arose because France, unlike Britain, abolished their monarchy.  
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Bourdieu (2014, pp. 34-6) distinguished between two meanings of the “state”, 
state 1 (i.e., the government, which Bourdieu refer to as the bureaucratic field) 
and state 2 (i.e., the entire territory, including state 1), which grants authority 
to state 1. For Bourdieu, state 1 (the bureaucratic field), has a significant power 
to produce and impose categories of thought that most people apply (in state 
2), including the state 1 (bureaucratic field).  
The bureaucratic field becomes a meta-field that controls different state 
capitals as well as holders of these capitals. The concentration of different 
types of powers in the bureaucratic field (paralleled with the construction of 
corresponding bureaucratic fields) lead to the emergence of statist capital. 
Statist capital enabled the state to monopolise social spaces as well as 
influencing the habitus of social actors. That said, the emergence of the state, 
for Bourdieu (1994), paralleled the reconstruction of the field of power. And the 
field of power became a site of struggle over, especially, the state’s power 
(statist capital) to control the totality.  
Bourdieu theorised five (interrelated) powers that enable the bureaucratic field 
to legitimise and dominate the state monopoly over symbolic (re)production of 
its symbolic rule. These capitals are: coercive power, economic capital, 
informational capital, juridical power, and symbolic capital.  
4.3.3.1. State physical power 
The monopoly for using coercive power (the army and police) become 
concentrated in the bureaucratic field, mainly to maintain social order and to 
undermine the lords’ warring function (Bourdieu, 1994). The emergence of the 
bureaucratic state influenced the nobility to abandon the war function and join 
universities, take positions in the bureaucracy and the courts (Bourdieu, 2004). 
According to Bourdieu (1994), the emergence of the bureaucratic field justified 
the concentration and control of physical force for two main reasons. First, 
creating an army to advance state (land) expansion interests as well as to 
protect its territories from the threats of foreigners. Second, for defense against 
the internal threats of the King’s entourage--the army was used for “inter-state 
competition”, and police for “intra-state order”. However, the state, as long as 
 117 
it can produce a cognitive structure that agrees with its objective structure, 
does not always have to exercise its coercive abilities to produce social order.  
4.3.3.2. State economic capital 
The concentration of physical force is paralleled with the creation of a fiscal 
system to cover expenses. This is unlike the logic of economic power in the 
dynastic state where levies are accumulated and converted to the symbolic 
status of one person, the King. Under a bureaucratic regime, the logic of the 
concentration of economic capital is to control expansion and defense (against 
the King’s entourage as well as for coercive power over the collection of taxes). 
However, the legitimacy of the tax institution is, as Bourdieu (1994, p. 6 [9]) 
argues, related to how these “public” monies are used--for public expenditures 
instead of the King’s usage, which was to satisfy his competitors. Also, the 
legitimacy of the tax institution (as it is interdependent on coercive and 
symbolic recognition) is related to the dignity of collectors, and various 
“accounting” tools were implemented and recognised.  
Bourdieu (1994, p. 7) argues that the legitimacy of the tax institution (rooted in 
defence needs) contributed to the rise of nationalism (as these monies are also 
used for societal interests) which eventually constructed the reality of 
the unitary territory of the state.   
4.3.3.3. Informational capital 
Bourdieu (1994) is of the view that the concentration of state informational 
capital is linked to state concentration of economic capital, mediated by the tax 
institution. With the bureaucratic claims for taking care of the totality, surveys 
and census helped the state to accumulate knowledge. However, codification 
(e.g., official forms) and classification (e.g., sex and age) through bureaucratic 
communications and procedures influenced the mental structure of the 
individual to inculcate a common vision and division that legitimised national 
culture. In other words, the unification of culture and language rationalise and 
legitimise the authority of the state to impose and inculcate social realities and 
reshape the mental structure of a nation.      
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4.3.3.4. Autonomous juridical capital 
Unlike, for example, state economic capital, judicial power has its own logic. 
Bourdieu (1994) explained the genesis of the Western juridical system and 
how the symbolic power of this field contributed to the power of the 
bureaucratic state. The creation of the juridical apparatus was a result of the 
King’s involvement beyond his royal domain; that is, in society. Under 
feudalism, feudal courts used to be sovereign, and supplication, according to 
Bourdieu, turned to appeal procedures, where appeal cases were decided by 
a hierarchy (lords, dukes, and counts) that ends with the King, not judges or 
juries. This system concentrated juridical power with the King. This model gave 
independent authorities for jurists and their field.  
Given the jurists’ interests in the kingdom, it legitimised all the King’s activities 
that represent people justice and security (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 10). Slowly, over 
time, it enhanced the competence of its field through changing self-appointed 
jurists to professional ones. Later, it stripped the kingly entourage by 
supporting royal “competent” jurisdiction over lords and churches. The creation 
of the bureaucratic structure was alongside jurists’ construction of their 
autonomous fields. However, with the rationalisation and legitimisation of state 
power, the reproduction of the juridical field become subject to the state 
(Bourdieu, 1994). 
4.3.3.5. Symbolic power of the state 
The symbolic power of the state as per Bourdieu (1994) is a correlation of 
various concentrations of capitals. Symbolic capital, in the bureaucratic field, 
is any form of power that is recognised by social agents “through categories of 
perception that are the product of the embodiment of divisions or of oppositions 
inscribed in the structure of the distribution of this species of capital” (p. 9). For 
Bourdieu (2014), the bureaucratic field (state 1) is the “central bank of symbolic 
power” (p. 217) as everything (directly or indirectly) becomes connected to the 
state. For Bourdieu the state’s ability to monopolise different forms of capital 
contributed to its symbolic power. Nonetheless, another significant logic that 
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contributes to state domination of symbolic violence is people’s doxic 
submission to the state ability to nominate.    
State nomination logic  
As I mentioned earlier, in England and France, the bureaucratic logic of the 
symbolic power of the state as argued by Bourdieu (1994, 2004, 2014), was 
rooted in the (re)production of juridical capital. The state started to accumulate 
and maintain its symbolic status via the concentration of various species of 
capital. The state’s nomination power is one of the authorities that the holder 
of state power uses to control the entire society. Nomination takes the form of 
empowering religious authorities, titles of nobility, or even the appointment of 
officials (Bourdieu, 2014). Nomination is a form of classifying the totality 
(nobility from commoners, and ranking and control within nobility and 
commoners).   
For Bourdieu, nomination is a mysterious and magical logic that owed its 
position to different species of capital (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 374). For example, 
the shift from social capital in the case of nobility by “blood” and to (often) 
cultural capital in the case of nominated “legal” nobility. Nomination in return 
contributes to and mobilizes the symbolic capital of who has the power to 
nominate (the King or the bureaucratic state), through collective recognition of 
objectified symbolic capital (e.g., dress and laws; Bourdieu, 1994, p. 11).  
In the contemporary bureaucracy, a nomination is only validated by officials 
(authority and individuals) assigned by the state (e.g., the procedures for 
registering an auditor, or who can sign an audit report); only their nomination 
carries legal effect. For Bourdieu (1994), official nomination (including licenses 
by and registration with the state) institutes social guarantee identities (e.g., 
citizenship, car owner, taxpayer) and legitimises social groups (e,.g, families 
and associations). With the state power to nominate and its authority to use 
symbolic violence, Bourdieu is of the view that:  
By stating with authority what a being (thing or person) is in truth 
(verdict) according to its socially legitimate definition, that is what he or 
she is authorized to be, what he has a right (and duty) to be, the social 
 120 
being that he may claim, the State wields a genuinely creative, quasi-
divine, power (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 12). 
A good (easy) example of state nomination power is automobile seat-belt laws-
-they show how state symbolic power works in parallel lines. The state 
constructs the rationality that it is safer to use a seat-belt. It enforces this idea 
with state physical power: punishment by a group of nominated (licensed and 
registered) actors, the police. Classification of citizenship underpins such a 
dynamic. Good people are those who accept state (seat-belt) ideas and bad 
citizens are those who reject submission to this free will constraint. Henceforth, 
nomination (including licensing, registration, and classification) intertwined to 
compose the state’s symbolic power to shape the commonsense of the 
society, including the state itself. A doxa that is generated by the state with its 
related symbolic violence on violating individual free will to choose and decide.  
4.3.3.6. Concluding the state concentration of power 
For Bourdieu (1994), in civil societies, the state has significant involvement in 
(re)producing doxa for the nation and, relatedly, the habitus of individuals. It 
applies different forms and constraints to discipline the body and mind. 
Nomination is one direct example, but a crucial one. The state gets its symbolic 
domination by the doxic submission of the embeddied (cognitive) structure 
(collective and individual) and objective structure (societal structure that 
applies to the cognitive structure). The state owes its symbolic legitimacy to 
imposing pre-reflexive vision to cognitive structures that accord to the state 
objective structure (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 14-5).  
The doxic submission to the dominant image is often a result of intra-state 
battles between different visions. Bourdieu put this politically produced relation 
and confrontation between the dominant and dominated this way: 
Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, 
when it presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view--the 
point of view of those who dominate by dominating the state and who 
have constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the state 
(Bourdieu, 1994, p. 15).  
 121 
The struggle of the few over the advantages and public resources of the state 
monopoly of physical and symbolic violence is through controlling and 
influencing statist capital which is a result of the state monopoly of different 
species of capitals. Again, such a universal monopoly is a result of submission 
and disinterestedness (Bourdieu, 1994). Bourdieu argues that the 
monopolisation of the bureaucratic field was done through commissions that 
are universally recognised and legitimised, aiming to promote general public 
interests. These commissions offered material or symbolic profits to the 
universe (public interests) at the cost of universal submission to commission 
rules and structures (Bourdieu, 2014).  
Now I move to the last part of the Bourdieusian state theory, the dynamic of 
the bureaucratic field.  
4.3.4. Dynamic of the bureaucratic field and its relation to 
the field of power 
Drawing on his “field” perspective as a “space of objective relations between 
positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or 
species of capitals” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 114), Bourdieu 
suggests that the bureaucratic field has a distinguished underlying structure 
and network (different dynamics).  
For Bourdieu, the construction of the bureaucratic field resulted in the 
emergence of different corresponding fields as well as statist capital (a form of 
meta capital) that enables the bureaucratic field (the state) to exert power over 
other fields. For Bourdieu (1994), the state power is crucial as it exercises 
control over other species of capital, their exchange rate, and consequently 
over the holder of these capitals in various fields. In other words, the “state” 
became a meta-capital that grants power to other capitals as well as to the 
holders of these capitals (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 114).  
As I explained earlier, with the shift from the patrimonial-dynastic to 
bureaucratic-state, the field of power changed (Bourdieu, 2004, pp. 25, 33). 
The field of power became a form of meta-field to govern various fields 
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(Bourdieu, 1994, p. 5). Actors in the field of power struggle, in particular, for 
power over the state power, for statist capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
For Bourdieu, the state does not solely occupy the field of power (Swartz, 
2013, pp. 126-7), but overlaps a big part of the field of power as the struggle 
in the field of power is mainly over control of the statist capital. Swartz (2013, 
pp. 136, 144) suggests a different reading to the Bourdieu state-field of power 
relationship: as the field of power fights to control the state, the state, in return, 
became an arena to control the field of power.  
As I mentioned earlier in Section 4.3.3, for Bourdieu (1994, p. 12), the state 
(re)produces social reality through its concentration of various species of 
powers. Also, its monopoly of the logic of nomination and classification 
institutionalises social identity and legitimises social groupings to accept social 
order that enables the state to (re)shape social reality through its physical and 
symbolic violence. Yet, as this is the end function of the modern bureaucracy, 
to maintain its (objective and embodied) symbolic domination, reaching this 
end is complicated, as Swartz (2013) argued; 
The state itself is a site for ongoing struggles between groups and 
bureaucratic agencies, each attempting to impose its understandings of 
the social world as legitimate (Swartz, 2013, p. 140). 
4.3.4.1. The bureaucratic struggle to maintain or transform 
order 
The bureaucratic field carries its function and mission to legitimise its 
monopoly of physical and symbolic violence through regulations (as the 
primary weapon for controlling the totality) and agents/agencies that impose 
and enforce these regulations. On the production and consumption of social 
policies (to maintain or transform reality) in contemporary societies, Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (1992, p. 111) argued: 
[W]hat we encounter, concretely, is an ensemble of administrative or 
bureaucratic field (they often take the empirical form of commissions, 
bureaus and boards) within which agents and categories of agents, 
governmental and nongovernmental, struggle over this peculiar form of 
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authority consisting of the power to rule via legislation, regulations, 
administrative measures (subsidies, authorizations, restriction, etc.).  
In contemporary societies, Bourdieu (1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2005, 2014) 
theorised the homologous structure (distribution of power and interests) of the 
bureaucratic field. Bourdieu argues that, due to political division, for the state 
to preserve or transform its vision of the social space (often via regulations), 
there are two types of intertwined battles within the bureaucratic field. First, the 
vertical struggle between and within high state nobility and low state nobility. 
Second, a horizontal battle between the right-hand of the state and the left-
hand of the state. In the middle of these tensions lie external forces (e.g., 
professions, banks, professional associations, building societies), that 
intervene in a particular bureaucratic struggle to influence the dynamics of 
bureaucratic disputes and to advance their interests. Nonetheless, these 
external forces are used by agents and bureaucratic institutions to support and 
win the imposition of their vision of reality (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 93). 
For Bourdieu (2005), the vertical spectrum represents a hierarchal power of 
bureaucratic agent or institution (relating to a specific policy). Bourdieu argued 
that the field of high state nobility (upper level civil servant) is a field of 
permanent struggle (to impose its political vision) mainly on the functions of 
the state associated with its bureaucratic organisations (e.g., government 
ministries). Battles within the field of high state nobility occur because every 
bureaucratic body defends its interests (existence and functions) which in turn 
“indirectly” defend the function of the bureaucratic state. However, struggle 
within the field of upper level civil servants is also related to the influence of 
external forces. In return, high state nobility uses external forces to support 
imposition of its vision (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 93). On the other side of this 
spectrum lies the low state nobility. Opposite to high state nobility, lower state 
nobility represents agents and institutions with low bureaucratic authority.  
To define the position-taking by a bureaucratic agent or institution, Bourdieu 
distinguished between two opposing rationalities behind bureaucratic 
(horizontal) struggles, the right-hand of the state and the left-hand of the state. 
For Bourdieu (1992, 1998a) the left represents the logic of spending ministries 
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(that in the past were responsible for social life) and the right hand represents 
paying ministries (with economic rationality and agenda; ministries responsible 
for managing/dispensing government monies). The right hand of the state 
could also be seen as the coercive hand of the state (e.g., the ability to use the 
armed forces) and the left hand as the social function of the state. Bourdieu 
(1992) is of the view that in contemporary societies, as the state is withdrawing 
from social life, the left-hand state senses that the right-hand lacks knowledge 
and probably does not want to know (or pay for) the social function of the left 
hand; this holds as well for socialist government. Nonetheless, while the 
distinction between left/right is a useful heuristic, it is not deterministic - the 
right hand of the state could act in a humanitarian way (e.g., the armed forces 
may help/rescue people from injury/death) and the left hand of the state may 
have a more coercive function (e.g., schools may suppress students’ 
understandings of certain issues).  
Strategies to maintain or transform bureaucratic reality depend on actor 
position-taking in relation to the position in the bureaucratic space (the 
bureaucratic structure) for a particular policy. What I mean is that a high state 
noble does not stick “permanently” to either a right hand “or” a left hand, but  
is selective, depending on the specific policy. And this position-taking depends 
on interests, the type of bureaucratic battle, the level of struggle, and the 
support of external forces--often through social capital or the illusio of externals 
(Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 110-20). Bourdieu (2005, p. 113) argued that the reason 
behind the tendency (left or right) in the strategic position-taking by 
bureaucratic authorities is “to prevent a bureaucratic body losing all raison 
d'être by losing its function”. This also apply to agents within bureaucratic 
bodies that owe their bureaucratic raison d'être to the existence of their 
authority.  
For Bourdieu, the struggle between civil servants related to the status of their 
bureaucratic capital. Bourdieu (2005, pp. 116-7) classified bureaucratic capital 
into bureaucratic capital of experience and technically-based bureaucratic 
capital. The former is related to knowing people and knowledge of regulations-
-a kind of capital that can be obtained over a long period and related to the 
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seniority of a civil servant. The latter, technical bureaucratic capital, may be 
accumulated more quickly and is a threat to seniority-based capital. Technical 
capital is related to assessing costs and effect through formalised procedures, 
statistical survey, mathematical modelling, etc. On this inner bureaucratic 
tension, Bourdieu added: 
The force possessed by a particular civil servant or body of civil 
servants always relates in part to their ability to master, if not indeed 
monopolize, the rare resource that is information (we know that in 
internal struggles, “information retention” is one of the weapons 
employed by those holding an informational capital based on 
experience and seniority) (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 117). 
The antagonism between bureaucratic commissions is involved in 
implementing strategies of mobilisation, manoeuvring, manipulation, and 
compromises to win the acceptance of a particular preference and solutions 
(to maintain or transform) of visions. However, as the bureaucratic 
agents/agencies have relative freedom for disposition depending on their 
position in the hierarchy, this in return gives greater indeterminacy and 
uncertainty to the bureaucratic field in comparison to other fields (Bourdieu, 
2005, p. 130).  
4.3.5. Concluding comments on Bourdieu state power and 
his late writings 
In this section, I categorised Bourdieu’s scattered work on the state into three 
parts. The first part summarised Bourdieusian ideas on the reasons 
underpinning the transformation of the social governance system from 
dynastic to bureaucracy. One of the main reasons for such change is the 
expansion of the King’s territory, which resulted in changing the monarchical 
system of governance. Nonetheless, among many other reasons, the 
reformation of the juridical field and the use of Roman Law influenced the 
judiciary to support the public.  
Part two explained how the bureaucratic state led the cognitive structure of the 
society to be aligned with the state structure for accumulating and maintaining 
its coercive and symbolic powers. Bourdieu theorised five related state 
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capitals. First, the concentration of coercive power is justified for inter-and-
intra-state defence purposes. Second, economic capital to control expansion 
and defence, which contributed to the legitimacy of the tax institution. Third, 
informational capital through surveys and census where codification and 
classification inculcated a vision of national culture. Fourth, juridical power in 
producing social justice and security. Fifth, symbolic capital though the logic of 
nomination, license, and registration. 
The last part explored Bourdieu’s explanation of the dynamic of the 
bureaucratic field. Bourdieu argues for two intertwined battles within the 
bureaucratic field: between high and low state nobilities, and between the right 
and left hands of the state. External forces lie in the middle of the bureaucratic 
fight. They aim to influence the bureaucratic outcome, and bureaucratic 
institutions use external forces to support their fight to impose the dominant 
vision of the social world.  
It is worth noting that Bourdieu’s late writing was dedicated to neoliberalism 
and criticising the concept of economic globalisation. He argued, “It is an 
altogether paradoxical reality which relies upon a politics of depoliticization” 
(Bourdieu, 2002)31. Bourdieu also wrote about the short-term mathematical 
imperial vision of IOs that he believed not only demolished the welfare state 
but also created “havoc” in the relationship between the West and the non-
West (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 5, 6, 19, 26).  
Sadly, Bourdieu passed away from cancer in 2002. This was at the beginning 
of the implementation of the “new” global order, the global spread of 
Washington Consensus architecture that started to intensify with the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s. Bourdieu did not offer detailed views on the 
process of globalising financial economies. In other words, as Bourdieu’s 
practice notions (including state theory) are powerful in unpacking micro-social 
arrangements and power, he did not reflect in detail on the process of action 
 
31 In his book Act of Resistance: Against the New Myths of our Time, Bourdieu (1998b) offered 
various essays criticising the doxic economic rationalisation and the concept of the 
globalisation of economics. 
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and reaction in the global sphere between those behind the enforcing of the 
international architecture and those dominating the national social space.  
To put it in Bourdieusian logic, as the state produces the cognitive structure of 
the individual mind to submit to the state’s vision/power, the exogenous 
influence of globalisation on the state and local actor dynamics is not 
discussed by Bourdieu. I tried to cover this empirical gap by adopting a 
theoretical framework that focuses on global-local relations without threatening 
my (and Bourdieu’s) philosophical position. I found Halliday and Carruthers’ 
(2007, 2009) recursivity framework to be developed on Bourdieusian ideas.  
4.4. The theory of recursivity  
Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers are American sociologists. Halliday is 
a research professor at the American Bar Association and Carruthers is a 
professor of sociology at Northwestern University, Illinois, US. Both Halliday 
and Carruthers completed their PhDs in sociology from the University of 
Chicago. They co-authored many works in areas such as sociology, law, 
globalisation, economics and politics, organisations, as well as accounting. 
Their studies are interpretive in nature and interdisciplinary oriented. Working 
together since the 1990s, they produced two books and many journal articles 
and book chapters.  
It was clear through reading some of their work, especially that related to their 
book Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis, that many 
scholars inspired their perspective and the creation of their theory. For 
example, John Meyer and Brian Rowan’s work on the theory of decoupling, 
James Scott’s book Weapons of the Weak, and the work of the economist 
Joseph Stiglitz and sociologist Max Weber (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009, pp. 
3, 4, 28-30, 345). Also, in some parts of their book (without explicitly referring 
to him), Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts and language were notable (e.g., fields, 
capitals, field of power, and habitus). The Halliday and Carruthers framework 
is a power theory. It emphasises power relations within and between globalism 
and the nation-state mediated by economic (neoliberal) activities.  
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In terms of their philosophy, the last chapter of their book (Bankrupt) largely 
explains their position. They are not anti-globalism, but they believe that 
Americanising the international finance system and then imposing it on 
countries with different social structures, practices, and cultures is hegemonic, 
wrong, and increases societal uncertainty (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009, pp. 
411-2, 426). I believe Bourdieu and Halliday and Carruthers share many 
axiological similarities and close philosophical positions.  
Following this introduction, the next sections aim to provide three things. First, 
I will introduce Halliday and Carruthers’ work in the accounting literature. In 
part two, I explain Halliday and Carruthers’ recursivity model. As I am heavily 
immersed in Bourdieusian logics, I intend to explain parts of transnational 
recursivity using Bourdieu’s perspectives, particularly his theory of the state. 
The third part concludes and offers scholarly critiques on the theory of 
recursivity.  
4.4.1. The theory of legal change and the accounting 
literature 
I should start by pointing out that Halliday and Carruthers’ notions on legal 
change were first published in 2007 in the American Journal of Sociology. 
Later, in the same year, Halliday and Carruthers issued a chapter in two 
different books about the same topic. One was on the foiling of global 
hegemony (Halliday and Carruthers, 2007b) and the other covered the modern 
transparency and predictability of bankruptcy law (Halliday and Carruthers, 
2007c). In 2009, Halliday and Carruthers produced a 400 page book that 
synthesised all their findings, theory, and ideas.  
It is noteworthy that some of Halliday and Carruthers’ prior works informed the 
accounting literature as they published a number of accounting research 
articles in accounting journals. For example, Halliday and Carruthers (1996) 
study on the English Insolvency Act were employed by Cooper and Joyce 
(2013). However, reference to Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) recursivity 
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theory in the accounting literature is scant. To my knowledge32, except for 
Mehrpouya (2015), accounting studies scarcely discuss Halliday and 
Carruthers’ investigation, findings, and their developed theory. Nonetheless, 
even the Mehrpouya (2015) study focuses on global/local intermediation, 
cooperation, and coalition in developing a global accountability system. 
Mehrpouya applied Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) to understand 
processes that led to the enactment of accountability governance for sovereign 
wealth funds. As we will see later, Mehrpouya’s employment of recursivity 
constitutes one part of the theory: intermediation. The following sections cover 
the Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) theory in greater detail. 
4.4.2. What is the theory of legal change, “recursivity”? 
In light of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 
2009) investigated and theorised how three different countries (Indonesia, 
Korea, and China) reacted, cooperated, and competed with IOs (global norm 
producers) to change their indigenous national bankruptcy systems to global 
standardised practices. Halliday and Carruthers found that the process of 
financial global convergence moves through three cycles. First, it starts from 
global scripts and norm-making (intermediation) to, second, national 
lawmaking (foiling), and third, from national lawmaking back to global norm-
making (recursivity).  
Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) theorised about the power relation 
between global hegemonic agencies and countries that are perceived to be 
distant (weak) from centres that produce global norms. Halliday and 
Carruthers (2007, pp. 1137, 1154) argue that their theory is a result of intensive 
work with global key actors, and it is part of a broader study of 60 nations. 
 
32 I examined how Halliday and Carruthers recursivity work has been employed in the 
accounting literature. I found only Mehrpouya (2015) applied part of their recursivity 
framework, which is related to global norm-making. Nonetheless, a recent paper by Mihret et 
al. (2019) used a few aspects of Halliday and Carruthers’ theorisation to explain the evolving 
relation between transnational forces and the Iranian state. A majority of studies either 
mistakenly cited the Halliday and Carruthers recursivity work or used it to support arguments 
about the tension in the global financial space. I even found a few studies referring to this 
theory in a footnote. However, in this thesis, I decided to not reflect (in detail) on how recursivity 
framework is followed in the literature.  
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These three countries were chosen, according to them, for two main reasons: 
the level of global involvement and influence differ in each case, and the 
mechanisms of resistance are different. The following sections will only cover 
the theory which is the outcome of their investigation (a summary of their 
findings is provided in Section 2.6.2).  
Recursivity theory is all about the power relations between and within 
“globalised localisms” and “localised globalisms”. The term “recursivity” is 
attractive and is often linked to their work. Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 
2009) used the three terms iterative cycles, recursive, and recursivity, 
differently (see Figure 6). In the global context, legal change goes through 
three cycles--first, iterative cycles for global scripts and norms production. 
Second, the recursive struggle of national lawmaking to enact and implement 
global scripts and norms. Third, the asymmetric integration between the two, 
where global power constrains national lawmaking and nations influence 
global norm-making through foiling, engendering what Halliday and Carruthers 
(2007, 2009) coined as “recursivity”. Hence, recursivity is the outcome of the 
entire cycle of dynamics from global influence to national enactment of laws 
(intermediation) to local struggles for implementation (foiling) and back to 
global norms-making (recursivity). The following two figures illustrate the 
objective structure of the recursivity model.  
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Figure 5: “Recursive cycles of bankruptcy lawmaking in global context”  
Source: (Halliday and Carruthers, 2007, p. 1147) 
 
Figure 6: “Recursive cycles of bankruptcy lawmaking in global contexts”  
(Halliday and Carruthers, 2009, p. 364) 











Similar to Bourdieu, Halliday and Carruthers offered a structure to understand 
power relations and disposition within and between global actors (global norms 
producers) and nation-states. The first diagram is from their 2007 paper, and 
the second is in their 2009 book. Although they look the same, a notable 
difference exists. In their paper, Halliday and Carruthers did not write much 
about the recursive cycle of global norm production but instead focused on the 
logic and literature of world polity theory. In contrast, a significant part of their 
book covers the struggle in the global space to produce norms as well as their 
processes33.  
4.4.2.1. Global norm-making and power   
For Halliday and Carruthers (2009, pp. 9-10), globalisation is both a concept 
and a process. The concept of globalism works in three ways. First, from the 
top, it is achieved through imperial and quasi-imperial global actors. Second, 
from below, through the construction of local rationality to believe that the 
global solution is the one for their internal problems. Third, across domains, 
shifting global solutions from one arena to another as well as borrowing 
regulatory efforts of transnational agencies from one to another.   
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argue that the process of gloablisation works 
in two parallel trajectories:   
Globalization comprises both structural changes and discursive 
representations of those changes (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005). The 
structural dimension concerns changes in global flows of people, ideas, 
money, and material objects. The discursive dimension concerns the 
meanings that motivate, rationalize, and interpret structural changes, 
including diagnoses, policy frameworks, political framing, 
epistemologies, and the like. A global normative consensus therefore 
signifies the combination of a dominant discourse and congruent 
structural capacities that undergird its development and propagation 
(Halliday and Carruthers, 2009, p. 7).  
 
33 I think one reason for excluding global norm production from their first paper, although it is 
part of recursivity logic, might be that it is too much (in terms of length and ideas) for a single 
academic article. Or, taking a more suspicious view, I would say that they may not have been 
able to publish these ideas in the American Journal of Sociology. 
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Halliday and Carruthers (2009) criticised many scholarly perceptions on taken-
for-granted globalisation as an unproblematic and uncomplicated process. 
They argued “globalization is contested and negotiated, not simply imposed 
and imprinted, even when the power differentials are pronounced” (p. 30). For 
Halliday and Carruthers (Ibid., p. 77-81), a global process is achieved when 
international players balance legitimacy (local submission to exogenous 
interference, procedural fairness in norm-crafting, effectiveness of norms), 
technology (appropriate arrangements to solve social problems), and leverage 
(depending on the capacity of global actors and the financial situation of a 
nation-state, leverage takes three forms: economic coercion for structural 
conditions, persuasion with potential incentives, and modelling for 
consideration by nations). Halliday and Carruthers (2009) criticised the 
process of globalism on the ground that “no IFI [international financial 
institution] or professional association had solved the fundamental problem of 
representation” (p. 121).   
Powerful actors in the global space 
According to Halliday and Carruthers (2009), on the one hand, IFIs (especially 
the IMF and the World Bank)34 have the most significant visible leverage to 
pressure countries, especially in a financial crisis situation, to adopt norms 
conditioned on lending. Nonetheless, clubs of advanced economies 
(especially the G7) have less obvious power, but their influence extends to 
most IFIs.35 On the other hand, the importance of international professional 
associations (for bankruptcy laws) lies in their ability to provide technical 
expertise, but their global influence depends on mutual interest(s) with 
powerful nation-state(s) (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009, pp. 76, 299). 
 
34 There are differences between IFIs. For example, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argue 
that the IMF is more centralised concerning its personnel and organisation compare to the 
World Bank’s long-term expansion in many countries. This difference makes the World Bank 
superior regarding knowledge and local experience compare to the IMF. Nonetheless, Halliday 
and Carruthers also argue that the IMF has the most coercive activities and the most 
substantial relationship and common global agenda with the US Treasury Department.  
35 For Halliday and Carruthers (2009), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) also plays a significant role in supporting norms produced by IFIs by 
disseminating them internationally.  
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However, through their technical and sometimes mediating involvements, 
professions make the interaction between global and local more complicated 
because they have different interests, epistemologies, and capabilities.  
Unlike the epistemological conflict for standardising bankruptcy between 
lawyers and accountants in the bankruptcy domain, the internationalisation of 
Western accountancy is monopolised by international standards-setting 
bodies and large international accountancy firms. Both share similar 
epistemologies. Relatedly, Arnold (2012, p. 375) theorised that in the wake of 
the East Asian Crisis and the reconstitution of international financial 
architecture, transnational accounting and auditing industries consolidated 
their power to pursue their (epistemologically similar) international expansion 
interests. 
Nonetheless, as accountancy is a language for capital, the global spread of 
Western accounting and auditing practices have an embodied logic to 
embrace capital, which makes accountancy, arguably, a more important 
system for economic globalisation. Such importance reflects the power of the 
accountancy profession and international firms in the global sphere (see 
Section 2.2.3).  
For Halliday and Carruthers (2009), other IOs that influence the crafting of 
global norms are the United Nations committees. These committees take the 
form of working groups and encourage the participation of countries and IFIs 
such as the World Bank and the IMF. The result of this type of arrangement is 
a high level of consensus on most issues. However, Halliday and Carruthers 
argue that countries of the south often share a common weakness in this 
regard. They either do not participate or continuously change their 
representatives. And most of their participants are diplomats with limited 
practical knowledge in comparison to participants from advanced economies 
and IFIs. This renders them ineffective in technical discussions and weak in 
negotiation. 
Last but not least, many powerful Western countries attempt to influence the 
design of global norms and their transcripts. In this regard, Halliday and 
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Carruthers (2007) are of the view that no other countries can match the 
influence of the US. The US (through their Treasury Department, American 
experts, and corporations) has a significant leverage on clubs of nations, IFIs, 
the United Nations, and professional associations to influence the design of 
any global norm (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009). In globalising bankruptcy 
scripts and norms, for example, Halliday and Carruthers (2009, p. 412) argue 
that US involvement and influence exceeded that of all other advanced 
countries put together. Nevertheless, variation in systems between powerful 
advanced economies authorise alternative practices. And, because of these 
differences, developing economies vary in their adoption.  
Politics and the struggle of global norm and script production  
Each actor in the global arena has strengths, limitations, and leverage, and 
each compensates for their weaknesses with the power of others. The 
dynamics in the global field constitute cooperation and conflicts as a race to 
the top and often IFIs work collectively (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009). 
Collaboration between global actors occurs because each institution knows 
the efforts of the other and may collaborate. Nonetheless, IFIs that do not 
develop norms rely on the models developed by others.  
Conflict arises between global actors mainly related to who leads the universal 
norm. Or as Bourdieu would argue, each struggles to impose their vision of 
reality to protect their international existence by defending their purpose and 
function. Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argue that the prize of such a battle 
is to put their stamp on worldwide norm production--a harmonised global 
standard by a particular international institution. They put it in this way:  
In its extreme form, when a dominant power prevails, the latter is the 
path to hegemony--universal acceptance of the rightness and 
“normality’’ of one course of action. In less extreme forms, it takes the 
paths of classification, labeling, and framing to develop universals that 
may be considered ‘’modern’’, “efficient’’, and “advanced’’ (p. 8).  
It is worth noting that the struggle between global actors and norm production 
is not always direct. For example, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argue that 
international standards and protocols for airline safety are an indirect way of 
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leading the global norm. These standards adopted the US system. Therefore, 
any country implementing international standards (sometimes without 
knowing) has adopted the US system. In this scenario, the US successfully 
globalised its localism softly by using IOs, and the adopting country localised 
the US globalism. Thus, in the global arena, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) 
argue that it is critical to understand “whose localisms are being globally 
institutionalized” (p. 298).  
Before I move to the next part, I thought I would provide a reflection on how 
Bourdieu’s theory (especially his ideas of the state) would explain Halliday and 
Carruthers’ perception on global norm production. I think Bourdieu’s 
theorisation of the state is highly appropriate for explaining the dynamic of the 
global space. The global space could be understood as Bourdieu’s theorisation 
of state 2 (the broader state, including state 1) and international players that 
construct the global space could represent Bourdieu’s theorisation of state 1 
(the bureaucratic field).  
Powerful countries (especially the UN Security Council’s five permanent 
members, P5, E 3+3) could be argued to occupy positions in the global field of 
power and the role of international organisations extends to the function and 
dynamic of the bureaucratic field. Depending on the ability of IOs to impose, 
maintain, or transform their vision of reality, they may be divided between high 
state nobility and low state nobility. The dynamic in the global space between 
the field of power (occupied by powerful countries) and high state nobility 
(occupied by powerful IO’s) is a collaboration and a confrontation, where each 
aims to monopolise physical and symbolic violence. However, the conflict 
between high state nobility (powerful international players) is to dominate 
specific policies and impose a particular vision of reality (see Section 4.3.4).  
As Halliday and Carruthers’ recustivity theory argues that non-Western 
countries refuse to submit to norms that create local disorder, the power of IOs 
and their authority to advance global norms must not be only perceived as 
doxa (depending on the global policy and country per se), but could be 
imagined as Bourdieu’s theory of nomination that (re)shapes the habitus and 
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then develop into common sense, with related physical (through state 
sanctions) and symbolic violence (see Section 4.3.3.5).  
The intersection of the global and the local 
The global normative framework for harmonising financial systems is achieved 
in two ways. First, norm-making through constructing international systems. 
Second, the restructuring of national systems through advice, assistance, and 
conditional lending to reform law and lawmaking. Halliday and Carruthers 
(2009) argue that it is naïve to assume that local and global powers are equal 
or that northern locals have similar power to the southern locals and vice versa. 
The global/local engagement is “complex, contested, and contingent on many 
factors” (Halliday and Carruthers, 2007, p. 1146). Biases are mainly related to 
national and regional importance, the inherited tension between global actors 
and the nation-state, the financial position of a state, social and cultural 
differences, and the level of integration of IOs’ ideologies and the practices of 
a nation-state. Nonetheless, only IFIs’ experiences with important countries 
influence global learning and inform their norms, not those with poor and less 
significant countries. 
Influence of IOs is of two dimensions. The broader the imbalance of power 
between global and local, the greater the capacity to influence change in 
countries. Moreover, the wider the distance between the non-Western states 
and powerful global actors and their mores, the more likely that diagnosis of 
problems in the former by the latter will be ineffective, which may lead to the 
creation of more significant contradictions. International actors have limited 
ability to successfully reform the course of national practices because of a lack 
of understanding, or lack of interest in understanding, other cultures. 
Sometimes, according to Halliday and Carruthers (2009), nation-states have 
interest in global programs and use the hegemonic power of IFIs for their own 
local interests. For example, a government may approach the IMF to obtain a 
loan not only for the money but for the conditions of the loan that may give a 
government more power and influence over its local opponents. And without 
these conditions, frequently imposed by international institutions, that 
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government would not be able to achieve such influence over its local 
opponent. Therefore, sometimes a domestic group allies with IFIs to increase 
its internal power for domination. This is in some ways related to what 
happened in Kuwait (see Section 9.5).  
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) found that national politics to enact global 
norms occur in two phases. In the first phase, a government demonstrates to 
global institutions in direct negotiations over financial support its willingness for 
law reform. In the other stage, the government turns to local political 
constituencies that may resent the terms of externally induced changes and 
are responsive to local politics that may have little to do with the enactment of 
global norms as such but resist international influence to govern the faith of 
the nation over societal self-determination. In this regard, Halliday and 
Carruthers (2009) argue that IFIs often prefer negotiating reforms with 
executives (governments), not legislators (parliament members) as the latter 
are usually involved in and demand complex political trade-offs. As we will see 
later, nation states overcome the national political dilemma through symbolic 
compliance or decoupling (see Section 4.4.2.3). The following section explains 
Halliday and Carruthers’ theorisation of national conflict on the changing of 
indigenous practices.  
4.4.2.2. Conflict in national lawmaking 
Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) differentiate between two poles that 
mediate national lawmaking and national implementation of global norms: law 
on the books (formal law) and law in practice (behaviour of actors affected by 
the formal law). Global power influences enactments of formal law, but lacks 
control on the practice and behaviours of locals that implement/practice the 
enacted law(s).  
Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) theorised that national enactment and  
implementation have distinctive actors, but similar mechanisms (see recursive 
cycles in Figure 6). Enactment cannot be understood independently from 
implementation and vice versa; they are in a contingent relationship. The 
dynamic of national lawmaking between enactment (law on the books) and 
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implementation (law in practice) could be understood through the unpacking 
of the tension between pools, cycles, actors, and mechanisms of conflict. 
Pools of legal change 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009), to clarify book and practice laws, explained 
that on the one hand, law on the books is a codified form of law (regulations, 
statutes, etc.) that is binding on a sovereign or transitional authority. However, 
“the law is binding de jure, and not necessary de facto” (p. 365). On the other 
hand, the law in practice is the behaviours and institutions of local actors. 
Halliday and Carruthers refer to actors that practice/implement the global 
norms and the enacted national laws as “truly local”.  
Nonetheless, practices can lead to a new law on the books and law on the 
books can lead to new practices (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009). Additionally, 
the law in practice cannot be understood separately from the law on the books. 
These two forms of law represent the two pools of global-driven national legal 
change, which is an integral part of the theory of recursivity. 
Cycles of national reform 
Reform leads to cycles between law on the books and law in action. These 
cycles begin with a problem, contradiction, or tension in social practice. 
Pressure for change is often caused by an event (a scandal or crisis). Cycles 
end when a problem, contradiction, or tension is resolved or a balance is 
reached between law on the books (enactment) and law in practice 
(implementation). It also may end when the pressure dissolves (external, 
political, etc.). After a cycle ends, the social practice continues, the practice of 
the enacted law may change, but the law on the books remains unchanged 
until a new reform episode begins. 
Endogenous actors 
Within national lawmaking, local actors populate the two recursive loops 
(enactment and implementation). On the implementation side, local actors 
occupy the practice of norms--this includes, for example debtors, creditors, 
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workers, lawyers, accountants, and/or auditors. These actors have the power 
to solve or complicate the gap between reformed law and practice. The other, 
enactment side, is occupied by actors with the power for legal, political, and 
policy change (the parliament and the government in the case of Kuwait). 
Halliday and Carruthers (2007) classify enactment actors in bankruptcy law 
into two groups: first, state actors (government officials, politicians, judges, 
Ministry of Finance vs. Justice etc.). Second, in countries with advanced 
capital systems, the market (e.g., lobbying and professional associations) has 
some influence on the enactment of law(s). Each of the two groups of 
enactment actors have their domestic allies (within a nation-state) to impact a 
statute of global norm.  
Bourdieu would argue that the national class of actors represents the structure 
of the bureaucratic field. Actors in the enactment pool are divided between 
high and low state nobility, depending on their authority to institute change. 
And the implementation pool with limited power to effect legal change is 
considered a force external to the bureaucratic field. These external forces 
influence conflict between high and low state nobilities to protect their interests, 
and state officials (enactment actors) use external forces in their bureaucratic 
struggle to win and advance their interests (see Section 4.3.4.1). 
Global market actors such as multinational corporations and/or international 
professional associations may influence the national bureaucratic conflict by 
siding with specific national actors to support or resist national reform based 
on how these changes may serve or hinder their interests. However, behind 
all global actors, there might be a powerful state such as the US “which often 
seek to orchestrate the global formulation of norms and their impact on 
particular nation-states” (Halliday and Carruthers, 2007, p. 1149). 
Mechanisms of struggle for legal change 
In national lawmaking, the two sides of the recursive loops (enactment and 
implementation) are arenas of power. The tension between the two groups of 
actors –those who enact law and those who practice law, results in what 
Halliday and Carruthers coin the implementation gap: the gap between global-
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norm-driven enacted law and existent indigenous practices. The national 
conflict for change as a result of international pressure, according to Halliday 
and Carruthers (2007, 2009) is often due to four mechanisms: indeterminacy 
of law, contradictions, diagnostic struggles, and actors’ mismatch.  
Bourdieu (1994, p. 2) theorised that in reforming national laws, the state 
causes significant resistance among locals. Such resistance is not only 
because of actor occupational interests, but also due to the associated 
changes to social division and hierarchy. Nonetheless, within the context of 
recursivity, Bourdieu may argue that the indeterminacy of law, contradictions, 
diagnostic struggles, and actors’ mismatch are strategies by local actors to 
resist associated changes to interest(s), the structure (division and hierarchy) 
and dynamic of (a) field, and/or the national social space.  
Indeterminacy of law 
Indeterminacy of law is the inherited ambiguity in any law (Halliday and 
Carruthers, 2009, p. 378). Ambiguities in laws and regulations (for example: 
multiple international interpretations, vague clarifications, inconsistency with 
other laws) leads to uncertainty and unexpected consequences--the more 
confusion in the interpretation and multi-interpretation by actors, the more 
inconsistent in its application. Moreover, the more sophisticated the local 
professionals, the higher the manoeuvring in implementing the law. Also, 
indeterminacy may be constituted by institutional corruption or incapacity. 
Indeterminacy with an undesired outcome may fuel recursive cycles (between 
enactment and implementation) to reduce these gaps until it reaches a 
balance. Ambiguity might relate to basic concepts such as the meaning of 
“debt” that generates a major recursive cycle (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009).  
Contradictions 
Engagement of different ideologies generates contradictions and these 
contradictions get internalised within laws and regulations. Partial, temporary, 
or even a customised solution imported from outside a nation may lead to 
unstable solutions that may create local interruption (Halliday and Carruthers, 
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2009). The tension between global and local is to reconcile ideological, 
political, and structural contradictions. For example, with the globalisation of 
neoliberal ideologies, nation-states are pressured to reduce their power over 
local sectors for foreign ownership and to reduce state intervention to control 
markets. To overcome this dilemma, lawmakers design policy to satisfy the 
global norm and at the same time, with the intention of maintaining local power. 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) refer to this reaction as a “symbolic gesture to 
foreign interests” (p. 28). They also define this as a strategy of national 
resistance and coined the term "symbolic compliance" (see Section 4.4.2.3).  
Structural contradictions may also arise when an implementation is divided 
between competing government agencies (e.g., economic, justice, finance 
ministries) with their different epistemologies. Not to mention when an 
implementation is allocated to competing occupations or weak professions 
(Halliday and Carruthers, 2007). Another form of contradiction may be sourced 
to domestic social conflicts. For example, in Indonesia, the ethnic and political 
struggle between the Chinese, who dominate the economy, and ethnic 
Indonesians, who dominate politics. I noticed similar structural contradictions 
in Kuwait within ruling groups (see Section 9.2).  
Diagnostic struggles 
Diagnosis relates to how a social problem is to be identified and understood, 
a field of struggle on who wins the right to define a social problem. Diagnosis 
for Halliday and Carruthers (2007) “usually contains an implicit theory of 
relations between parts of a society, market and government” (p. 1150). 
Frequently, to legitimise diagnosis, expert services are used. Conflict over 
diagnosis is most often transferred to a struggle over treatment. Actors whose 
diagnosis is accepted usually also win the right to prescribe the solution. 
However, disputes over treatment sometimes relate to how measurable these 
prescriptions are in order that they may be monitorable. Measurable and 
auditable solutions help actors to win at diagnosis and treatment. Actors whose 
diagnoses are rejected are frequently excluded from the prescription of 
solutions and later fight against their exclusion in the implementation stage. 
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In the global context, asymmetry of power between global and local leads to 
difficulties for an external actor to be able to diagnose and prescribe a national 
social problem. Besides, diagnosis at both the global and local levels often 
creates struggles between professions (economists vs. lawyers vs. 
accountants). Interestingly, Halliday and Carruthers (2007) say that “it is a 
common strategy of professionals to seek technical diagnoses and specialized 
treatments in order to encapsulate a sphere of regulation within their own 
professional jurisdiction” (p. 1151). 
Actors’ mismatch 
Mismatch always happens between actors who enact laws and actors who 
practice these laws. Halliday and Carruthers (2009, p. 384) argue that “[t]he 
mechanisms that produce or mitigate ‘mismatch’ are critically important in the 
recursivity of law”. Nonetheless, changing a law based on the diagnosis and/or 
prescription by non-key actors or a non-key group of locals often results in 
resistance, primarily if the change is found to affect the interests of these 
actors, to be an illegitimate process, or even if it is believed to be unfair. That 
said, failure to incorporate key local actors who practice lawmaking (diagnosis 
and prescription) result in shifting the battle-ground to the implementation site 
where local actors can undermine, resist, frustrate, or subvert the changed 
law36. Now I will move to the last part of the Halliday and Carruthers framework, 
recursivity.  
 
36 Halliday and Carruthers (2007) argue that “a double effect occurs that affects 
implementation: the quality of the prescription is likely to be lower since it rests on a weaker 
foundation, and disenfranchisement from participation in the design of treatment will lower its 
legitimacy for certain parties, reduce compliance, and engender resistance at the point of 
implementation” (p. 1189). I agree, and I understand that Halliday and Carruthers explain the 
reasons for local resistance and its relation to foiling global norms. However, in social problems 
surrounding capital and power, allowing “truly locals” to participate in diagnosis and 
prescription does not necessarily mean that it will be for the greater good of a nation. If a 
nation-state has unfair structures or practices, local actors may struggle to maintain their 
power even if it is at the cost of the greater good of the society (this may apply to global, local, 
West, and non-West). 
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4.4.2.3. Foiling global hegemony and the generation of 
recursivity 
Locals, whether domestic elites or domestic professions, have been less 
regarded by globalism and perceived to be lacking power and often thrown out 
of the global harmonisation arena. Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) argue 
that in the most extreme national crisis where global powers are at maximum 
impact (through enforcing economic coercion, strict deadlines, shaming or 
pressure through annual IMF Article IV), truly locals fight back at the 
implementation phase. They repeatedly find ways to resist foreign interlopers 
and continue to maintain autonomy over their local fields to protect their 
interests and domestic powers.  
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argue that converging global norms go through 
three processes: intermediation, national lawmaking (foiling), and recursivity. 
Intermediation and foiling ignite recursive cycles of struggle between 
enactment (law on the books) and implementation (law in practice). Bourdieu 
suggest that conflict arises not only between the bureaucratic field and social 
fields, but also within them, each actor(s)/agency aiming to legitimise their 
domination and the imposition of their vision of the social world.  
With the struggle between globalism and localism, for the latter to impose its 
norms on individuals who practice legal change, Halliday and Carruthers 
(2009) wrote: 
Convergence has its limits precisely because the strong are not so 
powerful as they usually are alleged to be and the weak have weapons 
that mitigate their powerlessness (p. 294). 
The next section explains Halliday and Carruthers’ theorisation on how nation 
states attempt to obstruct and subvert the global hegemonic agenda which 
creates recursivity between international actors and the nation-state(s). The 
next section will also explain Halliday and Carruthers’ notions on why countries 
that are distant from the centres of global norm production could “reject” global 
forces even when these countries are in their weakest financial situation.  
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Strength of the weak  
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) explained various findings concerning how 
countries around the world withstand the intervention of global powers in their 
internal affairs. These weapons of the “weak” include:  
- Rejecting conditional aid, which happened in Malaysia and Argentina 
(Halliday and Carruthers, 2009, p. 342). This situation is subject to the 
limited need for short-term money by a state or capital that can be found 
elsewhere. Also possible if a country has a strong leader who can challenge 
IFIs and, at the same time, maintain domestic power and order. 
- Refusal to adopt important recommendations is possible if the leverage 
of global actors is low. Or if a nation-state can demonstrate its general 
compliance, and can justify and convince IFIs that the recommendation 
creates more significant problems, especially to the market and economy. 
- Fragment international influence: for example, China’s ability to fragment 
global power gave it more freedom to determine its own path. Halliday and 
Carruthers (2009) argue that the ability to fragment global power is often not 
a state tactic but due to the state’s disorganisation such as various local 
agencies competing to protect the state from global intervention. This 
argument is similar to Bourdieu (2005) theorisation on the inter-bureaucratic 
conflicts between government agencies which reflect on protecting the 
bureaucratic state and rationalise its symbolic power.  
- Invoking cultural incompatibilities: resisting IFIs’ recommendations on 
the grounds that they contradict national cultural mores. This strategy is 
effective on small issues, not in cases of significant structural reform 
required by a global power.  
- Segment reforms: breaking reform into steps where every step influences 
the next (trial and error with less risk). This approach is often rejected in 
emergencies situations as IFIs have a maximum short term power, and this 
strategy is more applicable for long term reform. 
- Substitute a solution: this happens when a country has the freedom to 
choose or if the difference in the level of power between global and local is 
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minimal. Also, if the local proposed solutions are of similar sophistication to 
the global model. 
- Construct exclusions and escape routes: compliance with IFIs usually 
risks internal power relations and order. So, governments build “back doors” 
so that risky subjects and unanticipated consequences can be removed to 
mitigate local order (e.g., exceptions to the new law or government 
interference through local bodies to enforce the new law). 
- Deferral and delay of compliance happen if a government accept IFI 
recommendations and conditions and then do very little for a long time to 
enact these requirements. Manipulating time through “foot dragging” is to 
throw the responsibility to a new government, or await the rise of another 
local or global event that will overtake current global conditions and 
recommendations. Usually, these tactics are effective if IFIs are unable to 
punish countries for non-compliance or if a state is unable to deal with these 
global programs. 
- Symbolic compliance: Halliday and Carruthers (2009) support the 
scholarly view that: 
[C]ountries, like organizations, can offer signals of compliance to 
external constituencies but proceed divergently with international 
practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hirsch and Rao 2003; Meyer and 
Rowan 1997) (p. 345). 
For them, the appearance of compliance (or, to use the Halliday and 
Carruthers (2007, 2009) term, "symbolic compliance") is a cheap and easy 
strategy. It prevents potential (political and administrative) changes to the local 
balance of power and possible disorder in case implementation is seriously 
enforced. For Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009), “symbolic compliance” is 
a form of avoidance, which is the appearance of compliance only to satisfy 
global hegemonic power. 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009, pp. 345-8) explained five types of symbolic 
compliance. First, partial implementation of enacted regulations. Second, 
perverse implementation of principles, for example, subversion of new 
institutions by embedding them in weak existing institutions. Third, enacting 
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the required statute but subverting it through regulations that operate on the 
legislation. Fourth, failure to enforce the enacted law. Finally, in countries 
where the court system is affected by political influence, enacted law may be 
subverted by the court.  
The ability to comply symbolically is conditioned on various situations that are 
not only related to a country’s capacity to manoeuvre but also sometimes on 
circumstances in the global arena. For example, states can signal compliance 
in appearance (whether due to intention or incapacity) if IFIs have limited 
oversight and enforcement abilities to ensure that practice follows enactment. 
Without this global capacity, countries may enact law without enforcement.   
Additionally, if a specific IFI left a country, handed it to another IFI, or even if 
its priorities changed, countries gain more space to manoeuvre. Similarly, a 
new international crisis will affect how states comply with global symbolic 
power. Halliday and Carruthers (2009) provided an example of how the 9/11 
disaster in the US distracted and changed the priorities of IFIs which allowed 
countries to manipulate prior conditions.  
To conclude discussion on the strategies of the perceived “weak” state in 
submitting to global forces, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argue that:  
The IFIs are not naïve. They have been in many comparable situations. 
Their officials may have knowledge of the region or the country. They 
will have ample access to the best and brightest experts inside the 
country. They get immediate access to any government officials. And 
they have their formidable negative sanctions. In practice, however, it 
looks rather different (pp. 351-2).  
This is basically because for Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) global 
hegemonic activities and power have limits. 
Weakness of the strong 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) identified various issues that weaken the 
position of perceived powerful global actors to control the advancement of their 
international financial convergence interests: 
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- Time pressure: IFIs moves from crisis to crisis. Time pressure and 
inappropriate attention and resource allocation to local situations constitute 
a major threat to globalism. Each lawyer in the IMF legal department is 
responsible for several countries, and the World Bank legal department 
does not have a lawyer specialised in bankruptcy. 
- Diagnostic limitations: proper prescriptions depend on the accuracy of the 
diagnosis. While IFIs are dominated by economists with limited knowledge 
of each country’s political economy and local institutions, this will result in 
poor diagnosis and consequently poor prescription with respect to the 
cultural and institutional complexities of different countries. 
- Inappropriate borrowing: time pressure and limited capacity to deal on a 
case by case basis led IFIs to borrow ideas for practices from earlier crises 
elsewhere. 
- Formulaic solutions: labelling global norms as “best practices” offers no 
efficient and effective reform and often they are unrelated to global 
flourishing. Dealing with complex local institutions with these ideologies is a 
“cheap” way to generate  institutional change that is, as claimed by (Halliday 
and Carruthers, 2009), “Putatively efficient, yes. Practically effective, no” (p. 
353). 
- Excluding key locals: IFIs hegemonic practices ignite and fuel national 
recursive cycles through generating actors mismatch. Besides their 
carelessness regarding national sovereignty interests, endogenous power, 
and the exercise of economic muscle by IFIs and the powerful states behind 
them, protecting foreign interests only will intensify public resentment which 
will diminish the power of globalism over a country. 
- Asymmetry of expertise: IFIs access expertise quickly and easily, but 
developing countries cannot. In Korea, for example, national expertise 
matches IFIs staff and knowledge and therefore can buy more freedom in 
lawmaking. A nation without world-class domestic experience like Indonesia 
appointed a specialised law firm from the US to compete with IOs and offer 
a stronger voice for purposes of negotiation. 
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4.4.3. Concluding transnational recursivity 
In the theory of recursivity section, I provided a holistic explanation of the 
recursivity framework. Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) theorised the 
dynamic tension between globalising localism and localising globalism, where 
global hegemony creates leverage over the national enactment of global 
norms but lacks power over the implementation. Local actors resist changes 
to their social positions and often attempt to obstruct norms that affect their 
dominations. Accordingly, recursivity is often engendered because of the 
resistance of the “truly locals”. 
The theory of recursivity is constituted in three parts. Part one is about the 
crafting of norms at the global level and the advancement of these norms to 
nation-states. Part two is about the local conflict in lawmaking and the 
resistance of locals required to practice global norms-driven changes that 
affect their social position(s). Within a nation-state, exploiting the gap between 
the embedded culture of the global norm and national system of power result 
in what Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) define as the “theory of 
recursivity”.  
Countries have the ability to foil global power even in extreme economic 
situations mainly because “implementation gaps are the rule, not the 
exception” (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009, p. 428) and local actors are the 
experts on these gaps. Recursivity stops when a balance is reached between 
the integration of global norms and local settings. Often, according to Halliday 
and Carruthers, nations comply symbolically; that is, compliance in 
appearance.  
On the surface, global harmonisation of law, regulations, and institutions might 
appear to be simple. Enforcing the “Western” system, for example, infiltrates 
all aspects of local society. It is not related to mere change to finance 
exercises, but “institutional restructuring (Halliday and Carruthers 2004b)” 
(Halliday and Carruthers 2009, p. 362) and frequently sparks “a sea change in 
cultural orientations” (Halliday and Carruthers 2009, p. 414).  
 150 
Attracting the flow of foreign capital that will lead to local economic and social 
flourishing is the propaganda of localising globalism. Most foreign investments, 
according to Halliday and Carruthers (2009), move between advanced 
countries or to China, a country that only in recent years put in place basic 
commercial laws without effective implementation. They add, without 
respecting locals, global standardisation of law and the market will continue to 
be uncertain and compromised.  
Bourdieu’s theory of the state (part of his broader approach of practice) is 
comparable to Halliday and Carruthers recursivity model. The global space 
may be explained as the broader state and international players exemplify the 
bureaucratic field. Powerful countries (e.g., the G7), occupy different positions 
in the field of power and other countries represent other social fields. Conflict 
within powerful countries in the field of power is to legitimise their global 
domination, and the conflict within the bureaucratic (global) field is to impose 
its vision of truth. Each key actor in the global or Iocal spaces implements 
strategies and engages in struggle to accumulate or maintain domination over 
their related field(s). I also argued that Bourdieu would suggest that global 
norms might be understood as either doxa or state nomination logic, 
depending on the level of radical belief in these norms. If a country obstructs 
or resists the application of global norms, this arguably may mean that a nation 
does not have the radical belief in these global norms, at least not yet!  
Critiques of the Halliday and Carruthers recursivity model and book 
Halliday and Carruthers book has been criticised as lengthy with repetitious 
arguments (Power, 2009). Also, Shaffer (2011), for example, suggested calling 
this analytical framework Transnational Recursivity Theory and offered three 
challenges to it. First, bankruptcy law (in many parts) is technical and requires 
careful explanation. Second, it contains too much information for a single book! 
Third, which is, in my view, the most critical comment: the possibility of 
applying this theory to areas outside bankruptcy.  
Shaffer (2011) argues that unlike the “soft norm making” of international 
bankruptcy laws, other laws are “binding” by international agreements, such 
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as human right laws, which may not be relevant to recursivity theory. I think 
Halliday and Carruthers theory is more relevant to laws that are “directly” 
related to the international financial system. However, I found their theory 
extremely useful to understand the global-local dilemma for modernising audit 
regulations in Kuwait. 
By reading most of the Halliday and Carruthers recursivity work, a couple of 
questions came to mind that I could not find answers to in their cited (2007, 
2009) works. First, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) explained the “weakness of 
the strong” that is the limitation of global actors. An important question that 
deserves investigation is: if global actors know they are getting foiled, why do 
they continue with the same process? Is it because of what Espeland and 
Sauder (2007) explained as a self-fulfilling prophecy? Or, is it due, as Brown 
(2015) theorised, to norms as a “Trojan horse” to produce social neoliberal 
rationalities? Or, as Bourdieu would argue, that without their continuous 
struggle with nation state(s), IOs may not only lose their raison d'être, but 
diminish in global power and lose their authorised global hegemonic 
function(s). Or could there be other reasons? 
Finally, at the national level, recursivity is a long process that involves local 
tension between the time of enactment and the time of rejection by the truly 
local. My question is: what are the implications (if any) that the rejected laws 
create in a society? For example, does this rejection (during the period of 
resistance between enactments and implementation) spark/affect individual 
cognition in certain ways? I do not intend to answer these fairly complex 
questions, but thought they are worth reflecting on. 
The next section concludes the chapter.  
4.5. Chapter conclusion  
This chapter explained two related theories for understanding the social world 
in a globalised era. First, I started by explaining Bourdieu’s practice theory. 
Bourdieu designed an objective structure with a subjective disposition to offer 
his perspective of truth behind the social world and social practice. Bourdieu 
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inter-related master concepts including fields, capitals, habitus, and field of 
power. Fields are the space of struggle where Bourdieu’s practice notions 
settle. Capitals are the weapons of the agent(s) for accumulating power and 
battling to transcend in (a) field. However, as I demonstrated, Bourdieu 
differentiated between various types of capital, and important capitals differs 
in different fields. Nonetheless, an actor’s position in a field is related to the 
level of accumulation of important capitals. Habitus is the mental and physical 
actions and reactions of actors that direct their engagement in the struggle of 
(a) field. 
The meta field of power sets on top of the social space. Dominant actors at the 
top of important fields (e.g., economic and bureaucratic fields) have the ability, 
if they have the interest, to occupy a position in the field of power. The field of 
power struggles to control statist capital and to legitimise their dominations in 
their respective social fields. The field of power decides on the dominant 
capitals and the conversion rate of capitals in social fields. 
Bourdieu’s practice theory did not neglect the system of taken-for-granted that 
normalises peoples’ everyday life. This includes illusio, doxa, and symbolic 
violence. For Bourdieu, illusio is a specific interest in the rewards a field may 
offer. Doxa is a radical belief in social rules and structure. Relatedly, symbolic 
violence is a form of violence but with an actor’s complicity. It constraints the 
free will of actors because of the common sense in social rules and structure. 
In the second part of this chapter, I provided a holistic explanation of 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the state (which is part of practice theory). I 
argued that Bourdieu state theory is underused in the accounting literature. 
Bourdieu linked the power of the state to its ability to generate and accumulate 
statist capital which is partially related to struggle within the field of power. 
However, unlike Max Weber’s theorisation of the state monopoly on physical 
violence, Bourdieu’s focus was also on the symbolic dimension of the state as 
the producer of social doxa and its monopoly over symbolic violence. 
I explained Bourdieu state theory in three parts. The first part summarised 
Bourdieusian ideas on the genesis of the bureaucratic system as a successor 
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to dynastism. The second part explained how the state maintains its power 
through the monopoly of different species of capitals. The last part illustrated 
Bourdieu’s theorisation of the bureaucratic field. Within the bureaucratic field, 
Bourdieu argued for two intertwined battles for bureaucratic authorities to 
impose their vision of reality on the social world.  
As Bourdieu passed away without sharing his reflections on the process of 
economic globalisation, I tried to cover this shortage by adapting the Halliday 
and Carruthers theory of transnational recursivity. Accordingly, in the last part 
of this chapter, I explained the recursivity theory in full. Halliday and Carruthers 
theorised that the global convergence of financial regulations moves through 
three phases. First, conflict in global norms productions. Second, national 
struggle to implement global norms where the global player can influence 
enactment but not implementation.  
Truly locals (locals who are required to practice global norms) often resist 
global norms due to their indeterminacy of law, diagnostic struggle, 
contradiction, and actor mismatch. Such obstruction by locals engenders the 
third phase of the cycle for global convergence, recursivity. In the transnational 
recursivity section, I provided Halliday and Carruthers’ notions on how state(s) 
that are perceived to be weak in the global space employ strategies to 
undermine global hegemonic power. I also explained the Halliday and 
Carruthers’ notions on the significant weaknesses of powerful global actors in 
advancing their interests for countries’ structural changes. In this section, I 
argued that Bourdieu’s theory of practice (especially his notions on the state) 
could properly explain the dynamic of the global space.  
The following chapter explains my methodological position and the methods I 
pursued to collect data to help to understand the problem of modernising the 








5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
5.1. Introduction  
Morgan and Smircich (1980) criticised the majority of social science research 
that fails to “explicitly” discuss research methodological assumptions. 
Similarly, Hopper and Powell (1985) argued that “By making explicit the basic 
assumptions behind different pieces of work, it is hoped that a greater 
tolerance and awareness of research from alternative disciplines and 
perspectives may be encouraged.” (pp. 429-30). The intent of this chapter is 
to provide a general explanation of my philosophical position, including 
methods used to analyse the modernisation of audit regulations in Kuwait.  
I depend on various methodological studies to explain my research 
methodology and method. But my philosophical explanation is centred around 
the seminal work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) (Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis) on the different approaches to social theory. 
Additionally, I followed thematic analysis procedures described by Braun and 
Clarke (2006). This chapter is classified into four parts. The first part provides 
a brief explanation of research philosophy mainly depending on the work of 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) and some scholarly critiques. The second part 
explains my philosophical assumptions as a constructivist-interpretivist. The 
third part illustrates my research strategy (inductive qualitative), research 
design (case study), and data analysis (thematic). The last part concludes this 
chapter.  
5.2. Philosophy of social theory research 
Research methodology is “a reflexive resource for understanding the 
relationship between our worldview and our ways of researching and 
theorizing” (Cunliffe, 2011, p. 7). However, research methodology and its 
relation to method(s) is the result of antecedent philosophy applied to the 
social world. That said, consistency and correlation between research 
philosophy, theoretical framework(s), and the adopted method is vital.  
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In the seminal work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), to simplify the complexity of 
the realm of research philosophy, they theorised that the philosophy of social 
science research lies in two associated logics. First, the subjective-objective 
approaches to social science research (horizontal axis). Second, assumptions 
about the nature of society (vertical continuum). The intersection of these two 
philosophical perspectives generates what Burrell and Morgan theorised as 
the four philosophical paradigms to social science research (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: “Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory”  
Source: (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 22)  
5.2.1. Dimensions to the nature of social science 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) offered two extreme ends (subjectivity vs. 
objectivity) to explain approaches to social research (horizontal analysis). They 
theorised that the philosophical position on the subjective-objective scale 
relies on four dimensions of related assumptions: ontology, epistemology, 
human nature (axiology), and methodology (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: “A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science”  
Source: (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 3) 
Ontology, on the one end, is concerned with the existence of social reality as 
“truth” concretely existing independent from the individual, without influence by 
the people, and people are perceived as physical objects (objective-realism). 
On the other end, “truth” is seen to be the product of individual consciousness 
that is (re)produced by social arrangements, structures, and collective 
meanings (subjective-nominalism). Ontological questions could be something 
like, “Do we make real free will choices? Or are external forces controlling our 
outcomes?” (Lyon, 2017, 00:4:10).  
To reality comes epistemological assumptions. Epistemology is concerned 
with the process of knowledge and the assessment of “truth”. For example, 
epistemological questions could be: what is knowledge? What is the nature of 
knowledge? What is “true” and what is “false” knowledge? On the one hand, 
in relation to ontology, Burrell and Morgan argue that the social world may be 
acquired and transmitted in natural objects through scientific knowledge 
(objective-knowledge; positivism). Positivism sees knowledge as external to 
human behaviour.  
With a fundamentally different epistemological position, on the other hand, 
knowledge can be obtained from the individual: nature, meaning, perception, 
and experience (subjective knowledge; interpretivism--Burrell and Morgan 
refer to it as anti-positivist). An interpretivist understands reality from within 
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individuals or groups of individuals, rather than looking for the relationship 
between truth and knowledge from a distance. 
In social science research, an associated assumption to ontology and 
epistemology is “the relationship between human beings and their 
environment” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 2). Burrell and Morgan coined it as 
human nature. The two extreme views on the assumptions of human life are: 
human activities and practices are determined by the situation/environment 
(e.g., culture) in which the individual lives (objective-deterministic). Or, humans 
have free will, and voluntarily adapt to a situation/environment (subjective-
voluntarist). 
It is worth noting that “human nature” is one aspect of Burrell and Morgan’s 
dimensions on the nature of social science. However, the Burrell and Morgan 
analysis and reflection on this significant philosophical position is minimal. 
They explained a small part of human nature (deterministic vs. voluntarist) but 
omitted its broader logic to axiological assumptions (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, 
pp. 6, 9 [8]).  
To investigate and obtain truth, ontology, epistemology, and human nature 
have a direct implication to methodology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Methodology is the process of obtaining knowledge. With an objective 
approach to the social world, researchers often attempt to identify, measure, 
and express “generalised” patterns of a world that exists external to humans. 
Researchers submitted to this (nomothetic) approach often use methods of 
natural science and apply statistical techniques, whether through secondary 
data, questionnaire, or surveys (Hopper and Powell, 1985).  
On the other methodological end lies a branch of researchers who perceive 
reality within individuals. Knowledge is obtained through individuals or group 
of individuals who demonstrate “understanding” of the social world rather than 
seeking to generalise social laws (ideographic, non-numerical data). For the 
subjective approach to the social world, to acquire knowledge, “individuals” are 
at the centre of the research methodology; this includes, for example, 
observation and or interviews.  
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Now I move to explain the second part of Burrell and Morgan’s theorisation of 
research philosophy--the vertical axis on the assumptions about the nature of 
society.   
5.2.2. Assumptions about the nature of society  
The previous section offered Burrell and Morgan’s horizontal analysis to social 
research for two extreme philosophical viewpoints (objective vs. subjective 
dimensions). The vertical line that joins in making the four philosophical 
paradigms (as we will see in the next section) is the underlying assumption 
about the nature of  society. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that researcher 
commitment to a specific view of society is crucially important but widely 
neglected. Building on theories of order and social control, Burrell and Morgan 
(1979, pp. 10-20) argue that there are two fundamentally different positions 
from which to study society: the sociology of regulation and the sociology of 
radical change (see Figure 7). Although one side accepts the status-quo of 
social order while the other challenges it, Burrell and Morgan argue that 
dilution may exist, but separation is essential.  
On the one hand, the sociology of regulation is concerned with the importance 
of social unity and accepting the world “as it is”. For Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
this viewpoint stresses “the need for regulation in human affairs” (p. 17) to 
maintain taken-for-granted assumptions of social solidarity, consensus, status 
quo, and order. On the other hand, in contrast to regulation, the sociology of 
radical change is concerned with a deeper understanding of the social 
structure and the construction of human cognition in modern societies. Radical 
change worries about structural conflicts, domination, and contradictions.  
The “radical” school of thought focuses on emancipating humans from 
structural (material and mental) constraints to potentially develop a fairer social 
system (structure and arrangements) to enable human progress. Nonetheless, 
the sociology of radical change is “concerned with what is possible rather than 
with what is; with alternatives rather than with acceptance of the status quo.” 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 17).  
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5.2.3. The formation of Burrell and Morgan’s four 
philosophical paradigms 
According to Burrell and Morgan, the intersection between meta-theoretical 
assumptions of the nature of social science and the nature of the society 
results in four philosophical paradigms for viewing the social world: 
functionalist, interpretive, radical structuralist, and radical humanist (see 
Figure 7). Ryan et al. (2002) argue that these four methodological standpoints 
could be linked to categories of accounting research such as mainstream, 
interpretive, and critical theorists. That said, a philosophical paradigm is a set 
of beliefs that represents how a researcher views the world (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). For Burrell and Morgan, objective-functionalist and subjective-
interpretivist paradigms shares commonality within the societal assumptions 
of the sociology of regulation. Whereas objective-radical structuralist and 
subjective-radical humanist ones align with the sociology of radical change.  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that each of the four paradigms features 
mutually exclusive qualities (critiques on paradigmatic segregation are offered 
in the following section). Here I will explain my understanding of two paradigms 
within which my thinking is located: structuralist and humanist.  
For Burrell and Morgan, building on Frankfurt School logics, the “humanist” 
paradigm is a subjective dimension to radical change. The underlying logic of 
this philosophy is that human “true consciousness” is suppressed by 
“ideological superstructures” that drives cognition and (re)enforce human 
“false consciousness” and prevent humanity from developing (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979, p. 32). The humanist paradigm often focuses on human 
consciousness and the search for the potential to emancipate the social world 
from modes of domination and alienation.  
“Structuralism”, for Burrell and Morgan (1979), is an objective approach to 
radical change. Unlike the humanist concentration on consciousness, 
structuralism focuses on investigating structural relations and conflicts from an 
objective position to liberate humans from the constraints of embodied social 
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structures. For Hopper and Powell (1985, pp. 450-1), the main difference in 
Burrell and Morgan’s theorisation of the two radical paradigms, is that for a 
structuralist, the social world is embodied in structural conflicts, and individuals 
are external objects to such relations, while for the humanist, the social world 
is falsely conscious due to alienating the perception and interpretation of 
individuals.   
5.2.4. Critique of the Burrell and Morgan philosophical 
paradigms  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) built their philosophical theorisation on the postulate 
that “inter-paradigmatic 'journeys' are much rarer” (p. 24) and “A synthesis is 
not possible” (p. 25). Burrell and Morgan set a hard line to separate 
structuralism and humanism based on their subjective-objective theorisation. 
Their argument was built on Karl Marx “epistemological break” between his 
early and late works37. Many--Chua (1986), Cooper (1983), Hopper and Powell 
(1985), and Ryan et al. (2002), for example--offered critiques to such 
exclusive dichotomies, especially those related to radical paradigms. Hopper 
and Powell (1985) put it in this way: 
The mutually exclusive division of radical theories by Burrell and 
Morgan carries the danger that concerns of radical structural analysis 
are seen as incompatible or irreconcilable with those stressing 
consciousness, rather than seeing both as dialectical aspects of the 
same reality (p. 451). 
Similarly, Cooper (1983) argued: 
These four paradigms are intended to offer alternative ways of viewing 
organizational activities. Although it is possible to take issue with Burrell 
& Morgan’s view that there is no likehood of a synthesis of these views 
(Chua et al., 1981) (p. 272). 
I agree with Hopper and Powell’s (among others) disapproval of Burrell and 
Morgan’s separation of radical paradigms. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Pierre Bourdieu developed an objective structure of the social world to 
understand human subjective practices through the unpacking of structural 
 
37 Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 451) argue that several theorists positioned Marx’s early and 
late works within the same philosophical framework. 
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conflicts and domination. Within Bourdieusian theoretical ideas, one of the 
drivers of human practices is the system of taken-for-granted (illusio, doxa, 
and symbolic violence) that target the consciousness of the individual. 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of habitus also could be interpreted as a 
combination of structure and consciousness.  
Bourdieu’s theorisation of the social world (practice and bureaucracy) puts him 
(and probably many other radical theorists, e.g., Halliday and Carruthers) in a 
philosophical space that combines both structuralist and humanist aspects of 
Burrell and Morgan’s philosophical theorisation (see Figure 4). Nonetheless, 
even in Bourdieu’s late writing (e.g., neoliberalism), he continued to depend 
on the same structuralist-humanist combination, but I believe he only 
transcended in his societal assumptions of radical change.  
5.3. My philosophical stance 
5.3.1. World view assumptions (social science and society) 
I believe all branches of the sciences have implications for each other, 
including social science. I see the social world as subjectively constructed and 
sustained by individuals. For me, social reality is sustained by humans 
through, for example, practices and language to create a meaning for life. That 
said, as I understand it, truth lies within the individual’s unique personal 
emotion, perception, and experience; collectively, people create shared 
meaning, arrangement, and structure for life (culture). Sometimes these 
systems mislead "true" consciousness and alienate individuals to submit to 
specific general roles and a particular order which constrain and hinder their 
development. 
In social science research, with my perception of reality as subjective and 
socially constructed, knowledge can be known through individuals. 
Epistemologically, I see truth through the eyes of the people. However, a 
challenge exists for such an epistemological position that is “see[n] through 
the eyes of only some of the people who form part of a social scene but not 
others” (Bryman, 2016, p. 394). I guess (probably) this is one of the embodied 
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limitations of interpretive inquiry because it is not reasonable to obtain the 
reality of the total population38.  
However, depending on the research aim, I followed three things to minimise 
(and maybe eliminate) such an epistemological threat. First, identifying “key” 
actors and a purposive sample to help the researcher better understand and 
evaluate “truth”. Second, depending on the complexity of the problem, an 
appropriate theoretical framework might be helpful to overcome such 
limitation. Third, constructing an adequate research design. 
5.3.1.1. Axiological position 
I am a product of Kuwaiti culture. Except during my postgraduate studies (two 
years in Australia and around five years in the UK), I have lived most of my life 
in Kuwait. I was born and raised in Kuwait by Kuwaiti parents. I obtained a 
public school education and my undergraduate degree from the same society, 
Kuwait. Also in Kuwait, I worked for eight years in a governance function in 
financial institutions and around three years in academia. Arguably, this puts 
me in an excellent position to recognise the micro-dynamics of the Kuwaiti 
social system.  
A valid (but difficult) question here would be: if you are born and raised within 
Kuwait structural and ideological constraints, how can you evaluate 
(epistemologically) what is true and what is not about that same social system? 
In another words, how could a researcher who is subject to a specific societal 
structural and ideological formation (as an insider/native) “deeply” understand 
suppression and repression of the same society? 
To refute this inquiry, during my PhD programme (four-plus years), I have been 
living in the UK, away from the constraints of the Kuwaiti social system. This 
has helped me observe Kuwait from a distance. Nonetheless, since the 
beginning of my second year of PhD studies, I have immersed myself in 
various “critical” social theories either through independent readings or 
 
38 Another weakness in qualitative inquiries raised by Ryan et al. (2002) is “how far should a 
researcher expand the case in studying interrelations … How far back in time should the case 
study researcher probe?” (p. 159). 
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through reading group(s). Social theories helped me, arguably, “to see the 
world as it might be” (Suddaby, 2014, p. 408). Theories reconstructed my 
rationality to look at “things” differently. In other words, to a large extent, it 
helped me to comprehend the cognitive production, suppression, and 
structural domination of various social systems.  
5.3.1.2. Value of research  
Chua (1986) argue that “knowledge is produced by people, for people, and is 
about people and their social and physical environment. Accounting is no 
different” (p. 603). Indeed, accounting is not different. As we see the 
accountancy (accounting and auditing) research is dominated by the market-
based philosophy to maximise capital accumulation, I see the value of 
research (including accountancy) goes beyond the self-centred, maximisation 
of the economic utility of individuals, organisations, and polities. In 
accountancy, for example, there were calls from various scholars to locate 
accountancy research where it correctly belongs, the social and political 
domains (e.g., Cooper, 1983; Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Hopper and Powell, 
1985; Willmott, 1986).  
Although most research may constitute knowledge, even false or humble 
knowledge (e.g., economic orthodoxy in accounting) is itself knowledge. 
However, I believe that in order for societies to progress, praxis and the welfare 
of the totality needs to be at the centre of the investigation, not only for 
economic reasons but also, more importantly, for political and societal ones39. 
Relatedly, unpacking cognitive and structural constraints offers a productive 
road to fairer progress for humanity. Nonetheless, theories guide us to 
understand the complexity of the social world which, at the same time, 
underpins the value of knowledge (Suddaby, 2014). 
Cooper (2005) argued that as accounting and finance is at the core of national 
and global capital systems, a combined knowledge of accounting and research 
is powerful in the creation of pressure for social change and to develop a better 
 
39 By praxis I mean the act of practices in social life. 
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world. That said, challenging the status quo and questioning the social order 
are probably the first steps for a researcher to position her/himself on the right 
(moral) track. This type of positioning and research are complicated and less 
appreciated (even in academia itself). However, as individual consciousness 
is shaped, controlled, and suppressed by social arrangements and 
superstructures, I concur with the Cooper (2005) argument that it is a moral 
obligation of intellectuals, those who have the tools, to emancipate those being 
exploited to bolster human progress. 
I find it really strange how the so-called “mainstream” researcher views 
accountancy as an objective reality and applies a natural setting approach to 
their investigation! I always imagine that if humans disappear, will accounting 
or auditing “practices” continue to objectively exist? Definitely not! In fact, there 
will be no social life! This vision of imaginary objective reality also applies to 
"mainstream" market and economic dogmas.  
5.3.1.3. Nature of audit and knowledge  
Max Weber, in his book Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, linked 
double-entry bookkeeping as one of the significant contributions to the 
emergence of modern capitalism and the Western rationalisation of capitalistic 
enterprises (Weber, 1930, pp. xvi-xvii, xxxv). Similarly, Bourdieu (2014, p. 215) 
argued that the codification of accounting facilitated the centralisation and 
monopolisation of power in the modern bureaucratic state. This places 
accountancy as a system with a substantial effect on (re)producing social 
control and order.  
There is no clear-cut definition of accounting. Hamilton and HÓgartaigh (2009), 
for example, argued that accounting is a language for capital with embodied 
logics that re-shape the individual habitus. Miller (1990) argued that accounting 
should be understood on two reciprocal fronts. First, as calculative practices 
that materialise social practices. Second, as a programme of “political 
rationalities” that sets out the government vision of the social world through 
constructing and governing social reality.  
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Audit, as it is contained within the accounting cosmos, governs accounting 
“reality”. It is an additional layer of governance to disseminate accounting 
logics by (re)constructing social practices (through checking the application of 
accounting and diffusing the logic of checking which reinforces the ideas of 
accounting) aiming to make things auditable (Power, 1997). However, with the 
rise of the political and economic power of audit firms (e.g., the Big 4) at both 
the national and the transitional levels, they, arguably, dominate not only the 
“practice” of audit, but also the design, application, and interpretation of 
accounting.  
Unlike accounting, the system of audit is a clear political arrangement between 
the state and a group of social actors (auditors). The state nominates a group 
of “specialised” social actors and provides them with a market to check, 
legitimise, and  reinforce the use of accounting logic to ensure a specific social 
cognition and particular social order that are aligned to the state vision of the 
social world. In return, the nominated social actors (auditors) formed political 
fields (firms and associations) as a class of “competent” “experts” to 
monopolise and expand the state-designated market and to dominate the 
arrangement of their practices. Nevertheless, auditors use the state to 
advance their interests collectively and individually (Willmott, 1986) at both the 
national and international levels. 
With the rising social power of the audit profession and firms due to intensive 
economisation of social life, the state(s) became the protector of the legitimacy 
of  audit arrangements to promote confidence in the audit system and to attract 
capital (Sikka and Willmott, 1995). However, when (some) auditor practices 
became a threat to the state’s symbolic domination, the state interfered to 
regulate and oversee the profession (see Chapter 1) with different outcomes 
in different states, mainly depending on state power and/or the level of state 
dependence on the audit profession to govern social life (see Section 2.5.2). 
Henceforth, changing the mode of (inherited) regulations of auditor practices 
is a site of power between the state (including the government, powerful social 
classes, and the broader society) and the audit profession, whether the 
regulatory change is self-determined by a nation-state or externally imposed. 
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After explaining my understanding of research philosophy and providing a 
relatively clear account of my philosophical stand, I move to explain my 
approach and the process of accumulating data that aim to help me 
understand my research problem on the modernisation of audit regulations in 
Kuwait.   
5.4. Research method  
Philosophy, theoretical framework, and methods need to be in synch with the 
aim of the research (Hopper and Powell, 1985). Methodology is a fundamental 
process and an approach for the relationship between researcher world view, 
research inquiry, and technique to pursue knowledge (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980). Nonetheless, as methodological assumptions and adequate methods 
must be closely related (Chua, 1986, p. 604), research method is embodied 
within the research methodology and philosophy (Morgan and Smircich, 
1980).  
Research approach represents the relationship between theory and social 
research. In academic research, there are a couple of strategies to explain and 
theorise knowledge, such as deductive or inductive approaches (Bryman, 
2016; Bryman and Bell, 2015; Saunders et al., 2009; Yin, 2014). On the one 
hand, deductive reasoning involves deducing a hypothesis to test and verify 
theories. On the other hand, an inductive approach to research is more related 
to allowing theories to emerge from data. Ryan et al. (2002) argue that while 
the deductive approach merely provides predictions of general regularities, 
inductive research helps in understanding the world.  
As I set my position as constructivist-interpretivism, followed by non-numerical 
inductive-case study, it is worth noting that the purpose of research (strategy) 
reflects on the type of adopted case study. That is, whether to describe, 
explore, or explain a social case. I agree with Ryan et al. (2002) that there is 
no “clear cut” distinction between these purposes: “the distinction between 
exploration and explanation is rather ambiguous” (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 144). I 
have a tendency to explain practices within a particular social system and 
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specific circumstances, which probably positions me on the explanatory route 
to case study. 
5.4.1. Case study design 
Yin (2014) argued that there is no single formula for performing social science 
research as it mainly depends on the particularities of the research. However, 
this thesis follows a qualitative inquiry. That said, the qualitative approach is 
often referred to as a method or a methodology. What I mean by qualitative 
here is a socially constructive approach to obtain “truth” with a case study as 
my primary method to pursue knowledge. As I perceive reality as arising from 
within individuals, there are several techniques to seek such knowledge: 
ethnography, grounded theory, experiment, or even archival research. 
However, I believe, based on my methodology and research aim, a case study 
is the most appropriate method and strategy that will help me to gain in-depth 
understanding of the practices of regulatory change within the broader social 
settings. 
A case study is defined as “a strategy for doing research which involves an 
empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context” (Robson, 2002: 178, cited in; Saunders et al., 2009, p. 145). 
Among many research strategies, I found the case study method to be the 
most suitable one that resonates with my research aim, philosophical 
assumptions, and methodological position. Nonetheless, the explanatory case 
study method has the merit of helping to gain a deep understanding of social 
problems (Ryan et al., 2002; Yin, 2014).   
5.4.2. Preliminary interviews  
To set my field of investigation, I performed preliminary interviews in June 
2016. This was an important step to test the adequacy of interviewing, my 
targeted technique to collect data. Power and Gendron (2015, p. 151) warn 
doctoral students about the difficulties of accessing audit firms. Accordingly, 
preliminary interviews helped me evaluate my ability to access institutions and 
organisations, assess the level of interview feedback, and develop the feeling 
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as well as the mental preparation for the primary data collection phase40. For 
me, as I was open to navigate broad key issues, preliminary interviews were 
extremely beneficial in finding my niche research interests. I started by 
examining the regulations of corporate governance in its more general sense; 
that is, the (inter)relationship between audit, corporate governance codes, and 
financial regulators and regulations in Kuwait. The outcome of these interviews 
tempted me to focus on Kuwait’s SOX-driven audit reform. 
My preliminary interviews followed broad exploratory inquiries (see Appendix 
1). Such a design was helpful to gain further understanding of the problem of 
governing corporations and the practices of audit firms. To do so, as illustrated 
in Table 5, I performed one-to-one, face-to-face, open-ended semi-structured 
interviews with six actors. With variation in managerial levels, I interviewed two 
actors working with a financial regulator, one working with a medium-size listed 
company, and three interviews with two Big 4 firms located in Kuwait. These 
specific interviewees were selected for two main reasons. First, they practice 
as both producers and consumers of financial and audit regulations. Second, 
the six interviews were relatively easy to arrange41. Details about interviewees 
are as follows: 
No. Job Position42 Institution/Organisation43 
1 Executive  Big 4 (b) 
2 Executive Big 4 (d) 
3 Executive Listed company 
4 Mid-level staff State financial regulator 
5 Mid-level staff State financial regulator 
6 Audit non-executive  Big 4 (d) 
Table 5: Preliminary interviews 
 
40 This was my first personal experience as an academic research interviewer.  
41 Most of these interviews were arranged through social relationships.  
42 Executive position within audit firms refers to a managerial position above manager. Non-
executive refers to the function of manager and below. Executive position in a listed company 
refer to senior executive management level. Within the state financial regulator, mid-level 
represents a mid-level managerial position. Table 6 follow the same logic.  
43 Big 4 (b) and Big 4 (d) interviews were conducted in different international audit firms, 
reported so as not to reveal the firm names. Table 6 follow the same logic. 
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Interviews lasted between 50 and 70 minutes44. Four meetings were audio-
recorded, and for the remaining two, detailed notes were taken. Five 
interviewees were male; one was female. Semi-structured inquiries were 
centred around four broad themes: corporate governance codes, audit market, 
audit regulations, and audit independence (Appendix 1). 
Two things are worth noting. First, I did not perform proper academic research 
analysis for the preliminary findings. It was just six interviews with broad 
inquiries for the purposes detailed earlier. Second, none of the preliminary 
interview findings were “consciously” used in the analysis of my main research 
findings. The outcome of the preliminary examination merely helped me to 
clarify specific issues and motivated me to focus on the broader social conflicts 
of implementing US SOX-driven “international best practices” audit regulations 
to Kuwait. Consequently, such focus guided me to navigate a particular 
literature, legal documents, and the design of my research. The following 
section explains my main data collection phase. 
5.4.3. Main interviews  
Collecting data for a case study can be achieved via various techniques, for 
example through observation or focus groups. However, the selection of a 
specific method has an embodied methodological assumption that should 
work in parallel to the research objective(s). The interview method, for 
example, has different sub-types. For instance, on the one hand, structured 
interviews do not leave much space for interviewees to reflect on their personal 
experience and knowledge, whereas unstructured interviews are broad and 
general. 
On the other hand, the semi-structured interview provides similar flexibility to 
the unstructured for interviewees to reflect their worldview but with a list of 
inquiries on precise themes (Ryan et al., 2002). For that reason, I found open-
ended semi-structured interviews the best fit for both my methodology and 
 
44 Two of the six interviewees were interviewed again in the “main” data collection phase with 
different sets of inquiries (see Section 5.4.3). 
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research aim. Also, in comparison to different types of interviews, the semi-
structured interview is more suitable to an explanatory research approach 
(Saunders et al., 2009).  
To understand the logic of audit regulation, I reviewed various laws and 
regulations as a complementary additional source of information to help me 
understand the underlining structure of auditor practices. Most of these 
documents were publicly available and gathered through Internet search 
engines. Yin (2014) argued that applicable documents are noteworthy as 
multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) to help the researcher broaden the 
investigation as well as strengthening the constructive validity of the study. 
However, public access documents have been criticised for being subject to 
scrutiny by their writers because they are written for a purpose (Bryman, 2016, 
p. 560-1).  
I agree with Bryman’s argument but I believe, depending on the type of 
document, the credibility of documents may have different underlying 
“realit(ies)”. For example, it is inappropriate to compare the trustworthiness of 
a company audit report or financial statement with a state law. Both are 
documents, and both were produced for a purpose. But often laws and 
regulations are taken at face value because they go through a socially 
recognised mechanism (parliament or government department) to (re)shape 
practice(s) (individual and collective), and eventually form a collective meaning 
to (re)establish a specific order. Henceforth, to some extent, I agree with the 
Bryman claim, but this does not mean that a researcher ignores document 
review or analysis. On the contrary, but most importantly, one must be 
sceptical about them45. 
5.4.3.1. Formulation of my interview guide 
The interview questions were not intended to guide interviewee responses but 
to allow interviewees to reflect their world views concerning pre-set specific 
 
45 A significant part of the findings of this thesis argue that even financial laws and regulations 
must not be taken at face value (see Chapter 8).  
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inquiries. However, for some inquiries, I had to give a preface or lead the 
interviewee to reflect on a particular context (Q6, Q13, Q14, Q15, Q16, Q17, 
Q18; Appendix 2). My interview questions were designed to cover four broad 
themes. First, the dynamic of the field of audit firms. Second, the relationship 
between Kuwaiti financial regulators and audit firms. Third, modernising the 
Kuwaiti audit system. Finally, localising northern audit and financial systems 
(see Appendix 2).  
The development and formulation of the interview questions were guided by 
prior literature (including positivist research), the reviewing of various local and 
international laws and regulations (e.g., Kuwaiti laws and regulations46, US-
SOX of 2002, the EU 2014 audit legislation effective 2016, and the IFAC code 
of ethics), reports produced by different IOs (e.g., IMF, World Bank, IOSCO), 
my analysis and understanding of the local context, and Pierre Bourdieu’s 
ideas (especially his field concept, at the time of formulating of my interview 
inquiries).  
I was very surprised that the majority of non-positivist accounting literature, 
especially in audit, does not give much consideration to contemporary 
(globalised) technologies propogated to enhance audit quality (see Section 
2.5). I found myself forced to read “positivist” (US dominated) literature to have 
an idea of what is going on with regard to audit technologies (rotation of firms 
vs. partners rotation, SOX-logic of prohibition of advisory services, shift of 
oversight from the profession’s peer-review to the state, and implications of 
state inspection and disciplinary proceedings). That said, as most of my 
interview questions are driven from the literature, laws and regulations, and 
international reports, some of the interview questions, especially those related 
to modern audit quality technologies (e.g., rotation, disclosure of audit fees), 
were formalised from findings of “positivist” studies.  
 
46 This includes, for example, Kuwait audit law, commercial law and its amendments, and 
various laws and regulations of CBK and the newly established regulator, the Capital Market 
Authority.  
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Although the general themes that underpin my interview enquiries are broad 
per se, I purposely constructed many (sub) interview inquiries to guide the 
interview discussion (within specific themes), to gather as much data as 
possible, and to have a holistic understanding about the struggle of audit 
regulatory change (Appendix 2). However, although constructing interview 
questions to cover broad topics has the merit of providing a comprehensive 
understanding of social arrangements and practices, it bears significant 
challenges in the analysis phase (see Section 5.4.4, Appendix 5). 
Nonetheless, although some of these inquiries may look complex, as I will 
explain in the next section, it is important to keep in mind that I targeted and 
interviewed people who have intensive practices around these issues.  
All interview questions were translated into Arabic before interviews. On every 
interview sheet, I had all the questions in both Arabic and English. The reason 
behind the translation is to give the interviewee the flexibility to pursue 
discussion in Arabic and/or English, and for me to be prepared for this without 
losing focus. Also, I have designed my interview document to be practical and 
easy for taking notes (two-column layout). 
5.4.3.2. Collecting data from a purposive sample 
In a case study, it is impractical to collect data from the full population 
(Saunders et al., 2009, p. 212). However, given my research objectives, for 
the collected data to be representative, it is not very difficult to identify “key” 
actors in Kuwait’s relatively small audit regulations field. In Kuwait, three (main) 
government agencies are directly involved in producing modern audit 
regulations: the Ministry of Commerce, CBK, and the newly created Capital 
Market Authority (CMA; see Chapter 6). Indirectly, however, the accountancy 
body has minimal influence. The organisations that practice within these 
regulations are audit firms. I did not include companies in this sampling design 
mainly because companies (in my preliminary study) were not perceived to 
have an adequate understanding of the settings, arrangements, and practices 
of audit regulations.  
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With Kuwait’s small market, I know that six firms dominate the external audit 
scene (the Big 4 plus RSM and BDO), and approximately five individual 
auditors have the highest symbolic status within Kuwait’s audit field. However, 
before I travelled to Kuwait to perform my interviews, I was successful in 
identifying (through my social network) “key” people within state regulators 
who are directly involved and influence the regulation of corporate audit.   
As I mentioned earlier, Power and Gendron (2015) warn of the difficulty in 
accessing audit firms. Although this was done successfully, it was not an easy 
task. For me, obtaining interviews with state financial regulators was much 
more difficult than interviewing key individuals at audit firms as well as the 
accountancy body. That said, I was able to secure most of my interviews with 
key people before I moved to the field to collect my data. As I knew a few of 
these people myself, some I approached directly and many by using my social 
network. It is worth noting that in Kuwait, there are no “formal” procedures 
within government bodies for academic interviews. Table 6 illustrates details 
about my interviewees: 
No. Interviewee 
code 
Job position47 Institution/Organisation48 
1 Big-A Executive Big 4 (a) 
2 Big-B Executive Big 4 (b) 
3 Big-C Executive Big 4 (c) 
4 Big-D Executive Big 4 (d) 
5 TIER2 Executive Second-tier international audit firm  
6 TIER3 Executive Non-large international audit firm  
7 ABODY Executive Accountancy association  
8 SFR1 Executive State financial regulator  
9 SFR2 Executive State financial regulator  
10 SFR3 Executive State financial regulator  
11 SFR4 Executive State financial regulator  
12 SFR5 Mid-level staff State financial regulator  
 
47 Job position follows the same explanation as in footnote number 42 (Section 5.4.2). 
Executive at the accountancy body and state financial regulator represent positions of 
department head and above.  
48 Interviews with state financial regulators are sorted based on job position not institutions.  
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13 SFR6 Mid-level staff State financial regulator  
14 SFR7 Mid-level staff State financial regulator  
15 SFR8 Mid-level staff State financial regulator 
16 SFR9 Mid-level staff State financial regulator  
Table 6: Details of the main interviews 
Of the sixteen interviews, two were arranged differently. I phoned one audit 
firm asking about the possibility of interviewing a specific actor which they, 
thankfully, arranged. With regard to the other interviewee, one of the key actors 
whom I interviewed recommended I meet a specific person working at a 
specific regulator, whom I identified earlier but was not able to reach. By 
expanding the use of my network, I was able to arrange a meeting with her/him. 
The way I was able to secure interviews with “key” people in the audit 
regulations field probably tells a lot about the significance of social capital in 
the Kuwaiti social system.  
As I mentioned earlier, only two interviewees in the preliminary study were 
interviewed again in the primary data collection phase with a different set of 
inquiries. The majority of interviews was arranged and scheduled prior to my 
travel to Kuwait. All the interviews were performed within a period of two 
months, December 2016 and January 2017. Moreover, all interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and took place at the interviewee’s place of work. I 
interviewed fourteen male and two females respondents (other than the one I 
interviewed in my preliminary phase). All interviews, at the request of my 
interviewees, were conducted in the Arabic language. 
Interviews lasted between 70 and 90 minutes, except for two, which were 50 
minutes and 160 minutes. Most interviews were audio-recorded, except for 
four, because the interviewees were uncomfortable being recorded. In these 
four interviews, detailed notes were taken. The transcripts of the unrecorded 
interviews were done on the same day immediately after each interview. Also, 
after each interview (recorded and non-recorded), I wrote notes about my 
general feedback with the interviewees and things I noticed that were not part 
of the interview guide inquiries. 
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Three points need to be addressed here. First, I ensured complete anonymity 
for all my interviewees, including name, job position, as well as the names of 
their organisation/institution. Second, as we do not live in a utopian world, 
although my inquiries are broad and not sensitive in nature, many 
interviewees, especially with state agencies, were anxious about the 
implications of their discussion for their job security. Part of their worry was 
due to my request to record the interview and part was related to tension within 
regulators and between regulators and “influential” auditors. However, I 
promised them I would make any effort to track their discussion impossible. To 
meet this promise, I anonymised not only interviewee names and managerial 
positions but also did the same for the names of relevant government bodies. 
Nonetheless, in some direct quotations published in this thesis, I purposely did 
not incorporate interviewee codes. Finally, I was surprised by how open, 
honest, and enthusiastic most of my interviewees were! 
What I can disclose (without breaking my comittment) is that I collected data 
from three different government financial regulators that are perceived to 
control the regulation of audit practices. A total of nine interviews was 
conducted with the three regulators. Details about the nine meetings are in 
Table 7. 
Number of interviews Institution/Organisation 
2 State financial regulator (a) 
3 State financial regulator (b) 
4 State financial regulator (c) 
Table 7: Interviews with state financial regulators 
5.4.4. Data analyses  
For qualitative data, there are various strategies for analysing non-numerical 
(verbal) data, for example, grounded theory, discourse analysis, or content 
analysis. However, as I am following a case study method, I understand that 
my choice of analytical strategy and tool has a direct connection to my 
epistemological position and research aim. I found the inductive-thematic 
approach more appropriate to my constructivist position and research topic. 
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This section explains how I performed my data analysis which was concurrent 
with several personal judgements I made to render my findings possible. First, 
I depended on transcripts with their original language. Second, I chose a 
theory-driven analytical strategy. Finally, I used a thematic technique and 
procedures to analyse my data. That being said, I depended mainly on 
thematic analysis procedures described by (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Yin (2014) discussed the risks of using computer programmes to analyse 
qualitative data, such as the inability to capture complex human behaviours. 
However, although it would be an excellent opportunity to learn these 
programmes, to minimise such threats especially with my quite complex 
investigation and relatively limited number of interviews, I decided to analyse 
my data manually.  
5.4.4.1. Issues with transcription 
Transcripts of the interviews were typed (using the Microsoft Word program) 
based on the “original” language used in the interviews. To ensure accuracy, I 
transcribed the exact spoken words that were used during all meetings. 
Similarly, in a few cases where I was not allowed to record the interview, I 
transcribed the detailed notes taken during the interview immediately after 
each interview. However, other than problems often associated with 
transcription, for example, time consumption (including careful checking and 
data cleaning), or data (audio and text) security protection issues, I faced a 
problem which is not covered by the research method and methodology 
textbooks that I often referred to: the translation of interview transcripts49.    
Transcripts are vital for the process of analysing the collected data because it 
is not practical to merely depend on recorded audio. Also, transcription is 
considered “the early stages of analysis” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 88). 
However, as my interviews were conducted in the Arabic language and I am 
writing this thesis in English, I faced the following problem: for analysis 
 
49 These books include: Yin (2014), Case study research: Design and methods; Saunders et 
al. (2009), Research methods for business students; Ryan et al., (2002), Research method 
and methodology in finance and accounting, and; Bryman (2016), Social research methods. 
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purposes, should I depend on an Arabic transcript or an English translated 
version? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative? In 
fact, I personally found no significant benefit to translating my transcripts into 
English in relation to my research aim. On the contrary, it may constitute a 
significant epistemological threat as implied by Spence et al. (2017, p. 561) 
concerning their Chinese and Japanese interviews50.  
To give this argument more methodological insight, I found a brief literature 
that indirectly speaks of a similar problem. For example, Regmi et al. (2010) 
discussed the translation and transliteration of data in qualitative cross-cultural 
studies51.  Regmi et al. argue that: 
Sometimes ideas, concepts, and feelings might not always translate 
exactly from one language to another. It is even possible that in some 
cases there is apparent contradiction between valuing meaning, on the 
one hand, and a desire to obtain conceptual equivalence, on the other, 
which might present a real challenge to the novice (p. 19). 
The above quotation alludes to significant epistemological risk. However, I 
started to translate a couple of transcripts (because many researchers do so) 
and then realised that there are significant differences in meaning between my 
interviewee’s original reflection and my translation52. I realised that depending 
on an English translated transcript, especially because I did the analysis alone, 
will spur the loss of collected indigenous meanings and consequently affect 
the process of my analysis and diminish the quality of my findings.  
In an attempt to introduce and create non-English special issues for academic 
research, Andrew et al. (2019), explained the hegemony of the English 
language in academic research. They correctly emphasise the risk of losing 
sociocultural meanings in the process of translating research that examines a 
 
50 Spence et al. (2017) argued that “Not all transcripts were translated into English out of a 
concern that linguistic and cultural nuances be lost in the process” (p. 561).  
51 Regmi et al. (2010, p. 17) defined translation as “the process of changing something that is 
written or spoken into another language”. For Regmi et al., transliteration “is to write or 
describe words or letters using letters of a different alphabet or language (Wehmeier, 
McIntosh, Turnbull, & Ashby, 2005, p.1632).” (p. 17) 
52 I believe every language has its particularities and probably certain phrases and metaphors 
cannot be translated exactly. However, careful translation might be possible, but it carries 
tremendous costs (money and time).  
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social problem in a language setting different than the language of the 
produced research.  
I considered the dilemma of weakening my epistemological position as well as 
my research project. In my case (as the sole author of a PhD project), I believe 
the issue of translation is mainly about “trust” (e.g., how would anyone “really” 
know that transcription/translation was done in the first place? Or that it was 
done without jeopardising meanings?). Accordingly, I decided to depend on 
the language used in my interviews for analysing my data and then carefully 
translate quotations that I used to support my findings (story)53.   
5.4.4.2. Analytical strategy and procedures 
Yin (2014) argued that the analysis in the case study method is less developed 
because there is no fixed (codified) formula; it depends broadly on researcher 
methodology and the type of research objectives. However, being explicit 
about the process of analysis (strategy and procedures) helps evaluate 
methodological and epistemological choices (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 98 
[3])54. I believe that being explicit about analysis is difficult, costly (open to 
never-ending critiques), and maybe less required by academic logics 
(especially academic journals). But I think it is a progressive form of 
communication between scholars to advance knowledge. 
Yin (2014) argues that the first steps in case study analysis are to define a 
strategy that guides data analysis. What is meant by analytical strategy is the 
dynamic that connects and spurs research objective(s), collected data, 
interpretation of data, and findings. Yin explained four general strategies: 
relying on a theoretical proposition (deductive), ground-up (inductive), 
developing the case description, or rival explanations. However, I decided to 
 
53 Thanks to Javier Husillos (Public University of Navarra) for encouraging me to depend on 
interviews in their original language for transcripts and analysis.  
54 Similarly, Ryan and Bernard (2003, p. 80) criticised researcher ambiguity of analysis and 
argued, “If we do not know how people went about analysing their data, or what assumptions 
informed their analysis, it is difficult to evaluate their research, and to compare and/or 
synthesize it with other studies on that topic, and it can impede other researchers carrying out 
related projects in the future (Attride-Stirling, 2001)”. 
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depart from Yin’s explanation of analytical strategies for two main reasons. 
First, Yin’s explanation is broad with no detail (especially with regard to 
patterns analysis). Second, arguably, Yin’s explanation of pattern analysis is 
driven by positive logic(s). Hence, I decided to follow the Ryan et al. (2002) 
explanation of “pattern model of explanation” as an analytical strategy and the 
Braun and Clarke (2006) explanation of themes analytical procedures.  
Analysis strategy 
Ryan et al. argue that the pattern model helps to understand the dynamic 
process of the social world (social practices) through the provision of an 
empirical explanation of a particular context within a specific social system. 
Under this research strategy, according to Ryan et al. (2002): 
[The] researcher seek[s] to identify a pattern in the case and uses 
theories to explain the observed relations ... Theories will be used to 
explain empirical observations, and empirical observations will be used 
to modify theory. As such there is a two-way interaction between theory 
and observation (p. 148). 
By theory, Ryan et al. (and many methodologists) mean researcher 
understanding of the problem. However, I depended on two external (to me) 
theories to direct me to observe and analyse my collected data and to form my 
perspective on the complexity of the social realm and make connections 
between my data and my research aim possible. These were Bourdieu’s 
practice theory (including his theorisation of the state) and Halliday and 
Carruthers’ recursivity model. These external theories have helped me through 
the whole process of analysis from coding to the generation of various levels 
of themes, as well as the connection between codes and themes. That said, I 
had to move backwards and forwards between my data and my theoretical 
framework many times; it was a difficult analytical process. 
There are some criticisms with regard to external-theory-driven analysis. For 
example, Ryan and Bernard (2003, p. 93) argued that although this type of 
analysis contributes to shedding light on socially important issues, the use of 
theories to identify themes carries the risk of hindering new and surprising 
ideas (Chrmaz (1990) cited in; Ryan and Bernard, 2003, p. 94). I guess this is 
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correct to a certain point, depending on the sophistication of theories in use. 
However, in external-theory-driven social analysis, the surprises often, I guess, 
lie in the contextual details. However, social theories “allow us to see the world 
as it might be” (Suddaby, 2014, p. 408). They also guide us to understand the 
complexity of the social world.  
In the case of my thesis, it would be easier for me to employ a single theoretical 
perspective or to make significant changes to reduce the challenges of my 
research aim but at the cost of providing (I think) a “genuine” contribution to 
the accounting knowledge, especially for full-time PhD students (as I have 
more “time” in comparison to other academics). Nonetheless, part of the 
complexity of my investigation lies, on the one hand, in the rich but also diverse 
data that I collected, aiming to have a holistic understanding of audit 
regulations (including change). On the other hand, I gathered the world view 
of key actors within five different (interrelated) fields that form the audit 
regulations field in Kuwait. This makes analysing the collected data even more 
complicated--as each field has different dynamics and shared habitus.  
Analytical technique and emergent themes 
For analysing my collected data, I decided to adopt a thematic instrument. 
Thematic analysis has been argued to offer a “flexible” approach (to various 
methodologies and different inquiries) to analyse qualitative textual data and 
to provide an understanding of the problem under investigation (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006; Ryan and Bernard, 2003). Although this particular analytical tool 
is widely used in qualitative research, its flexibility is one of its significant 
weaknesses as it is problematic to standardise (codified) thematic procedures 
(Bryman, 2016, p. 570). Also, according to Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 97), 
thematic analysis has limited interpretation power if it is not backed with a 
theoretical framework. However, as there is no systematic way to perform 
thematic analysis, I decided to follow the guidelines offered by Braun and 
Clarke (2006).  
For Braun and Clarke (2006), “Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (p. 79). However, 
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patterns are not only limited to semantic repetitions of data but also, more 
importantly, especially for constructionists, a combination of thematic 
approaches (e.g., repetition, similarities and differences, transitions, 
metaphors) as well as considering the analysis of latent data across data-sets 
to search for patterns of social meaning that are important for the research aim 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003).  
Braun and Clarke (2006) explained six phases for thematic analysis, which I 
followed (see Figure 9). However, during my analysis process, I found that 
there is no sequential demarcation between the phases (especially between 
phases 2 to 5). In refining my findings, I had to go to through these phases 
(sometimes) in non-sequential order.  
 
Figure 9: Phases of thematic analysis  
Source: (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 87) 
By following these phases, Appendix 5 offers the final analytical map that led 
me to define my overall story on how and why Kuwait implemented “modern” 
audit regulations. I found six overarching themes to help achieve my research 
aim. Four general themes related to “how” Kuwait modernised its audit 
regulations and two themes on the “why” modernisation took place.  
On the “how”, the first theme reflects the dynamic of bureaucratic conflicts 
between the newly established regulator and two other state regulators that 
used to collaborate in regulating the practices of corporate audit. The second 
theme emerged concerning the bureaucratic strategies employed by the new 
regulator to lead the capital market audit regulations space.  
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The third emergent overarching theme concerned the confrontation between 
the newly created regulator and the audit field over the modernisation agenda 
of auditor practices. Two sub-themes had been generated by analysing my 
data--first, reasons for the audit field actors to resist the new regulator’s 
modernisation agenda. Second, the strategies that the audit field followed to 
obstruct changes to institutionalised practices and the audit field structure.  
The final theme on how Kuwait modernised its audit regulations is related to 
the implication of resistance between the new regulator and influential auditors 
who dominate the audit field. In this regard, three sub-themes emerged. First, 
containing conflict on the end of the new regulator in pursuit of its international 
integration agenda and considering the audit profession in the design of any 
(future) regulations. Second, customising audit rotation. Third, the 
underpinning reasons for the silence of auditors on the new regulator’s 
complete prohibition of non-audit services.  
Regarding why Kuwait was eager to modernise audit regulations as part of 
broader international best practices-driven reform to its capital market, I found 
two overarching themes. The first is related to the weak (national and 
international) reputation of the Ministry of Commerce (the Audit Law enforcer) 
to regulate and oversee auditor practices. Although this finding is a result of 
several sub-themes, the infiltration of auditors in the Ministry of Commerce 
steering activities was the most salient one.  
The second emergent theme that helped to understand why Kuwait 
modernised its audit regulations is related to my interviewees doxic belief in 
Western-driven international practices. My data analysis suggests that such 
radical belief is a result of continuous pressure of external forces to frame local 
understanding, a potential solution to overcome what is perceived as 
“ineffective” local government, regional competition, and for national security 
purposes. 
I believe I collected a rich set of data from key actors who produce and 
consume regulations of external audit practices. However, reflecting all my 
findings in one research project is way beyond my ability in a PhD thesis, with 
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its time and size constraints. Nonetheless, having holistic data on the audit 
regulations and their changes helped me to go deeper in my analysis.  
There are two general themes I decided not to reflect in this thesis, although 
they informed my overall understanding of audit regulatory dynamic and 
change: first, detailed explanation of the dynamics of the audit field in Kuwait. 
This theme helped me understand how actors who dominate the audit field 
accumulate capitals and their strategies to maintain their symbolic status. 
Second, the regulators' system of overseeing auditor practices (e.g., 
inspecting the work of auditors). This theme helped me to understand how the 
Kuwaiti government perceives the purpose of the external audit function as a 
mere social instrument to legitimise the practices of influential social groups. 
The story of oversight extends to explaining how influential auditors use the 
disciplinary framework in their battle for transcending the audit field. 
Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti regulatory audit architecture is designed to provide 
an exit strategy for influential auditors to “escape” any complaints of 
misbehaviour. I decided to leave the two themes for future research. 
Now I move to conclude this chapter.  
5.5. Chapter conclusion  
In this chapter, I started by explaining my understanding of the research 
philosophy. I depended mainly on the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) to 
explain the realm of social theory. I argued, based on Burrell and Morgan’s 
theorisation, that philosophical paradigms are the outcome of the intersection 
of two axes. A horizontal pole on the nature of social science and its related 
ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological assumptions. 
The vertical axis represents the nature of society. Burrell and Morgan identified 
two extreme assumptions in the social world. The sociology of regulations 
postulates order and unity, disregarding social classifications, inequality, and 
repression. The underlining assumptions of the sociology of radical change 
challenge the taken-for-granted arrangements, meanings, and order to 
develop a fairer world. However, the intersection between the two axes 
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represents Burrell and Morgan’s four philosophical paradigms. In this section, 
I focused on radical paradigms and provided scholarly critiques accordingly.  
In the second part of this chapter, I illustrated my philosophical assumptions 
on the nature of social science as well as my assumptions about the nature of 
the society. This arguably positioned me as a (radical) constructivist based on 
Burrell and Morgan’s social theory. Also, I explained my axiological 
proposition, including the value of research (to develop a better world) as well 
as the nature of audit knowledge. I argued that audit regulations and practices 
are political in nature and a site of power between a nominated group of social 
actors who work individually (as auditors) or collectively (as a profession) and 
powerful groups within a state (e.g., the government and ruling class). Each 
tries to use the other to advance its own interests.     
The last part of this chapter provided the process that made my findings 
possible. I followed a research inductive strategy and argued that case study 
is the most suitable approach for my research problem. I then moved to 
provide some details on the preliminary interviews I conducted that aimed to 
set my field of investigation and test the ability to access the audit regulations 
field. However, as I was open to ideas, the preliminary stage helped me to find 
an area of interest.  
I then explained my main interview phase. I identified and approached key 
local actors who practice the design as well as the implementation of audit 
regulations (including the politics surrounding this process). The design of my 
interview protocol, which was generated based on prior literature, review of 
various documents, and Bourdieu’s ideas (especially his field concept), 
included a predetermined set of inquiries that covers four broad themes. First, 
the dynamic of the audit field. Second, the relationship between audit 
regulators and the audit field. Third, the modernisation of audit regulations. 
Finally, the localisation of Western systems to Kuwait. I purposely aimed to 
collect as much data as possible to have a holistic understanding of the 
practice of regulations and their change.  
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The last part of this section illustrates my data analysis. I explained an issue I 
faced concerning the translation of my interview transcripts. I decided, for my 
analysis, to depend on the language used in my interviews, Arabic. However, 
to pursue the analysis of my collected data, I adopted the analytical procedures 
of thematic analysis offered by Braun and Clarke (2006). Finally, I provided a 
summary explanation of the emergent overarching themes. I clarified that 
through analysing my collected data, I was able to generate six general themes 
to help explain how and why Kuwait modernised its audit regulations. Four 
overarching themes related to the how question and two themes concerned 
the why.  




6. CHANGES TO THE KUWAITI AUDIT REGULATORY 
STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS 
6.1. Introduction 
In modernising the dynamic of audit arrangements, prior studies focused on 
conflict (underpinned by corporatist logic) between the newly created 
“independent” oversight regulator and the audit profession (Canning and 
O’Dwyer, 2013, 2016; Caramanis et al., 2015; Hazgui and Gendron, 2015; 
Malsch and Gendron, 2011). The situation in Kuwait is different in the sense 
that the audit profession was (and is) a state regulated profession. Except for 
the application of international accounting and auditing standards, the Kuwaiti 
state regulates every aspect of the audit profession, including the accountancy 
body. However, to pursue the explanation of what I found in this regard, it is 
worth noting that I classified my findings into three chapters. This chapter aims 
to explain changes to the Kuwaiti regulatory arrangements. Chapter seven will 
provide the dynamic of struggle to modernise the audit regulations. And 
chapter eight will clarify the outcome of the conflict.  
This chapter is classified into three sections. The first section explains the 
Kuwaiti audit regulatory arrangements before the change. Within this section, 
I aim to explain the regulatory audit framework and the underpinning laws that 
authorised the Ministry of Commerce to dominate the audit regulations field.  
The second section of this chapter demonstrates the interference of IOs in 
framing the Kuwaiti understanding of the capital market reform (including 
external audit) based on international best practices. In this section, I will show 
the level of criticism of the World Bank and the IMF on the Kuwaiti regulatory 
framework. I will also provide their proposals for structural changes. 
Additionally, I will explain my findings on why the Ministry of Commerce (the 
audit law enforcer) was perceived to be weak in its corporate audit oversight 
function. 
In the third section, I intend to provide four important aspects - first, the 
internationally driven changes to the Kuwaiti capital market regulatory 
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framework. Second, further interference of IOs on potential bureaucratic 
overlaps with other state agencies. Third, the new regulator’s programme to 
change capital market audit practices. Lastly, my findings on why Kuwait 
followed an internationally driven modernisation agenda.  
6.2. Section 1: Audit regulatory framework before modern 
reform 
This section is dedicated to explaining the audit regulatory arrangement before 
attempts to modernise auditor practices and related structural changes in 
Kuwait’s regulatory framework. The pre-reform structure is essential as it helps 
to explain the inherited power of regulatory practices as well as the 
foundational reasons for conflict over regulatory power (see Chapter 7).  
Before the enactment of the new capital market regulator, the audit of listed 
companies used to be “directly and indirectly” regulated by four institutions, 
with different levels of authority. Regulation was administered directly through 
the Ministry of Commerce and indirectly through CBK, the accounting 
association, and the KSE Market Committee. A brief explanation of the 
regulatory responsibilities of the four institutions are found in Table 8. 






The Ministry of 
Commerce (direct) 
- Enforces the Audit Law of 1981 and the 
Companies Law of 1960 
- Licences and regulates all external auditors 
- Required auditors to follow international 
accounting standards/IFRS and international 
standards on auditing since 1990 (enforced in 
1991 post Kuwait invasion)  
- Demand companies to submit audited financial 
statements for review for arranging general 
assembly (in case of shareholding companies) 
and for renewing company licenses (for other 
types of companies).   
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- Significant influence on the decisions of the KSE 





- Limited authority in regulating the audit profession 
- The audit law gave the association certain 
responsibilities which help it to survive   
The Central Bank 
of Kuwait (indirect) 
- Has its own criteria of audit firms to audit banks 
(mainly the Big 4)  
- Banks must obtain central bank approval before  
general assembly approval in appointing new 
external auditor(s) 
- Review/approve banks’ audited financial report 
before public announcement 
- Required banks not to purchase “accounting 
related services” from their external auditors 
- Required banks to have policies for auditor 
rotation 
- Other than financial audit, CBK requires banks to 
provide two audited annual reports, one on the 
internal control system and one on the lending 
portfolio. Both reports are required to be 
performed by an audit firm (other than the banks’ 
external auditors), subject to central bank approval 





- Check the application of the Companies Law 
Amendment of 1994 concerning joint audit 
requirements for listed companies  
- Some periodic profitability announcements, 
accounting disclosure requirements for major 
transactions, as well as accounting implications for 
judiciary rulings 
Table 8: Summary of participants’ roles in regulating auditors practices before change 
6.2.1. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Commerce  
The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for regulating, overseeing, and 
facilitating commercial and industrial activities in Kuwait. Part of its diverse 
responsibilities is the enforcement of the Companies Law for (all) types of 
private businesses as well as the Audit Law for (all) external auditors. Within 
the context of external audit, the Ministry of Commerce’s legal responsibilities 
go from preparing and organising the audit licence exam, to licencing and 
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registering auditors, to renewal of these licences, and the disciplining of 
auditors.  
Before the capital market reform, the Ministry of Commerce used to have a 
significant involvement and influence in regulating the stock market through 
the KSE Market Committee (see Section 6.2.4). It also occupied one seat (of 
eight) on CBK’s board of directors. The Minister of Commerce, in addition to 
her/his responsibility for the Ministry, also had parliamentary responsibility for 
the decisions of the KSE Market Committee. The Minister of Commerce and 
her/his deputy, post-Kuwait constitution, are often appointed (by the Amir 
based on the recommendation of the prime minister) from outside the Alsabah 
royal family.  
The Ministry of Commerce regulates auditors through two laws. First, the 
Companies Law of 1960 (reformed only in 2016, see Section 7.2.1.3) which 
defines the relationship between the Ministry of Commerce, company owners 
and management, and external auditors. Second, the Audit Law of 1981 
regulates the practices of external auditors, and has never been modified. Both 
laws empowered the Ministry of Commerce to regulate and oversee auditors. 
Detail on these two laws are in the next section. 
6.2.1.1. Audit in the Companies Law of 1960 
The Companies Law of 1960 was the first law to regulate private commercial 
activities in Kuwait. It was enacted due to the increase in shareholding 
companies motivated by the oil operations of Anglo-American companies in 
Kuwait (see Section 3.5.1). All shareholding and limited liability companies, 
according to the Companies Law of 1960, are required to have external 
auditor(s). This law created a market for statutory external audit. The 
Companies Law defined auditor responsibility: 
[T]he external auditor shall be responsible for the accuracy of the 
information contained in their report as an agent for the total number of 
shareholders, and each shareholder during the convening of the 
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General Assembly may discuss and clarify what is stated by the auditor 
(Article 165).55 
With some difference between shareholding and limited liability companies, 
the meeting of shareholding companies (listed and unlisted) is arranged and 
supervised by the Ministry of Commerce. According to the Companies Law of 
1960 (and its  amendments), this meeting should take place within three 
months of the end of the financial year. Requirements for such an assembly to 
take place within the legal time frame are a meeting agenda (with defined 
minimum legal issues to be covered) and the audited financial statements 
(including auditor report).  
According to article 157 of the Companies Law of 1960, as part of the meeting 
agenda, external auditors “must” be “(re)appointed” annually in every general 
meeting as well as deciding on their fees56. On the day of the general assembly 
meeting, the board chair or representative, the external auditor, and a 
representative from the Ministry of Commerce are obliged to attend. In 1994 
(post Iraq invasion of Kuwait), the Companies Law was amended to require 
“all” listed companies to have two joint external auditors, a requirement 
removed in 2012 after the establishment of the new capital market regulator 
(see Section 6.2.4).  
This is the general governance logic on external audit by the Companies Law. 
This law was reformed in 2016 and introduced new types of corporate legal 
vehicles, though still without significant change to the system of corporate 
audit.    
6.2.1.2. Audit Law no. 5 of 1981 
Legally, external audit was regulated since 1962. This first law set the broad 
registration requirement to be an external auditor. This law was amended in 
1963, to achieve two things. First, an initial attempt to localise/Kuwaitise the 
 
55 Translated by the researcher. 
56 The general practice in Kuwait with regard to audit fee decisions is that in the general 
assembly, shareholders delegate this responsibility to the board of directors.  
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audit profession. Second, the amendment shifted registration responsibility 
from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Commerce (see Appendix 3).  
The Audit Law of 1981 is still in practice, unchanged, today (see Appendix 4). 
It clarifies detailed licencing requirements (licenses granted by the Ministry of 
Commerce), regulates the practices of auditors (duties and responsibilities), 
and empowers the system for audit regulatory oversight within the Ministry of 
Commerce. The Audit Law empowered the Ministry of Commerce to be 
responsible for regulating all aspects of audit practice; preparing the licencing 
examinations, granting audit licences, regulating auditors’ practices; and 
imposing disciplinary actions in the case of misconduct by licenced auditors. 
Unlike the 1963 amendment that did not specify time limitations on the 
registration of non-Kuwaitis, the 1981 Audit Law emphasised the Kuwaitisation 
of the profession. Article 5 of the same law allowed licencing of non-Kuwaitis 
for only three years, renewable once for a maximum of two years. This mean 
that five years after 1981, only Kuwaitis were legally authorised to sign off on 
audit reports. 
The Kuwaiti regulatory setting for audit firm(s) is different from the legal rights 
of private business. A private company is a juridical/legal person that has a 
legal identity. It can, for example, lend and borrow monies and sue and be 
sued as a distinct legal entity. Audit firms in Kuwait have no legal personality; 
legal rights and responsibilities lie on the individually licenced auditor, not 
firms.  
A firm is just a name. Legally it does not exist. We found that the ideal 
solution is to regulate individual licenced auditors. (Anonymised 
interviewee)  
Civil liability lies on the licenced auditor, not the firm because we do not 
have a law for audit companies in Kuwait. (SFR2) 
The firm represents a licenced individual. We still deal with the firm as 
a licenced individual. (SFR1)  
I was unable to find out about the financial arrangements between the partners 
inside international audit firm(s) operating in Kuwait nor the legal/financial 
arrangements between the local (international) firms and their global head 
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offices (see Sections 8.4 and 8.4.1). With the 1981 Audit Law, the legal 
responsibility lies on the licenced “individual” who signs the audit report, as the 
audit law does not regulate the concept of “audit firm”, “partnership”, nor “audit 
teams”. In fact, the term بتكم  in Arabic could be translated into a firm or an 
office. Articles 2, 4, 20, 32 of Appendix 4, translated the term بتكم  to firm or 
office interchangeably, but the original text of the law (which is in Arabic) 
means office, not firm. However, in this no-firm legal environment, every 
licenced auditor is legally responsible for her/his signature (Article 4, Appendix 
4).  
From 1981 to today, the Audit Law hasn’t witnessed a single change. Unlike 
the intra-professional struggle in the Western context between international 
and indigenous audit firms (e.g., Caramanis, 1999, 2002), the logic of the 
Kuwaiti audit settings results in competition not only between firms, but “more” 
importantly, between individual auditors. In Kuwait, there are currently 
approximately 100 functioning individual auditors (with signatory power) 
licenced with and regulated by the Ministry of Commerce (Alqabas 
Newspaper, 2018).  
In this individual-based regulatory environment, international audit firms 
(including the Big 4) do exist. The operation of international audit firms 
depends on the type of arrangements between partners working in Kuwait and 
the international office of the audit firm. In Kuwait, all my interviewees 
confirmed that all of the Big 4 are fully integrated into their global network (Big-
A, Big-B, Big-C, Big-D). Interestingly, the existence and operations of these 
firms in Kuwait is unregulated! Again, this is because the Audit Law regulates 
Kuwaiti individuals, not firms. Moreover, the Companies Law (including all its 
amendments) does not regulate these firms.  
The current legal framework allows international audit firms to exist 
“permanently” despite any local audit crises because the licenced individual is 
the one legally liable, not the firm, which legally does not exist. Ironically, the 
global office of each international firm decides who represents them in Kuwait 
(e.g., partners) without any regulation from Kuwaiti regulators. Not only this, 
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but the audit law does not regulate auditors who do not sign audit reports. This 
includes Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. It is worth noting that in the Kuwaiti audit 
field, the majority of partners in audit firms are non-Kuwaitis with no state 
regulations to govern their practices (also see Section 8.3).   
The Audit Law of 1981 also emphasises the “independence” of auditors by 
prohibiting providing “any” non-audit services. It stresses independent 
relations between external auditors and audit-clients (no occupation of 
managerial functions at any level, ownership, or close blood relationship with 
an audit-client), as well as prohibiting the advertising of auditor services (more 
details on the prohibition of advisory services is offered in Section 8.4). 
The Audit Law of 1981 empowered the Ministry of Commerce to licence and 
regulate the audit profession through five committees, each having different 
functions (see Appendix 4). This legal system indirectly involved 
representatives from the Kuwaiti accounting and auditing association and 
other organisations to participate and collaborate in regulating the audit 
profession under the leadership of the Ministry of Commerce. Table 9 
illustrates the structure of these regulatory committees. 
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6.2.2. Kuwait accounting and auditing association 
The Kuwait accounting and auditing association (KAAA) is a public welfare 
association (not a union or political lobby) established in 1973 and regulated 
by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Altaher et al. (2014) argue that this body has 
emerged following the traditional concept of Dewaniya57. Historically, KAAA 
started as a club at Kuwait University for staff and students (Altaher et al., 
2014). Since its official creation, an elected board manages the association. 
Voters are Kuwaiti members (holders of bachelor’s degrees in accounting) 
registered with the association.  
For many reasons, KAAA has minimal power in regulating auditors. For 
example, first, it has no legal power to directly interfere in regulating auditors; 
such empowerment is granted to the Ministry of Commerce. Second, members 
have full-time work elsewhere. Third, limited funding (it survives on 
membership fees, limited state funding, and donations). Fourth, the law that 
regulates the public welfare association (Law 24 of 1962) constrains the 
association’s political activities.  
The Audit Law of 1981 gave this accountancy body two main responsibilities 
that helped it survive (see Appendix 4). First, one of the conditions to be a 
licensed auditor is to be registered with this accountancy association. Second, 
it requires the association to nominate representatives from the profession in 
many of the Ministry of Commerce audit regulatory committees (see Table 9).  
Beyond this legally “constrained” authority, the existence of this association 
benefits the regulators as a mediator for communication between the Ministry 
of Commerce (the audit regulator) and the individually licensed auditor(s), 
according to one of the interviewees: “The thing that helps us with the 
presence of the association is that in the event of any correspondence with the 
 
57 Dewaniya is a place for men to gather for discussion. While some wealthy 
individuals/families have a complete house as a dewaniya, the place is often a large room 
“within” the owner’s house. Official dewaniya usually takes place once a week and the 
unofficial one is daily. Dewaniya is a unique cultural tradition and until today it is fundamental 
setting of Kuwaiti society. Chay (2016) argue that the history of dewaniya goes back to the 
emergence of Kuwait. In recent decades, dewaniya has become popular in other Arabian Gulf 
countries. 
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auditors, we send it to the association and they circulate it to members.” 
(Anonymised interviewee)  
As the accountancy association has no (direct) power to directly influence 
change, for many years they strove to change the audit law to acquire more 
authority as interviewee ABODY explained58:  
Look, proposing to change the audit law, every board [referring to the 
board of directors of the accounting body] works on it, and at a particular 
stage, it stops. Maybe it reaches the Ministry of Commerce and stops. 
Or if the Ministry of Commerce transfers it to the Department of Legal 
Advice and Legislation and then stop. Maybe the Department of Legal 
Advice and Legislation responds to the Ministry of Commerce and then 
stop. Sometimes it reaches the financial committee [of the parliament] 
and something happens and then [it is] postponed or stopped … it 
depends on the political circumstances; the deputy [deputy of the 
Ministry of Commerce] retires, the assistant deputy got changed. 
Sometimes it goes to the parliament, and then it gets revoked. We 
finished all these stages, and it has been included in the finance 
committee of the parliament. They are supposed to discuss it in 
October, but the parliament gets revoked.  
As I mentioned earlier, the accountancy association is registered and 
regulated by the Ministry of Social Affairs under the Social Clubs and Public 
Welfare Associations Law (24 of 1962). In violating the Public Associations 
Law, the ministry’s cabinet, based on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Social Affairs, has the power to revoke this association. Not only this, but the 
Minister of Social Affairs has the ability to revoke the elected board of directors 
and appoint a temporary board. However, we will see in the next chapter how 
auditors used the accounting association to confront the new regulator’s 
demands to modernise auditor practices (see Section 7.3.2).   
6.2.3. The Central Bank of Kuwait 
The Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) acts as the government bank and is 
responsible for Kuwait monetary policies. CBK is empowered to regulate 
commercial banks, investment and currency exchange companies59. It has 
 
58 Currently, there are serious attempts by the Ministry of Commerce to change the Audit Law. 
59 In 2011, the responsibility to regulate and oversee investment companies was moved from 
CBK to the new capital market regulator. 
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specific criteria for banking external audit. CBK has a board of directors of eight 
Kuwaiti members headed by the governor of CBK. Other members include the 
governor’s deputy, a representative from the Ministry of Finance, a 
representative from the Ministry of Commerce, and four members with 
economic, financial, and banking expertise.  
An Amiri decree appoints the governor and vice governor for five years 
(renewable once for the same period), recommended by the Minister of 
Finance. An Amiri decree also appoints the other four expert members for 
three years (renewable once for the same period), supported by the Minister 
of Finance’s recommendations. The ministry’s cabinet appoints 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce. 
Except for one governor from the Alsabah family (serving from 1986 to 2012), 
all governors, since the bank commenced operations in 1969, are from outside 
the royal family, including the current governor.  
It is worth noting that the Central Bank Law 32 of 1968 (article 49) states:  
The audit of the accounts of the Central Bank shall be entrusted to one 
or more external auditor(s) appointed by the Council of Ministers, and 
their fees shall be determined on the proposal of the Minister of 
Finance.60  
Interestingly, although CBK is a government institution supervised and audited 
by the different state audit institutions, Ernst and Young has been the external 
auditor of CBK since 1968; in 2010, KPMG joined them in this function. 
Ironically, CBK regulates banking audit that is dominated by the Big 4, and the 
Big 4 are involved in the audit of the CBK accounts!  
6.2.3.1. CBK guidelines for banking external audit 
To avoid conflict with the Ministry of Commerce’s legal authority of sole 
enforcement of the Audit Law, CBK does not regulate banking external audit 
directly, but requires banks to consider specific criteria for appointing/changing 
external auditor(s). However, banks are required to obtain CBK approval to 
change external auditors before proposing the change to the shareholders 
 
60 Translated by the researcher.  
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assembly, even if the proposed external auditor(s) satisfies CBK guidelines. 
Both local and foreign banks operating in Kuwait must consider the following 
guidelines before seeking the approval of CBK for changing their external 
auditor(s):   
- The local audit firm must be a full member with their global office. 
- The audit firm international network must have audit expertise in auditing 
the largest 50 bank(s) in the world. 
- Development of banks audit methodology by the audit firm global office. 
- The audit firm must have at least one partner and audit staff who have 
experience in auditing banks as well as professional certification (US-CPA, 
CA) for bank auditors. 
- A minimum of 30 hours of training for bank auditors. 
- The global office inspects sample files from the local office to ensure global 
office policies and procedures are followed. 
Interestingly, CBK guidelines recognise “audit firms” despite their legal 
nonexistence. In Kuwait, there are 11 listed local banks; 10 local banks, and 
one Kuwaiti owned bank (Ahli United Bank) established in Bahrain and jointly 
listed in Kuwait and Bahrain capital markets--all local banks are listed. Also, 
there are 10 foreign banks operating in Kuwait; all are unlisted (e.g., Bank of 
Bahrain and Kuwait, BNP Paribas, Citibank, HSBC, Muscat Bank, and Qatar 
National Bank).  
As mentioned earlier, in 1994, the Companies Law was amended and required 
all listed companies to have two external auditors, including (listed) banks. This 
joint-audit was no longer required with the establishment of the new regulator 
(and subsequent changes to the Companies Law), but CBK has continued to 
follow joint-audit logic. For many years, eight of the 10 local banks were jointly 
audited by Ernst and Young and Deloitte. The other two banks are different. 
The Commercial Bank of Kuwait used to be audited by those two firms but 
since a few years ago, it is audited by Deloitte and RSM. This bank is controlled 
by one of the members of the Alsabah royal family. Nonetheless, Warba Bank-
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-the youngest bank, established in 2010 – is audited by Ernst and Young and 
KPMG, the external auditors of CBK accounts. 
6.2.4. Kuwait stock exchange (KSE) 
The stock trading system used to be regulated, operated, and administrated 
by the state with the support of private brokers and a private clearing system. 
The KSE used to be managed by a market committee following its reform in 
1983, post Souk Almanakh crisis (see Section 3.7.2.1)61. This committee is 
responsible for regulating and overseeing stock listing and trading. By law, the 
market committee is chaired by the Ministry of Commerce, and it is the highest 
authority in the stock market. The Commerce Minister recommends members 
of the market committee and they are appointed by the ministry’s cabinet.  
An Amiri decree used to appoint a manager for the stock market based on the 
recommendation of the Commerce Minister. The head of the stock market 
enforces market committee decisions with certain authorities and has 
responsibilities decided by the market committee. The market committee 
established three sub-committees that help in managing stock market 
operations: a disciplinary committee, a disciplinary appeal committee headed 
by a judge, and an arbitration committee chaired by a judge appointed by the 
higher judicial council. All decisions taken by the arbitration committee are 
binding to all parties, including the market committee. With regard to the role 
of the KSE Market Committee in the external audit of listed companies, its 
function centres mainly around certain aspects mentioned in Table 8. 
As I mentioned in Section 6.2.1.1, the Kuwait capital market used to have a 
mandatory joint audit system for listed companies, which was removed from 
the Companies Law in the 2012 amendment. Big-D argued that “joint audit did 
not make technical nor independence contributions due to differences 
between audit firms”. The failure of the joint-audit system occurred mainly 
because the KSE Market Committee did not enforce it properly to ensure that 
 
61 Before the Souk Almanakh crisis, stock trading was regulated by the Ministry of Commerce 
(see Section 3.7.2.1) 
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the two external auditors coordinated and cooperated in company audit 
engagements, as Sikka et al. (2018, p. 79) argued.  
Because of the KSE Market Committee’s lack of proper enforcement and 
oversight over the system of joint-audit, the general practice in the capital 
market was as follows. Non-large listed companies, which represent the 
majority of listed companies, used to appoint one large audit firm and one small 
audit firm. The large audit firm performs the audit engagement alone. The 
small firm merely signs the audit report after its preparation. Accordingly, listed 
companies pay minimal audit fees for the second audit firm.  
For small firms, this abandoned system allowed them to accumulate some 
economic capital but at the expense of acquiring knowledge and being able to 
expand. However, it is unclear to me if small audit firms purposely involved 
themselves in this loose joint-audit model merely to accumulate money, or 
large audit firms subverted this model to prevent small firms from expanding 
their knowledge base and competitiveness.    
6.2.5. Concluding audit regulatory framework before the 
changes 
In the first part of this chapter, I explained the audit regulatory framework in 
Kuwait before the change. There are direct and indirect players who 
participated in regulating audit(ors) practices within the changed regulatory 
framework. The Ministry of Commerce dominated the field of regulating auditor 
practices. However, despite many changes in Kuwaiti social and political life, 
the Ministry of Commerce continued to sustain order through the enforcement 
of old laws with no significant changes: the Companies Law in place since 
1960 and the Audit Law since 1981. The Ministry of Commerce also controlled 
the stock market with the same regulatory settings since the early 1980s. 
Nonetheless, the KSE Market Committee failed to properly enforce the 
mandatory joint-audit system.  
CBK involvement in regulating banking audit was designed not to contradict 
with the authority of the Ministry of Commerce. Two firms within the Big 4 
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dominated the external audit of local banks. The accounting association had 
limited authority to control the audit profession. It merely survived because one 
of the Audit Law requirements for licensing was to be registered with the local 
accountancy association. Nonetheless, the Audit Law gave some authority to 
the accounting association to participate in the regulation of auditors through 
the Ministry of Commerce controlled audit regulatory committees.    
In regulating auditor practices, the Ministry of Commerce’s system of 
governance through collaboration with different interest groups helped it to 
sustain the no change situation to the regulatory framework. Such 
collaboration had the merit of benefitting the Ministry of Commerce in avoiding 
political conflicts, but also benefitted (a few) auditors in influencing regulators’ 
decisions. This regulatory framework was criticised by international 
organisations as loose and exposed to political interference. Now, I move to 
cover the second part of changes to the Kuwaiti regulatory framework, the 
interference of international organisations in criticising the Kuwaiti regulatory 
arrangements and framing the regulatory understanding.  
6.3. Section 2: Responses of the IOs to the Kuwaiti financial 
regulatory framework and reasons behind weak 
oversight 
IOs (the IMF and the World Bank) started to issue a (publicly available) annual 
report on the economic policies and development of financial systems for most 
countries around the world (see Section 1). The IMF periodic assessment 
report is called Article IV Consultation. For Kuwait, the IMF started to publish 
the first report in 2001. Similarly, the World Bank issued various types of 
reports on Kuwait’s economy, business regulations, environmental, political 
and geopolitical issues. Interestingly, the World Bank, as I demonstrated in 
Section 3.5, based on the request from the government of Kuwait, assessed 
Kuwait’s economy and issued their first report in 1961, immediately post-
independence from the protectorate agreement with Britain (IBRD, 1961).  
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In various projects, the IMF and the World Bank worked together to evaluate 
countries’ systems (e.g., ROSC initiative). ROSC was established in 1999, as 
an initiative between the IMF and the World Bank to comply with G20 demands 
aiming to standardise international financial architecture (Halliday and 
Carruthers, 2009). ROSC assessed countries based on international 
standards in 12 areas (IMF, 2018; The World Bank, n.d.).  
ROSC completed five assessment reports on Kuwait as described in Table 10.  
Report name Year 
Report 
No. 
Kuwait: Financial System Stability Assessment, 
including Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, 
Securities Regulation, Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
2004 4/151 
Kuwait: Financial Sector Assessment Program—
Detailed Assessments of Observance of Standards and 
Codes―International Organization of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO)―Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation 
2004 4/352 
Kuwait: Financial System Stability Assessment—
Update 
2010 10/239 
Kuwait: Report on Observance of Standards and 
Codes—FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism  
2011 11/267 
Kuwait: Financial System Stability Assessment 2019 19/96 
Table 10: ROSC reports on the Kuwaiti financial system 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argued that these reports are publicly 
accessible so as to pressure countries to standardise their institutions with 
what Halliday and Carruthers call global (neoliberal) norms. Indeed, most, if 
not all IMF-World Bank macroeconomic, fiscal, and structural 
recommendations are neoliberal. They cover  four types of market liberation: 
first, to open “a more appropriate” market for international capital. Second, 
internally, to empower the private sector over public services, to diversify the 
economy (through privatisation), and to help the private sector lead the 
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economy/society. Third, to reform indigenous labour forces to support private 
capital by providing employment opportunities in private organisations, helping 
“entrepreneurs” to open businesses, as well as educating them to thrive in the 
neoliberal economy. Also, the IMF especially always urged development of 
statistical economic data so that IOs could provide more recommendations, or 
more accurately, more pressure to adopt neoliberal trajectories.  
It is worth noting that starting from their 2010 release, the IMF and the World 
Bank long before that, began in their reports to compare Kuwait with other 
Arabian Gulf countries. This comparison, arguably, is another form of pressure 
for nations to compete against each other on IMF/World Bank terms.  
6.3.1. ROSC and the IMF structural reform proposals  
Prior to the Kuwait capital market reform of 2010, the two ROSC’s 
assessments of 2004 disapproved of the regulatory framework of Kuwait’s 
capital market as well as its system of corporate audit. The first ROSC 
assessment, dated May 2004, is concerned with Kuwait’s financial regulations 
and supervision. The second ROSC assessment, dated November 2004, 
focused on the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
objectives and regulations for Kuwait’s capital market. However, it is worth 
noting that the first (May) report often refers to the second (November) report.  
IOs criticised Kuwait’s institutional arrangements for lack of institutional 
independence, diffusion of responsibilities between three institutions (the 
Ministry of Commerce, CBK, and KSE Market Committee), weak financial 
regulations, loose oversight, absence of accountability, deficiency in 
developing the capital market, as well as lack of competence of regulatory 
staff. Concerning Kuwait’s stock market, the following quote provides an 
example of what these reports say about Kuwait’s financial systems before the 
change. The first report argues: 
Although the law establishes broad mandates for the supervision of the 
intermediaries in the securities market, the lack of an orderly regulatory 
framework has led to a significant fragmentation of responsibilities. 
From a statutory viewpoint, the MC [market committee] is an 
independent agency, although in practice it is not. The government 
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appoints the director-general and the majority of the board of directors. 
The MC has only limited powers to fulfill its mandate, as most licensing, 
supervision, and sanction powers lie elsewhere [referring to the Ministry 
of Commerce]. The inspection, investigation, and surveillance powers 
of the MC and KSE are not adequate and lack a clear process. The 
power to set technical standards for the market is fragmented and not 
well coordinated. In addition, the staffing of the MC and KSE needs 
strengthening to increase efficiency … The KSE is not, in practice, 
operationally independent of external political or commercial 
interference in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory functions 
(IMF, 2004a, pp. 36-7). 
With the same logic of criticism, the second assessment states:  
The review of compliance with the IOSCO objectives and principles 
reveals that, while some progress has been made in the recent past in 
the regulatory and institutional aspects of supervision of securities 
markets, the underlying legal framework remains inadequate and in 
need of improvement (IMF, 2004b, p. 8). 
In current practice, many of the law enforcement agencies (MC, CBK, 
and MOCI) [market committee, CBK, and the Ministry of Commerce] 
rely on external auditors more than inspection to monitor compliance by 
supervised institutions. To ensure the quality of the auditing and 
particularly the audits of financial intermediaries and listed companies, 
and pending the amendments of the legal framework, it is suggested 
that the MC administer and maintain a list of auditors who meet the 
eligibility criteria developed by the MC (IMF, Ibid, p. 11). 
ROSC proposed the following structural changes: 
Numerous changes are thus needed to bring the securities regulatory 
and supervisory system into closer conformity with international 
standards. The following measures are likely to be central: 
• The creation by law of a single, independent, and accountable 
authority with full powers to regulate, supervise, and develop the 
securities market. 
• Rules, regulations, and systems should be developed to deter and 
detect unlawful and fraudulent practices. Insider trading and market 
manipulation should be prohibited by law and enforced by establishing 
an inspection, investigation, and surveillance system. 
• The law should clearly define entry standards for all types of market 
intermediaries and provide for prudential regulations governing their 
licensing, supervision, and performance. Owners and officers of 
licensed intermediaries should be subject to fit and proper conditions to 
be developed by the regulator. 
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• The regulator should build capacity to enforce disclosure requirements 
and to examine compliance of auditors and audited companies with 
internationally acceptable accounting and auditing standards. 
• The regulator should arrange for continuing training programs for its 
staff (IMF, 2004a, p. 14). 
Pressure for structural change did not stop at these few assessment reports, 
but they are repeated (directly and indirectly) in the IMF Annual IV reports until 
Kuwait, based on these recommendations, enacted Law number 7 of 2010 to 
establish a new capital market regulator. However, as the Ministry of 
Commerce used to have a dominant role in controlling both audit regulations 
and the KSE Market Committee, before I move to the third section, I believe it 
is proper now to explain my findings on why the Ministry of Commerce was 
perceived to be weak in its regulatory capacity.  
6.3.2. A system of collaboration turned into a system of 
exploitation  
The majority of my interviewees stressed the ineffectiveness of the Ministry of 
Commerce in improving auditor practices. These claims were related to the 
broader administrative/bureaucratic responsibilities, that the “old” audit law did 
not help in performing proper oversight, unqualified staff, the impracticality of 
the Ministry of Commerce requirements to govern companies (e.g., license 
renewal requirements and deadlines for arranging company annual meetings) 
which were argued to help the rise of “fraudulent” auditors, state carelessness 
in the financial audit function due to the absence of systems for corporate and 
income taxes, and delays/resistance in reforming the Audit Law. Examples of 
my findings follow.  
The Ministry of Commerce is still a government institution, they are busy 
with many things … we are involved in discussions with them [Ministry 
of Commerce], we tell them your employees do not have the 
experience, do not have the technical know-how, there is no common 
language between us. One day we are talking with an employee who 
reviewed the financials of an insurance company. She does not know 
what insurance is, she does not know what reinsurance is. We explain 
once, twice, three times, and then she gets lost. (Big-D) 
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[W]e do not have [the Ministry of Commerce] standards for oversight, 
and we do not have the staff that perform oversight. You are talking 
about large firms with complex engagement. (Anonymised interviewee) 
[T]he Ministry of Commerce is dead. At the oversight level, the Ministry 
of Commerce is dead, dead. (Anonymised interviewee)  
The Ministry has a specific ceiling for salaries … the Ministry for a long 
time has not been heavily involved in organising the profession because 
the government does not give it [the audit profession] much 
consideration. The most important reason for not organising the 
profession is because there is no tax in Kuwait. Because there is no tax 
the state does not give it [the audit profession] much care. (SFR2) 
Criticising the competence of regulators is often a strategy to resist change 
(Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013; Hazgui and Gendron, 2015; Malsch and 
Gendron, 2011). However, other than these stereotypes “blaming” the local 
bureaucratic system per se, what has been noticed through linking the findings 
are voices that “implicitly” argued for “hidden” effects by the infiltration of 
influential auditors in the Ministry of Commerce regulatory committees to 
protect and advance their domination interests.  
In theorising the economic field, Bourdieu (2005) argues:  
Competition among firms often takes the form of competition for power 
over state power - particularly over the power of regulation and property 
rights … In their attempts to modify the prevailing “rules of the game” to 
their advantage, and thereby to exploit some of their properties which 
can function as capital in the new state of the field, dominated firms can 
use their social capital to exert pressures on the state and to have it 
modify the game in their favour (p. 204). 
In relation to this, Sikka (2002) and Sikka et al. (2018) in the UK and prior 
studies on the audit transnational space found that the Big 4 involvement on 
various regulatory committees influenced regulatory decisions to protect and 
advance their interests (see Section 2.2.3). Arguably however, auditors do not 
overtly use these committees to advance their interests, but use various tactics 
to reach this end (e.g., demonstrate their support for the regulatory initiative, 
practices that wins regulators’ trust, attack the competence of non-Big 4, 
construct the understanding of regulators about various regulatory issues, and, 
not surprisingly they may use parliament to pressure/support the Big 4 
representations on various regulatory committees).  
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What happened in Kuwait involved a similar strategy, but at a local level. I 
found that one of the factors that participated in constraining the Ministry of 
Commerce’s ability to enhance its regulatory function over the audit 
profession, is partially due to the participation of influential auditors in steering 
corporate audit functions and regulations. This infiltration tactic has been 
mentioned by interviewees:  
[T]here are people involved effectively in this committee. … [name] as 
an auditor, in a certain period … [name of an auditor], … [name of an 
auditor] in a certain period but did not continue. Only … [name of an 
auditor] continued. (SFR1) 
Those sitting at the top of the audit field participate in the Ministry audit steering 
committee for long periods. This audit steering committee, which is required 
by law, is responsible for managing accounting and audit (technical and 
ethical) issues (see Table 9), had been used to deciding on regulatory issues 
outside its agenda. 
[T]he last meeting was the first time I attended the Ministry committee. 
They are discussing items in their last meeting minutes. Many issues 
are irrelevant … it is not part of this committee … They discuss the 
contents of the audit file and how the Ministry of Commerce looks at 
these files. This is not part of this committee’s function. (Big-A) 
In Kuwaiti social settings and probably elsewhere, as argued by Bourdieu 
(2005, p. 204) theorisation of the economic field and the importance of social 
capital in influencing bureaucratic decisions, it is not very difficult to influence 
the government decision on who participates in such steering committees, 
especially because the audit law did not define membership in this committee 
(see Table 9, Appendix 4). Social relationships mainly guide these decisions 
and sometimes political bargains (which are also infused by social relations), 
and both demonstrate the importance of social capital at the sociopolitical and 
socioeconomic spheres. However, one of the main interests for specific 
auditors to be involved in these steering committees is not only to push for 
regulations that serve their interests but also to be in a strong position to reject 
unfavourable rules that affect such power:  
[H]onestly, without our involvement I do not think the wheel will move, 
this is in my personal opinion and if it moves maybe it takes a wrong 
 210 
direction or the raised issues are not delivered in the right way, we play 
a role in that … I do not want them to say we are leading, but we play 
an effective role in this committee. (Anonymised interviewee) 
They appear to participate in helping the state financial regulator with its social 
responsibilities, for free, to guide the perception of the regulator on specific 
issues as well as to earn their trust: 
I proposed to them. I told her, please come and look at my files. At least 
to make sure that this firm has a file for the client. I know they will not 
understand what am enclosing [in the files] but at least to see that I 
audited … they will go to a firm, and they will find nothing [referring to 
files] … they will find a firm but maybe they will not find files. (TIER2) 
I wrote and asked the Ministry of Commerce, to promote the profession 
and the people who are called Bassam [fraudulent auditors], you have 
to ask for the file of the audit work to make sure, did they do the job or 
not. … I raised this issue … we helped them. We provided them with a 
checklist. We gave them the contents of the file. We told them just ask 
for it. (Big-D) 
[T]oday I sent a letter to the chairman of the committee with seven or 
eight issues for discussion. Let us assume: there is a standard called 
IFRS for SME's. This standard exists but is not yet applied in Kuwait. 
We wrote specific definitions on the meaning of small and medium-
sized companies so that we could use it in Kuwait. (Big-D) 
The audit law driven by the Ministry of Commerce’s audit disciplinary 
committee promotes a collaborative relationship between the enforcer of the 
audit law (the Ministry of Commerce) and auditors to discipline auditors (see 
Table 9). The logic behind such a disciplinary arrangement is on the ground 
that audit technicalities are best known by auditors, without considering 
independence and collegial relationships. In other words, compromising 
neutrality for “imaginary” technical ability:  
This is one of the contradictions. How an auditor who is a competitor 
within the same profession becomes a judge of me … this is creating 
problems, enemies. (SFR2) 
[T]he Companies Law did not cover the Ministry inspection on audit nor 
the Audit Law. Even disciplining auditors is not easy … the first stage is 
disciplining and then the appeal. The second stage is more dangerous. 
The judge does not recognise the existing situation. He depends on the 
other two people that we appoint from the profession ... what is 
happening is that as you are my colleague and I know you, and you 
know me, he [the appointed member from the profession] tries to 
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influence the judge through not disclosing the matter transparently. This 
is a problem we are facing. (Anonymised interviewee) 
For me, it is clear that influential auditors participate in weakening the oversight 
ability of the Ministry of Commerce through intervening in two pivotal oversight 
committees: steering and disciplinary. My emphasis on “influential auditors” is 
because not just any auditor has enough social capital to enable her/him to 
continuously participate in the Ministry of Commerce steering committee. 
Additionally, it is illogical (power-wise) that an audit member of the Ministry of 
Commerce-led disciplinary committee could challenge the work of actors that 
dominate her/his audit field (or the work they authorised with a signature). As 
we will see in a later chapter, “fear” of the influence of “influential auditors” is 
one of the instruments of domination in the Kuwaiti audit field (see Section 
8.3).  
As we saw, it could be argued that one of the major issues for weakening 
regulators’ capacity to develop auditor practices is the “old” Audit Law. A valid 
question here could be, as the Audit Law was implemented for a different time 
and perhaps for different practices, why has it not changed since 1981? I found 
that large audit firms blamed small firms for resisting change, but large firms 
also did not believe in the necessity of changing the “old” Audit Law! 
Small auditors resist change, and the Ministry of Commerce is not 
serious about changing the audit law. (Big-C) 
What do you want to change? It is a licence law and about auditor rights 
and responsibilities … if the proposed changes are minimal, then why 
should we change it? (TIER2) 
[W]hat are you going to change that will add [value] to the law? We will 
enter into details that may actually cause harm. In my opinion, the more 
you elaborate, the more you create issues. (Big-A) 
Shortcomings in the audit law, for example, include: the legal conceptualisation 
of “firm”, the regulating of partnership and its remuneration, the regulating of 
expatriate involvement in audit as well as that of unlicensed Kuwaitis, the 
regulating of advisory services, promoting ethical and moral dogmas in form 
and substance, the constraining of audit firms’ “global office” to local laws, 
continuous education, the procedures around changing external auditors, 
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empowering the audit law enforcer with inspection and sanctions, the redesign 
of disciplinary mechanisms to remove the involvement of auditors, definition of 
auditors’ social responsibilities, maximum working hours, and training.  
All these unregulated areas are significant shortcomings in the Audit Law that 
the audit profession sees as less important or, more accurately, threatening 
the way current order is maintained within the audit field as well as the way 
they accumulate economic capital. Even the majority of these examples of 
shortcomings are not covered in the latest proposed changes to the Audit Law 
(for details see Alanba, 2016). However, despite the profession’s minor 
proposal for reforming the Audit Law, changing it does not occur in isolation 
from the political field, as discussed by ABODY (see Section 6.2.2).  
The Ministry of Commerce could not put forward a law which would not please 
those who practice it (auditors), as the Ministry is easily exposed to political 
(parliamentary) disputes. Also, the changing of laws goes through the 
parliamentary system. Every influential auditor or group of small auditors could 
use their social capital to pressure parliament members to side with their 
particular interests.  
6.3.3. Concluding comments on international interference 
and the exploitation of the audit law enforcer 
IOs increased their interference in Kuwaiti arrangements following the US 
invasion of Iraq. They issued various and repeated reports criticising the 
regulatory framework and proposed alternative structural solutions. Their 
criticism mainly surrounded lack of order in financial regulations, lack of 
independence of the stock market as the Ministry of Commerce had significant 
influence over its operations, no clear sanctioning procedures, and regulator 
exposure to political interference. They pressured Kuwait, especially through 
the IMF periodic reports, to create a specialised regulator to reform all aspects 
of the capital market, including the practices of external auditors.  
In the audit regulations domain, my findings suggest there were many causes 
that weakened the oversight capacity of the Ministry of Commerce. The most 
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salient reason is the “old” Audit Law and the long-time presence of some of 
the influential auditors on these committees. So while the law and the Ministry 
of Commerce encouraged the involvement of various social groups to 
collaborate in regulating auditor practices (under the leadership of the Ministry 
of Commerce), probably as a strategy to avoid conflict, the result was a 
worsening of the reputation of the Ministry of Commerce’s oversight capacity.   
Instead of collaborating with other social groups to progress the social 
responsibilities of auditors, influential auditors exploited these committees to 
advance their interests, reject unwanted regulations, and frame regulator 
understanding on financial and regulatory issues (see Section 8.4.1). 
Nonetheless, as my findings suggested, influential auditors blamed small audit 
firms for resisting reforming the audit law, while at the same time refusing to 
believe themselves that there were major issues that required changes to the 
“old” Audit Law.   
Now I move to the third section of this chapter, the regulatory change.  
6.4. Section 3: Modernising Kuwait’s capital market and the 
further interference of IOs 
Following the local implications of the global financial crisis (Section 3.7.2.3), 
and the involvement of IOs to influence framing of the regulatory arrangement, 
in 2010 Kuwait reformed its capital market and enacted a new regulator (the 
CMA) to take over capital market regulatory responsibility from the KSE Market 
Committee. Such regulatory change resulted in ending the KSE Market 
Committee functions. The explanatory memorandum of the enacted law 
supported all the arguments in section 2 about the pressure of IOs.  
[I]t is appropriate to establish an authority for the capital markets in the 
State of Kuwait to serve as a basic element of the capital markets and 
act as a balancing part among the various elements of these markets, 
while exercising control and ensuring the soundness of their operation. 
The capital markets in the State of Kuwait lack such authority and, in 
certain circumstances, no other entity performs the proposed functions 
of the Authority, although the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
occasionally performs these functions. Indeed, most of the studies that 
addressed the question of reforming and developing Kuwait Stock 
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Exchange have concluded that this approach be followed. This 
approach was also recommended by various studies undertaken by the 
concerned international organizations, particularly the International 
Monetary Fund (CMA, 2010, pp. 61-2).62 
The newly established regulator was empowered to be responsible for 
regulating and supervising all aspects of securities activities (listed and non-
listed). The enacted law also empowered the new regulator to be responsible 
for regulating investment companies. This resulted in moving the power to 
regulate and oversee investment companies (both listed and non-listed) from 
CBK to the new regulator.  
The newly created regulator is managed by five commissioners appointed by 
an Amiri decree based on the recommendations of the Minister of Commerce. 
Also, within the five commissioners, an Amiri decree decides on the chair and 
vice chair of the new regulator. Appointments are for four years, renewable 
once for the same period. The new regulator was chaired by the KSE general 
manager until 2014 (see Section 7.2.1.5). 
Unlike the KSE Market Committee headed by the Ministry of Commerce, the 
Minister of Commerce continue to be politically responsible for the new 
regulator, but has no direct involvement in regulating the activities of the new 
regulator (see Chapter 7). Also, the financial resources of the new regulator 
come from the fees collected from different parties involved in the activities of 
the capital market. Shortages in the new regulator’s annual budget are covered 
by the government.  
Similar to the situation of the CBK (Section 6.2.3), Law no. 7 of 2010 requires 
the new regulator to have an external auditor, other than state auditors:  
The Authority shall maintain proper books of accounts and records 
relating to its revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities and all 
transactions related to the Authority. The Authority shall have one or 
more independent auditors (Article 22).63 
 
62 Translated by the researcher. 
63 Translated by the researcher. 
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The CMA external auditor used to be Deloitte and then changed to KPMG. 
Interestingly, KPMG’s office is located in the same building as the new 
regulator, Alhamra Tower, one of the most prestigious privately owned 
commercial buildings in Kuwait!  
To separate the trading administration from oversight, the 2010 law empowers 
the new regulator to (also) work on privatising the stock market after 
completing its corporatisation and accepting the best bid for an institutional 
investor with experience in capital market operations. Fifty percent of the 
privatisation project is open for the public to subscribe/invest. That said, only 
in early 2020 was the privatisation project of the KSE completed.  
In general, the law aims to regulate and develop the capital market based on 
aspects raised by the 2004 ROSC assessment reports, including the external 
audit of companies. Suddaby et al. (2007, p. 355) argued that advancing 
embodied transnational logics is often accomplished through attracting 
regulators to be members in international networks. This occurred in Kuwait, 
where the new regulator aimed to incorporate Kuwait’s capital market for 
membership in IOSCO and to promote the ranking of the capital market from 
developing to emerging on specific international indices (i.e., FTSE Russell, 
S&P Dow Jones, MSCI). These capital market ranking agencies depend not 
only on the amount of liquidity within the capital market and the sophistication 
of financial instruments (to incentivise financialisation), but also the broader 
capital market governance practices as well as membership in international 
clubs such as IOSCO that diffuse standardised forms of governance in capital 
markets. However, immediately after the announcement of the “aim” of the 
Kuwaiti regulatory restructure to integrate its capital market with the 
international system, ROSC issued its 2010 assessment and provided 
additional recommendations.  
6.4.1. Proposal of ROSC 2010 assessment  
After the enactment of the new capital market law in 2010, IOs supported this 
reform as they had encouraged this movement for many years. Nonetheless, 
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the ROSC 2010 assessment provided additional proposals to assist the new 
structural changes: 
The creation of the CMA [Capital Market Authority; the new regulator] 
is a significant step forward, but it raises important issues about the 
division of labor with the CBK. The CMA Law grants broad regulatory 
and monitoring powers over most ICs [investment companies] activities 
to the CMA, including licensing and issuing quantitative and qualitative 
regulation for securities businesses and prudential requirements for ICs 
themselves. There is, however, significant potential for regulatory and 
supervisory overlaps and gaps, which need to be addressed to ensure 
effective oversight. In particular, the CMA Law is unclear on the 
respective responsibilities of the CBK, CMA, and MOCI [Ministry of 
Commerce]. In the future, the CMA is expected to take the lead on 
market conduct-specific aspects of securities operations. This includes 
client administration, separation of assets, complaint handling, client 
relations, insider dealing, price rigging and conflict of interest and 
compliance. However, the law is not clear on whether the CBK or the 
CMA will take the lead on prudential regulation (solvency risk 
management, financial guarantees, capital, and large exposure 
reporting/limits) and general operational aspects (such as 
organizational structure, strategy, reporting lines, and internal controls) 
(IMF, 2010, pp. 22-3). 
The above quotation emphasised the ROSC’s urge to solve regulatory 
overlaps between the three regulators: the newly established regulator, CBK, 
and the Ministry of Commerce. Also, it signalled the support for the new 
regulator to lead the capital market oversight activities.  
IOs deal with bureaucratic agencies as movable objects without any 
consideration to their inherited authorities or even inherited contradictions 
within these agencies. In other words, IOs alluded to potential regulatory 
conflicts between the three state financial regulators, without explaining how 
to solve these institutional conflicts because, at the end of the day, what 
mattered most to them is the “form” of institutional arrangements. Now I move 
to explain the reform of audit regulations in the new structure of the Kuwaiti 
capital market. 
6.4.2. Reforming the external audit of the capital market 
The new regulator targeted the application of international best practices to 
develop its capital market practices and to be admitted as a member of IOSCO 
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as a first step toward an agenda to promoting the international ranking of 
Kuwait’s capital market. Among various provisions for modernising the capital 
market system, in June 2011 the new regulator, despite the practiced audit law 
and the (sole) legal authority of the Ministry of Commerce, issued its first 
corporate audit system (details in Appendix 6).  
As per the new audit regulations, no legally licenced auditor is allowed to 
engage with the capital market companies unless s/he is registered with the 
new regulator. Nonetheless, for an auditor to be registered, there are 
conditions that need to be satisfied.  
Registration with the new regulator allows external auditors (firms) to enter the 
re-designed market for external audit not only for listed companies but all non-
listed companies under the oversight of the newly established regulator (e.g., 
investment fund and non-listed investment companies). However, albeit the 
many requirements for the new system (illustrated in Appendix 6), the new 
regulator also demanded the implementation of new (to Kuwait) (modern) 
regulatory ideas such as, for example, auditor rotation. As we will see in the 
next chapter, such demands ignited social conflicts not only between the new 
regulator and auditors, but also inter-governmentally, between the new 
regulator and other regulators (the Ministry of Commerce and CBK) that used 
to collaborate in regulating auditor practices themselves.  
This new capital market audit system witnessed three changes after its first 
publication in 2011 (all changes illustrated in Appendix 6). The first major 
change was in December 2012, and in 2015 further minor changes occurred 
as part of broader changes to CMA bylaws. In 2019, after the analysis of the 
collected data was completed, a further “minor” change (concession) occurred 
in the capital market audit system (see Appendix 6).64   
Before I move to the next two chapters that continue explaining how Kuwait 
modernised its capital market audit regulations, the following section explains 
 
64 The 2019 amendment mentioned in Appendix 6 was minor but proved part of the findings 
of this thesis. It mainly removed the constraints on the number of clients per audit manager 
and further reduced the Kuwaitisation demand (see Section 7.3.1).  
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my findings on why Kuwait took such international-driven trajectory and aimed 
to integrate its capital market with the international system.  
6.4.3. Kuwait’s doxic submission to Western (international) 
practices and supremacy 
I have dedicated two interview queries to help understand the internationally-
driven Kuwaiti modernisation programme (see Q17, Q18, Appendix 2). From 
Bourdieu (1990): 
Practical belief is not a “state of mind”, still less a kind of arbitrary 
adherence to a set of instituted dogmas and doctrines (“beliefs”), but 
rather a state of the body. Doxa is the relationship of immediate 
adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field 
to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that 
flows from practical sense (p. 68). 
Surprisingly, the majority of my interviewees expressed similar reasons for 
complying to Western-driven international practices and replied with either a 
surprising comment or a question: why do you want to re-invent the wheel?  
This is an old argument. The West has research, development, and 
funding to develop standards. The development of businesses and 
financial instruments is fast ... it is more advanced and fits the purpose 
… why do you want to re-invent the wheel? (Big-B) 
Few argued that the pressure of IOs was behind the reform. However, these 
responses do not indicate criticism of the role of IOs in re-orienting the culture 
of the society through demands for institutional changes (reform) as argued, 
for example, by (Halliday and Carruthers, 2009; Section 6.3), but to criticise 
the government’s ineffectiveness in progressing the polity. 
If Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s rate a country, there are many 
criteria, not only your financial capabilities. What is your financial 
legislation, if they saw your financial institutions are rubbish or your 
central bank does not apply Basel, all will affect your rating. Kuwait was 
paused because of the money laundering issue. They forced Kuwait [to 
change]. Do you think Kuwait wanted to establish a money-laundering 
unit? It was imposed … you are a country that submits to forces, you 
do not impose anything. Look, if you have money and you are a fool, it 
is different than if you have money and you know what to do with it. 
(Anonymised interviewee) 
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They [decision makers] do not wake up until crises happen. If no 
disasters happen, they will continue to do the same until Judgment Day. 
Unless it is externally imposed … government institutions should be 
under more oversight than the private sector. In the private sector, 
people worry about their money. This is public money. Neither the 
government worries about the country’s money nor do responsible 
people worry about the country’s monies. The private sector does 
because it is private money, they want to maximise their profits as much 
as possible. The government is a disaster. (Anonymised interviewee) 
My interviewees doxically submitted to unified international solutions, reform 
based on Western (best practice) logic is expected to solve Kuwait social 
problems. One of the central reasons that underpin such rationalisation, as 
argued by some of my interviewees, is the government incompetence to create 
progress in the social sphere. I believe that the questions “why 
implementation” and “why late implementation” are related. I aim to discuss 
these findings in further detail in the Discussion Chapter (see Section 9.5). 
6.5. Chapter conclusion  
This chapter provided a comprehensive explanation of the Kuwaiti audit 
regulatory framework. To do so, I classified this chapter into three sections. 
Section one clarified the regulatory arrangement before international pressure 
to change auditor practices within the capital market. Pre-change, the 
regulations of external audit used to be solely under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Commerce. On the one hand, the accounting association was 
authorised by the “old” Audit Law to have some involvement in supporting the 
function of the Ministry of Commerce regulatory committees. On the other 
hand, CBK, so as not to contradict the authority of the Ministry of Commerce, 
did not interfere directly, but through banks. It required banks to consider 
specific criteria for external audit (firms) before seeking the approval of CBK 
to change external auditors.   
I explained that the Ministry of Commerce regulates auditor practices through 
two laws--the Companies Law of 1960 and the Audit Law of 1981. I also 
demonstrated how the Ministry of Commerce enforced the Audit Law through 
regulatory committees that it controls. I argued that the involvement of and 
collaboration between different parts of society helped the Ministry of 
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Commerce maintain its system of domination over audit regulations without 
change since the early 1980s.  
Things started to change when the IOs introduced their vision of regulatory 
arrangement to Kuwait, which framed the understanding of the Kuwaiti 
decision makers as well as of society. In section two, I explained how the World 
Bank and the IMF responded to Kuwait’s regulatory arrangements. I also 
provided some direct quotations to show the level of criticism and their 
proposals for institutional changes. Additionally, within section two, I 
demonstrated my findings on why the audit regulator (the Ministry of 
Commerce) was argued to be weak in its oversight capacities. There are 
various reasons, but I think the core cause is the continuous operation of the 
“old” Audit Law. This law probably was implemented for a different time and 
practice set. The law encouraged the Ministry of Commerce to incorporate 
different fields, and this system of collaboration was exploited by influential 
auditors to advance their interests. In return, auditors, both more and less 
influential, resisted changes to this “old” system. 
With the social implications of the global financial crisis of 2007/8 on Kuwait, 
the country followed the recommendations of IOs and reformed its capital 
market regulatory arrangements accordingly. Kuwait created the CMA (the 
new regulator) to reform the capital market activities based on “international 
best practices”, including the external audit function of the capital market 
companies.  
With the creation of the new regulator, in the third section I demonstrated how 
IOs further interfered to raise issues of potential local conflict over regulatory 
power between the new and other financial regulators. I also explained the 
new regulator programme to modernise external audit practices of the Kuwait 
capital market.  
In the last part of section three, I showed my findings on why Kuwait 
modernised its regulatory arrangements. I found two related reasons that 
underpin such a logic--first, the radical belief of society in the supremacy of 
Western practices. Second, the realisation that change was due to 
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international pressure. Nonetheless, international technologies are expected 
by my interviewees to be a potential solution to ineffective Kuwaiti government. 
I aim to elaborate on these findings with more detail in the discussion chapter. 
The next chapter presents the second part of my findings. It will focus on the 
conflict between different bureaucratic agencies as well as the audit field over 





7. CONFLICTS ON MODERNISATION OF AUDIT 
REGULATIONS IN KUWAIT 
7.1. Introduction 
With the interference of IOs in Kuwaiti regulatory arrangements and the 
negative reputation of the Ministry of Commerce, a new specialised regulator, 
the CMA, was established to modernise the capital market and corporate audit. 
The new regulator aimed to reform and integrate Kuwait’s capital market with 
the international system. It also aimed to satisfy the membership requirements 
of IOSCO and worked to promote the ranking of Kuwait’s capital market from 
developing to emerging market on particular international indices (i.e., FTSE, 
S&P, MSCI).   
Within the context of corporate audit, the new regulator did not have the power 
to overthrow the Audit Law that empowers the Ministry of Commerce to decide 
who may be nominated as an auditor as well as its authority to regulate and 
oversee the audit profession. To bypass this regulatory constraint, the CMA 
followed the US SOX/PCAOB model by demanding that any auditor(s) wishing 
to provide services to capital market companies “register” with the new 
regulator and fully comply with their registration requirements. Also, 
companies were prohibited from dealing with non-CMA-registered auditors 
and were threatened with sanctions. 
Nonetheless, the CMA, claimed the power to lead (change) the regulations 
governing auditor practices in capital market companies regardless of the 
Audit Law system and the inherited (audit) bureaucratic arrangements, legal 
capacity of other state agencies, and power. These bureaucratic ambitions led 
to a different type of tension than that discussed in prior studies (see Section 
2.5.2). Battles occurred not only between the new regulator and the audit 
profession, as several corporatist studies suggested, but also extended to 
include other state financial regulators that had been responsible for audit 
regulations over many decades. 
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This and the following chapters intend to explain my findings on how Kuwait 
modernised its capital market audit regulations. It is worth noting that in my 
interview protocol, I only had one question regarding conflicts between 
financial regulations (Q 10, Appendix 2). This theme emerged during the data 
analysis on questions related to the relationship between regulators and audit 
firms (see theme 2, Appendix 2).  
This chapter is classified into two main parts. The first part starts with an 
explanation of my findings on bureaucratic conflicts between the CMA and the 
long-established regulators (the Ministry of Commerce and CBK). In this first 
part, I also aim to explain my findings on the domination strategies employed 
by the new regulator to lead the audit regulations of the capital market.  
The second part evaluates the audit field’s responses to the modernisation 
demands. I intend to demonstrate the underpinning logic that drove the audit 
field to resist change and their strategies to confront the implementation of 
“international best practice” audit regulations by the new regulator.  
7.2. Part 1: Bureaucratic struggle over how to maintain 
regulatory order 
Bourdieu (1998a, 1998b) theorised that within bureaucratic policy change, 
there are two synchronous internal battles in the bureaucratic field. First, there 
is the vertical battle between high state nobility (higher civil servants) and low 
state nobility (lower civil servants). Second, a horizontal battle exists between 
the right hand (economic wing) and left hand (social wing) of the state. Within 
this structure of inter-bureaucratic conflict, each bureaucratic agency attempts 
to impose its vision of reality (Bourdieu, 2005). Nonetheless, within the field of 
government agencies (high state nobility, higher civil service) Bourdieu argued 
the following;  
The field of the higher civil service is the site of a permanent debate on 
the very function of the state. The civil servants closely associated with 
bureaucratic organizations oriented toward one or other of the great 
state functions (ministries, directorate, services, etc.) tend to assert and 
defend their existence by defending the existence of those bodies and 
working towards the fulfilment of those functions. But this is merely one 
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of the underlying causes of the antagonisms that divide the field of the 
civil service and orient the great political “choices” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 
93). 
Bourdieu (2005) also theorised that within this structure of bureaucratic 
conflict, each agent/agency, in order to impose its vision of reality, uses the 
help/pressure of external forces to support them in their inter-bureaucratic 
fight. For Bourdieu, external forces are those that are affected by policy change 
(e.g., professions, banks, professional associations, building societies). 
Nonetheless, in the bureaucratic fight, external forces choose to support 
agencies that protect and advance their interest (see Section 4.3.4). This is 
what happened in Kuwait. 
With the new regulator’s calls for auditors to comply with the new audit system, 
the Ministry of Commerce did not submit to the marginalising of its power. It 
resisted and produced tension between bureaucratic agencies, directed 
against the new regulator’s ambitions to define the financial and audit 
regulations. In other words, it did not allow the new regulator to impose its 
vision and transcend the bureaucratic field without a fight:  
Alhay’a [CMA, the new regulator] imposed their regulations on us and 
this is wrong. We fought with them, a big fight, but it was imposed … 
they want to regulate auditors alone, independent of the Ministry [of 
Commerce]. This is the role of the ministry and this is unacceptable. 
Their law was issued in 2010 [Capital Market Authority Law] our [the 
Ministry of Commerce] law [Audit Law] was issued in ‘81, this means 
we are older. The [audit] law does not classify, any other registrars, you 
[CMA] are in contradiction … the CMA in their first phase only wanted 
international firms. We entered a dispute with them, we told them this is 
not your right. Every licenced auditor should be welcomed, if you have 
regulations tell them [licenced auditors], you do not have the right to 
reject them. (SFR1) 
One of the main strategies for resisting the new regulator’s challenges was to 
attempt involving auditors (which they regulate) in this bureaucratic battle to 
pressure the new regulator to back down:  
All their regulations are unlawful. I was surprised that no one legally 
appealed against them [CMA]. I told them [licenced auditors], “you are 
the owners of the profession, you all will be harmed.” Now it has become 
part of the system because they all stayed silent. (SFR1) 
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The CBK has a different position with regard to the CMA’s “registration” 
demand. For many years before the establishment of the new regulator, the 
CBK, to avoid contradicting bureaucratic/legal arrangements, was “indirectly” 
involved in regulating audit by requiring banks to consider specific “firm” criteria 
to propose external audit change (see Section 6.2.3). The CBK limited the 
external audit of banks the Big 4.  
CBK does not register you [audit firms] like the CMA … they give the 
green light on who is acceptable and who is not to maintain, let us say, 
the standards. (Big-D) 
The previous arrangement of the CBK’s indirect regulation of banking audit is 
a practice to override the legal constraints of the audit law that solely authorise 
the Ministry of Commerce to regulate external audit. Probably, such 
interference did not constitute a direct challenge because it was not done 
directly, but through the banks. However, a majority of my interviewees 
justified such an override, based on the importance of the economic and social 
function of the banking regulator:  
Almarkazi [CBK] have the right because the banks are the base of the 
economy, thus they [CBK] want to guarantee that auditors are 
competent when they are appointed. (Big-B) 
The number of banks are limited. The CBK especially has a unique 
position in Kuwait and the banking system is sensitive. Kuwait looks at 
the integrity of the banking system as the integrity and safety of the 
country, not only the banks. You know, when the crisis happened [the 
global financial crisis of 2008] all the state did was pump money into the 
banks. (SFR3) 
Banks represent the core of the economy. They do not want auditors 
with no competence to audit banks. For example, a firm with five 
auditors auditing the National Bank [of Kuwait], how could they? They 
[CBK] have the right  … the civil liability lies on the individual who signed 
… an individual represents a firm, the civil responsibility lies on the 
individual not on the firm because in Kuwait we do not have a law for 
audit firms. (SFR2) 
… to make sure that Basel’s instructions can be applied by the auditors. 
If you appoint a regular firm, they may not even know what Basel’s 
instructions are. They are not only required to know it but also 
understand it. (SFR5) 
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This, however, does not mean that there were no tensions between CBK and 
the CMA. On the contrary, as we will see later (Section 7.2.1), because CBK 
does not regulate auditors “directly”, this bureaucratic arrangement helped the 
CMA to shift the tension in the audit “modernisation” programme to banks.  
It is worth noting that my findings suggest that banks have little interest in the 
new regulator’s modernisation of auditor practices, but is interested in a 
particular embodied technology, audit rotation: 
Banks resisted [periodic rotation requirement] because for them it is 
costly to change auditors [audit firms]. This resistance is not from us 
[audit firms], but we benefit from it. They pressure the CBK not to 
change. It requires lots of work and training and risk, and this takes 
years. (Big-C) 
You know who is on the board of Alwatani [National Bank of Kuwait], 
they have influence. (SFR5) 
Local banks in Kuwait are mainly controlled by ruling groups. The new 
regulator’s ambition to interfere in their institutionalised audit arrangement with 
the CBK and audit firms drove them to support the CBK resistance position. 
However, because the CMA employed stealth strategies to impose its vision 
of reality, many in return fought back against it. 
They [new regulator] were under fire from everywhere. (SFR6) 
Now I move to explain the CMA’s strategies to accumulate bureaucratic capital 
and transcend in the bureaucratic field to fulfil its functions: modernising capital 
market activities and achieving international integration.  
7.2.1. Strategies to reproduce inter-bureaucratic 
domination for audit regulations 
For Bourdieu (2005), the field of high state nobility (higher civil servants) 
become a field of permanent struggle during policy changes, each aiming to 
protect its bureaucratic function by imposing its political vision of reality (see 
Section 4.3.4.1). My findings suggest that the CMA employed five strategies 
in their symbolic disputes with other bureaucratic organisations that used to 
dominate the audit regulation field. The CMA’s domination strategies ignited 
conflicts with other bureaucratic agencies that had established particular 
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regulatory arrangements for audit: the Ministry of Commerce and CBK. 
However, here I am not offering exclusive description of these strategies on 
the accumulation of bureaucratic capital by the new regulator, but themes I 
encountered during my data analysis.  
7.2.1.1. Strategy 1: Registration: A bureaucratic technology to 
expand regulatory territories  
In Kuwait we have a problem. When I become a [new] government 
institution I accumulate, give me, give me [responsibilities]. Why all 
these administrative issues? The document goes from one place to the 
other. Because everyone is taking responsibilities of each other, what 
will happen? There is chaos out there. Everyone [government 
institutions] intervenes with the other … this is not limited to Alhay’a 
[CMA, the new regulator] but all government institutions. (TIER2) 
Look at it from a larger scale, since the number of government bodies 
increased, corruption increased in the country. (Anonymised 
interviewee) 
Surprisingly, the above quotations match Bourdieu’s notions on the genesis of 
the bureaucratic system as a substitute to the feudal system;  
The lengthening of the chains of delegation and the development of a 
complex structure of power do not automatically entail the withering-
away of the mechanisms aimed at securing private appropriation of 
economic and symbolic capital (and of all the forms of structural 
corruption). (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 33) 
As most investment companies were financially affected by the global financial 
crisis of 2008, CMA was empowered (by its establishment law) to regulate all 
securities activities including those of investment companies. This regulatory 
shift relieved CBK from the headache of the financial troubles of investment 
companies, but it was at the cost of reducing its authority and increasing the 
power of the new regulator. It is worth noting that one of the dilemmas that 
CBK faced is that it used to be the regulator of both banks and investment 
companies. Hence, it was difficult for the banking regulator to clearly side 
with/favour one group over the other as the crisis mainly generated monies 
due to banks from investment companies (see Section 3.7.2.3). 
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With the shifting of oversight of investment companies to the CMA, the CBK 
could easily side with the group that gives it bureaucratic legitimacy, the banks. 
However, as the new regulator became responsible to regulate and oversee a 
majority of listed companies (outside the banking sector), shifting investment 
companies to its regulatory authority increased its bureaucratic capacity. 
Nonetheless, given that all local banks are listed, the CMA strove to take over 
the regulation of the banking sector but could not, as that might not only 
marginalise the bureaucratic position of CBK but also probably create 
confusion in the government as the majority of local banks are controlled by 
ruling groups.  
Registration was the primary strategy employed by the new regulator to control 
capital market activities, enlarge its regulatory authority, secure a position in 
the state regulatory arena, and enforce its symbolic dominance. In the field of 
audit regulations, as I illustrated in Section 6.2, for almost three decades the 
Audit Law empowered the Ministry of Commerce to nominate and classify 
auditors through licencing and registration. CBK, on the other hand, 
implemented tactics to avoid contradicting the law by requiring banks to 
consider certain aspects in proposing changes to external auditors (see 
Section 6.2.3.1).  
The new regulator was more vigorous. Although all financial institutions 
continued operating under the same government, the CMA, in contradiction to 
the Audit Law, bureaucratic arrangements between other agencies, and the 
rules of the audit field, aimed to govern the audit regulations alone. 
Nonetheless, in addition to the contradiction between the CMA and the Audit 
Law, “registration” with the new regulator also endeavoured to include bank 
external auditors, on the grounds that local banks are listed in the capital 
market and consequently the audit of banks “should” be under the oversight of 
the new regulator, not the banks’ regulator, which is the CBK.  
Looking at the issue of registration from a macro lens, despite registration 
being one of the powers of the state, “multiple registrations” does not mean 
auditors are equally treated by regulators. As the Audit Law grants audit 
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regulatory power only to the Ministry of Commerce, registration with the 
Ministry of Commerce does not automatically grant a registration with the 
CMA; by contrast, to be able to register with CMA, registration with the Ministry 
of Commerce is one of the requirements.  
The new regulator becomes the barrier to enter the capital market or sole 
protector of the capital market. However, to further control the order of capital 
market companies audit, the new regulatory system led to a further 
classification within the audit field, CMA registered and non-CMA registered. 
In the broader sense, registration with CMA become a symbolic status for 
competition between auditors and audit firms. That said, within this context, 
competition is complicated. As audit firms do not legally exist, not all auditors 
working within audit “firms” are licenced by the Ministry of Commerce nor 
registered with the new regulator. Registration became limited to specific 
licenced individuals not firms. However, as we see in Section 7.2.1.3, there is 
an institutional superiority logic between state agencies, as the last 
bureaucratic decision on who is nominated (registered) is the one with “real” 
bureaucratic power to control a specific field.   
There is also a hidden logic behind the fight of the new regulator over 
registration power. In addition to expanding its influence, fees are associated 
with registration. For an auditor to be able to provide services to capital market 
companies s/he, in addition to complying with practice conditions, must be 
registered with the new regulator and pay periodic registration fees (see 
Appendix 6). These fees not only enlarge the economic power of the new 
regulator but are also, arguably, a method of legitimisation/recognition of the 
activities of the new regulator by various social agents. In other words, the act 
of paying fees (in itself) is an act of recognising the legitimacy (power) of the 
receiver, the CMA.  
With the CMA attempting to impose its vision of social order, the Ministry of 
Commerce in return, to maintain its bureaucratic influence, entered into 
disputes about the contradiction of the Audit Law and the Ministry of 
Commerce registration system. Also, the Ministry of Commerce encouraged 
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auditors to take part in these institutional disputes through prosecuting the 
“unconstitutional” demands of the CMA (see Section 7.2).  
Unlike the Ministry of Commerce, in this battle, CBK was not greatly affected 
(or maybe it was not evident in the collected data and analysis) by the new 
regulator registration requirements, as banking external audit is already limited 
to the largest firms within the Big 4. But banks (mostly controlled by ruling 
groups) resisted some registration requirements, such as periodic rotation of 
external auditors, which strengthened the position of the CBK in ignoring the 
new regulator’s demands. 
The following section covers the second strategy of domination between 
bureaucratic agencies to lead the audit regulations field.  
7.2.1.2. Strategy 2: Recruitment tactics  
Bourdieu theorised that a bureaucratic agency transcends the bureaucratic 
field by accumulating bureaucratic capital. Bourdieu (2005, pp. 116-7) 
differentiated between two types of bureaucratic capital accumulation. First, 
the bureaucratic capital of experience (related to “time”) gained through 
knowing people and regulations. Second, a scientific technically-based 
bureaucratic capital which threatens the cultural capital of the earlier, seniority 
type. For Bourdieu (2005), mastering and monopolising information is one of 
the crucial powers of state officials and bureaucratic agencies. 
The timing of the establishment of the CMA played an essential role in its ability 
to accumulate cultural capital and battle to transcend the bureaucratic field. 
Backed by the vision of international agents (especially the IMF) and public 
discourse on Kuwait’s weak regulatory framework, the new regulator was able 
to stand in the face of long-established regulators with high bureaucratic 
capital.  
As the global financial crisis affected mainly private companies in Kuwait, 
many employees (in the private sector) either found themselves in insecure 
jobs, pressured to leave companies, or were discharged by their employer as 
a result of austerity measures (see Section 3.7.2.3). It is worth noting that the 
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number of Kuwaitis working at private companies is small in comparison to the 
public sector (see Table 1). The number of Kuwaiti staff working at financial 
institutions, in governance of private companies, and in audit is even smaller, 
and the majority of this (small) labour group works either in banks or for the 
CBK.  
Unlike for government ministries (including the Ministry of Commerce), as most 
recruitment goes through a central recruitment agency (see Section 3.6.2), 
CMA is similar to CBK in having autonomy over its recruitment decisions. 
However, as I explained earlier, for the new regulator, registration fees and 
fines are an important source of revenue (Sections 6.4, 7.2.1.1). The new 
regulator implemented a much better pay scale compared to other financial 
institutions, especially in comparison to CBK with its symbolic position within 
the state65.  
The financial crisis helped CMA attract many experienced employees from 
financial institutions and audit firms in addition to other commercial industries 
as it offered attractive financial packages as well as job security. CMA also 
targeted many of the senior staff who had worked with the banking regulator. 
Recruiting CBK staff was one of the institutional behaviours that exacerbated 
disputes between CMA and CBK, leaving the latter with limited expert staff and 
probably making it vulnerable to the ongoing information battles with the new 
regulator. 
From the days of [name], he sat with [name] and told him do not take 
our employees, all our seniors left us, they [CMA] continued recruitment 
[of CBK employees]. Even transfer of services between government 
bodies was allowed, CBK does not accept it. They [CBK] force you to 
resign so you can be appointed [to the CMA] … maybe half of CBK 
employees moved to the capital market [regulator]. (Anonymised 
interviewee) 
 
65 The new regulator’s ability to implement an attractive pay scale was concurrent with 
significant changes to the pay scale of the oil industry. Prime Minister Mr Naser Almuhammad 
approved (significant) changes to the packages of staff working in state-owned oil companies 
after pressure from the oil employees union and the parliament. Prime Minister Mr Naser 
Almuhammad was replaced due to public protests during the Arab spring. Arguably, such 
changes in remuneration affected many newly created agencies, starting with the CMA.  
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What distinguished the CMA from the CBK, given its short period of existence, 
is not only that it was able to compete on cultural capabilities but also most of 
its experienced staff are Kuwaitis which gives it a greater symbolic element to 
its cultural power in the battle with other financial institutions and business 
organisations. Nonetheless, attracting Kuwaitis with expertise in capital market 
activities facilitated top-down relations with companies, as the private sector 
of Kuwait is mainly dominated by expatriates; this also applied to audit firms.  
7.2.1.3. Strategy 3: Bureaucratic superiority practices  
The CMA’s demands for additional and parallel “registration” could be 
interpreted as a superiority practice, especially with the Ministry of Commerce, 
the Audit Law enforcer. Superiority behaviours have been one of the tactics 
for institutional disputes over regulatory power. For example, laws should be 
the basic grounds for government institutions to guide their practices as well 
as the practices of other groups subject to these laws. As the CMA demanded 
the implementation of regulations that conflicted with some existing laws (the 
Companies Law and the Audit Law), it started to pressure the Ministry of 
Commerce to amend the laws to conform to its functions.  
The Companies Law must be amended and then the capital market law 
should be issued based on the Companies Law, but the opposite has 
happened. What happened is funny, it is really funny. (SFR1) 
It is worth repeating here that the Companies Law had witnessed no reform 
since it was enacted in 1960. Arguably, one of the reasons for not changing 
the Companies Law was its function as a medium between the government 
and companies. In other words, a medium between the ruling groups that 
influenced both, the government and large corporations. An “uncalculated” 
reform may have congested such a historical and political relationship (see 
Sections 3.5, 3.7.1). With CMA’s pressure, the Companies Law was amended 
to be relevant to the new regulator’s operations in 2012, 2013, and with 
significant reform in 2016. 
As the banking regulator demands banks get its approval for appointing 
individuals to certain senior functions, the CMA in turn required banks, as they 
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are listed on the capital market, to get its approval as well, otherwise publicly 
announced fines would be applied. Remarkably, CMA approval for the 
appointment of senior individuals in banks is required to be subsequent to the 
approval of the banking regulator. In other words, a bank proposes an 
individual for a senior position, and if CBK accepts the nominated candidate, 
CMA then decides whether to accept the appointment or not. Equally, whether 
to accept CBK approval or not. This power disposition is elaborated by one of 
the interviewees:  
The capital market [regulator] is interfering in CBK authority … the 
appointment of executive management [in banks] must be approved by 
CBK, and also the [CMA] and there are individuals approved by CBK 
and rejected by the capital market [regulator] … and the position stays 
vacant for a long time … the CEO and his deputies must be accepted 
by CBK before appointment … Alhay’a [CMA] told the banks any 
executive you want to appoint I must agree on. They said we have 
received the approval of CBK. No [demanded the new regulator], send 
it to me … they made their approval subsequent to CBK approval as if 
they have the superior authority. This means you CBK, when you 
approve send it to me and I will either accept or reject it. (Anonymised 
interviewee) 
Outside the regulators’ relationship, similar superiority practices were found to 
be practised by CBK with the banks’ external auditors, the Big 4:  
CBK calls and says, “I want to meet with you today at 1 o’clock.” Like I 
have nothing to do and I am waiting for CBK to call me. Anyway, this is 
the ruling of the strong over the weak. They exploit their authority. (Big-
A) 
“Come we must meet tomorrow.” This is the attitude of CBK, “come 
tomorrow, come tomorrow”. I am outside Kuwait: “cancel your trip and 
come tomorrow” [laughing]. (Big-C) 
In the above quotations, I am not signalling that the CBK has significant 
leverage over the Big 4. On the contrary, the CBK-Big 4 relationship is more 
collaborative and more supportive in comparison to the CMA-Big 4 
relationship. But these are institutional practices to demonstrate influence and 
power (superiority). And it wouldn’t be overstating to say that this superiority 
logic was probably transferred from CBK to the new regulator, as many of the 
senior staff of CBK moved to the new regulator. 
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7.2.1.4. Strategy 4: Fighting one of the most symbolic social 
groups, the merchants  
Outside the “direct” audit regulatory struggle, fighting a group among those 
with the greatest symbolic power, the merchant group, delivered a clear 
message to the Ministry of Commerce, auditors, CBK, and companies under 
the oversight of the new regulator of its seriousness in reforming capital market 
activities and integrating Kuwait into the international order.  
Although this is “indirectly” related to the battle to reform the audit regulatory 
structure and auditor practices, one of the main technologies used by the new 
regulator to achieve its international integration goal, was to implement a 
compulsory Anglo-American “international best practices” driven, codified 
corporate governance system. The required system includes establishing 
various internal control functions, creating various subcommittees for the 
board of directors (audit, remuneration, nomination, etc.), as well as appointing 
“independent” board member(s). Views on the usefulness of these 
technologies vary: 
Our problem in Kuwait with the companies that failed [in the global 
financial crisis] is not due to toxic products like what happened with 
Lehman Brothers, it is all governance issues and mismanagement. 
There was no proper governance framework that guided the boards and 
executive committees. (TIER3) 
They brought systems that work for General Motors, not a company 
with thirty million [dinars] and that owns four properties … this was done 
for companies with two hundred thousand employees, not a company 
with twenty. Instead of demanding to implement all these committees, 
ask for two. What is a nomination committee? It is not necessary at all. 
(TIER2) 
Despite financial costs associated with this Anglo-American system and its 
challenges to the dynamic of power within many companies, the CMA 
demanded an independent director on company boards of directors, which 
changes how order is controlled at the level of board members (owners). 
Accordingly, most listed companies have resisted the implementation of 
corporate governance codes. However, when companies sensed that the 
 236 
CMA decision was not affected by their resistance, the Chamber of Commerce 
(merchant lobby) interfered.  
As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the Chamber of Commerce is one of the oldest 
“merchants” political organisations in Kuwait. It has significant political power 
and a  strong presence/relationship with the parliament, the government, as 
well as ruling groups. In fact, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce is 
the father of the parliament chairperson! The merchant lobby organisation has 
substantial ability to influence laws and regulations, and is explicitly involved 
in criticising the proposed implementation of the “compulsory” corporate 
governance system. Dates are essential here to link some sequential 
implications to the direct involvement of the Chamber of Commerce. 
As per the new regulator demands/pressure, the amendment of the 
Companies Law in 2012 and 2013 empowered the CMA to regulate and issue 
a system of corporate governance for companies under its regulations. 
Consequently, in June 2013, the new regulator issued a system of corporate 
governance principles for all listed companies. Companies were surprised by 
the CMA demands for compulsory adoption, effective from December 2014. 
Following enactment of the CMA-required corporate governance system, the 
Chamber of Commerce interfered with negotiating the new regulator’s decision 
through various meetings as well as meeting with the Minister of Commerce 
about the same issue (KCCI, 2014). One of the interviewees referred to this 
incident:  
They [Chamber of Commerce] do not interfere directly. Look what they 
did to the CMA when they tried to constrain companies with the 
governance. [Name] the deputy of the Chamber of Commerce publicly 
said that we refuse this governance [corporate governance codes]. 
After a while, they revoked the commissioners’ board [of the CMA], they 
amended their law [law of the CMA]. This shows they have influence, 
maybe not directly because they do not have the authority, but through 
certain pressures. I do not know the mechanism. (Anonymised 
interviewee) 
In March 2014, the Chamber of Commerce started to publish their opinions in 
public newspapers on the ineffectiveness of this system as well as bringing 
attention to several regional and international practices as alternatives to the 
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one proposed by the CMA. The following month, the CMA issued their decision 
to postpone the effective date of implementing the new corporate governance 
to mid-2016. Interestingly, in the same month as the postponement, the 
commissioner in charge of corporate governance enforcement resigned. 
However, as the details surrounding his resignation are unknown, it is likely 
either that he was pressured to leave or left because he objected to external 
forces constraining the CMA agenda to reform the capital market. 
Furthermore, the board of commissioners and its chairman was changed a few 
months later, before their term was over.  
7.2.1.5. Strategy 5: the appointment of autocratic leadership  
A new chairman was appointed with a political background (a former Minister 
of Education) and known for his autocratic leadership. His appointment 
probably aimed to face and contain the government-merchants political 
tension without threatening the government’s neoliberal reform programme, as 
implementing corporate governance codes was one of the roads to 
membership in IOSCO and improving the capital market’s international 
ranking.  
Remarkably, a few months following the appointment of a new commissioner’s 
board, the newly appointed chairman approached CBK to settle the unresolved 
tangle of institutional responsibilities/conflicts. The discussions probably did 
not go as the newly appointed chairman planned.  
There was a collaboration protocol between [names] they signed the 
protocol and two months later they prosecuted him [governor of CBK] 
for his shares in Bait Altamwel [Kuwait Finance House, a local bank] … 
there is nothing documented, but it looks like the relationship [between 
senior officials of the two institutions]  got worse. (Anonymised 
interviewee) 
Following the meeting, in early 2015, the CMA "publicly" referred a case 
against the governor of the banking regulator to the capital market prosecutor 
for potential violation of the law. The CBK governor invested in the capital 
increase of one of the local banks (Kuwait Finance House). This investment 
related to a small number of shares that the governor owned before his 
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appointment (investment of capital increase worth 1,000 Kuwaiti dinars, 
approximately 2,500 pounds Sterling). An amount less than 10% of the 
governor’s monthly salary.  
The prosecution strategy aimed to change the banking governor by 
discrediting his reputation as well as delivering a message to companies and 
the Chamber of Commerce about how things may go if the CMA demands are 
not satisfied. However, this behaviour gives a strong signal of clientelism in the 
enforcement of laws and regulations. It is a problem I will return to in the 
Discussion Chapter as an additional layer to Kuwaiti government power.  
Companies and the Chamber of Commerce continued resisting the proposed 
system with many delisting from the capital market, but eventually, the new 
chairman implemented some amendments (customised) on the corporate 
governance codes in 2015, especially those related to the appointment of 
independent directors, one of the most resisted requirements. The new 
compulsory system was enforced in mid-2016.  
We changed some requirements. But we implemented it. We forced 
them [listed companies] to comply with everything. (SFR6) 
With regard to the prosecution story, the prosecutor decided not to proceed 
with the case against the CBK governor who continues to fill this function as 
of this writing. It is worth noting that only in 2018, one month after the chairman 
of the new regulator left his office to become the Minister of Finance, a 
memorandum of understanding was signed between CBK and the CMA (see 
Section 8.2).  
In the first part of this chapter, I explained my findings on the bureaucratic 
conflict between the new regulator and other state agencies to 
transform/maintain the order of the regulations of the capital market corporate 
audit. I also explained my findings on the CMA’s strategies to accumulate 
bureaucratic capital aiming to transcend in the bureaucratic field and lead 
capital market operations, including its external audit function. Now, having 
clarified the dynamic of inter-government conflict, I move to the second part of 
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this chapter to explain the struggle between the new regulator and the audit 
field. 
7.3. Part 2: Conflict between the new (bureaucratic) regulator 
and the audit field 
Bourdieu (1994, p. 2) theorised that when the state modifies previous law(s), 
many agents affected by such change will resist. Bourdieu argued that 
resistance is not only because changes will affect the occupational interest of 
influential social actors, but also because of the associated changes to the 
social division and hierarchy.  
On similar grounds, Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) argued that enacting 
global rules that affect the national institutional order instigate local struggles 
at the implementation phase, often because affected groups did not influence 
the diagnosis and prescription of a social problem. Exploiting implementation 
gaps between regulations and practices is often a strategy by locals to 
complicate/obstruct/subvert reform (see Section 4.4.2.2). This is exactly what 
happened in Kuwait when the new regulator demanded auditors implement its 
first system of audit regulations:  
They did not ask for the opinion of the profession … there is something 
called an exposure draft … you should not issue professional 
regulations without talking to the profession. (TIER3)  
The beginning of the commission [the CMA] was wrong. It is difficult to 
fix now … they did not ask anyone, this is wrong. (TIER2) 
Before I explain my findings on audit field resistance strategies against the 
interference of the new regulator in audit field dynamics, I think it is more 
appropriate to start with explaining my findings on why auditors were opposed 
to the CMA’s audit modernisation programme.  
7.3.1. Audit field rationalities behind resistance to 
reforming audit regulations 
My findings suggest that there were different interests between actors in the 
audit field regarding the new regulator’s interference in the dynamic of the audit 
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field. Differences of views are mainly related to the positions of actors which, 
according to Bourdieu, depends on the way capitals are accumulated 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  
Non-large firms perceived registration requirements as economically costly to 
their “small” market share in the Kuwaiti audit market. For small audit firms, 
digesting the high cost of the new capital market audit system is difficult as 
accessing some “profitable” (audit and advisory) markets of large companies 
(e.g., banking and oil sector) is relatively limited and mainly dominated by a 
few large international firms. Consumers of such services often give much 
consideration to the symbolic capital (e.g., name) of the firms. In other words, 
the ability of small firms to accumulate economic capital to meet the new 
regulator’s demands was limited. 
We should have an equal opportunity with other firms, the way you 
enforce conditions on me similar to those for Ernst and Young, this is 
unfairness. They have the opportunity to go to companies which I do 
not have. Although the law allows you to audit, CBK, for example, 
monopolises banking audit to four or five or six firms and does not give 
you any instructions in writing. (TIER3) 
The Big 4’s resistance has different logics. They can bear the financial costs 
of the new audit regulatory programme. Firms at the top of the audit field 
resisted mainly three technologies embedded within the registration 
requirements. These technologies are found to constitute significant threats to 
the symbolic power of specific virtuosi within the audit field66. First, certain 
measures on the governance of audit teams through constraining the number 
of clients for each senior auditor working with a registered auditor (see 
Appendix 6). This means that a firm may have to recruit (costly) expensive 
senior staff.  
They failed in parts of the law, and we addressed them in this matter. 
For example, they want to increase efficiency by specifying that a 
manager should have a maximum of seven clients for a certain number 
of years. What about the size of the client? They want to improve 
 
66 For Bourdieu, “Virtuosi are able to play the game up to the limits, even to the point of 
transgression, while managing to stay within the rules of the game (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992, p. 78).” (Cooper and Joyce, 2013, p. 110). 
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quality, but they do not see the right practice. This client I work with for 
500 hours and this client I work with for five hours. (Big-C) 
We said … why you are using numbers [of clients]? You have hours of 
work, and every regulator links the hours, because I can have a client 
take me an hour as a team leader, and another client take ten hours as 
a team leader. It is not right to limit my work with ten clients, one takes 
20 hours and one takes five hours. Then you ask me to comply with 
IFAC. IFAC states that I do not accept work if I do not have the time to 
do it. Why go into these details? You should say “follow IFAC”, and 
that’s it. They should teach people what IFAC is, many people do not 
know. (Big-A). 
Alhay’a [the new regulator] should not do this. We disagree with its 
involvement and the distribution of work. We do not see the number of 
clients as much as the number of consumed hours. It is irrelevant to 
limit the work of the team head to five or six clients. I have a client with 
six or seven consolidated companies which require many hours and a 
big team, this is considered as one client. And another client can be 
audited in two or three days. A real-estate company with one large 
complex. (Big-B) 
You come and say this partner should have only seven clients, what do 
these clients look like? A bank or a company with a capital of 30 million? 
Which one needs more time? … Say I have six banks and another has 
six small companies, how are these similar? This is not right. I do not 
know how they implement it, I think they took it from somewhere, maybe 
it is implemented in Oman and they mimicked it  … I think it should be 
by hours … I do not know why they did not consider hours, obviously 
the number of clients is easier to check, how they are going to check 
the hours? (TIER2) 
I do not remember the exact number but for example, they say a partner 
should have a maximum of five clients and the head of the audit team 
ten companies, something like this, or the opposite. This is funny, we 
raised this issue but they do not listen. I will give you an example, … 
[mentioned the name of an auditor], because he audits all banks is the 
responsible partner for … [named five banks] these are considered five 
clients and … [mentioned his name] audit … [named a few small 
companies] you compare these five clients with five banks clients, this 
is not right. You should measure this with hours. … [named a bank] 
which is considered the smallest bank is equivalent to [a name]’s five 
clients. We proposed this in writing, we spoke to them, but they did not 
consider it, you know why? Because they do not understand the 
profession. (TIER3) 
The second technology resisted involved forcing “registered” auditors to recruit 
Kuwaitis, as the new regulator aimed to enlarge the number of Kuwaitis 
working in the audit field which is dominated by expatriates. Arguably, 
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expatriates spread in the audit field contributed to the symbolic domination of 
a few Kuwaiti senior auditors who work in and manage the international audit 
field.  
Kuwaitisation is one of the painful issues, we tried [to pressure to 
change], we are still trying, the CMA according to article three of its 
establishment law covers the purpose of establishing the commission. 
It talks about its goals to protect the shareholder, regulate the capital 
market, it did not talk about encouraging Kuwaitis, this is outside of its 
function. This is one thing, second, you implement a percentage of 
recruiting Kuwaitis only for auditors. If you care about recruitment and 
Kuwaitisation you should apply it to all. (Big-C) 
Sharia audit [a type of religious ‘Islamic’ audit conducted in Islamic 
financial institutions], external auditor, brokerage, investment 
consultant, maybe fifteen different licenses and registrations, fund 
manager, portfolio manager, we the [external] auditors are the only 
license required to implement a percentage of Kuwaitis. An investment 
advisor, a company like KIC or companies with a minimum capital of 20 
or 30 million, are not required to recruit, and we are required to do it? 
What is this arrogance? We encourage them [referring to Kuwaitis] they 
do not want to work, as auditors. (TIER3) 
As I illustrated in Section 3.2, the private sector Kuwaiti workforce is about 4% 
of total employees. The audit field is no exception. Many Kuwaitis prefer not to 
work in the private sector in general, and audit firms in particular, for many 
reasons: e.g., low pay, long working hours, and lack of security. On the other 
hand, as we will see in Section 9.4.1, audit firms prefer not to recruit Kuwaitis. 
This resulted in the occupational domination of expatriates, and because the 
audit law empowers only Kuwaitis to sign audit reports, the result was the 
domination of a few Kuwaiti auditors over the entire audit field. The CMA’s 
attempts to Kuwaitise the audit profession is probably a strategy to dismantle 
the domination of expatriates as well as of the monopoly power of a few Kuwaiti 
“influential auditors” at the top of the audit field.   
Third, as the new regulator demanded “firm” rotation every four years with a 
cooling-off period of two years (see Appendix 6), for medium and small audit 
firms, “firm rotation” is found to be a great opportunity to compete and enlarge 
their market share. But for this class of firms, the new regulator’s demands for 
costly firm structure and qualifications of the audit team(s) is something they 
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find difficult to meet, and consequently, a significant barrier to entering the 
market for the capital market audit. For them, rotation, although vitally 
important, is of secondary concern. The rotation of firms has been strongly 
resisted by firms that dominate the audit field.  
In the beginning, when the first resolution was issued, obviously [lists 
names] will be harmed the most. (Big-A) 
It is worth noting that because the market share of the Big 4 is unbalanced and 
consequently the position of dominant actors (within the Big 4) in the audit field 
varies considerably, there were different views with regard to firm rotation not 
only between large and small firms, but also between the Big 4.  
In my opinion, healthy rotation starts with rotating the audit team 
including the partner responsible for the engagement more than rotating 
firms because the goal is independence and a fresh look. (Big-D) 
Lots of firms do not have enough work to help them to develop. You 
develop, enhance your capabilities and efficiency when you have 
something in return [money]. Rotation will allow firms to enter the 
profession and engage with companies, an opportunity that was not 
available in the past. (SFR3) 
It [firm rotation] supports the profession. If four firms are in control of the 
audit of large companies, companies will not look elsewhere but if you 
rotate, medium size and other large firms will enter and accumulate 
knowledge and grow. So, the number of firms with capabilities will 
increase, and this will refresh the audit market. (ABODY) 
Interestingly, among the largest audit firms in Kuwait, three out of five firms 
supported firm rotation, basically because it increases their opportunities to 
accumulate social and economic capitals and put them in a better competitive 
position with the field dominators. 
Firms with the largest market share will reduce … as a profession it will 
not make a big difference … theoretically, on the medium run there will 
be a balance, you know. This is healthy competition. (Big-B) 
Firm rotation is healthy. (TIER3) 
The current version of rotation is not logical … it is not right that you 
rotate licensed auditors. What is the point? (Big-A) 
As the audit market is not equal between the Big 4, the rotation of firms is a 
significant threat to the symbolic power of those at the top of the audit field. 
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Rotation of firms in an unbalanced market was perceived to be a substantial 
threat to the way dominant auditors maintain their symbolic capital (most 
noticeably social and economic):   
Our client portfolio exceeds 60 years … it has dedicated auditors for 
banks, companies, and institutions … they [other firms] should invest to 
reach this level. (Anonymised interviewee) 
This is selfish, I think 50%, maybe more, of my capital market portfolio 
will go away. (Anonymised interviewee) 
They [a few firm representatives] disputed in the accountancy 
profession meeting that you want to take my clients from me. 
(Anonymised interviewee) 
Around 25% of my auditors are junior Kuwaitis and if you want me to 
reach 50% and I am investing and, at the same time, you take my 
portfolio, what should I do with them? ... if you take my portfolio and give 
it to other firms only to rotate, these staff will leave the firm. 
(Anonymised interviewee) 
The implication of firm rotation was not only limited to the audit field but also 
affected socially powerful corporations, the banks: 
Banks resisted [firm rotation] because for them it is costly to change 
auditors. This resistance is not from us but we benefited from it. They 
pressure CBK not to change. It requires lots of work and training and 
risk and this takes years. (Big-C) 
There was resistance from some people that are affected by it, and 
[they say], “if you rotate I lose”. Ernst and Young is the auditor of the 
National Bank of Kuwait for 65 years. Who can force [them] to change 
their auditors? (Big-B) 
Few firms audit Kuwaiti banks and if you implement firm rotation, this 
means you will apply this rotation to banks and then you force CBK to 
sign up for the same requirement. I felt that they do not want to go to a 
war that is not their war or a fight that is not their fight, you know? 
Whoever wants to do this [firm rotation] will enter into a big fight with the 
banks. (Big-B) 
Some banks do not want … they are used to specific auditors: “why do 
you force me to change?” (ABODY) 
Opponents to firm rotation justified the resistance on the contradiction of law 
(where firms legally do not exist), limited cultural capabilities of the audit field 
to be responsible for auditing large companies, and unfairness to Kuwaiti 
partners working in large international firms. Ironically, the required 
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technologies are expected by dominant firms to stimulate competition with 
potential negative implications on the quality of audit. 
The CMA tried to look at the individual auditor as a firm, problems 
happened. The association interfered and the Ministry [of Commerce] 
refused and said that every licensed auditor has the capability and 
companies select. If you [the CMA] have additional requirements other 
than ours, demand in a way that does not contradict with our demands 
as a Ministry. (SFR3) 
From a legislative viewpoint, if we must rotate, based on the current 
laws is to rotate me not the firm because, as you know, the license is 
for an individual auditor, not for the firm. The firm is not registered with 
the Ministry of Commerce as it is the source of the audit license, before 
you go to CBK and the CMA. So how do I rotate a firm if it does not 
exist? (Big-D) 
Now I have three or four licensed auditors. If you rotate the firm this is 
unfair to them … rotating licenced auditors is the right thing. (Big-D) 
Today, the existing firms in the market with their technical abilities and 
staff, if firm rotation happens, they do not have the staff and capabilities, 
they are not prepared to handle large companies. Leave competition on 
the side, if you actually see the market for firms, you will find nothing. 
(Big-D) 
We will go back to point zero, competition. Small firms do not have high 
overhead costs, they will reduce fees … fees are linked to quality … to 
protect the integrity of the profession, there should be a minimum 
pricing agreement for listed companies. You cannot compete with lower 
fees. This is unethical competition, wrong, or it means that the quality 
of the work will diminish. (Big-C) 
As illustrated above, every firm has different interest(s) in resisting the new 
regulator’s demands to change the dynamic of the audit field. Non-large firms 
found the CMA’s “one-size-fit-all” demands as economically costly, especially 
in the Kuwaiti audit market, where the audit of some large corporations is 
limited to large audit firms (especially the Big 4). Such an environment is 
rationalised to constrain the ability of non-large firms to accumulate economic 
capital and to meet the economically costly demands of the new regulator.  
Large firms have a different logic to resist change. The reason large firms resist 
is not registration per se, which was used by the lobbyists as one of the main 
strategies to fight the audit reform, as we will see in the next section, but 
embedded technologies within the registration requirements, such as 
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governance of audit teams and Kuwaitisation. However, there are different 
interests within large audit firms concerning the CMA demands to apply firm 
rotation. As the market share of audit firms is unequal in Kuwait, three out of 
the five largest firms supported firm rotation. Those who dominated the audit 
field were convinced that firm rotation would diminish their positions.  
The next section explains my findings on how the audit field responded to the 
new regulator’s modernisation demands.  
7.3.2. Strategies by the audit field to resist modernisation 
rules 
Bourdieu (1994) argued that:  
… monopoly of the universal [a state] can only be obtained at the cost 
of a submission (if only in appearance) to the universal and of a 
universal recognition of the universalist representation of domination 
presented as legitimate and disinterested. (p. 17). 
As we saw in the earlier section, auditors had different views and interests 
regarding the CMA’s demands to change the role of the capital market audit. 
But the majority of auditors opposed some/many parts of the new system. 
Consequently, the majority of audit firms used the accountancy association 
(what Bourdieu categorised as low state nobility) and organised a “collective 
lobby” to resist submitting to the new regulator’s vision of regulatory structure 
as well as their aim to modernise capital market audit practices. A combination 
of international, local, medium, and small firms participated in disputes against 
the CMAs audit programme, each with different interests. Resistance was 
mainly related to the contradiction between the modern regulations and the 
Audit Law, ambiguity in some parts of the regulations, and the high economic 
costs to comply with the programme. Bourdieu (1990) put the collective 
response this way: 
The collective strategy that leads to any given “move” (whether in 
marriage or any other area of practice) is nothing other than the product 
of a combination of the strategies of the agents involved which tends to 
give their respective interests the weight corresponding to their position 
in the structure of domestic power relations at the moment in question. 
(p. 188) 
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It is unclear to me if the lobbyists influenced the regulatory modernisation 
programme merely by exploiting what Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) 
call the implementation gap: the struggle between demands to modernise 
practices and existing (institutionalised) practices (e.g., ambiguity of law and 
contradictions). As we saw earlier, the new regulator strove to pursue its 
agenda despite contradictions to existing laws and the inherited regulatory 
arrangements. However, based on Kuwaiti social settings, opponents to 
change often use their social capital to frustrate changes that affect the 
hierarchal position of social actors. Possibly, at the beginning, auditors used 
their social capital to confront the new regulation agenda, but were not 
successful. Accordingly, auditors of different positions and interests grouped 
to form a collective resistance. Lobbyists used the accountancy association as 
a collective front to confront the new regulatory reform demands.  
Lobbyists decided not to register with the new regulator, a strategy aimed at 
threatening CMA legitimacy as well as its position in the inter-governmental 
fight with other financial institutions over its ambition to be involved in (and 
lead) regulation of every aspect of capital market activities, including corporate 
audit. Ambiguity of the modern regulations and contradictions with existent 
laws and regulatory arrangements are the main justifications for the lobby’s 
resistance. However, surprisingly in this lobby, auditors/audit firms did not fight 
the CMA demands for a full ban on non-audit services, a theme that will be 
returned to in the next chapter.  
What is remarkable is that some influential auditors used the power of 
collective resistance to protect their symbolic domination by advancing their 
“private” interests:  
We met in the Jam’eya [name of accountancy body], we were around 
20 or 30 … they [specific auditors] did a lobby within the accountancy 
body [lobby] to reject firm rotation. (Anonymised interviewee) 
Based on the lobbyist agreement, the accountancy association, the collective 
lobbyist front, issued a letter with their demands to the CMA challenging many 
of the modernisation requirements.  
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However, some influential auditors (part of the lobby group) approached the 
new regulator and complimented them on their audit reform agenda to make 
the capital market and its audit system thrive. This meeting was mainly around 
the illegality of firm rotation where “firms” do not legally exist. Nonetheless, to 
avoid contradicting the audit law, the CMA was encouraged (or maybe 
threatened/pressured with filing a case against this unlawful/unconstitutional 
requirement) to change its regulations from firm-driven requirements to dealing 
with individual auditors.  
Before amended regulations were issued, we sat with the auditors, a 
few of them, there was give and take. We informed them that we want 
a particular standard for auditing corporations that we regulate. 
(Anonymised interviewee)  
… in our discussion with officials in these two institutions [CMA and 
CBK] that audit licenses are individually based, not firm based… I was 
honest with the financial regulators, today I am in the profession but 
tomorrow I am not, our global office is telling me, you will not leave until 
we see 50% of your staff are Kuwaitis … if you take my portfolio and 
give it to other firms only to rotate, these staff will leave the firm. 
(Anonymised interviewee)  
From a legislative viewpoint, if rotation is a must, under the existing laws 
… rotate “me” because a “firm”, as you know, does not have a license. 
A firm is not registered. What are registered with the Ministry of 
Commerce are individuals … so how will I rotate a firm … if it does not 
exist? (Big-D) 
A firm is just a name, legally it does not exist. We found that the ideal 
solution is to regulate licenced individual auditor. (Anonymised 
interviewee)  
The above quotation alludes to Halliday and Carruthers (2009) views on the 
variations of regulatory practices between powerful capital countries. For 
example, the US implemented partner rotation and the EU recently enacted 
firm rotation; non-Western countries have some sort of flexibility in practices 
adoption.  
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) theorised that often actors whose diagnosis is 
accepted usually also win the opportunity to prescribe the solution. The new 
regulator bought the idea that partner rotation is the ideal solution based on 
the Kuwaiti audit legal setting. Consequently, in 2012 (over one year after 
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issuing the first regulations) the CMA issued amendments to the previous 
regulations and continued with its demand for registration. In return, reduced 
(but not removed) audit firm governance and Kuwaitisation requirements. 
Changed the concept of “firm” to “individual registered auditor” throughout the 
regulations, which resulted in changing firm rotation to the proposed “partner” 
rotation, and continued with the same requirement concerning “full” prohibition 
on non-audit services.  
7.4. Chapter conclusion 
In this first part of this second chapter of my findings, I explained my findings 
on the bureaucratic conflict between the new regulator and the other state 
regulators that used to dominate the system of audit regulations in the Kuwaiti 
capital market. However, as the new regulator did not have the power to 
overrule the Audit Law, it battled the Ministry of Commerce and the CBK to 
submit to its structural vision of order for the regulation of corporate audit. 
However, the Ministry of Commerce resisted the domination ambitions of the 
CMA and fought back to protect its bureaucratic function and its “image” of 
domination. Accordingly, the Ministry of Commerce approached auditors (what 
Bourdieu refers to in this kind of conflict as externals) to side with them in this 
bureaucratic fight.  
CBK, as it mainly deals with the Big 4 for banking external audit, was supported 
by the banks (mostly owned by some ruling groups), not because of the CMA 
audit system per se, but mainly against the demand for firm rotation. However, 
as many perceived the sensitive social and economic function of CBK, its 
symbolic position helped it resist and ignore the new regulator’s attempts to 
interfere in the banking regulations.  
In the first part of this chapter, I was able to identify five strategies employed 
by the CMA to accumulate bureaucratic capital and transcend the audit 
regulations field. First, it expanded its regulatory territory by claiming to own 
the authority to regulate auditors, through registration power. This was a 
strategy that aimed to legitimise its involvement in the audit regulations field. 
Second, it recruited staff with high cultural capital, especially from an opponent 
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government institution (CBK), probably to weaken CBK’s position in the 
cultural battle. This strategy intensified disputes between CBK and the new 
regulator. I also found that the timing of the operation of the new regulator 
played an essential role in its ability to accumulate cultural power. 
Third, challenging the (inherited) authorities of other financial regulators with 
superiority practices. Fourth, challenging one of the most influential social 
groups in Kuwait, the merchant families, by attempts to change the way they 
control their (listed) companies. Finally, the appointment of autocratic 
leadership to continue pursuing the international integration agenda of the 
capital market and to confront opponent groups both inside the bureaucratic 
field (other state regulators) as well as external forces (banks, listed 
companies, and auditors). The new chairman succeeded in enforcing 
corporate governance codes after prosecuting the CBK governor, a clear 
message to all market actors on the seriousness of reform.    
In the second part of this chapter, I explained my findings on the confrontation 
between the audit field and the CMA. I started by explaining why the audit field 
resisted the CMA’s modernisation of corporate audit, and then I moved to 
clarify the resistance strategies of the audit field. I argued that there were 
different interests between audit firms in resisting the new system but none 
rejected the CMA demand for a new (additional) registration. Non-large audit 
firms found the new audit system economically costly and argued that 
profitable markets are limited to large audit firms, while large audit firms mainly 
found two technologies inappropriate: compulsory Kuwaitisation recruitment 
and limiting the number of clients for each audit manager. However, there were 
different views among large firms on the new regulatory demand to implement 
firm rotation. Some large firms found it an opportunity to compete with the field 
dominators, whereas field dominators found it a significant threat to their 
symbolic status. 
I then moved to explain my findings on the strategies of the audit field to 
confront the new regulator’s system. As the majority of audit firms would be 
affected by the change, they collaborated to form a collective lobby and used 
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the accounting associations as a front. Lobbyists rejected registering with the 
new regulator, a strategy aimed at challenging its legitimacy. Resistance was 
mainly around the ambiguity of some parts of the regulations, contradiction 
with existing (regulatory) practices, and the high economic costs associated 
with the required change. After some lobbyists approached the new regulator 
with their “collective” position on change, the CMA changed the regulations to 
be congruent with the Audit Law. This resulted in changing the logic of firms to 
that of individuals (to comply with the Audit Law) and accordingly changed 
rotation from a firm basis to an individual basis, reduced governance and 
Kuwaitisation requirements, but continued with registration demands as the 
main gate to interference in the audit regulatory space. 





8. OUTCOME OF RESISTANCE: SATISFYING 
INFLUENTIAL LOCALS 
8.1. Introduction  
In the last two chapters, I explained my findings on the conflict surrounding 
changes to the capital market audit practices. In chapter six, I illustrated the 
Kuwaiti structural audit regulatory arrangement before and after 
internationally-driven changes. I also demonstrated the interference by IOs in 
driving such change. Then I moved to explain my findings on why the Ministry 
of Commerce was perceived to be weak in its audit oversight function. I argued 
that one of the salient reasons is the ability of influential auditors to infiltrate 
and exploit the Ministry of Commerce’s system of collaboration (see Section 
6.3.2). Moreover, after I demonstrated the regulatory structural changes and 
the new regulator’s audit modernisation programme, I explained my findings 
on why Kuwait modernised its capital market.  
Chapter seven focused on the dynamic of conflict for modernising capital 
market audit practices. I explained two battles: first, the inter-governmental 
conflict between the newly established regulator with other state regulators 
that used to dominate audit regulations. In this fight, I explained the dynamic 
of conflict and the strategies employed by the new regulator to accumulate 
power and dominate the audit regulations field. The second struggle that I 
discussed was between the CMA and the audit field. I illustrated my findings 
on the underpinning logic of auditors to resist modernisation demands of the 
CMA as well as auditors’ strategies to confront reforms to their practices.  
This chapter aims to explain the outcome of the audit field resistance to the 
new regulatory modernisation programme. I intend to focus on the 
customisation of two technologies that were embedded within the resisted 
reform: the change from firm rotation to “partner” rotation and the new 
regulator’s demands for a full prohibition on advisory services. The reason for 
focusing on these two technologies is that with regard to the rotation, it was 
one of the controversial technologies in the reform programme that agitated 
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those who dominate the audit field. I do not aim to explain the correlation 
between rotation and audit independence/quality but to explain my findings on 
how the customisation of rotation maintained the status quo within the 
hierarchy of the audit field. Regarding the other technology, I was interested in 
examining the reasons underpinning the silence of auditors on the CMA’s 
demands to implement a full prohibition on provision of non-audit advisory 
services, knowing full well that non-audit services are one of the main 
economic resources for the Big 4, in general, and influential auditors, in 
particular. For me, these two technologies, which happen to be perceived as 
potential solutions to the auditor independence dilemma, are the most 
remarkable “problems” worth scrutiny within the new regulator’s modernisation 
programme.  
8.2. Balancing interests between the new regulator and 
influential actors 
In 2012, amended audit regulations were issued after almost a year of 
struggle, lobbying, and legitimacy threats through audit firms’ refusal to register 
with the CMA. The amended regulations allowed the CMA to maintain order in 
the capital market and corporate audit, and to legitimise its capacity to interfere 
in the audit regulations space (see Appendix 6). The amendment merely 
reduced registration requirements and changed the logic of “firm” in the first 
regulation to “individuals” to make it compatible with the practices of the “old” 
Audit Law. This resulted in altering audit rotation from firm-based to individual-
based. However, the full ban on non-audit services continued untouched! 
The CMA did not compromise on the registration concept which gives it the 
power to interfere in the practices of the corporate audit. However, 
changing/customising the audit regulations in 2012 partially resolved tension 
with the audit profession, and auditors began to register with the CMA. The 
audit profession continued to pressure the new regulator for further 
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concessions on Kuwaitisation (Big-A; Big-B; Big-C; TIER2; TIER3) and team 
governance requirements (Big-A; Big-B; Big-C; Big-D; TIER2; TIER3)67.  
The customised rules tried to balance state interests in promoting 
“international best practices” of audit regulations, satisfy global requirements 
for an international integration path (through membership in IOSCO and 
promoting the international ranking of the Kuwaiti capital market), and at the 
same time not significantly disturb the private interests, order, and positions of 
influential social actors. As argued by one of the interviewees: 
They [the government] want to handle the stick from the middle [local 
saying on balancing interests, especially, at a time of tension], they are 
handling the stick of many issues from the middle. (Big-B)  
Nonetheless, one of the important messages that the audit field lobby 
delivered to regulators was that changing the balance of power in an 
economically profitable field(s) with links to ruling groups cannot be achieved 
without a war. Following the auditors’ collective resistance, which was led by 
influential auditors, the new regulator started to involve the profession in new 
roles in audit practices, especially those at the top of the field. 
We are required [internal instruction] before issuing any resolutions 
related to licenced individuals to listen to their opinion. (Anonymised 
interviewee) 
The new method in issuing any new regulations is to take the opinion 
and feedback of the largest [actor] in every sector. (SFR6) 
Concerning CBK, the new regulator and CBK entered into many disputes and 
tensions on who should lead banking audits, even after the CBK governor was 
prosecuted (see Section 7.2.1.5). As a result of tension between these two 
symbolic government institutions, in 2018, a revised memorandum of 
understanding was finally signed between the two regulators (CBK, 2018). 
They decided that the banking regulator should continue with its “indirect” 
regulations of banking audit, but also that banks are required to appoint 
 
67 Recently, in 2019, the new regulator waived its requirements for limitations on the number 
of clients per audit manager as well as a further concession on the Kuwaitisation rate (see 
Appendix 6). Probably, such a waiver was granted because the new regulator achieved a 
significant part of its agenda: membership in IOSCO and the ranking promotion of the Kuwaiti 
capital market from developing market to emerging market was achieved. 
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external auditors “registered with CMA”. In other words, CBK only approves 
appointment/change of banks auditors from among the auditors registered 
with the CMA. This does not change much as the banks are audited by large 
international audit firms (especially the Big 4), and these firms are already 
registered with the CMA to secure their market share in the capital market. 
The following sections analyse customised rotation as well as the silence of 
auditors on the full prohibition of non-audit services.  
8.3. Maintaining the status quo type of rotation 
IOSCO claims that rotation is a “good practice” to advance audit quality 
(IOSCO, 2002b, 2002a) without elaborating on the type of rotation. However, 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argued that the variations of regulatory 
practices between northern countries offer southern countries some flexibility 
to reform practices. The new Kuwaiti regulator tried to implement firm rotation 
but was antagonised by influential auditors on the basis that “firms” do not 
legally exist68.  
It is worth noting that existing audit law does not recognise the concept of “firm” 
or “partner” but only “individuals”. Licence to audit is granted to Kuwaiti 
individuals who meet specific requirements (see Section 6.2.1.2). For the audit 
law, every licensed auditor is responsible for her/his signature and practices. 
The new regulator, instead of pressuring the Ministry of Commerce to amend 
the Audit Law as they did with the Companies Law (see Sections 7.2.1.3), 
followed the prescription of influential auditors and changed its firm-driven 
regulations to individual-based ones. Such customisation resulted in changing 
firm rotation to an “awkward” form of rotation, what many claimed to be similar 
to the US version of partner rotation, but in fact is rotation of signatory 
“individuals”. I call it “awkward” because rotation now exists, but in a 
manipulated form so as not to contradict with the way power is accumulated 
by those at the top of the audit field. 
 
68 In 2013, the US PCAOB proposed implementing mandatory firm rotation which was blocked 
by the US House of Representatives (Alloway, 2013). 
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My findings suggest that the customisation of rotation follows one of the core 
ideas of Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) theory of recursivity, symbolic 
compliance (see Section 4.4.2.3). That is, compliance in appearance to 
address internationally driven pressure for change and avoid changes to the 
local balance of power. Indeed, forcing independence in societies with a high 
level of nepotistic, clientelist, and social dependence settings would possibly 
create disorder (at least) in the short run.  
The Kuwaiti customisation of rotation means the application of rotation lies on 
the individual auditors registered with the new regulator, not the firm or the 
partner. In Kuwait, partnership, license to be an auditor, and registration with 
CMA are not the same thing. Being an auditor licensed by the Ministry of 
Commerce or registered by the CMA does not necessarily mean being a 
partner in an audit “firm”, which do not legally exist. Not only this, but I came 
across a “Kuwaiti” partner working at the Big 4 that had no local license and 
no legal power to sign audit report(s). I think this is not the norm in Kuwaiti 
audit partners field, but it is a case I came across during my interviews. 
Nonetheless, non-Kuwaiti partners (who happen to dominate the audit field) 
do not have the legal authority to sign audit reports because audit licences are 
only granted to Kuwaitis and consequently non-Kuwaiti partners cannot be 
registered with the new regulator.  
The logic of customised rotation is basically linked to who has the power to 
practice her/his right to sign an audit report. Being a licenced auditor 
(according to the Audit Law) does not necessarily mean the ability to sign an 
audit report, especially for those working in “firms” governed by internal 
policies, procedures, authority, and hierarchy which define who has the power 
to sign an audit report as well as who gets the authority to register with the 
new regulator. Again, signature rights are limited to the few Kuwaitis in a field 
dominated by non-Kuwaitis.   
The Big 4 only register Kuwaiti partners with legal signatory powers as well as 
internal authorisation (inside their firms) to practice such authority. Large firms 
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register at least two licenced auditors (partners) so that they can rotate their 
clients between them (see Table 11).  
Firm name 
Number of licenced auditors 
registered with CMA 







Table 11: Licenced auditors registered with the new regulator  
Source: (CMA, 2019)69 
Registered auditors sign the audit reports (in their name) for dozens of listed 
companies. The individual auditor is legally responsible for the audit because 
s/he signed the audit report of these companies in her/his name, as the audit 
law states. Logically, it is irrational that the signer participates in the 
engagements of dozens of companies at the same time (as majority of 
companies financial year end on 31 December). In fact, I am sure some of 
them may have nothing to do with the actual audits, which are performed by 
dedicated audit teams. This situation is understood by the regulator’s audit 
disciplinary mechanism.  
They [regulators] know that you [as a signatory] did not audit 500 
companies. Sure, other people worked with you, so all of the people 
who worked in this audit can be questioned in the event of audit error 
or in a crime. (SFR3) 
Auditors work on a sampling basis. If an error is found outside the 
sample, this is what they call a professional error. There is acceptable 
[vs.] significant error. If a licenced auditor is found to be involved in a 
significant error, we hold him accountable. But we look at these issues 
from a professional viewpoint. (SFR2) 
 
69 In 2019, the total number of registered auditors with the new regulator was 37 individuals 
from 25 audit firms. 
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What the above quotation alludes to is that those who sign audit reports often 
have escape strategies for legal disputes. Either blame the Audit Law that 
forces them to sign audit reports without holding other auditors accountable, 
or use the sampling method as an excuse. This also demonstrates how 
rotation of registered auditors is merely rotation of signatories.  
In large audit firms (especially the Big 4) where they have many audit clients 
and a limited number of Kuwaiti partners who sign audit reports, the practice 
of auditors with signatory power is best understood as a company with a 
number of general managers. The staff (at all managerial levels) do the work 
and the general manager (CMA registered auditor, in this case) authorise their 
work with a signature on the audit report. Regulators understand that the “few” 
authorised Kuwaitis cannot engage in the audit of all the reports that they 
legally sign. In the case of an audit problem, the few Kuwaiti general managers 
either point fingers toward their staff or use sampling as an excuse. The 
customised rotation of the new regulator became merely a rotation between 
Kuwaiti general managers working in the same company! 
Now I move to demonstrate my interviewees responses to the customised 
version of rotation. 
We spoke about this, we told them this it is wrong to rotate based on 
licenced auditors, what is the point? … If you tell me [name] is sitting 
here and [another name] is sitting in the next office, today I sign and 
tomorrow he signs, do you count this as a rotation? I told them this is 
silly. I recorded this in the minutes. … Rotating individual registered 
auditor is ineffective because the whole team under him [CMA 
registered auditor] is the same. (Big-A).  
It is worthless. (Big-B) 
It is cheating. (TIER2) 
It did not achieve the purpose of rotation. (SFR9) 
Ineffective, a firm with five or six partners, a company may rotate 
between them forever. (SFR3) 
In my opinion, this is not right. At the end, the team is the same … a 
partner leaves, another partner arrives in the same firm, the team is the 
same, and the school of thought is the same. (ABODY) 
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Rubbish … I met one of the commissioners … I told him, you 
customised it to maximise the profit of the Big 4 and leave the small 
always small. He said we want quality. I told him you do not want quality, 
you want to enlarge the big and leave the small, small. Even the small 
will not be able to develop themselves … let me audit a few companies, 
let me develop myself. What you are doing is telling me that I will never 
audit, small firms will never be able to compete. (SFR2) 
Rotating licensed auditors in firms with two hundred employees will 
defeat the purpose of rotation. (Big-B) 
Three interviewees went beyond the ineffectiveness of this technology and 
viewed the customisation as a form of social deception: 
They want to deceive people, cheat them ... if you look at it carefully 
you will find there is no rotation. I audit for four years and then you audit 
for four years. They say this is rotation but if you look at it carefully, this 
is not rotation, I see it as deception. (SFR5) 
With this system, board members in the annual shareholders meeting 
claim that they rotate audit partners, to imply a better audit quality. This 
is deception. (SFR8) 
Now CBK also started to rotate individuals, you change the name 
similar to the US. This is cheating. (TIER2) 
After subverting the goal of rotation by a few dominant auditors, many large 
international audit firms argued that despite the ineffective customised 
rotation, their firm’s internal policies enforce rotation whether the regulator 
requires it or not.  
We rotate the team … our global office forces us to rotate the technical 
partner every six years. Exceptions are very rare. (Big-D) 
We comply with IFAC. We rotate partners and teams according to IFAC 
guidelines. (Big-A) 
All the Big 4 internally rotate partners and teams every six years. (Big-
B) 
Now, we know how a few actors in the audit field exploited the gap between 
modern regulations, the “old” Audit Law, and audit field dynamics (dominated 
by expatriates with no legal authority to sign audit reports) to maintain the 
status quo. Two important questions need to be addressed. First, why did the 
new regulator implement this distorted form of rotation if it does not promote 
independence or help non-dominant firms to compete and acquire knowledge? 
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Second, why did auditors who lost the opportunity to progress in the field not 
rebel?  
With regard to the first inquiry, it is important to note it was the management 
of the new regulator that decided on changes to capital market regulations, not 
internal committees with representatives from the audit firms (also see Section 
9.3). However, one of the main goals for reforming Kuwait’s audit architecture 
is to integrate Kuwait’s capital market with international capital markets 
through registration with IOSCO and promote the ranking of the capital market 
according to specific international capital market indicators. Within the global 
neoliberal norm context, rotation of firms and partners is perceived as an 
indicator of audit independence which signals better audit quality. Hence, for 
Kuwait, implementing rotation was essential to satisfy global neoliberal 
governance norms. But it was equally important not to disrupt the way order is 
maintained. 
It is part of the corporate governance system for the international capital 
markets and best practice and and and they have to do it, they 
implemented it, but the substance is something else … They do not 
understand the consequences of audit. (Big-B)  
You know, in renewing and changing laws there are many institutions 
and individuals that have interests that laws are customised in a specific 
way. (SFR3) 
Interestingly, the new regulator was able to implement the logic of firm rotation 
within the existing “individual-based” audit regulatory environment. It could 
basically forbid rotation between registered auditors working together in the 
same “office”, but it did not. As argued by Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) 
the power lies with those who practice regulations, pushing countries to either 
enter into a war with the locals or to “deceive” international requirements for 
integration, what Halliday and Carruthers refer to as symbolic compliance. 
I felt that they do not want to go to a war that is not their war or a fight 
that is not their fight, you know? Whoever wants to do this [firm rotation] 
will enter into a big fight with the banks. (Big-B) 
So why did opponents of the customised version of rotation not rebel?  
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In Kuwait, the majority of individuals with big influence serve their own 
interests, they will also harm others [their opponents] to protect their 
own. (Anonymised interviewee) 
They [few auditors] have influence on all of Kuwait. They have influence 
in the Ministry [of Commerce], in CBK, in the capital market. This is 
because they are in the profession for so long. (Big-A) 
Large audit firms that sided with firm rotation did not rebel against the 
customised version of rotation, because, as my findings suggested, they did 
not want to create tension in the relationship with those who dominate the audit 
market. In other words, due to “fear” of those sitting at the top of the audit field, 
with their large social capital, who have the influence to complicate the private 
interests of opponents to accumulate economic capital. However, with the new 
regulator’s audit system, entering the capital market became limited to mainly 
non-small audit firms. Not only this but reforming the capital market and its 
companies enlarged the advisory market for audit firms which increased 
influential auditors’ ability to accumulate economic capital that adds to their 
symbolic power.  
Concerning CBK, as it was able to secure its “indirect” involvement in 
regulating banking audit (see Section 8.2), what about auditor rotation policies 
for CBK clients, the banks? As I mentioned in Section 6.2.3, CBK does not 
engage directly in regulating the practices of external auditors, but through 
banks. The banking regulator in their codes for corporate governance required 
banks to have policies concerning “rotation” (CBK, 2012, 2019).  
One of my interviewees discussed that the banking regulator met with the Big 
4 to solicit their opinion on how to design a policy for rotating the external 
auditors of banks. The audit field dominators proposed implementing a similar 
version of customised rotation to CMA to align banking rotation with capital 
market requirements. This solution probably also aimed to soften the tension 
between the two regulators as well as maintain the domination of specific audit 
firms on the banking audit.  
CBK is trying to follow CMA because they [CBK] used the same people 
[influential auditors], who are the direct beneficiaries, to design a 
rotation policy for banks. We spoke to banks and asked them, “do you 
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really believe this is a policy?” They laugh and say CBK and CMA are 
happy with it. (Big-A)  
It is worth noting that the existing practice of rotation policies within the local 
banks is a rotation of responsibilities between each bank’s two external 
auditors. One audit firm is responsible for the asset side and the other firm is 
responsible for the audit of liabilities and equity. Rotation is changing the 
responsibilities of each audit firm after a certain period of time.  
In summary, the findings in Kuwait suggest that audit firm rotation clearly 
changes the rules of the game through stimulating competition within the audit 
profession, with potential implications on the redistribution of the audit market 
share. This was a concept that threatened the audit field dominators’ (part of 
the Big 4) way of accumulating and maintaining their prestige and reputation. 
With the agreement of the new regulator, rotation of “registered” individuals 
became the acceptable alternative solution as “firms” do not legally exist. 
However, “partner” rotation is customised to mean signatory rotation with 
maybe few (to zero) implications for audit independence, which contradicts the 
purpose of this technology.  
The customisation of rotation achieved two goals. First, satisfying the global 
modern requirement to implement rotation in the Kuwaiti capital market. At the 
same time, it maintained the status quo and local order of powerful social 
actors. It could be argued that international audit firms have two levels of 
influence: international influence, as they participate in (re)shaping the 
rationality of transnational agencies on governance issues. They also have 
local influence, helping the state to manoeuvre around global constraints. In 
both cases, auditor practices move towards freeing their intensive capital 
accumulation activities.  
The following section investigates the second part of this chapter, the “silence” 
of auditors on full prohibition of non-audit services, the other modern 
technology  perceived to promote auditor independence.  
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8.4. The silence of auditors on complete prohibition of 
advisory services 
The prohibition of non-audit services has a different story but an ending similar 
to that of customised rotation. An ending that points toward strategies to 
enhance/maintain the symbolic position of a few auditors at the cost of 
subverting “potential” solutions to enhance the social role of auditors by 
reducing their economic dependence on their audit-clients. However, I do not 
intend to explain the Kuwaiti story behind the correlation between prohibiting 
advisory services and the quality of audit, but how the common understanding 
of the threat of providing advisory services to audit-clients is manipulated by 
influential auditors to accumulate power.   
I was curious to understand why the audit firms’ lobby did not reject CMA’s 
requirement for a complete restriction on advisory services, one of (or the) 
main source of economic capital for audit firms, in general, and the Big 4 in 
particular! Two of my interview protocol queries indirectly touched on this area 
(Q14, Q16, Appendix 2). Two things need to be noted. First, data on the 
revenues of the international audit firms operating in Kuwait are not publicly 
available, but advisory services are argued to constitute large operations for 
the Big 4 operating in Kuwait (SFR2, SFR5, SFR6). ABODY put it in this way:  
Most of the work is in the advisory [realm] … audit is nothing [as an 
income generator].  
Second, advisory services in Kuwait are mainly dominated by the Big 4 as the 
presence of international consulting firms is minimal.  
It is also worth noting that during my data collection phase, I went into the field 
with the idea that there are some controls over auditors’ advisory activities, as 
stated in the practice’s Audit Law (see Article 20, Appendix 4 and Section 
6.2.1.2), and that the new regulator attempted to re-emphasise the legal 
constraints of the audit law. My actual findings were relatively shocking for me!  
My interviewees responses made me rationalise that there is some kind of 
resiliency on providing advisory services which drove me to inquire how audit 
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firms legally operate in Kuwait in order to understand how auditors provide 
services prohibited by the Audit Law. A majority of my audit field interviewees 
were reluctant to discuss issues concerning their “firm’s” legal structure and 
revenues. I was able to gather data on these matters from my state regulator 
interviewees. Details of these issues to come.  
Before I explain my findings on the “silence” of the auditors lobby concerning 
the new regulator’s “full” prohibition on non-audit services, I will start by 
explaining my findings on how regulator understanding of advisory services 
was re-shaped by some auditors and then, relatedly, I will explain how 
auditors/audit firms legally provided advisory services despite the “imaginary” 
prohibition (which accounts for the lack of resistance among auditors).  
The story behind the underlying arrangement of advisory services is mainly 
related to exploiting Kuwait’s legal structure of corporate audit, which I found 
to be outside Halliday and Carruthers transitional recursivity framework. The 
core idea of their theoretical framework concerns the state’s ability to foil global 
interference which creates recursive dynamics. It is highly likely that the non-
audit services regulation was due to a previous recursivity episode that 
became a regulatory reality. However, as per my findings, the advisory 
regulation story is better understood via the  Bourdieusian theorisation of actor 
strategy to accumulate power (especially economic capital).  
8.4.1. Shaping the rationality of regulators on the logic of 
advisory services 
My findings suggest that influential auditors followed a strategy that (re)shaped 
regulatory understanding on the logic of advisory services. This scheme 
originated with the Ministry of Commerce (the Audit Law enforcer), then moved 
to CBK (the banking regulator). Recently however, the reshaped idea of 
advisory logic became a regulatory reality and the CMA followed the same 
understanding. The strategy of forming the understanding of regulators aimed 
to facilitate the accumulation of economic power by influential auditors who 
reproduce their symbolic domination in the audit field.  
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A long time back, some dominant actors in the audit field approached the 
Ministry of Commerce, as it was the sole enforcer of audit and company laws, 
to convince them that the Audit Law is unfair as other professions have much 
more flexibility in providing various services in comparison to auditors. Actors 
at the top of the audit field convinced the Ministry of Commerce that the idea 
behind restricting advisory services is for licensed auditors not to be involved 
in the “management and the organisation” of providing non-audit service. 
However, if an audit “firm”, which is a group of licensed auditors, has a 
separate and specialised advisory team, this “will not” threaten the 
independence of audit(or) or the rule of the Audit Law. Licensed auditors “must 
not” be “directly” involved in the decision to provide an advisory service.  
This strategy was used by auditors to institutionalise (at the individual level) 
the link of audit independence to technical independence through the 
separation of teams (operational split), without exposing how licenced auditors 
(economically) benefit from such a design. Such a regulatory (re)design aimed 
to overcome constraints of the “old” Audit Law, which resulted in disregarding 
the increase in economic dependence of auditors on audit clients.  
When we talked about advisory services, the idea of independence is 
that you practically separate this service [advisory service] from that 
service [audit service]. In our discussion with the Ministry of Commerce, 
when you give license to … [his name] to practice audit, you forbid him 
from everything, while other professions are not. Today I have a legal 
entity [advisory company] I might be an owner or not, why do I treat this 
company unjustly about practising advisory work. It is independent 
[from the activities of the licensed auditor], has a separate team, 
independent approach, independent methodology ... in our discussion 
with the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Commerce gives you a 
license for an advisory company whether you have an audit firm or not, 
or if you are one of the owners. We do not want to do like other firms: 
they put it in names of others [meaning that some licensed auditor owns 
an advisory company but on the books, it is owned by someone else], 
and in substance, it is a different thing. (Big-D) 
The Ministry of Commerce was convinced by the “equality" justification that 
linking advisory services to a team outside the licensed auditors would not 
affect auditor independence nor contradict the provision of the Audit Law that 
regulates the individual auditor.  
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We do not have a problem with this, but you do not have the right to 
sign there [in the advisory company], you have the right to sign for audit, 
but in advisory, you should not influence or sign. (SFR1) 
The same tactic was followed with CBK, the banking regulator. On 14th of 
August 2002, immediately following the SOX enactment in the US, CBK issued 
a circulation to banks that forbade them from obtaining advisory services from 
their external auditors.  
In order to enhance the independence of audit work assigned to the 
auditors by the General Assembly, and to give the most credibility for 
shareholders of the auditor's opinion on financial statements, the Bank 
[commercial banks] should not assign any work to assess the adequacy 
of the internal control systems applied by the Bank or any other 
technical or advisory work to audit firms that audit the Bank accounts. 
Note that the external auditor is required to be associated with an 
international audit office to obtain the approval of CBK to assign audit 
work or evaluation of the internal control systems of banks. (CBK, 2002, 
p. 28)70 
Two months later, on 16 October 2002, the banking regulator amended the 
circulation and classified advisory services to accounting type services and 
non-accounting type services. CBK changed their requirement and allowed 
banks to obtain non-accounting type of services from their external auditors.  
Reference to CBK of Kuwait circulation dates 14 August 2002 … with 
reference to article number 20 of law number 5 of 1981 [the Audit Law] 
… we would like to point out that your bank must not assign the work to 
assess the adequacy of the internal control systems and other technical 
and advisory work to your bank's audit firms, while not assigning other 
technical and advisory work of an accounting nature (for example: 
designing accounting records, providing advisory on alternative 
accounting treatments) to companies that are economically or legally 
linked to these firms, whether this link is through joint ownership or joint 
management. Therefore, what your bank can obtain from these 
companies is only technical and advisory works of a non-accounting 
nature (for example, preparation of feasibility studies, review of the work 
plan, development of salary and salary structure, and recruitment 
advisory). (CBK, 2002, p. 29)71 
 
70 Translated by the researcher. 
71 Translated by the researcher. 
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This change in regulating consultancy services, although around 18 years old, 
was a result of negotiation and tension between bank auditors and CBK, as 
put by one of the interviewees: 
When we talked to CBK about their circulation. To solve the disputes 
we decided on the term “accounting nature”. So that, anything with an 
accounting nature we stayed away from so that no one says we were 
involved directly or indirectly. (Anonymised interviewee) 
After CBK amended its circulation, it said licensed auditors economically or 
legally linked to consulting companies, whether this link is through joint 
ownership or joint management, can provide non-accounting services (details 
on ownership/joint management follows). What is also remarkable is that the 
amendments referred to the Audit Law, as the first circulation did not. Arguably, 
the logic of the “old” (individual-based) Audit Law is what influential auditors in 
international audit firms rely on for disputes, to maintain the status quo. 
Nonetheless, in 2012, CBK issued its code for corporate governance, and in a 
section related to risk management and internal controls, it again discussed 
advisory services:  
The Bank [commercial banks] shall ensure that no [advisory] work is 
assigned to assess the adequacy of the control systems and other 
technical and advisory works to the Bank's [external] audit firms, while 
not assigning other technical and advisory work of an accounting nature 
(evaluation of accounting records, advice on accounting procedures ...) 
to companies that are economically or legally linked to these firms 
[banks external audit firms], whether it is through joint ownership or joint 
management. (CBK, 2012, p. 85)72  
The code emphasised the prohibition on obtaining “accounting nature” 
advisory services from a bank’s external auditor and stayed silent with regard 
to services of a non-accounting nature. The same logic extended to the recent 
amendments of the bank regulator designed system of corporate governance 
(CBK, 2019, p. 30). This regulatory “manoeuvring” by the banking regulator to 
show that it forbade advisory services, in not mentioning the other class of 
advisory service (which includes all types of services except those which are 
accounting related) means that the amended circulation that allowed non-
 
72 Translated by the researcher. 
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accounting services is still in operation as it is the latest legal reference. 
However, without explaining the meaning of “accounting”, the 16 October 2002 
circulation was the last legal reference that explicitly discussed and allowed 
non-accounting services. Concerning these contradictions, interviewees 
escape by answering related inquiries73:  
I do not remember but for ICR [annual; internal control report] … you 
[audit firm] should not work on the ICR with another task I gave you on 
a periodic basis. (Anonymised interviewee) 
The Audit Law forbids a licensed individual from providing non-audit services, 
and the regulator's rationale with regard to the link of audit independence and 
separation of teams had been constructed. The question now is how audit 
firms provide advisory services without contradicting the Audit Law? As I 
mentioned earlier, the majority of interviewees from audit firms were reluctant 
(and often tried to escape inquiries related to consultancy services) to fully 
explain the legal structure of their firms, but some were kind enough to clarify 
the regulatory structure of audit firms.  
We have a limited liability company for advisory, I am one of the owners. 
In substance, I am not involved in it. In form, I am one of the owners. It 
has a specialised team. (Big-A) 
They work under two licenses, an advisory company and a license for 
audit … we do not have a problem with this, but you do not have the 
right to sign there [in the advisory company], you have the right to sign 
for audit, but in advisory, you should not influence or sign. (SFR1) 
The audit license is for audit; it did not say advisory. So, I have to 
establish an advisory company because when you sign with large 
companies, they ask for evaluation services, advisory … you cannot 
provide these services because your license does not allow you to 
 
73 With the 2012 corporate governance codes, arguably, CBK purposely manipulated 
regulatory constraints not only due to audit firm pressure or to support the auditors’ agenda to 
maintain their symbolic reputation, but because of “problems” CBK itself generated over the 
years. On the one hand, as with the support of CBK, for many years, the banking audit was 
performed by mainly two audit firms (Ernst & Young and Deloitte). This was one of the reasons 
for enlarging, in terms of firm size and probably technical capabilities, the gap between the Big 
4 in Kuwait. On the other hand, CBK may not have wanted to create obstacles for a local bank 
to demand services beyond audit, if they wish to, especially from the largest firms. Or to stress 
the banks-audit relationship in any way. For example, advisory could be used as a gate for 
increasing audit fees. Meaning, as audit fees go through a shareholding meeting, and to avoid 
such obstacle, increases in audit fees may have been paid in the form of advisory fees.  
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practice this kind of work. So you have to establish an advisory 
company. (TIER3) 
An audit firm that provides non-audit advisory services has at least two legal 
vehicles within a firm. One is related to a group of licensed and registered 
auditor(s) and the other is a limited liability company licensed to provide 
economic, financial, and administrative advisory services. Ownership of the 
advisory company is arranged internally and with the audit firm global office. It 
often includes all partners (audit and advisory), with different distribution of 
dividends depending on the arrangement with the global office.  
As the Ministry of Commerce is the source of all types of commercial licenses 
and they accepted the idea of separation of teams; they do not care who owns 
the advisory company even if it is completely owned by a licensed auditor. 
Again, as long as a licensed auditor is not involved administratively (in 
appearance) with the advisory function (linked auditors involvement to merely 
signing advisory contracts), this became the rationalised practice by the 
regulator. Logically, despite ignoring auditor economic dependence on clients, 
the constructed architecture of separation is doubtful. 
The separation exists [referring to her/his firm] but needs to be 
regulated and supervised to make sure it is applied. (Big-D) 
To satisfy Ministry laws, regulations, and requirements, these two functions 
are legally separated in appearance, but internally within a firm, all functions 
are operated under the firm’s internal control structure, as Big-B claimed: 
Despite different licenses in operation, internally we organise all our 
activities under a single umbrella. (Anonymised interviewee) 
With this “imaginary” operational split that has limited contribution to 
progressing independence and quality, audit firms, without changing the law, 
became free from the Audit Law’s restriction. Provision of advisory services 
became dependent mainly on the decisions of each individual firm:  
We already, before they implemented it [the new regulator], we have 
risk management, we evaluate all work for independence and the self-
review threat … these requirements did not make any difference to us. 
(Big-B) 
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There is work that does not affect independence. International firms, the 
Big 4, put specific definitions, whether regulators accept it or not, this is 
another topic, but we in … [firm’s name] any client approaches me for 
advisory work, to accept him, I have to input this information in our 
global system. If they find a conflict of interest, they will not give you a 
code. (Big-D) 
We have what we call SPS, that is a statement of permissible services. 
There are things we cannot do and things we can. If an audited client 
asks me [to perform] a specific task, we review the statement of 
permissible services to see if we can do this work or not. If we can, we 
start a process we call AFS authorisation for services. We send it to the 
client engagement leader of the audit. You tell them that your client “A” 
asked us for an advisory service and this is the service, and this is the 
fee, and these are the details and the reference of the statement of 
permissible services that say we can do it. Do you have another 
opinion? He and the responsible for independence and risk, they review 
it and give us the approval or not. There is a process in the firms that 
you can say comply with certain standards. I do not need law or 
guidelines from Almarkazi [CBK] or the CMA or others to know what I 
can do and what I cannot. I’m supposed to have policies, 
professionalism, ethics, and compliance with IFAC and my own 
independence regulations. I know what I can do and what I cannot. We 
go back to the quality of the firm. (Big-A) 
I have a partner responsible for advisory. When he signs a contract in 
the proposal stage, we have a system that involves all partners. We are 
a small firm … if one of the partners says that this company is a 
subsidiary of a company that I audit, here, we study this issue. Is there 
going to be a self-review threat? … because our firm is small, we can 
control it. But, the larger the firm, the higher the [risk of] mistakes. 
(TIER3) 
Influential auditors are successful in manipulating laws to accumulate and 
maintain their symbolic capital and domination. The new regulator followed the 
logic of the other financial regulators. Since the first system of 2011 that aimed 
to modernised audit regulations and demanded “firm” rotation, it prohibited 
advisory services from the individual auditor (not firms).  
The CMA emphasised the separation of audit and non-audit teams without any 
consideration of how economic dependence compromised auditor quality, but 
linked independence to the separation of teams.  
There is no prohibition [on advisory] but a complete separation between 
teams that work in audit and teams that work in advisory … if you are a 
licensed auditor and own an advisory company, you are required to 
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separate teams. As long as you sign a report of a company [audit 
report], you do not provide advisory [work] for this company, but your 
team provides it. A complete separation between them and the auditors. 
(SFR7) 
With the technology of separating teams, audit firms still decide what affects 
their independence and what does not. So auditors were “silent” on the CMA’s 
demands for complete prohibition of non-audit services, because the 
prohibition is on the “individual” auditor, not for the “firm” (which legally does 
not exist), even if the advisory company is completely owned by the licensed 
and registered auditor! 
In summary, the Audit Law prohibition of non-audit service was “morally” 
violated by influential auditors to revoke constraints to accumulate economic 
capital. Regulator understanding of the logic of such prohibition became a 
doxa and moved to CBK and then to the CMA. Influential auditors designed a 
structure to override the Audit Law constraints without risking changes to them. 
The constraint on advisory services is “imaginary” as economic dependence 
of audit firms on their audit-clients is outside of the regulatory scheme. 
Manipulation of audit regulatory concepts enabled the Big 4 to expand their 
consultancy services, and consequently enlarge their economic and symbolic 
power. This drove me to conclude that the silence of auditors on the regulatory 
prohibition is because they basically rendered it null and void. 
8.5. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter aimed to explain my findings on the outcome of resistance to two 
embedded technologies that were part of the new regulator’s audit 
modernisation programme. First, changing “firm” rotation to “individual” 
rotation. Second, the silence of auditors on the CMA’s emphasis of full 
prohibition on auditors’ ability to provide advisory services.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I illustrated how the CMA, as a result of the 
audit field collective lobby, changed its authoritative approach to including 
influential actors in the re-design of audit regulations and future rules that affect 
auditor practices. Then I explained what the customised audit rotation meant. 
It is basically a rotation of signatory in a legal environment that comprehends 
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the domination of non-Kuwaitis which provided some exit strategies in case of 
problems with the corporate audit. I explained the legal environment of auditor 
practices as a manager of a “private” company. Accordingly, interviewees 
criticised this ineffective model of rotation that maintained the status quo with 
no implication to auditor independence nor competition between audit firms.  
I argued that this regulatory strategy aimed to achieve two things. First, it 
aimed to maintain the local order of the audit field, as it may have implications 
on the way ruling groups manage their listed companies. Second, it aimed to 
satisfy global requirements to implement rotation to signal improved audit 
independence and audit quality. My findings also suggested that those 
opposed to this model of rotation did not rebel out of fear from those 
dominating the audit field and their social influence.  
I then explained my findings with regard to the second technology: the silence 
of auditors on the CMA’s demands to implement a full prohibition on non-audit 
services. My findings suggest that influential auditors have long shaped the 
understanding of the Ministry of Commerce (the audit law enforcer) on the logic 
of constraining advisory; that is, the operational split between audit and non-
audit teams.  
This strategy was extended to CBK’s attempt to implement the prohibition, in 
line with SOX in 2002, to local banks. This way of understanding, arguably, 
became a common sense between regulators. With this rationality construction 
strategy, I also explained how influential auditors invented a structure to free 
them from Audit Law constraints without changing the Audit Law. I found that 
in front of state regulators, audit firms basically operate under two legal 
vehicles: one between licensed auditors (each responsible for her/his 
signature) and one for their “firm” advisory activities, despite who owns this 
vehicle. Internally, however, all auditors and advisory teams work under one 
umbrella.  
This architecture helped audit firms to freely decide which services they want 
to provide, audit or non-audit, accounting or non-accounting! The new 
regulator followed this constructed understanding of the antecedent 
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regulators. A CMA registered auditor is not allowed to (directly) engage with 
the advisory team. Still, the new regulator accepts if the CMA registered 
auditor is the sole owner of the advisory company and the sole beneficiary of 
the income of the non-audit services provided by the audit “firm” to the audit-
client! This contradictory regulatory understanding is the main reason for the 
silence of auditors on the new regulator’s “imaginary” demands to implement 




9. DISCUSSION CHAPTER 
9.1. Introduction 
This thesis has sought to answer two related questions concerning why and 
how Kuwait modernised its capital market audit regulations based on SOX-
driven international best practices. Answering these questions demanded a 
broad understanding of different trajectories of influence of the global space to 
the local settings of nation-states, their impact on the societal balance of 
power, and the responses of the dynamic of the local authority to such 
exogenous interference.  
Unlike prior studies that examined changes to corporatist audit regulatory 
arrangements which happen to be dominated by Western state-audit 
arrangements (see chapter 2), Kuwait, with its unique local settings, follows a 
legalist mode of regulations. Accordingly, internationally-driven changes 
instigated a different type of conflict than what had been examined in the 
accounting literature. My findings suggest that local conflicts related to 
regulatory change ignited two intertwined battles. One was between the new 
regulator and auditors, but the main struggle was an inter-governmental one 
between the three state financial regulators. Each implemented strategies to 
defend or transform their vision of regulatory reality concerning the capital 
market audit. Bourdieu’s theorisation of practice (including his theory of the 
state) helped me to understand and explain such complex conflicts. 
Nonetheless, I mainly drew on Halliday and Carruthers recursivity framework 
to help me understand the dynamic of global power as well as the outcome of 
the struggle to customise auditor rotation. 
In this chapter, I intend to discuss my findings on the broader theorisation of 
how and why Kuwait modernised its capital market audit regulations by 
attempting to combine the various parts of this thesis to reflect on my emergent 
research questions. This chapter is organised into four main parts; three parts 
are related to how implementation was achieved and one part is concerned 
with why Kuwait modernised its capital market audit. In the first part, I intend 
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to discuss my findings on the inter-governmental battle between the new 
regulator and other state regulators that used to collaborate in regulating 
corporate audit. In this section, I aim to extend my explanation of this conflict 
to the broader Kuwaiti social space. In the second part of this chapter, I explain 
the underpinning logic of the audit field’s collective resistance and how a few 
auditors exploited this movement to advance their interests. The third part of 
how change happened focuses on the implication of collective resistance. I 
intend to discuss two salient technologies within the Kuwaiti audit 
modernisation programme: rotation and prohibition of non-audit services. 
The fourth part of this chapter aims to elaborate on why Kuwait modernised its 
audit regulations. As the Kuwaiti reform is relatively late in comparison to its 
regional markets, I will discuss the relationship between “why reform” and “why 
late reform” and then I will conclude this chapter. 
9.2. The state’s hierarchal battle to transform its regulatory 
vision  
Bourdieu (2014), theorised that the state is “the monopoly of legitimate 
physical and symbolic violence” (p. 4) and “the central bank of symbolic 
capital” (p. 217). However, Bourdieu’s understanding of the hegemonic power 
of the state, is, as yet, underutilised in the accounting literature (see Section 
4.3). In fact, the “state” is a widely neglected theme in academic studies. In a 
special issue on state power, Kourula et al. (2019) argued there is a shortage 
in our knowledge mainly because, in a globalised era, the underpinning 
assumptions of a majority of business research include: the state is losing 
power, the lack of enforcement authority, or it is an irrelevant unit of analysis. 
In fact, there is not much literature that examine how nation-state(s) reproduce 
their power in the transnational era. Honestly, I do not know if prior studies, 
especially in the mainstream, perceive the state as passive, neutral, marginal, 
something scary, or an enemy! 
I am not implying here that the state is entirely off researchers’ radar. Suddaby 
et al. (2007, pp. 344, 352-4), for example, correctly argued that the state 
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continues to be an important player in the global space to coercively advance 
transnational regulatory logics to polities. Nevertheless, the core idea of 
Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) work on transnational recursivity is that 
the state, whatever its distance from the global power, continues to have 
weapons to confront the hegemonic power of international actors even when 
a state is at its weakest (financial) situation.  
Some studies on global-driven accounting regulatory change did consider the 
power of national governments (e.g., Alon et al., 2019; Arnold and Sikka, 2001; 
Caramanis, 1999, 2002; Caramanis et al., 2015; Cooper and Robson, 2006; 
Ezzamel and Xiao, 2015; Mihret et al., 2019; Sikka, 2002, 2009, 2015; 
Suddaby et al., 2007). Besides being little-studied, state power continues to 
be a widely neglected theme in anti-positivist studies. In this chapter, however, 
I aim to discuss my findings in relation to both the local government as well as 
its relation to the broader society. 
Although I was able to illustrate the bureaucratic fight between bureaucratic 
agencies, one of the important issues that my findings raised is how come a 
state like Kuwait, with a constitution that structures the ruling power (within a 
few individuals) to govern Kuwaiti social life, witnessed such bureaucratic 
division in vision and power to change the order of the capital market and audit 
regulations?  
I believe Bourdieu’s theorisation of the relationship between the field of power 
and the bureaucratic field provides answer(s) to this complex inquiry. Bourdieu 
(1989, p. 263) theorised the field of power as a space of the dominant class 
that struggles to “confront each other using strategies aimed at preserving or 
transforming these relations of power” (p. 264-5). Nonetheless, the struggle 
between the field of power and the bureaucratic field intend for each to control 
the other (see Sections 4.2.3.3, 4.3.4). Relatedly, there is the antagonism 
within the field of high state nobility (government agencies), each aiming to 
defend their function and power by attempting to impose its vision of reality 
(Bourdieu, 2005, p. 93).  
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In Kuwait, some members of the merchant families, especially in the pre-oil 
period, used to have significant (direct) political influence (Crystal, 1990) as 
the ruling power was sustained through taxes paid from their economic wealth 
(see Section 3.5). Post-oil, this power started to be reshaped as the royal 
family became independent of merchant monies. However, influential 
merchant groups began to re-design their mechanisms of authority to protect 
their (inherited) interests and status (see Section 3.5.1).  
To influence ruling decisions, some merchant groups involved in occupying 
senior positions in bureaucratic agencies (often not directly but through loyal 
representatives within their group(s)), sustain the symbolic status of the 
Chamber of Commerce (merchants lobby), and maintain an influential 
presence in the national parliament. Today, the parliament chair is the son of 
the Chamber of Commerce chairman (merchants lobby). This generated what 
I referred to in Section 3.4 as the ruling groups of Kuwait, which includes a few 
individuals from some (historically powerful) merchant families and some 
individuals from the royal family.  
As infiltrating the state power (and using its apparatuses) is part of the 
domination battle between ruling groups, it resulted in no “unified” government 
decision. Those at the top of bureaucratic agencies have their individual vision, 
interests (economic, political, social and or ideological), and loyalties to 
different social groups (royal, merchants, tribal, public or other political groups) 
which sometimes animates a fragmented governmental agenda. This logic 
possibly extends to operate inside some ministries and government agencies. 
This power relation is not limited to two broader categorisations of ruling 
groups, but also occurs within each of them. However, the inter-bureaucratic 
conflict about modernising auditor practices represents a struggle between 
ruling groups that have institutionalised influence within the bureaucratic field 
to maintain their domination in the social space.  
I am not suggesting that the public (and their parliamentary representatives) 
have no political voice, but often these voices are penetrated, shaped, divided 
and employed for the battle of domination between powerful groups with 
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commercial interests. Bourdieu (1994) theorised that the state’s symbolic 
power works through the guaranteeing of state authorities to legitimise social 
groupings and identities that legitimise state power and those controlling it. 
Public collective vision and decision is always a threat to the dominant vision 
of symbolic (specific) order, and henceforth such power gets dismantled by 
classification. Such division is often achieved through, for example, social 
classification of micro-religious difference (Sunni and Shia) in addition to 
differences in schools of thoughts within these micro-religious interests, 
differentiation in cultural tradition (between Badu and Hadar), tribal and family 
roots (Asel and not-Asel; see Section 3.3).  
Back to the inter-ruling group conflicts: as I could not find any relevant work on 
inter-government conflicts or bureaucratic domination strategies in non-
Western traditions, I was able to identify some strategies that empowered the 
new regulator to accumulate bureaucratic capital. I had argued in Section 7.2.1 
that the new regulator was able to antagonise two state agencies (the Ministry 
of Commerce and CBK) and two influential social groups (the merchant group 
and the influential auditors) to submit to the new regulator’s vision of regulatory 
reality, by following various strategies (such as registration and strategies to 
confront the merchant group, among others).  
Concerning the new regulator’s “registration” technology, my findings support 
the MacDonald and Richardson (2004) study that found licencing public 
accountants was one of the powers used by the created council to reconstruct 
regulatory space in Ontario. However, in Kuwait, unlike changes to corporatist 
arrangements, registration demands also ignited intergovernmental conflicts 
because the interference of the new regulator was perceived to override and 
marginalise the Ministry of Commerce’s registration authority.  
With regard to the appointment of new leadership in the new regulator to 
confront powerful opponent groups. Canning and O’Dwyer (2016), mentioned 
something similar by arguing that the chairman of the Irish oversight body 
played a significant role in guiding the board’s diverse interests toward 
achieving the agenda of the newly established body. However, Canning and 
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O’Dwyer was looking at arrangments within the “new” oversight board, which 
included members from the audit profession. The “legalist” situation in Kuwait 
is different. Auditors have no “direct” invovlement in the decision making of the 
new regulator. The new chairman of the CMA was hostile to the other state 
regulators, and determined to have them submit to the new vision of regulatory 
reality.  
The story of suing the governor of CBK carried an essential message to 
opponent groups, as CBK regulates banks that are mainly controlled by some 
ruling groups, on the seriousness of integrating Kuwait in the international 
system. Nonetheless, this story also tells an important message about the way 
some Kuwaiti government agencies regulates social life. Clientelism in the 
enforcement of the law is an additional layer of the Kuwaiti state’s symbolic 
power. The story of the lawsuit against the CBK governor tells us that some of 
the Kuwaiti government agencies are resilient with regard to its responsibility 
to apply the rule of law. Still, if any actor (or group of actors) constituted a threat 
to the vision of reality of those who dominate the bureaucratic field, often the 
state uses its coercive power and applies the law to these people.  
In the broader social space, the Kuwaiti government institutionalised wasta 
(nepotism and clientelism) as a social norm at the individual level. Wasta used 
to be employed to get exceptions from (or to override) state regulations74. The 
government started to accumelate the loyalty of individuals either directly or 
through empowering some parliament members as a medium for wasta. This 
member becomes popular in the social space (with loyal voters) due to 
government-driven enlarged social capital, and s/he becomes subordinate and 
a supporter of the government vision. For me, although wasta ruins societal 
moralities and justice, it follows the same logic of clientelism in the 
enforcement of the law. Whenever someone uses wasta to violate regulations 
authorised by the government, these violations are used by some government 
 
74 Today, wasta, as it became a social norm, is also used (in many cases) by people to get 
their own legal rights. 
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agencies against the individual (including the empowered parliament member) 
in case s/he constitutes a threat to the vision of the dominators.  
Knowing the underpinning reasons for the division of vision within the 
bureaucratic field, another issue that emerged from my findings is: how was 
the new regulator able to win (at least in a significant part) in transforming the 
capital market’s regulatory reality despite the inherited power of oppositions? 
The answer to this question is fairly related to earlier reflections on the division 
of visions within the Kuwaiti government.  
Canning and O’Dwyer (2013) suggest that for a reform to succeed, it depends 
on the level of political support from the parliament and the public. The new 
capital market regulator’s ability to confront and transcend other bureaucratic 
agencies (institutionalised and penetrated by different groups with different 
interests) as well as the merchant group may never be achieved without 
political support by those with a higher position in the field of power. This 
support enabled the new regulator to accumulate bureaucratic capital and 
transcend in the field of high state nobility.  
A central argument in the internationally-driven oversight reform literature is 
that local traditions (history, social, cultural, economic) influence the trajectory 
of institutional change (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2016; Caramanis et al., 2015; 
Hazgui and Gendron, 2015). I agree that local social systems play a significant 
role in shaping change, but equally important is the political support for change 
as argued by Canning and O’Dwyer (2013, 2016).  
Nonetheless, local traditions and political support are kind of fuzzy. Caramanis 
et al. (2015) for example, argued that because Greece follows a clientelistic 
government, audit regulatory reform was not successful. However, although 
Kuwait probably shares many similarities with Greek political traditions, it was 
able to significantly reform its capital market.  
Remarkably, Bourdieu (1994, p. 15) argued that the state uses physical 
coercion if it is cannot produce social doxic submission to its objective 
structures. In non-democratic societies, the strong desire for change among 
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those sitting at the top of the national power pyramid (with authority to use the 
state’s physical coercive power) often achieves their agenda even if it opposes 
societal traditions (cultural ideology). A good contemporary example is the 
enforcement of the “significant” liberation wave that is happening now in Saudi 
Arabia (Kuwait’s neighbour) in contradiction with local inherited (religious) 
traditions.  
9.3. Collective lobby to advance the private interest of the few 
My second research question explored the reaction of the audit field to the new 
regulator’s demands to modernise institutionalised practices. The first attempt 
to modernise Kuwaiti audit regulations suffered from major regulatory holes. 
Auditors resistance logic was mainly centred around what Halliday and 
Carruthers theorised as mechanisms of struggle for legal change aiming to 
exploit regulatory gaps and obstruct change (see Section 4.4.2.2). This include 
arguments of indeterminacy of the regulations, contradictions with existing 
laws, in addition to what was perceived to be costly embodied requirements 
(see Section 7.3.1). A similar response on the economic costs is argued to be 
found in the first stages of the Irish reform (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013). 
However, as my findings suggested, auditors did not reject the registration 
concept per se which aimed to offer an intervention strategy for the new 
regulator to change auditor (institutionalised) practices, but conditions 
associated with registration. However, lobbyists used registration as the main 
weapon to confront the new regulator’s modernisation agenda. 
To influence/limit/control the regulatory audit reform agenda, the literature 
often argues for the tactic of infiltrating executive positions or steering 
committees in the changed architecture. These strategies have been found at 
the national (e.g., Hazgui and Gendron, 2015; Malsch and Gendron, 2011; 
Sikka, 2002) and international levels (e.g., Humphrey et al., 2009; Loft et al., 
2006b; Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey, 2015). However, in the Kuwaiti 
situation, this tactic was partially employed with the Ministry of Commerce, 
through their authorisation for auditors to become involved in audit steering 
committees, which resulted in weakening the Ministry of Commerce oversight 
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ability by advancing the interests of a “few” auditors (see Section 6.3.2). As I 
mentioned earlier, the situation with the new regulator was different. Within the 
new regulator, decisions on regulatory change are decided in-house, without 
the “direct” involvement of externals (market actors, including external 
auditors). At least, this is what happened in the first reform.  
For Bourdieu (2005, p. 204), dominators of social fields often use their social 
capital within bureaucratic agencies to pressure the state to align regulations 
to their favour. In the first reform episode, because auditors had no access (or 
direct engagement) to influence regulatory decisions, or the use of their social 
capital (e.g., wasta) was not effective, auditors (each with different interests) 
used the “passive” accountancy association to form and represent a collective 
lobby to resist what was perceived to be transgressional demands by the new 
regulator.  
Lobbyists refused to register with the new regulator. Interestingly, similar 
strategy was found in France, with auditors threatening to stop providing 
statutory audit (Hazgui and Gendron, 2015, p. 1247). However, although my 
findings were not clear concerning who engineered the lobby, I believe some 
influential auditors had no access to decision makers in the new regulator (or 
failed) to influence the reform agenda. Consequently, to be part of a larger 
pressure group, they used their connection (social capital) in the accounting 
association to call for collective resistance against constraining the lawful 
practice of auditors to engage with the capital market companies. Bourdieu 
(1990, p. 188) interestingly linked the collective strategy of an individual to 
her/his interests as well as position in the field (see Section 7.3.2). 
Collective power was formed (each with varying interests depending on their 
position in the audit field) and used by influential auditors to advance their 
domination interests, mainly against firm rotation. However, collective rejection 
to register with the new regulator was, I think, a powerful confrontation that 
targeted the legitimacy of the new regulator not only regarding the reform of 
audit practices but its broader reform agenda. Following the collective unified 
decision on the unlawfulness of the “firm” concept (among other issues) in the 
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first attempt to modernise auditor practices, influential auditors approached the 
new regulator to deliver the collective message and emphasised mainly the 
unlawfulness of the “firm” concept.  
Now I move to my third question of how change happened in Kuwait.  
9.4. Manipulation of international regulations to maintain 
order  
9.4.1. Customised rotation: A solution to maintain broader 
order 
My third question was: as result of audit’s collective resistance, what are the 
implications for customising modern audit regulations? My findings suggest 
that auditors’ collective resistance to the new regulator demands resulted in 
four responses. First, the accounting profession is to be considered and 
consulted in any future changes to audit practices. Second, registration with 
the new regulator continued as it is the means to engage in the regulatory 
space and to influence and oversee audit practices within the capital market. 
Third, registration’s “costly” requirements were reduced but not removed. 
Fourth, replacing the explicit concept of “firm” to “individuals” to be compatible 
with the practiced existing “old” Audit Law. This change resulted in changing 
firm rotation to rotation of “individually-registered” auditors.  
I have argued in my literature review chapter that the majority of prior non-
positivist studies in accounting were less interested in examining micro modern 
technologies of SOX-driven international audit regulatory changes (see 
Section 2.5). This includes applying the concept of rotation or following the US 
path to prohibit advisory services. My findings claim that these international 
micro technologies “must not” be taken for granted as a potential solution to 
the audit dilemma.   
Bourdieu theorised social resistance to legal change is mainly due to its 
associated changes to social division and hierarchy (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 2). 
The new regulator’s demands to implement firm rotation was perceived by the 
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audit field dominators as a significant threat to their strategies of maintaining 
their symbolic position, as it disturbed their long-term investments with ruling 
groups and the way they accumulate economic and symbolic capitals.  
In Kuwait, although the Big 4 dominate audit services for large organisations 
(e.g., the banking and oil sectors), the market share between the Big 4 is 
relatively unbalanced. That said, implementing firm rotation most probably will 
result in shifting (sharing) dominant power (client portfolio with its embodied 
sources of social, economic, symbolic, and cultural powers) to other firms. 
However, unlike the findings of Belal et al. (2017) in Bangladesh, which 
emphasised the animation of cultural power on the dynamic of their audit field, 
the Kuwaiti story of rotation tells us that the hierarchy of actors within the audit 
field depends on the weight and quality of social capital (especially with ruling 
groups with commercial interests).  
The introduction of firm rotation threatens such a dynamic within the audit field. 
Firm rotation, as influential auditors believe, challenged the capital that 
animates their symbolic domination the most, social capital. Nonetheless, 
implementing (as-is) firm rotation (in an environment without equal distribution 
of market share) will eventually shrink the influence of dominant audit firms, 
and lower the position of those sitting at the top of the audit field because the 
monopoly of accumulating and sustaining the symbolic element of social 
capital will no longer be exclusive to those “few” auditors. Firm rotation means 
that after a specific period (tenure), dominant auditors must step down for other 
auditors to take their function or, more accurately, their power.  
Canning and O’Dwyer (2013) found that in reforming the Irish system, when 
auditor strategies to resist change were not successful (e.g., emphasis on 
over-regulation), auditors engaged in “manipulating” the regulations. However, 
unlike what I understand of manipulation, for Canning and O’Dwyer, 
manipulation is influencing the legislation (through demands to redraft “vague” 
legislation); they then lobbied to demand professional representation in the 
new body. In a similar attempt to subvert reform, Malsch and Gendron (2011) 
found that in Canada, the involvement of the accounting profession in the 
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operations of the newly created oversight body resulted in maintaining the 
status quo of the audit field.  
As I already discussed my findings on how manipulation (customisation) was 
achieved and how it maintained the status quo position of the audit field 
dominators (see Section 8.3), here I will interpret my thoughts on “why” the 
new regulator changed their conception on rotation. My findings suggested 
that dominant auditors exploited the modernisation of auditor practices and 
provided solutions to the new regulator (using the collective lobby) to deceive 
global standardisation and maintain the order of the audit field. As “fear” is one 
of the motors that guide the application of internationally-driven regulatory 
change (Malsch and Gendron, 2011), my findings also suggest that opponents 
of the new regulator’s customisation of rotation did not react out of “fear” of 
those who dominate the audit field. I believe there might be other reasons for 
the new regulator to accept manipulating (customising) rotation and what 
Halliday and Carruthers theorised as symbolic compliance.  
I am building the following discussion because the new regulator was able to 
implement the “concept” of firm rotation without contradicting the “old” Audit 
Law (see Section 8.3). It merely required the new regulator to “disallow” 
rotation between registered auditors working together (within the same firm), 
instead of explicitly allowing it75.  
I do believe that the new regulator, when demanding such independence 
technology, did not calculate the (embedded) implications of such “best 
practice” technology on how “social order” is maintained. That said, firm 
rotation in the case of Kuwait does not only threaten the position of those sitting 
at the top of the audit field, as a couple of firms dominates the audit field, but 
equally important, it challenges the logic of how some ruling groups (with listed 
companies or those who intend to list their private companies) operate and 
legitimise their commercial activities.  
 
75 Note 5 of Article 5 of Customised Regulation number 24/2012 explicitly states that after a 
four-year tenure, companies can immediately appoint a registered auditor that work with their 
existing registered auditor. This mean that two registered auditors who work in the same “firm” 
can rollover audit-clients (every four years) indefinitely.  
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I believe, in Kuwait, “keeping secrets” could explain the interests of the 
regulator in changing rotation policy. “Keeping secrets” is one of the vital 
characteristics to make partnership, as argued by one of my key interviewees 
(Big-D). In the Kuwaiti audit field, it is one of the significant methods for 
maintaining and accumulating a symbolic element of social capital within the 
ruling class. Similarly, Big-C discussed that sometimes clients (from ruling 
groups) tell an audit engagement partner to change an auditor within an audit 
team because her/his family is from a competing ruling family! SFR5 also 
argued that the Big 4 prefers not to recruit Kuwaitis because, unlike expatriates 
with limited social networks, Kuwaitis “talk”.  
Keeping secrets may indicate covering up clients’ unlawful practices or 
violations of specific accounting/auditing standards. I do not believe this is 
always the case, but that it is done mainly to protect the sources of income, for 
inter-ruling “competition” purposes. Culturally, Kuwaiti society, including 
business and audit firms, is not used to transparency concerning their income 
sources (especially “the old generation”) or how they manage their income. 
This is one of the reasons that expanding the number of people who have 
access to these “secrets” is something culturally indigestible, especially for 
some ruling groups.  
Firm rotation means that secrets will be accessible over time by various firms 
and various audit-engagement teams and (probably) will be out of (secret) 
control. Hence, in a non-transparent culture, firm rotation is not only targeted 
to stimulate competition between audit firms but may also confuse competition 
between some ruling groups. In the Kuwaiti case, the embodied forces of 
rotation meant to disturb the dynamic of legitimising domination within the field 
of power (see Section 3.7.1). 
Influential auditors, banks (controlled by ruling groups), and CBK (part of its 
”hidden” function is to balance relations within ruling groups with commercial 
activities), each with different interests, fought to resist firm rotation. Even 
today, CBK requires banks to decide on their own rotation policies (CBK, 2019, 
p. 39)! Banks shift responsibilities between their two external audit firms (that 
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happen to audit their accounts for many decades) and this is completely 
acceptable as a rotation by CBK, of course it is!  
I believe the new regulator realised the cultural contradiction of firm rotation 
only after it demanded its implementation. Now I move to discuss my findings 
concerning the prohibition of non-audit services.  
9.4.2. Prohibiting non-audit services: An exploitation that 
became a regulatory norm 
This section discusses the second part of the implication of resistance. I 
explained my interest in examining the silence of auditors on the new regulator 
demands to implement “full” prohibition on non-audit services and that my 
findings on the Kuwaiti modernisation programme is outside the recursivity 
framework of Halliday and Carruthers (2007, 2009) (see Section 8.4). I also 
explained how this story is better understood within Bourdieu theorisation as a 
strategy to facilitate auditors’ ability to accumulate economic capital.  
Kuwait’s original “old” Audit Law “forbids” licenced auditors (as individuals) to 
engage in providing any type of services outside audit. As the old law was 
implemented for a different time and practices, arguably, it is “significantly 
weak” for the current period as many parts of auditor practices are unregulated 
(see Section 6.3.2). Auditors, in return, benefit from this “loose” regulatory 
arrangement especially its lack of recognising “firm(s)”. However, the Ministry 
of Commerce (the Audit Law enforcer) system of collaboration by involving 
auditors to participate in steering their profession, provided auditors the ability 
to build up relations with the Ministry of Commerce and resist modernising the 
audit law.  
Nonetheless, the Ministry of Commerce steering arrangement, by combining 
auditors with their regulators and influential actors in the economic field (e.g, 
representatives from the Chamber of Commerce), according to Sikka (2002), 
threatens the “independent” function of auditors. However, as a result of the 
“trust” relationship between the Ministry of Commerce and influential auditors, 
the latter were able to institutionalise the idea that forbidding advisory services 
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is mainly related to technical independence (separation of teams) “despite” 
who individually profits from providing such services.  
The constructed meaning of the prohibition was designed not to threaten the 
(appearance) of the rule of “old” Audit Law, as long as the Ministry of 
Commerce licenced auditors did not engage directly with the advisory function 
and as long as a “Chinese wall” existed between legal vehicles and teams, 
even if the registered auditor is the sole financial beneficiary behind the 
provision of such advisory services! Even though the Ministry of Commerce 
which authorised this design did not have the “legal” capacity to investigate the 
application of the so called “Chinese wall” (SFR1). Sikka et al. (2018) put it 
perfectly: 
Non-auditing services result in an identification of the interests of 
auditors and their clients and economic bonds make it psychologically 
impossible for auditors to be independent of audit clients. (p. 35) 
My findings do not explain how anyone could buy this nonsensical “imaginary” 
idea or what situation (at that time) influenced the Ministry of Commerce to 
accept such justifications. However, what my findings do show is that all my 
regulatory interviewees doxically believe that this is the right way to regulate 
non-audit services! Probably, at that time, some ruling groups needed advisory 
services and so this regulatory override was the solution to prevent changes 
to the “old” Audit Law.  
Influential auditors, as I found, also fought to extend this type of understanding 
to CBK. This is clear by the manner in which CBK changed and manipulated 
wordings and concepts (accounting and non-accounting related services) in 
its corporate governance guidelines regarding advisory services after US SOX 
came to international consciousness (see Section 8.4.1). The CBK scenario of 
2002 could be explained as Halliday and Carruthers’ symbolic compliance, as 
an attempt by CBK to foil SOX-driven internationalisation of the banking 
system audit (see Sections 4.4.2.3, 8.4.1).  
Such regulatory belief in the logic of prohibiting advisory services moved to the 
new regulator who publicly propagated application of the “international best 
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practice” prohibition on auditor advisory services! Ironically, auditors and their 
firms continue to provide whatever services they choose, despite regulator 
claims, as long as the licenced or registered auditor does not sign the advisory 
contracts!  
The prohibition story proved the power of auditors’ “disguised” strategies to 
lower regulatory barriers to accumulate economic capitals. I also believe the 
“ineffectiveness” of regulators is one of the reasons for having such a loosely 
regulated space. Nonetheless, with regulators doxic belief in the reality of 
advisory arrangements outside economic dependence, it might be that 
regulators and auditors (in a previous episode of conflict) tried to foil global 
influence through recursivity, which later became a regulatory reality. To 
conclude, the collective lobby did not resist the new regulator’s demands for 
full prohibition on advisory services because regulators believe that separation 
of teams is the true reality behind such prohibition.  
The next part discusses my fourth research question.  
9.5. Legitimising Kuwait in the “new” global order 
The previous three sections addressed questions on how Kuwait modernised 
its capital market audit. In this section, I elaborate on my fourth research 
question that investigates why Kuwait modernised its capital market audit 
regulations. In Section 6.4.3, I demonstrated my findings on why Kuwait 
attempted to modernise its capital market, including its audit regulations. I 
argued that my findings suggested a doxic submission to international financial 
technologies as a potential solution to Kuwaiti’s “ineffectual” governance 
system. I also argued that the two questions “why implement?” and “why late 




9.5.1. Why submit to Western logics? 
Reflecting on investigation of the doxic submission to economic globalisation, 
Bourdieu (1998b) argued that, “I believe, by analysing it and trying to 
understand the mechanisms through which it is produced and imposed” (p. 
31). Accordingly, I think a valid inquiry for discussion may be centred around 
why a small non-Western country had this doxic belief in, and submission to, 
north-Western internationalised practices? I think there is no single answer to 
this complex inquiry. What I am offering here are thoughts based on my 
analysis of my data and the Kuwaiti socio-context that may help to understand 
the reasons underpinning such taken-for-granted beliefs.  
I believe there are three main motives that explain “why” modernisation of the 
capital market and its audit regulations took place. First, the exogenous (direct 
and indirect) constant influence on local culture. Second, mimicking regional 
practices, where others started to reform their capital markets years before 
Kuwait. Finally, national security matters.  
9.5.1.1. Rationalising Western practice supremacy 
There are many causes that facilitated the reconstruction of individual and 
social rationalities to align with global (cultural) norms. I find the following 
reasons are the most salient to Kuwait.  
• University education in Kuwait (both undergraduate and graduate) follows 
Anglo-American curriculums, with their embodied Western norms. Also, 
many Kuwaitis did their university degrees in north-Western countries. One 
of my interviewees, for example, argued that, “We teach them business 
administration and the majority of graduates go and work for government 
institutions” (SFR3).  
• Kuwait society is open to other cultures, as evidenced by the percentage of 
expatriates in Kuwait (see Tables 1 and 2). Such admixture influences 
cultural (indigenous) traditions.  
• Western cultural hegemony in Kuwait increased after it was liberated (with 
the direct participation of the West, especially the US) from the Iraqi 
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invasion. As Kuwait is considered to be within the US/Western influence 
orbit, Western (financial) practices became the epitome, despite the 
repeated financial crises that they engendered, or the rising gap in wealth 
inequality. Nonetheless, it might be that the Iraqi war was a way for the US 
to “frighten” other states into accepting Western supremacy and emulating 
its practices.  
• The involvement of IOs in recommending institutional changes not only for 
the capital market and audit (see Section 6.3), but for many aspects of 
social life especially by the World Bank (e.g., education system, 
government support of entrepreneurial programmes). When these 
recommendations are discussed, they probably provide an unconscious 
perspective and alternative views of reality. These perceptions advance the 
(cultural) interests of powerful international actors.  
• As the government is a field of struggle between some ruling groups to 
accumulate all sorts of power, especially economic and symbolic, the public 
rationalises Western practices as potential solutions to government 
problems and its insufficient interest in progress toward broader social 
moralities and justice.  
These rationalisations intensify cultural contradiction. I mean here the 
contradiction between the embedded culture of internationally-driven Western 
practices with the embedded culture of indigenous practices (traditions, 
arrangements, and social structure). The story of the Kuwaiti modernisation 
project demonstrated some of these contradictions.  
9.5.1.2. Regional competition  
Another reason for rationalising reform, is that countries of the region started 
to reform their capital markets (probably) due to similar (hegemonic) 
interference and pressures. Regional practices stimulated an inter-states 
reform competition as each country started to look at the other. For example, 
how come my neighbour country is better ranked internationally than me? How 
come my neighbour can attract foreign monies and I cannot? How come my 
neighbour is a member of a prestigious international club, and I am not? This 
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level of inter-state competition was one of the essential reasons Kuwait 
modernised its financial systems. Following regional practices is explicitly 
mentioned in the explanatory memorandum of the enacted law of the new 
regulator (CMA, 2010, pp. 61-2).  
Nonetheless, I found a similar dynamic to motivate inter-state competition with 
the IMF annual reports that recently began to compare Kuwait to regional 
countries in neoliberal terms (see Section 6.3). This makes me confident to 
argue that the way the globe is governed not only targets an individual country 
but also a cluster of countries that share similar social settings (culture) and 
location, through stimulating and motivating an inter-state ranking competition 
ignited by institutional jealousy.   
9.5.1.3. National security as a reason  
An indirect reason for “why modernising social systems” is explained by 
Alsabah (2019). In a local television interview, Mr Naser Alsabah (son of the 
current Amir) who used to be the Minister of Defence and is expected to have 
a higher ruling position in the future, explained Kuwait’s interest in being part 
of the Chinese initiative to build an international Silk Road. In this interview, 
Alsabah explicitly argued that enticing foreign money to Kuwait provides 
international security to Kuwait from external threats as international power will 
protect their money inside Kuwait. Although this argument is centred around 
David Harvey’s theorisation of New imperialism (Harvey, 2003), I believe this 
way of thinking explains the reasons behind modernisation of the capital 
market and the political support for the new regulator. This argument is also 
found in Greek interest in being admitted to the EU to protect itself from Turkish 
threats (Caramanis, 2002) (see Section 2.3.1).  
Institutional settings such as those of Kuwait, where some ruling groups 
dominate commercial activities, do not tend to attract foreign monies. On the 
contrary, it may expels foreign investors. Nonetheless, financial instruments 
(e.g., equity shares) do not necessarily require operational presence. 
Promoting the capital market ranking is a confidence message addressed to 
foreign investors. Changing audit practices is one of the pillars for reforming 
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the capital market. Modernising institutions and practices are solutions to 
promote ranking, attract foreign monies, and consequently achieve national 
security “rationality”.  
9.5.2. Why late reform?  
Another critical question is that if modernity is perceived to be necessary, why 
was Kuwait a “late runner” to reforming its capital market system in comparison 
to regional countries? Interestingly, Halliday and Carruthers (2009) argued that 
sometimes countries approach IOs for funding not because they need money, 
but because conditions often associated with these funds empower some local 
groups over others.  
Integrating Kuwait’s capital market in the international system meant the 
potential involvement of international investors in commercial activities in 
Kuwait. Such involvement threatens the symbolic power of merchant groups 
and their institutionalised mechanisms for accumulating economic power, 
often through the monopoly of government construction contracts (see Section 
3.7.1). As large government construction contracts are often won by a few 
merchant families, the tension between the new regulator, the Chamber of 
Commerce (merchants lobby), and the banks regulator was the source of 
conflicting positions on modernising local institutions and opening Kuwait’s 
economy to international money. 
I believe the implications of the global financial crisis on Kuwait created a 
“golden” opportunity for some ruling groups to overcome the internal forces of 
other ruling/merchant groups (that occupy prominent positions within 
bureaucratic agencies and the parliaments) and implement change. That said, 
as the state mainly depends on oil, the global financial crisis mainly affected 
the capital market due to intensive speculation activities by some ruling groups 
in a loosely regulated market. Many of the public found themselves deceived 
by some merchant groups (with commercial and trading activities) and 
reforming the capital market became a public demand that supported change 
in line with the agenda of some within the ruling class. 
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9.6. Chapter conclusion  
The modernisation of audit regulations in Kuwait highlights significant 
contradictions between Western traditions (embedded within international best 
practices) and the local social structure. It also shows allegiances, 
collaborations, confrontations, and deceptions between various social groups. 
In the case of Kuwait, the implementation of “international best practices” 
regulatory structures and technologies challenged the way the balance of 
power is maintained in society. It also indicates that the social system of 
collaboration began after interest-driven conflict between powerful groups was 
settled with segregation of authorities.  
This chapter has further developed themes that were explained in my findings 
chapters. To understand the battle of “how” modernity was implemented, I 
discussed my findings on three correlated themes: first, an inter-governmental 
fight to change audit practice regulatory architecture. Second, the audit field 
reaction to the new regulator demands to change their practices. And finally, 
the implications of the auditors-regulator conflicts. I then moved to discuss my 
findings on why Kuwait modernised its capital market and audit regulations as 
well as why Kuwait was a late runner in modernising its capital market activities 
in comparison to regional countries.  
Concerning how change happened, the first part of my story covered the inter-
bureaucratic battle between three state financial regulators. As different ruling 
groups secured various positions within the bureaucratic field to advance their 
interests, I discussed that the inter-bureaucratic division in visions within the 
same government is a reflection of a higher (on the social space spectrum of 
power) level of struggle. It was a battle within the field of power between 
different ruling groups that occupy different (power) hierarchal positions in both 
the bureaucratic field as well as the field of power.  
By claiming the power of “registration”, the new regulator secured a position in 
the audit regulatory space. They were backed by the political support of 
individuals who occupy high(est) position(s) in both the bureaucratic and 
power fields. The new regulator used its coercive power to confront opponents 
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and overrule their vision of regulatory reality. We saw this physical power used 
in many situations. For example, threatening listed companies with sanctions 
if they dealt with non-registered auditors. Suing the governor of CBK for 
potential violation of the law for something he did many years back. In fact, the 
way the capital market audit system was changed could be interpreted as a 
use of state coercive power to force different social groups to submit to its 
(changed) vision of reality.   
I discussed that the case of suing the banking regulator delivered a clear 
message on clientelism in the enforcement of the law by the Kuwaiti 
bureaucratic institutions. These practices, I argued, are the Kuwait 
governance’s strategy as a second layer of power and are often used when 
people constitute a threat to the power of dominators. I also gave an example 
of how the government is ruining Kuwaiti social life with practices to 
institutionalise wasta as a social norm, to accumulate this type of (second 
layer) power to control the society.  
In the how question, I moved to discuss my second research question on the 
reaction of the audit field to the new regulator’s audit modernisation 
programme. As the Kuwaiti audit field is dominated by a few Kuwaiti individual 
auditors backed by international brand names (Big 4), they used their 
accumulated social capital to influence the new regulator’s decision to change 
“specific” regulatory practices but were not successful in stopping regulatory 
audit change. Accordingly, dominators of the audit field used the accounting 
association and formed a collective lobby to confront the new regulator and to 
advance their “private” interests. This lobby threatened the legitimacy of the 
new regulator by rejecting registering with it. Audit dominators approached the 
new regulator to deliver the collective decision but emphasised the illegality of 
designing regulations based on firms, which legally do not exist.  
As the auditors’ solution was accepted by the new regulator, this drew me to 
my third research area, a discussion of the outcome of the resistance. In this 
thesis, I focused on the customisation of two technologies which I found the 
most salient in the Kuwaiti modernisation programme. The rotation of 
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signatories was the result of changing the logic of firm rotation from the 
modernised regulations. Firm rotation was found to be a significant threat to 
the way influential auditors maintain their dominant position within the audit 
field, as market share and power between the Big 4 in Kuwait is noticeably 
unequal.  
In discussing the change from firm to individual rotations, I provided a broader 
reflection on the CMA’s approval of such customisation, especially because it 
was able to implement the concept of firm rotation within the existing Kuwaiti 
(individual-based) legal setting. I argued that firm rotation has more significant 
implications on the broader collaboration between some ruling groups to 
maintain their symbolic status. I discussed that firm rotation risks one of the 
Kuwaiti traditions, “keeping secrets”. Arguably, the new regulator realised the 
embedded contradiction between firm rotation and the “secrets” of some ruling 
groups’ (with commercial activities) sources of income. Accordingly, the 
prescription of the dominant auditors was accepted, deceiving both the global 
as well as the local to maintain order within ruling powers.   
Concerning the second technology, I found that the silence of auditors on the 
new regulator’s requirement to implement “full” prohibition on non-audit 
services is a “myth” that violated the basic idea of such a prohibition, reducing 
the economic dependence of auditors on their audit-clients. Influential auditors 
constructed the understanding of the Ministry of Commerce on the logic and 
meaning of such a prohibition. This idea was followed with the banking 
regulator when it attempted to follow the SOX prohibition. The (constructed) 
regulatory understanding became a norm that the new regulator followed. I 
also discussed that this could be an old recursivity logic that became a 
regulatory reality.  
The second part of this chapter focused on why Kuwait modernised its capital 
market audit. I argued for three salient themes: first, doxic submission of 
society to the supremacy of Western practices and the reasons behind such 
beliefs. Second, to mimick regional modernisation practices. Third, for national 
security purposes. I then moved to explain why Kuwait was considered a “late 
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runner” in reforming their capital market in comparison with other markets in 
the region. I argued that the implications of the global financial crisis, along 
with public support for reform, backed by the support of IOs, provided an 
opportunity for some ruling groups to overcome the resistance of merchant 
groups who see integrating Kuwait with the international system could risk their 
monopoly over government construction contracts as well as the Kuwaiti 
private sector.   
The following chapter concludes this thesis. 
  
 299 
10. THESIS CONCLUSION 
10.1. Introduction  
The global trajectory for homogenising regulatory practices is mysterious. This 
thesis argues that the confrontation between the embedded culture of global 
norms and indigenous arrangements and practices stimulates local conflict 
which implicates struggle at the field of power. More specifically, this thesis 
aimed to evaluate the implementation of SOX-driven global norms to 
modernise audit regulations in Kuwait. To do so, four objectives have been 
pursued. First, to identify the dynamics that enabled the newly created 
regulator to dominate the regulatory space despite the long-time presence of 
other state financial regulators. Second, to assess the response of the audit 
field to the new regulator’s modernisation agenda. Third, to evaluate the 
implications of the local battle between the new regulator and the accountancy 
profession. My final aim was to understand why Kuwait modernised its capital 
market audit regulations.  
In terms of theoretical framing, my investigation was guided by two related 
(power) theoretical lenses: Pierre Bourdieu’s practice (including his theory of 
the state) and Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers’ theory of transnational 
recursivity. In a general sense, I found that applying global norms created a 
sea of local institutional and organisational conflict for power. The local 
battle(s) demonstrated the interest and practices of various (influential) social 
groups in the modernisation  attempts to reproduce (and challenge) social, 
structure, order, and the balance of power, depending on actor(s) positions in 
the broader social space and relevant fields. Not only this, but to overcome 
wrangles within the ruling powers, some powerful local groups (including 
influential auditors) collaborated against global norms with the potential to 
significantly disturb the social order/structure. They did this by deceiving both 
global players and local citizens. Modernising the Kuwaiti capital market was 
driven by doxic submission to Western practices which was rationalised by 
some to overcome (ineffective) government arrangements, while others saw it 
as necessary for national security purposes.  
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will elaborate on the 
contributions that my study offers to existing knowledge. With some detail, I 
argue that this thesis makes three contributions to existing knowledge. First, 
the Kuwaiti “legalist” system is novel for the literature examining 
internationally-driven modifications to audit structural changes. My second 
contribution is the introduction of the process of international best practice 
micro-technologies to the critical accounting literature. Finally, an in-depth 
examination of the context of Kuwait contributes to scarce studies looking into 
the state-profession relationship in the non-West, in general, and the Arab 
world, in particular.  
The second part of this chapter offers a number of practical implications for 
Kuwaiti policymakers.  
Section three explains the potential limitations of the thesis. I argued for two 
main limitations to this thesis. First, an embedded epistemological risk to 
constructivist reality. Second, not challenging capitalism. Other limitations 
include, for example, not considering the parliamentary conflict (if any) 
surrounding the enactment of the law establishing the new regulator. Also, the 
exclusion of the vision of the merchant lobby (Chamber of Commerce) and 
companies on the audit regulations modernisation programme.  
The fourth section elaborates on various proposals for future research and the 
final part concludes this chapter and this thesis. 
10.2. Contributions to existing knowledge 
I argued in Section 2.7 that prior studies suffer from a number of limitations. 
This thesis aimed to fill the gaps in prior studies by making three significant 
contributions to existing knowledge. 
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10.2.1. Contribution 1: Confrontation between Western-
driven internationalisation of structural logics with 
non-Western and non-corporatist traditions 
The first contribution this thesis makes is to emerging literature that examines 
the application of SOX-driven global-norms on audit regulatory structure (Alon 
et al., 2019; Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, 2016; Caramanis et al., 2015; 
Hazgui and Gendron, 2015; Malsch and Gendron, 2011). These studies 
focused on the local challenges to change state-profession inherited 
corporatist arrangements by introducing a state body to oversee the practices 
of the audit profession. Although each of these studies has relatively different 
findings depending on countries’ social dynamics and particularities of history 
and arrangements, they focus on corporatist systems in neoliberalised states.  
This thesis contributes to this particular literature in the sense that, in addition 
to Kuwait being a unique context to this literature, Kuwait follows a “legalist” 
system. Such a difference in the mode of regulating audit produced a different 
dynamic of the struggle between affected groups. Accordingly, as this thesis 
suggested, the confrontation for regulatory change was not limited to being 
between the newly established oversight body and the audit profession, as 
most prior studies suggested, but it was mainly between government 
agencies.  
Furthermore, unlike prior studies, because of the Kuwaiti (inherited) legalist 
system, with the guidance of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the state (in 
particular), I was able to track the conflict of change to disputes between ruling 
classes within the field of power.  
10.2.2. Contribution 2: The myth of the implementation of 
international best practice micro audit technologies  
Prior studies focused mainly on regulatory structural changes by introducing a 
new oversight body. My second contribution is by introducing an examination 
of the process of implementing international best practices audit 
microtechnologies to the critical accounting domain. As I demonstrated in 
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Section 2.6, very scarce prior studies in the public administration literature 
(with many limitations discussed in Section 2.6.1) considered the implications 
of the global diffusion of “international best practices” in Africa. In the non-
positivist accounting literature, to my knowledge, both the concept and the 
process of international best practices does not exist.  
I examined audit technologies that lie within the logic of international best 
practices: firm rotation and SOX-driven prohibition of non-audit services which 
happen to be rarely considered in non-positivist accounting studies. This study 
suggests that the Kuwaiti case implemented these technologies in 
appearance, and that they were manipulated so as not to affect the status quo. 
This, I believe, is a significant contribution which may open a new space in the 
accounting literature to consider the concept and the processes around the 
global diffusion of international best practice micro-technologies in the 
accounting domain.  
10.2.3. Contribution 3: The Kuwaiti example of the 
relationship between the “state” and the audit 
profession in the non-Western literature  
Non-positivist studies on the state-accountancy profession relationship are 
mainly Western-dominated (Spence et al., 2019). Such societies are governed 
by neoliberal states and frequently with an inherited corporatist system. In the 
non-Western part of the world, studies within this domain often focus on the 
historical nature for formulations of the accountancy profession, with few 
studies on the contemporary relationship between the state and the 
accountancy profession. In a recent literature review study, Chua et al. (2019), 
correctly argued that non-Western studies on accountancy still lack in-depth 
examination of states that are different from the West. Similarly, research that 
investigates the interaction between international standards and local 
practices is scarce (Mennicken, 2008, p. 385).  
In the Arab world, critically inspired accounting research is scant (Gallhofer et 
al., 2011) and studies on the state-accountancy profession relationship are 
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even fewer. In fact, to my knowledge, outside a few historical studies on the 
formation of local accountancy bodies, there are no studies on contemporary 
(regulatory) practices within the state-profession nexus in the Arab world. A 
recent paper was just released on the professionalisation of accounting in Iran 
with different focus (Mihret et al., 2019). However, Iran is not an Arab country. 
This thesis contributes to the lack of studies on the state-accountancy 
profession relationship in the Arab world in general, and the Arabian Gulf 
countries (with their many cultural similarities) in particular.   
10.3. Practical implications 
I could argue that based on my findings, policymakers must consider 
modernising accounting and auditing. Still, I know that accounting carries 
embedded logics that reinforce capital and power structures (Miller, 1990), and 
contemporary audit stimulates specific modes of governance aiming to make 
things auditable (Power, 1997) to benefit the expansion of the accountancy 
profession (Willmott, 1986). Instead, I will focus on audit regulatory “practices”.    
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) in their book (Chapter 11) provided valuable 
recommendations aiming to correct the trajectory of global governance. 
Accordingly, in this section, I will focus on implications that are relevant to 
Kuwaiti policymaking (my case) which I think could be extended to other 
regulated professional fields in Kuwait, and also to countries that follow similar 
“legalist” arrangements. Especially because Kuwait and its regional countries 
started to move toward a neoliberal economic agenda, a system that has been 
theorised to prioritise capital over social welfare and democracy (Bourdieu, 
1998b; Brown, 2015).  
My findings argued for several significant problems within Kuwait’s audit 
regulatory system:  
• Individual-based audit law is problematic and offers an “easy” exit strategy 
for licenced auditors in cases of audit errors. Audit firms (as a concept and 
process)--international and local--do exist, but in the contemporary 
regulatory arrangements, they are not regulated.  
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• The legal responsibility of audit lies on the licenced auditor who signs the 
audit report. However, audit firms are full of expatriates at all managerial 
levels, with no state regulations to govern their practices. This regulatory 
gap also extends to un-licenced Kuwaitis who work in the audit function 
within audit firms. 
• Allowing the accountancy profession (especially representatives from the 
Big 4) to participate in the Ministry of Commerce committees offers them 
an excellent opportunity to enlarge their social capital (with regulators and 
companies) and advance their interests. Section 8.4.1 of this thesis 
elaborated how influential auditors constructed the understanding of 
regulators to advance their interests on their ability to provide advisory 
services. Nonetheless, it is not right that a “few” influential auditors 
represent the “majority” of the profession.  
• It is not logical that auditors occupy the disciplinary system. In the collegial 
relationship environment, technical know-how may never reflect an 
independent opinion.  
• The customised rotation system needs to be fixed to allow other firms to 
acquire knowledge and upset the oligopoly of the “few” powerful auditors 
who represent a few large international audit firms. Similarly, the current 
structure of advisory services needs to be re-evaluated to ensure auditors 
focus on their primary social rule, which is to audit.  
• Joint audit, if enforced properly, offers small firms opportunities to enlarge. 
However, the earlier version of the Kuwaiti Joint Audit (1994-2012) was 
subverted due to a lack of proper regulatory arrangements and oversight. 
In a similar vein, CBK could include more firms in the external audit of 
banks, instead of its reliance on two audit firms, contributing to their 
domination in the audit field.  
• Kuwait satisfies global demands for institutional change by adding different 
(non-independent) agencies to the existing ministerial structure 
specified/organised by the constitution. The expansion of bureaucratic 
agencies in regulating social life is unhealthy. Different ruling groups follow 
strategies to occupy senior positions in these agencies to advance their 
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interests. Especially, new agencies are not under direct accountability to 
the parliament. Such a system intensifies conflict within the bureaucratic 
field, each actor aiming to implement its (private) vision of reality at the cost 
of marginalising the focus on social progress. The regulatory architecture 
should be redefined to reflect public interest infused arrangements. The 
intergovernmental conflict to modernise capital market regulations proves 
that. 
The Kuwait audit regulatory arrangement was designed and implemented for 
a different era. Influential auditors adhere to these regulations because it is the 
perfect law for helping them maintain their symbolic position and resist/reject 
changes that challenge the structure of the audit field. Regulatory reform is 
worthy, but not on global norm terms. Change must consider strengthening 
moral behaviours, equal opportunities, justice, societal welfare, and design an 
audit system that revokes the domination of a “few” influential auditors. 
I think that the government cares about the practices of the accountancy 
profession, as evidenced by attempts of the Ministry of Commerce to include 
auditors to help them in this function as well as reforming auditor practices for 
listed companies. However, they do not know how to do it properly in the 
presence of influential auditors who legitimise the activities of some powerful 
social groups that “help” in ruling and maintaining the order of the broader 
society.  
Outside the audit regulatory space, in Section 5.4.3.2, I explained the 
occupational concerns of my interviewees in state bureaucratic agencies 
about disclosing data to academic interviews. Government agencies are 
encouraged to implement formal procedures for academic interviews to protect 
their staff and researchers. At the end of the day, a public intellectual’s main 
aim is to improve the social system (Cooper, 2005). 
10.4. Limitations 
There are a few limitations in this thesis. I believe the main limitation is one 
embedded within subjective methodology--one salient threat is an 
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epistemological risk by not reflecting the truth of people’s views. However, 
there are a number of measures that I adopted to minimise such risks. For 
example, collecting data from a representative sampling (key actors in the 
regulatory audit space), careful data analysis, and employing (external) 
theoretical lenses to minimise such a threat. Nonetheless, I believe, 
epistemological risk is inescapable in interpretive philosophy.  
Empirically, this thesis focused on the regulatory audit domain and found that 
the relationship between and within influential auditors and some of the ruling 
powers underpinned the regulatory trajectory for modernising local financial 
systems. I believe there are two empirical limitations to this thesis. First, as I 
did not consider the parliamentary enactment of the law of establishing the 
new regulator, I do not know the type of conflict (if any) that surrounded the 
establishment of the new regulator. However, not a single issue related to the 
process of parliamentary enactment of the law on the creation of the new 
regulator came to my attention during my data collection or analysis.  
Second, it would have been valuable if I had extended my research boundaries 
to include locally-owned listed banks and the merchant lobby (the Chamber of 
Commerce) to understand their perception of the broader regulatory 
modernising trajectory. Also, the underpinning logic that guides their 
relationship with the new and old financial regulators might provide an 
interesting subject of study. However, before my data collection phase, I did 
some tentative investigation and found that merchant lobby and local banks 
know little on the dynamics of the audit regulatory struggle, which encouraged 
me to exclude them from my research design (see Section 5.4.2).  
With regard to the financial system of the Kuwaiti context, besides well-
documented studies on Souk Almanakh, I could not find much in the way of 
historical sources that explain the evolution of the financial system in general 
and corporate audit arrangements in particular within the broader social 
context (Altaher et al. (2014) is an exception). A few mainstream studies on 
the Kuwaiti regulatory structure do exist, but they merely touch the surface of 
the complex dynamics of social life. The majority of historical work on the 
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Kuwaiti context is on the evolution of the political system, not the economic 
one.  
Another important limitation, although I tried to extend my research boundaries 
to understand the logic of practice at the level of the Kuwaiti state as well as 
the individual, I am  still constrained by the capital logic (which is reflected in 
this thesis). What I mean is that in this thesis, I did not position myself to 
challenge the logic of audit and/or capital-driven regulations as one of the 
instruments of capitalism (and its advanced form, neoliberalism) to regulate 
social life.  
10.5. Recommendations for future research 
This study found that the implementation of international best practice 
regulatory arrangements as well as micro audit technologies infused struggle 
within some ruling groups. Each influential actor or group of actors used 
strategies to maintain their symbolic domination. As each society has different 
power dynamics, future studies could explore how the implementation of global 
accountancy norms affect the balance of power in societies.  
As many prior studies examined internationally-driven regulatory change in 
corporatist systems (see Section 2.5.2), in this thesis I focused on the “legalist” 
system of Kuwait, future studies may focus on different modes of regulation or 
other societies. On the other hand, as micro internationally driven regulations 
had not been given much consideration in critical accounting in both Western 
and non-Western contexts, future studies may consider examining their 
implementation and implications.   
In Section 2.4, I examined studies on the sociology of the audit profession that 
used Bourdieu’s practice theory. However, one of the salient themes that 
emerged during my analysis of the conflict surrounding firm rotation is the 
multiplicity of visions within the Big 4 (see Section 7.3.1). Interests in firm 
rotation varied depending on the actors’ positions in the audit field. 
Interestingly, however, Bourdieusian sociological studies often group the Big 
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4 as a field without recognising differences in their positions. Accordingly, 
future studies are encouraged to investigate conflict within the Big 4 field.  
Another related area of future research could explore the role of the state in 
the broader accountancy domain. As I demonstrated in Section 2.2.2, the 
accounting literature has been packed with studies that examine the 
corporatist system of the accountancy profession in Western neoliberal 
arrangements. However, unlike the Suddaby et al. (2007) theorisation on the 
importance of the state in advancing global norms to local terrains, the state 
and its power are less appreciated in business research (Kourula et al., 2019) 
especially after transnational activities intensified (Samsonova-Taddei and 
Humphrey, 2014). Similarly, within non-Western contexts, Chua et al. (2019) 
argued that we still do not know much about the state-profession relationship 
in southern systems. Future research is recommended to consider state power 
in their investigations; such research design may contribute to knowledge on 
the role of the state in the organisation of society.  
Nonetheless, global norms such as ranking, transparency, benchmarking, and 
international best practices are not given much consideration in the broad 
(critically-driven) social science literature. This study provides a novel 
perspective on how Kuwait dealt with and incorporated international best 
practices in audit regulations. Still, as these terminologies and concepts are 
used by global actors to govern the global neoliberal space and to construct 
the rationalities of societies (Brown, 2015), the accounting literature does not 
know much about the dynamic of their production and consumption. 
Accordingly, future studies may consider the confrontation of these norms with 
local accountancy settings. 
In Section 2.2.1, I argued that there are few studies that examined regional 
influences on national arrangements of audit practices. The majority of prior 
studies looked into the EU standardisation programme. The Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) has a dedicated organisation that attempts to regulate 
accounting and auditing in GCC members: GCC Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation. Examining this organisation and the mutual influence with their 
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member states might provide some insights to prior studies that examined the 
dynamic of regional influence on the relationship between the state and the 
audit profession.  
At the micro Kuwait level, critically-inspired studies are minimal. Future studies 
are encouraged to adopt a critical perspective to investigate accountancy and 
business-related social problems. Such a perspective is a powerful way to 
discover truth through challenging the systems of taken-for-granted (dogmas). 
Kuwait and many Arab countries are heavily driven by religious beliefs. I did 
not find any links between religion and the struggle to modernise audit 
regulations. Future studies are recommended to investigate the role of the 
Islamic religion on local audit regulations as well as auditors practices.  
Furthermore, there is a lack of studies which examined the history of Kuwait’s 
financial system in general and its audit arrangements in particular. A clear 
correlation in Kuwait exists between oil prices, regional geopolitical tension, 
and political stability. Nonetheless, the history of economic crisis (other than 
Souk Almanakh) is poorly documented. Future studies are recommended to 
consider these issues in addition to other factors (e.g., transnationalism) in 
examining the history of accountancy regulations and professions.  
One of the arguments of this thesis is that merchant groups, auditors, banks, 
and some financial regulators collaborated to confront the new regulator’s 
modernisation agenda. Within the Kuwaiti context, we do not know much about 
the arrangements that guide the relationship between influential auditors and 
business elite groups. For example, the CBK restricts the audit of local banks 
only to the Big 4. However, one bank that is controlled by a member of the 
royal family used to be audited by Ernst and Young and Deloitte. In the last 
few years, Ernst and Young was replaced by RSM (a non-Big 4 firm). Why is 
that? Do financial regulators regulate local corporations unequally? Are 
international audit firms categorised by their loyalty to local influential social 
groups? We do not know much about the relationship between international 
audit firms and the ruling classes within countries. 
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Finally, Hammond et al. (2017) emphasised focusing on the implications of the 
conflict for power in future studies. In critical studies, implications of struggle 
are often very challenging to capture. That is why, I believe, many prior studies 
focused on the battle for power and often did not extend their research to 
include what happens next or explicitly discuss the implications of conflicts. I 
found, in Kuwait, to maintain local order between elite social groups, the 
outcome of the regulatory struggle to modernise regulations incorporated 
factors of deception. I support the recommendations of Hammond et al. (2017) 
to consider the implications of the struggle for power in future studies.  
10.6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter aimed to close this thesis by providing its aim and objectives, 
contribution, practical implications, limitation, and recommendations for future 
studies. This study provided a novel approach and insight on the application 
of global norms to audit regulations in Kuwait, a country distant from the culture 
of global norm producers. My investigation enhances our understanding of 
many un-discovered themes in the accountancy domain. 
This study aimed to investigate how and why Kuwait modernised its capital 
market audit regulations. The investigation of the application of modernity is a 
complex field of inquiry. It demands a thorough understanding of issues from 
global (direct and indirect) interference, the dynamic of power within a state, 
to the operation of a field (audit in my case), and then to the practices of 
individuals who dominate a field.  
I argued that this thesis made three contributions to shortages in prior studies. 
First, to prior studies that examined internationally driven regulatory change 
(Alon et al., 2019; Canning and O’Dwyer, 2013, 2016; Caramanis et al., 2015; 
Hazgui and Gendron, 2015; Malsch and Gendron, 2011), by theorising the 
unique Kuwaiti context and its different mode of regulations. Second, my thesis 
advanced the idea of questioning the process of implementing international 
best practice micro audit technologies. Third, communicating contemporary 
issues on the relationship between the Kuwaiti state and the audit profession 
in a non-Western context.  
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The literature assumes that international organisations influence changes to 
indigenous traditions either directly through structural conditions on capital, or 
indirectly through published reporting and recommendations. However, in the 
beginning of my introduction chapter, I considered the coercive and non-
coercive power of IOs as direct, and argued that the indirect involvement of 
international forces in the national space is more complicated.  
The global space is neoliberally governed through the collaboration of different 
international players. It started with the support of global hegemonic states to 
empowering the IOs to re-constitute its neoliberal (cultural) vision on the global 
economic space (Arnold, 2012; Halliday and Carruthers, 2009). Various 
international players arose to support such a hegemonic trajectory and form 
different layers of pressure for the cultural transformation of countries.  
In this thesis, we saw how Kuwait was trapped into following the global 
neoliberal path. Starting from exogenous (indirect) pressure, the way the 
global space is neoliberally designed and governed through rating, ranking, 
and “international best practices”, to the (direct) interference of IOs through 
constructing the rationality of the society to align to their designed international 
architecture, maintained by supportive international players.  
We saw how capital market ranking agencies (international payers) 
conditioned countries to become members of prestigious international clubs, 
such as IOSCO. The benchmark in financial practices is often the US. 
Accordingly, for a country to be able to admitted to IOSCO, it is conditioned to 
adopt certain governance practices at the regulatory level, for listed companies 
as well as auditors. Other ranking agencies condition ranking promotion of a 
certain level of liquidity within the capital market to stimulate national 
financialisation. To achieve this requirement, countries either prioritise 
attracting foreign and/or local monies for listing or to intensify national 
privatisation programmes.  
What we saw in the Kuwaiti case is that when global interference reached a 
point that affected the order and symbolic positions of dominant actors within 
a society, things begin to take an internal conflict course. Influential actors use 
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all the means at their disposal to maintain their symbolic position in the broader 
social space and the fields that they dominate. Deceiving global demands 
through symbolic compliance is often the easiest way (Halliday and 
Carruthers, 2009). The way the global space is governed offers countries 
opportunities to engage in malpractice. Manipulation of rules to protect one's 
interests in maintaining or accumulating economic and symbolic capitals, 
especially if they are imposed by the government and then the same 
government authorises the misuse, could extend the self-interest defiance 
practices to society and could become a norm that threatens the morality of 
the society, intensifies cultural contradictions, and possibly, leads to 
corruption.   
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Do you think the implementation of CGCs are important? 
Why? 
How does the implementation of CGCs benefit external 
auditors? 
How does implementing CGCs affect the audit market? 
Audit market 
How do you define the relationship between audit firms? 
What type of conflict may occur between audit firms? 
What do you think about the practices of non-Big 4 firms? 




What do you think about the laws and regulations of 
external audit in Kuwait? What are the issues that need to 
be improved? 
How do you define the relationship between large audit 
firms and state financial regulators? 
Does the accountancy association have a role in 
regulating corporate audit? How and why? 
Why did regulators stop joint audit requirements? 
Why do auditors not present “letters of representation” to 
the shareholders in the general assembly meetings?76 
Audit 
independence 
What is audit independence? 
How, internally, do audit firms measure and promote 
auditor independence? 
Does providing advisory services affect auditor 
independence? How and why? 
Do you think rotation is the right solution to promoting 
independence? How and why? 
Is it true that banks are trying to stop/resist the 
implementation of audit rotation? How and why? 
 
76 I understand the “letter of representation” as an official letter signed by an auditee (legal 
representative) at the end of the engagement to show “good intention” in critical issues raised 
by external auditors. This letter, arguably, has a substantial legal power that protects auditors 
in case of conflicts. To my knowledge, although this issue is beyond the aim of this research, 














Appendix 2: Interview protocol 
General 
theme 1 






























1 What are the differences within the Big 4 and large non-Big 4 firms?  
2 How does a firm become a famous audit firm in Kuwait?  
3 Who do you think will dominate the audit field in Kuwait in ten years? Why? 
4 How could your audit firm control/influence the audit market in Kuwait? Is brand name important? Why?  
5 












































Given the repeated financial crises around the world, why do you think there has been no major change 
to audit law since 1981? 
7 What are the audit regulations that need to be changed? How could change happen? 
8 
Do you think it is important for the audit profession to be regulated by the government? Why is there no 
powerful accountancy body with independent authority? Why does the Ministry of Commerce indirectly 
empower the accounting association and companies to participate in regulating the audit profession? 
9 
Why does each financial regulator have different regulatory requirements (e.g., registration, rotation, 
advisory services, disciplinary proceedings)? Why do some regulators (not all) not regulate audit firms as a 
single entity? 
10 
Why does each financial regulator require audit firms to register with them? Do you think there are 
tensions/conflicts between regulators that regulate audit? Why and how?  
11 Who has a big say with regard to audit regulations in Kuwait? Why? 
12 
Large audit firms are auditing financial regulators (CBK and CMA) and at the same time, these financial 















In the West, after many years of implementing compulsory partner rotation, recently, there are 
higher demands for firms’ rotation as a superior way to enhance audit independence and quality 
 
Do you think it is 
important to 
implement 
rotation at the firm 
level in Kuwait? 
Why? How will it 









the work of large 
audit firms? Do you 
think it is important 
to implement 
rotation at the firm 
level in Kuwait? 
Why? How it will 




implement it? Who 
will resist 
implementation? 






Do you think it is 
important to 
implement rotation 
at the firm level in 
Kuwait? Why it is 
not implemented? 
How it will affect 
the audit market 
and profession? 





How will Regulator 
3’s rotation 
requirement affect 
the work of large 
audit firms? Do you 
think it is important 
to implement 
rotation at the firm 
level in Kuwait? 
Why? How it will 





How can resistance 
be avoided? 
Do you think it is 
important to 
implement 
rotation at the firm 
level in Kuwait? 
Why? How it will 









The majority of capital markets around the world are adopting US-SOX prohibition of non-audit 
services (NAS) at the firm level. On the adapted prohibition of NAS in Kuwait (the Ministry of 
Commerce prohibit non-accounting and some accounting services at signatory level, CBK 





Do you think 
Kuwait should 
follow the US 
prohibition of 
NAS’s at the 
firm level in 
Kuwait? Why? 
How could it 
affect the audit 
market? 
Do you think 
Kuwait should 
follow the US 
prohibition of NAS 
at the firm level in 
Kuwait? Why? 
How could it affect 
the audit market? 
How will Regulator 
1’s prohibition on 
authorised 
signatory affect  
audit work? 
Do you think 
Kuwait should 
follow the US 
prohibition of NAS 
at the firm level in 
Kuwait? Why? How 
could it  affect the 
audit market? Why 
are audit firms 
allowed to provide 
most types of 
accounting NAS to 
their clients?   
Do you think 
Kuwait should 
follow the US 
prohibition of NAS 
at the firm level in 
Kuwait? Why? 
How could it affect 
the audit market? 
Why are audit 
firms  allowed to 
provide non-
accounting NAS to 
their clients?   
Do you think Kuwait 
should follow the US 
prohibition of NAS at 
the firm level in 
Kuwait? Why? How 
could it affect the 
audit market? What 
do you think about 
the different 
prohibitions of NAS 







One of the main purposes of audit firms’ registration with the capital market regulator(s) is so 










large firms’ audit 











could affect the 
audit market? 
Why?  





large firms’ audit 
quality? Why is 















could affect the 
audit market? 
Why? 





large firms’ audit 
quality? Why are 
Regulators 1, 2, 
and 3 not 
performing 
inspections? Do 
you think the 
outcome of 
inspections, such 






could affect the 
audit market? 
Why?  




inspections of large 
firms’ audit quality? 
Why does 
Regulator 3 not 
participate/perform 
inspections? Do 





and disclosure of 
inspection reports, 
is something that 
could affect the 
audit market? 
Why? 
Do you think it is 
important for 
regulators to perform 
inspections of large 
firms’ audit quality? 
Why are financial 
regulators not 
performing 
inspections? Do you 
think the KAAA 
proposal for the 
Ministry of Commerce 
to be responsible for 
inspections will be 
effective for large audit 
firms? Do you think 
the outcome of 
inspections, such as 
disclosure of 
disciplinary actions 
and inspection reports 
is something that 
could affect the audit 
market? Why? 
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In Bahrain since 2011, corporate governance regulation requires companies to disclose 
audit and non-audit fees. Do you think it is a good idea to disclose such fees? If, for example, a 
regulator wants to apply this disclosure requirement to all listed companies, how could they 
achieve this? How will it affect the audit market? Whose blessing is required? 




Despite having a different business/legal culture from the West, why do our financial 
regulators follow Western structures of audit regulation? (Registration, rotation, NAS, 
management responsibility of accounts) but NOT with regard to disclosure of audit operations 
(i.e., audited clients’ NAS fees, engagement partners names, disciplinary actions, etc.)     
18 
Western research evidenced that IASB and IFAC are dominated by large corporations and 
Western Big 4 to advance their interests. Do you think we need our own accounting and 
auditing standards? Or customised standards? 
 




Appendix 3: Provisions of audit laws prior to 1981  
 
Prepared and translated by the researcher. 
Arabic source: (Eastern Laws Network, 2017a, 2017b)  
 
 
Law (6) of 1962 (22/4/1962) 
 
Law (3) of 1965 (7/3/1965) 
Amendments to Law (6) of 1962 
 
Conditions for registration as a 
statutory auditor with the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy: 
 
- Obtaining a degree in 
commerce,  economy, or finance 
equivalent to a university 
degree, conditional to covering 
accounting subjects 
Changed membership in 
associations to requiring registration 
to “Kuwaitis”. Nonetheless, the 
Minister of Commerce can accept 
registering non-Kuwaitis for five 
years, “renewable”.  - Membership in an accounting 
and auditing association 
approved by the Minister of 
Finance and Economy or three 
years of experience post-
university degree in: 
 - Accounts audit in an audit 
firm 
  
 - Accounting or auditing 
function in public or private 
companies 
Empowers the deputy Commerce 
Minister to deal with violation of this 
law by referring violators for 





Shifting the responsibility of 
enforcing the audit practice law from 
the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy to the Ministry of 
Commerce. 
 - Accounting or auditing 
function in government 
agencies 
 - Teaching accounting topics in 
a business college or high 
school 
 - Practicing audit in an audit 
firm before the enactment of 
this law 
 
- To be resident in Kuwait 
- Full civil and legal capacity (e.g., 
no convictions for honesty or 
integrity … etc.) 





Appendix 4: English version of Kuwait Audit Law of 1981  
 
Decree Law No. (5) Of 1981 concerning the Practice of the Auditing 
Profession 
 
- Having reviewed the Amiri Decree issued on 4th Ramadan, 1396 H, 
corresponding to 29th August, 1976 to review the Constitution, and 
- Amiri Decree issued on 14th Shawwal, 1400 H, corresponding to 24th 
August, 1980, and 
- Article 16 of the Constitution, and 
- Law No. (6) of 1962 concerning the practice of Auditing, amended by Law 
No. (3) of 1965, and 
- Based on the presentation of the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and the 
approval of the Council of Ministers. 
 
We have issued the following law: 
 
Chapter One 
Auditors’ Register and Conditions and Procedures for 
Registration therein 
Article (1) 
No person may be engaged in the practice of auditing unless enrolled in the 
register of auditors with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Article (2) 
Those who are registered in the auditors’ register must fulfill the following 
conditions: 
1. Be a natural person. 
2. Hold a bachelor’s degree in accounting from Kuwait University, or an 
equivalent university or higher institute considered as such by the Minister of 
Education. The auditor must also be a member of an association of 
accountants accredited by the Minister of Commerce and Industry had been 
issued. 
3. Auditors of banks, insurance companies, and financial companies must 
have a minimum of seven years of experience after obtaining the academic 
qualification, while other auditors must have five years experience. 
The above-mentioned years of experience should be in one of the following 
fields: 
a) Auditing accounts in a certified auditing office firm, 
b) Practicing accounting or auditing accounts of companies, institutions, 
or public or private authorities. 
c) Practicing accounting, or monitoring auditing at any Ministry. 
4. Be a Kuwaiti national with a full civil capacity, and not less than 25 years 
old. 
5. Be a reputable person, and not sentenced to a felony, or a crime that violates 
honor and honesty, or be sentenced to disciplinary action for violation of the 
profession’s honour, unless he has been rehabilitated, or if three years have 
elapsed since the date of his final conviction for the disciplinary offense. 
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6. Pass the auditorship exam, as determined by the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry with regard to the exam’s materials, rules, procedures, place and 
timing. 
Article (3) 
All persons listed in the auditors’ register with the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry shall submit the documents proving that the registration’s conditions 
as provided in the previous article have been fulfilled, except for the conditions 
stipulated in items 3, 4, and 6 of the previous Article. These documents must 
be submitted within a period not exceeding six months from the effective date 
hereof, to consider their registration in the mentioned register in accordance 
with the provisions of this Law; otherwise, this registration shall be considered 
as void. 
Article (4) 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of this Law, if the audit firm 
consists of more than one auditor listed in the Register, one of them must be 
Kuwaiti and each of them shall sign the work done by them individually. 
Article (5) 
Non-Kuwaitis enrolled in the register of auditors shall be subject to a temporary 
registration of three years from the said date. A decree by the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry may renew this period once, for a period not 
exceeding two years. 
Article (6) 
The registration application shall be submitted to the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry. It shall be presented to a committee formed under the 
chairmanship of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
or his representative, in addition to the membership of two specialists in the 
auditing profession nominated by the Kuwait Accountants Association. They 
shall be appointed by a decree from the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
for two renewable years. 
A file containing the following information and documents shall be attached to 
the registration application: 
a) Applicant’s name, surname, nationality, residence, and date of 
submitting the application. 
b) Certificates of academic qualification or their relevant official 
certificates, and the dates of obtaining them. 
c) Names of the associations of accountants to which he belongs, and 
the date of his membership. 
d) Birth certificate, or an official extract thereof. 
e) A certificate of previous experience. 
f) A certificate indicating a clear criminal record from relevant authorities 
in the State of Kuwait. 
These data are recorded in a special record. 
 
The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is entitled to 
request any other documents from the applicant. 
Article (7) 
The application shall be decided on within three months of the date of 
submission thereof. If the applicant is required to submit additional 
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information/documents, the said period shall then start from the date of 
submitting the required information or documents. 
Article (8) 
The applicant shall be notified of the issued decision of acceptance or rejection 
within 15 days as of the date of issuance through a letter with 
acknowledgement of receipt. 
Article (9) 
The auditor registered in the auditors’ register shall swear an oath to perform 
his duties with honesty and honour, respect the principles of the profession, 
not to conceal the truth from those to whom it may concern, not to disclose the 
confidences of his clients or any information entrusted to him by virtue of his 
work, and to abide by the code of ethics governing the profession. The oath 
shall be taken before the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry or whoever acts in his place. The auditor then signs a related 
document. 
The auditor shall not proceed before swearing an oath. 
Article (10) 
The name of the auditor whose application is accepted--after swearing an 
oath--shall be recorded in the auditors’ register, in accordance with the 
precedence of the approval of entry. 
A statement of the period of registration and the rules and conditions for its 
renewal shall be issued by the Minister of Commerce and Industry.  
Chapter Two 
Rights and Duties of an Auditor 
Article (11) 
The auditor may obtain a certificate of registration in the auditors’ register, 
showing his name, head office address, date of registration, and the 
registration number. 
Article (12) 
The registered auditor shall review the accounts of individuals, companies, and 
authorities in accordance with the technical accounting rules and the rules of 
honour of the profession, which are stated in a resolution issued by the Minister 
of Commerce and Industry and based on the recommendations of the 
Permanent Technical Committee for Establishing Accounting Rules. This 
committee is formed for such purpose by a resolution issued by the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry. 
Article (13) 
The auditor shall associate his name with his registration number in all the 
letters, certificates, budgets, and reports he signs. 
Article (14) 
The person enrolled in the register of auditors shall notify the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry with his office address within 30 days of the date of 
registration, and within 15 days of the date of change in case of any changes 
therein. 
Article (15) 
Each auditor, appointed in such manner in a company, shall notify the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry through a letter with acknowledgement of receipt 
within eight days of the date of his appointment. 
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Article (16) 
The auditor shall designate a file for each company he audits, in which he 
keeps all the documents, copies and correspondence letters he releases to 
the company throughout the duration of his auditing. 
The auditor shall list, in a record, all his work for each company, including the 
date of performing each work, time taken to complete each work, and the 
names of his assistants or experts whom he hired along with a description of 
what each one of them did. 
The auditor--even after quitting his job--must keep these files and records for 
ten years as of the date of last entry. 
Article (17) 
The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry may request 
the auditor to submit a report accompanied with supporting documents on the 
joint stock companies that he audits. 
The Undersecretary is entitled to make remarks to the auditor concerning this 
report. 
Article (18) 
The auditor of a joint stock company is not entitled to be the chairman of the 
company’s board of directors, a delegate member, a member of its board of 
directors, or an employee therein. 
Article (19) 
The auditor of the company must not be: 
a) A partner in the company, or performing any administrative work 
therein; 
b) A partner or an employee in any of those mentioned in Article(18) or 
in the preceding paragraph. 
c) A relative to the fourth degree of those entrusted with the company’s 
management or accounts. 
Article (20) 
The auditor must not practice any other profession that includes a conflict of 
interest with auditing, particularly the following: 
a) Consultation services not relating to accounting. 
b) Promotion services for the establishment of companies. 
c) Maintaining accounts, and preparing closing accounts and balance 
sheets. 
d) Promoting his office, or seeking employment through breaching of 





The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry may refer the 
auditor to the Disciplinary Committee if he is charged with violating the 
provisions of this law, or the disciplines of the profession, negligence, an act 
of dishonour and dishonesty, or breaching one of the conditions stipulated in 
this law. 
If the Undersecretary of the Ministry finds out that the incident attributed to the 
auditor is a criminal offense, he shall refer the case to the Public Prosecution. 
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Article (22) 
The disciplinary action shall be filed by a decree from the Undersecretary of 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to the committee referred to in Article 
(6), provided that it is held under the chairmanship of the Assistant 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, who is appointed 
by a decree from the Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
The Committee shall adjudicate in the disciplinary action after informing the 
accused auditor to attend at least 15 days prior to the scheduled date of the 
hearing. Notifying the auditor shall be through a letter with acknowledgement 
of receipt, indicating the charge against him, the date, and place of the hearing. 
If the accused does not attend, despite the announcement, he may be 
sentenced in absence. 
Article (23) 
The disciplinary penalties that may be inflicted upon the auditor are: 
a) Warning. 
b) Suspension from practicing the profession for a period not exceeding three 
years. 
c) Striking the name from the registry of auditors. 
Article (24) 
If the auditor is sentenced to the penalty of suspension from the profession, 
the chairman of the Disciplinary Committee shall notify the companies he 
works for. 
If the company does not have another auditor and the date of the General 
Assembly meeting has not yet taken place, the Company may issue an order 
from the President of the Supreme Court to appoint an auditor from the registry 
instead of the suspended auditor. 
The suspended auditor shall not re-commence the company’s business after 
the end of the suspension period, until the General Assembly approves the 
company's accounts, unless the company has dispensed with his services. 
Article (25) 
The chairman of the Disciplinary Committee shall notify the relevant 
department in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of any disciplinary 
decisions it issues. 
The mentioned department shall record these decisions in a special register. 
Article (26) 
The auditor may not request to be re-registered in the Registry before five 
years from the date of his disciplinary dismissal. 
The auditor shall, once suspended or his name is stricken, return to the 
company its documents. 
Article (27) 
The auditor may appeal against the decision of the Disciplinary Committee 
within one month from the date of issuance, if it was issued in his presence, or 
from the date of notification through a letter with acknowledgement of receipt, 
if it is issued in his absence. 
The complaint shall be submitted to the Minister of Commerce and Industry in 
a letter with acknowledgment of receipt. 
If the appeal is filed on time, the decision shall be suspended until it is finally 
arbitrated from the Disciplinary Appeal Committee.  
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Article (28) 
The Disciplinary Appeal Committee shall be formed by a decree from the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry for one year, as follows: 
1. A Counselor from the Supreme Court of Appeal appointed by the Minister 
of Justice as President. 
2. Two members chosen by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, provided 
that they are not members in the Disciplinary Committee that issued the 
decision on which the complaint was filed. 
Article (29) 
The Disciplinary Appeal Committee may support, reduce, or cancel the 
sentence. 
Article (30) 
The final decision of the Disciplinary Committee shall be published in the 
Official Gazette. 
Article (31) 
The auditor may not be punished for any offense after five years has elapsed. 
Article (32) 
Without prejudice to any more severe penalty stipulated by another law, a 
penalty of not less than one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding 
1,000 dinars shall be imposed on the following: 
a) Any person who has been engaged in auditing without his name being 
registered in the registry of auditors. 
b) Any person who exercised auditing after suspension from practicing the 
profession or being stricken from the registry. 
c) Any person who is not listed in the registry or whose name is stricken who 
uses bulletins that may mislead the public that he has the right to practice the 
profession of auditing. 
d) Any person who obtains a registration in the registry of auditors by giving 
incorrect data or by submitting certificates that are not in conformity with reality. 
In all cases, the court shall order the deletion of the name from the registry and 
closure of the firm. It shall order the publication of the sentence three times in 
the Official Gazette at the expense of the sentenced person. 
The penalty shall be doubled if the felony is repeated within five years from the 
date of the previous sentence. 
Article (33) 
Every person who has been required to testify before the Disciplinary 
Committee and has declined without an acceptable excuse shall be sentenced 
to a fine not exceeding 100 dinars. 
Article (34) 
The Undersecretary of Commerce and Industry is entitled to issue a decree to 
temporarily suspend the auditor from practicing the profession, once a criminal 
action has been instituted upon him in relation to auditing or the conditions of 










A fee of 100 dinars shall be paid upon submission of the application for 
registration in the register. This fee is not refundable in any case. 
Article (36) 
The provisions of this law shall not apply to auditors working in the government 
and public institutions and authorities. 
Article (37) 
The Minister of Commerce and Industry shall issue the necessary resolutions 
to implement this Law. 
Article (38) 
Law No. (6) of 1962 concerning the practice of Auditing profession shall be 
repealed. 
Article (39) 
This law shall be implemented by the Ministers each in the area of his concern 
and shall be effective on the date of publication in the Official Gazette. 
 
 




Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah 
 
Minister of Trade and Industry  
Abdul Wahab Yousef Al-Nafisi 
 
Issued at the Seif Palace on: 11th Rabi' al-awwal, 1401 H Corresponding to: 
17th January, 1981 
 








Appendix 5: Analytical Map of the findings 
 
Observations  Sub-themes  Overarching themes  
Research 
Question 
       
- Limited competent firms to audit 
banks 
- The support of banks to resist 
rotation 
- Shifting the regulations of 
investment companies to the new 
regulator (CBK became focused on 
banks, CMA extended its authority) 
- CBK requirements for banking 
audit do not “directly” contradict 
MoC laws 













































     
- Used auditors to back its leading 
regulatory position 
- Arguments that CMA contradicts 
the audit law 
- Ministry of Commerce has 
governed regulatory practices 
longer 







     
- New regulator claims registration 
power 
- Required registered auditors to pay 
periodic fees (legitimises CMA 
activities) 
- Fines from disciplinary 
proceedings (gave CMA superior 
regulatory power) 
- Superiority practices with other 
regulators 
- Demands to amend various laws to 
be congruent with practices of 
CMA 
- Shifting the regulations of 
investment companies to the new 







of other state 
regulators 
  
      
      
- Fight over registration power 
- Required registered auditors to pay 
periodic fees (legitimises CMA 
activities)  
- Shifting the regulations of 
investment companies to the new 
regulator (extended CMA authority)  
- Attempts to take over banking 















- Pressuring banks to accept CMA 
audit regulations  
- Hierarchy of registration 
(superiority practices between 
regulators, classifications within 



















    
- Attractive pay scale  
- Attracting CBK staff (weakening 
CBK cultural power)  
- Timing of establishing CMA  
- CMA centralises recruitment 
decisions  







     
- CMA pressures to amend existing 
laws  
- Superiority practices between 
regulators (having the final 
decision on fit and proper)  
- Hierarchy of registration 
(bureaucratic power argued to be 





     
- Imposing compulsory best 
practices corporate governance  
- Companies resisted associated 
costs and independence 
requirements  
- CMA pressure to amend existing 
laws  








     
- Appointment of autocratic 
leadership  
- Prosecuting CBK governor 
- Message to opponents on 
seriousness of change  









       
 
Observation  Sub-themes  Overarching themes  
Research 
question 
       
- Limiting number of clients per 
audit manager  
- Kuwaitisation (few support, 
majority resist)  
- Firms do not legally exist 
(majority support, few resist)  






















changes to      
 349 
- Design of audit regulations 
taken away from auditors  
- Contradiction with existing laws  
- Using accountancy body to 
represent collective lobby  
- Refusing to register with the 
new regulator  
- Some used collective power to 
advance their private interests  
- Collective proposal on 










      
Observation  Sub-themes  Overarching themes  
Research 
question 
       
- Collective proposal on 
alternative solutions  
- Firms do not legally exist  
- Changing the logic of 
regulations from firm based to 
individuals  
- Changing rotation from firm 
based to individual based  
- Reduced requirements of 
number of clients  


































     
- Modern regulatory practices  
- Listening to auditor opinions 







     
- Applicable to audit law  
- CMA customization used to 
influence CBK rotation plans  
- Not related to independence  
- Deception  
- Maintain status-quo  
- Big 4 claim to have proper 
internal policies for rotation  
- Firms help CMA show the 
implementation of partner 
rotation 
- Harm resistance against 
customized rotation  
- Capital market broad reform 







     
- Audit law is unfair  
- Forming Ministry of Commerce 
rationality to link advisory to 
technical independence and 







- Separate legal vehicle (within 
firms) to provide advisory  
- CMA prohibited individual 
registered auditor from 
providing advisory (not firm)  
- Firm decides what type of 
advisory could be provided to 
audit client  
- Old disputes with CBK about 
“accounting nature” services  
 
 
      
Observation  Sub-themes  Overarching themes  
Research 
question 
       
- Limited authorities to govern 
auditors 
- Impractical for companies 
administrative requirements  
- MC broad responsibilities 
(beyond audit)  





















     
- Limited authority to govern 
auditors 
- State carelessness to regulate 
audit (no tax)  
- Parliamentary issues to change 
audit law  
- Auditors resist law reform  
 
Old Audit Law 
  
     
- Involvement of certain auditors 
in regulating audit through MoC 
steering committee  
- Earn MoC trust though various 
initiatives to develop audit 
practices 
- Advance symbolic interests of 
specific auditors (pressure 
MoC to inspect small firms)  
- Form MoC understanding on 






      
- Reinvent the wheel argument 
- International pressure to 
correct local arrangements  
- Potential solutions to 
government ineffectiveness  
- Jealousy between regional 
countries 
- Attract foreign money  




















Appendix 6: Selection of salient CMA audit regulation requirements 
 
  CMA Resolution 
 
(8)/2011 (24)/2012 (Part of bylaw)/2015 (58)/2019 
Registration with CMA ? ? ? ? 
Application fee, registration 
fee, and renewal fees ? ? ? ? 
Requirements for registering licensed auditor 
Ministry of Commerce 
registration category A A A A 
Experience 
10 years in auditing 
shareholding 
companies as a 
licensed auditor 
5 years in auditing 
shareholding 
companies as a 
licensed auditor 
5 years audit 
experience as a 
licensed auditor 
5 years audit 
experience as a 
licensed auditor 
Not convicted of audit errors 
or violations ? ? ? ? 
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Audit firm requirement 
No less than 5 full-time 
auditors and one of them 
is a professional partner 
? ? ? ? 
Team experience 
60% of the audit team 
have  audit 
experience of 10 
years after obtaining 
US CPA 
35% of the audit team 
have audit experience of 
5 years after obtaining 
professional certification 
33% of the audit team 
have audit experience 
of 5 years and a 
bachelor’s degree in 
accounting 
33% of the audit 
team have audit 
experience of 5 




No less than 25% of 
the audit team within 
a year, increasing 
10% yearly until it 
reaches 50% 
No less than 15% of the 
audit team within a year, 
reaching 25% in 5 years 
from registration and no 
less than 50% in 10 
years 
No less than 15% of 
the audit team within 3 
years, reaching 30% in 
6 years from 
registration and no less 




No less that 15%  
 
 
Number of clients 
-Head of an audit 
team with a minimum 
experience of 10 
years must not have 
more than 10 clients 
-Head of an audit team 
with a minimum 
experience of 7 years 
must not have more 
than 10 clients 
-Same (but conditioned 
on companies with 
capital of more than 3 




auditors to apply 
IFAC International 
Standard on Quality 
Control no. 1 
 
-Head of an audit 
team with a minimum 
experience of 5 years 
must not have more 
than 7 clients 
-Head of an audit team 
with a minimum 
experience of 5 years 
must not have more 
than 7 clients 
-Same (but conditioned 
on companies with 
capital of more than 3 
million Kuwaiti dinars 
(US$10 million) 
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Audit independence requirements 
Separation of teams 
If the audit firm has a 
license for advisory 
services, there should be a 
complete separation 
between audit and advisory 
teams 
Same Same Same 
Full prohibition on non-
audit services 
Not to provide any 
additional services to the 
company other than those 
required for an audit. It is 
forbidden to provide 
services that affect audit 
independence like advisory 
services and internal audit 
during the engagement 
Same Same Same 
Audit rotation 
 
The audit firm is appointed 
every year, renewable for a 
maximum of 4 consecutive 
years with a cooling off 
period of no less than 2 
years. 
The registered auditor 
is appointed every year, 
renewable for a 
maximum of 4 
consecutive years. 
Then it is permissible 
for her/his partner to 
continue for the same 
periods. 
The registered auditor is 
appointed every year, 
renewable for a 
maximum of 4 
consecutive years with a 
cooling off period of no 
less than 2 years. 
Same 
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CMA oversight authority 
CMA has the power to inspect 
the audit work ? ? ? ? 
CMA head can, with cause, 
stop a registered auditor from 
work or cancel her/his 
registration if in violation of 
some articles in this 
regulations or if her/his licence 
got revoked by the Ministry of 
Commerce 
? ? ? ? 
 
Prepared by the researcher 
